UNITEDSTATESPOSTALSERVICEetal.v.KONAN certiorarito theunitedstatescourt ofappealsfor thefthcircuit No.24–351.

ArguedOctober8,2025—DecidedFebruary24,2026 RespondentLebeneKonanandthelocalpostofficeinEuless,Texas,had anextendeddisputeconcerningmaildeliverytotworentalproperties ownedbyKonan.

Konanallegedthat,amongotherthings,United StatesPostalServiceemployeesintentionallywithheldhermailand interferedwithitsdelivery.

Afteradministrativecomplaintsproved unsuccessful,KonansuedtheUnitedStatesinfederalcourt,bringing variousstate-lawtortclaimsallegingthattheUnitedStatesPostal Serviceintentionallyandwrongfullywithheldhermail.

TheDistrict Court dismissed Konan’s complaint pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act’s postalexception, underwhich theUnited Statesretains sovereign immunity for all claims “arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter,” 28 U. S. C. §2680(b). The Dis- trict Court concluded that the United States enjoys sovereign immunity fromKonan’sclaimsbecausetheyallrelatetopersonalorfinancial harmsarisingfromnondeliveryofmail.

TheDistrictCourtfurther heldthatthepostalexceptionisnotlimitedtomerelynegligentfailure toproperlycarrythemail.

TheFifthCircuitreversed,holdingthat theterms“loss,”“miscarriage,”and“negligenttransmission”donot encompasstheintentionalactofnotdeliveringthemailatall.

Incon- trast,theFirstandSecondCircuitshaveinterpretedthepostalexcep- tion to applyto suits even whenthey arise from harms causedby inten- tionalmisconduct.

TheCourtgrantedcertioraritoresolvethesplit.

Held: The United States retains sovereign immunity for claims arising out oftheintentionalnondeliveryofmailbecauseboth“miscarriage”and “loss” of mail under the FTCA’s postal exception can occur as a result of the Postal Service’s intentional failure to deliver the mail. Pp. 398–406.

(a)The postal exception reflects Congress’s judgment that redress for “harms”of“thesortprimarilyidentifiedwiththePostalService’sfunc- tion of transporting mail throughout the United States” should not come frompotentiallyburdensometortsuits.

Dolanv.PostalService,546 U. S.481,489.

P.398.

(b)Both“miscarriage”and“loss”ofmailunderthepostalexception can occur as a result of the Postal Service’s intentional failure to deliver themail.

Pp.399–404 Page Proof Pending Publication POSTALSERVICEv.KONAN (1)TheCourt interpretsstatutoryterms accordingto theordinary meaningstheyhadwhentheywereenacted.

WisconsinCentralLtd.

v. United States, 585 U. S. 274, 277.

When Congress enacted the FTCA in1946,the“miscarriage”ofmailordinarilyincludedanyfailureofmail toproperlyarriveatitsintendeddestination.

Dictionariespublished aroundthattimeconfirmthata“miscarriage”ofmailhappenedwhen mail failed to arrive at its destination.

The Court declines to limit “mis- carriage”tonegligentfailures,asnodictionariescitedimposethislimi- tation,andordinaryspeakersused“miscarriage”torefertoproblems withmailcausedbyintentionalmisconduct,suchaswhenmailwassto- lenorburned.

TheCourtalsodeclinestolimit“miscarriage”towhen mailgoestothewrongaddress,asspeakersusedthetermwhenmail failedtoreachitsintendeddestinationregardlessofwherethemail endedup,includingwhenmailwasdelayed,cametoolate,orwasleft inthepostoffice.

Pp.399–401.

(2)When Congress enacted the FTCA, the “loss” of mail ordinarily meantadeprivationofmail,regardlessofhowthedeprivationwas broughtabout.

Contemporarydictionariesdefined“loss”astheactor factoflosingorsufferingdeprivation,andonecansufferadeprivation ofsomethingwhenanotherintentionallykeepsthatthingforhimself. Konanallegedthatshewasentitledtopossessionofhermailbutthat thePostalServiceconvertedit,meaningshewas“deprivedoftheuse andpossessionoftheproperty,”Black’sLawDictionary421,soher claimsariseoutofthelossofhermail.

TheCourtdisagreeswiththe attempt byKonan to limit “loss”to only inadvertent losses. Aloss can betheresultofanotherperson’sintentionalmisconduct,andordinary speakers commonly described a “loss” of mail from theft, including theft bythecarrier.

TheCourtalsodisagreeswiththeargumentthatthe postalexceptionappliesonlywhenthePostalServicelostthemail,be- causeCongressappliedthepostalexceptiontoall“claim[s]arisingout oftheloss,miscarriage,ornegligenttransmission”ofmail,describing kindsofharms,notkindsofactionsbythepostalworkers.

Thisinter- pretationisconsistentwiththeprincipalprovisionoftheFTCA,which includeslossescausedbyintentionalmisconductanddoesnotrequire thattheGovernmentlostanything.

TheCourtrejectsKonan’spro- posaltolimit“loss”toonly“destruction.”

Ordinaryspeakersreferred to lossesof maileven when themail wasnot destroyed, andthe diction- ary definitionsKonan pointedto werelisted firstbecause theywere the oldest,notbecausetheywereprimary.

Pp.401–404.

(c)TheCourtrejectsKonan’sremainingargumentsthatherclaims mustnotbebarredbythepostalexception.

Pp.404–406.

Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:607U. S.391(2026) (1)Konanarguesthatthepostalexception’s“negligenttransmis- sion”categorynarrowsthemeaningof“miscarriage”and“loss,”but Congressintentionallylimitedthe“negligent”qualifierto“transmis- sion” and did not use it to qualify “loss” or “miscarriage.” An adjective beforethefinalnouninalistcannotbetransplantedtoqualifythepre- cedingnouns.

SeeBarnhartv.Thomas,540U. S.20,26.

TheCourt does not think that the “negligent” qualifier suggests that Congress was tryingtoenablesuitsinvolvingintentionalmisconduct.

Instead,the inclusionof“negligent”toqualify“transmission”foreclosesclaimsin- volvingmaileventhoughnothingwentwrongwithitstransportorde- livery,keepingthefocusofthepostalexceptiononmail-deliveryprob- lems.

Pp.404–405.

(2)KonanalsoarguesthattheCourt’sinterpretationsof“miscar- riage”and“loss”runafoulofthepresumptionagainstsurplusage,be- causemanyclaims—includingKonan’shere—willarisefrombotha “miscarriage”anda“loss”ofmail.

ButKonan’sproposaltosolvethe surplusage—threenonoverlappingdefinitionsofthestatutoryterms— isinconsistentwithordinarymeaning,whichshowsthattheseterms areoftenusedinanoverlappingmanner.

InDolan,theCourtinter- pretedthetermsinthepostalexceptiontosubstantiallyoverlap,546 U. S.,at487,andthecanonagainstsurplusageissubordinatetothe cardinalcanonthat“alegislaturesaysinastatutewhatitmeansand meansinastatutewhatitsaysthere,”ConnecticutNat.Bankv.Ger- main,503U. S.249,253–254.

Congresslikelyusedbroad,overlapping termstobetterkeepcomplaintsaboutmaildeliveryoutofcourt. Pp.405–406.

(d)TheCourtdoesnotdecidewhetherallofKonan’sclaimsare barredbythepostalexception,orwhichargumentsKonanadequately preserved.

P.406.

96F.4th799,vacatedandremanded.

andAlito,Kavanaugh,andBarrett,JJ.,joined.

Sotomayor,J.,filed a dissentingopinion, in whichKagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson,JJ., joined, post,p.406.

FrederickLiuarguedthecauseforpetitioners.

Onthe briefswereSolicitorGeneralSauer,AssistantAttorney General Shumate, Deputy Solicitor General Mooppan, Urja Mittal, ThomasJ. Marshall, Stephan J.Boardman, Michael D.Weaver,andJoshuaJ.Hofer.

Page Proof Pending Publication POSTALSERVICEv.KONAN OpinionoftheCourt Easha Anand argued the cause for respondent.

With her onthebriefwereJeffreyL.Fisher,PamelaS.Karlan,and RobertClary.* JusticeThomasdeliveredtheopinionoftheCourt.

TheUnitedStatesenjoyssovereignimmunityandcannot besuedwithoutitsconsent.

BymeansoftheFederalTort ClaimsAct,Congresswaivedthatsovereignimmunityfor certaintortsuitsbasedontheconductofGovernmentem- ployees.

See 28 U. S. C. §§2674, 1346(b).

But, in the provi- sion at issue in this case, Congress retained sovereign immu- nityforawiderangeofclaimsaboutmail.

Specifically,the FTCA’spostalexceptionretainssovereignimmunityforall claims“arisingoutoftheloss,miscarriage,ornegligent transmissionoflettersorpostalmatter.”

§2680(b).

This caseconcernswhetherthisexceptionapplieswhenpostal workersintentionallyfailtodeliverthemail.

Weholdthat itdoes.

I

A

TheUnitedStatesPostalServiceisafrequentpointof contactbetweencitizensandtheFederalGovernment.

In 2024, the Postal Service’s more than 600,000 employees deliv- eredmorethan112billionpiecesofmail—over300milliona day—tomorethan165milliondeliverypoints.

SeeUnited StatesPostalService,FiscalYear2024AnnualReportto Congress3,29,32,34.

Unsurprisingly,giventhisvolume, notallmailarrivesproperlyandontime.

ThePostalServ- icereportsreceivingapproximately335,000customercom- plaintsperyear.

SeeBriefforPetitioners24.

*BriefsofamicicuriaeurgingaffirmancewerefiledforAPAWatchby LawrenceJ.Joseph;fortheInstituteforJusticebyJabaTsitsuashvili, AnyaBidwell,andPatrickJaicomo;andfortheTaxpayersProtection AlliancebyErikS.Jaffe.

Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:607U. S.391(2026) OpinionoftheCourt BecauseitisaGovernmentagency,recourseagainstthe PostalServiceintheformoflawsuitsformoneydamagesis limited.

Aspartof“theexecutivebranchoftheGovern- mentoftheUnitedStates,”39U. S. C.§201,“thePostal Service enjoys federal sovereign immunity absent a waiver,” Dolanv.PostalService,546U. S.481,484(2006).

Before 1946,thatsovereignimmunitygenerallypreventedthosein- juredbyGovernmentemployeesfromreceivingcompensa- tionthroughlawsuits.

SeeMolzofv.UnitedStates,502 U. S.301,304(1992).

Thatyear,Congressenacteda“lim- itedwaiver”ofimmunitythroughtheFTCA.

Id.,at305.

Subjectto enumeratedexceptions,theFTCA allowsaplain- tifftosuetheGovernmentforinjuriesorlossofproperty “causedbythenegligentorwrongfulactoromissionof”a federalemployee“actingwithinthescopeofhisofficeor employment.”

28U. S. C.§1346(b)(1).

TheFTCA’spostalexceptionretainstheGovernment’s sovereignimmunityforlawsuitsaboutfailingtoproperly carryordelivermail.

Itforecloses“[a]nyclaimarisingout oftheloss,miscarriage,ornegligenttransmissionofletters orpostalmatter.”

§2680(b).

ThisCourthasinterpreted thepostalexceptiontoapplywhentheplaintiffisharmed “becausemaileitherfailstoarriveatallorarriveslate,in damagedcondition,oratthewrongaddress.”

Dolan,546 U. S.,at489.

B

Thiscasearisesfromthedismissalofacomplaint,sowe acceptthecomplaint’sallegationsastrue,althoughtheGov- ernmentdisputesthem.

NationalRifleAssociationof Americav.Vullo,602U. S.175,181(2024).

Respondent LebeneKonanownstwohousesablockapartinEuless, Texas—oneonSaratogaDriveandtheotheronTrenton Lane.

Konanleasesroomstotenantsinbothhousesand occasionallystaysatthemherself.

ThePostalServicede- livers mail for all the houses in the neighborhood to a central Page Proof Pending Publication POSTALSERVICEv.KONAN OpinionoftheCourt structurewithaboxforeachhouse.

ThePostalService distributes keys to the owners of the houses so that they can retrievetheirmail.

Asthehomeowner,Konanreceivedthe keys to the boxes for both houses.

Konan kept the keys and distributedthemailtohertenantsdaily,andshealsore- ceivedsomeofherownmailattheSaratogaaddress.

Konan’sgrievanceswithhermailservicebeganinMay 2020.

AfterKonannoticedthatnomailhadarrivedather Saratoga house in several days, she learned that the assigned carrierhadchangedthelistedownerfromKonan’snameto a tenant’s name.

The same carrier then authorized a change ofthelocktoallowthetenanttohavehisownmailkey withoutKonan’sconsent.

Konanconfrontedtheemployees atthelocalpostofficeaboutthesechanges.

Asupervisor atthelocalpostofficeexplainedtoKonanthatthePostal ServicewouldstopdeliveringmailtoherSaratogaaddress untilthePostalServiceInspectorGeneral’sofficeinvesti- gatedanddeterminedtheproperowner.

Konanthenre- ceived no mail to the Saratoga address for a couple of months beforeserviceresumed.

Konanthenlearnedthatthesamecarrierhadmailad- dressed to her and her tenants returned to senders as “unde- liverable.”

Asaresult,Konanandhertenantsdidnotre- ceiveimportantmail.

Konanresortedtoprivatecarriers.

The disruptions in mail service resulted in the loss of tenants andmadeitmoredifficultforKonantoattractnewtenants.

The carrier also taped a red notice inside the mailbox stating that mail addressed to some, but not all, of the Saratoga resi- dentscouldbedeliveredtothebox.In2021,postalworkers alsoallegedlystoppeddeliveringmailtotheTrentonhouse afterdiscoveringthatKonanowneditaswell.

Inresponse,KonansignedupforthePostalService’s“In- formedDelivery”service,whichallowscustomerstoview scans of incoming mail.

When she discovered that mail on its way to her addresses was not being delivered, she requested thatthemailfortheSaratogaresidencebeheldatthepost Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:607U. S.391(2026) OpinionoftheCourt officesothatshecouldretrieveitinperson.

Butthepostal employeesdidnotgiveherthemailbecauseKonanfailedto provide identification for the addressees.

In addition to these efforts, Konan also filed administrative complaints, but with- out success.

C

InJanuary2022,KonansuedtheUnitedStatesinfederal court.

KonanallegedthatthePostalServiceintentionally and wrongfully withheld her mail.

As relevant here, Konan broughtclaimsunderstatelawfornuisance,tortiousinter- ferencewithprospectivebusinessrelations,conversion,and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

She sought dam- ages forloss of rentalincome, the deprivationof her rightful mail,andthedistressthatthepostalworkerscausedher.* TheDistrictCourtdismissedKonan’scomplaintbasedon sovereignimmunity.

Relyingonthepostalexception,it concluded that the United States enjoys sovereign immunity fromherclaims“becausetheyallrelateto‘personalorfi- nancial harms arising from nondelivery . . . of sensitive mate- rialsorinformation...’andothermail.”

652F.Supp.3d 721,731(NDTex.2023)(quotingDolan,546U. S.,at489).

TheDistrictCourtheldthatthepostalexceptionisnotlim- itedtomerelynegligentfailuretoproperlycarrythemail.

652F.Supp.3d,at730–731.

TheCourtofAppealsfortheFifthCircuitreversed.

It heldthat“theterms‘loss,’‘miscarriage,’and‘negligent transmission’do notencompassthe intentionalactof notde- liveringthemailatall.”

96F.4th799,804(2024).

It reasonedthatKonan’sclaimsdidnotariseoutofthe“loss” *Konanalsobroughtdiscriminationclaimsagainstthepostalworkers under42U. S. C.§§1981and1985,allegingthattheyweremotivatedby racialanimus.

TheDistrictCourtdismissedtheseclaims.

652F.Supp.

3d721,731–732(NDTex.2023).

TheCourtofAppealsaffirmed.

F. 4th 799, 804–805 (CA5 2024).

We denied Konan’s cross-petition for cer- tiorariregardingthoseclaims,sotheyarenotbeforeus.

604U. S.1256 (2025).

Page Proof Pending Publication POSTALSERVICEv.KONAN OpinionoftheCourt ofmail“becausethemailwasnotdestroyedormisplacedby unintentionalaction.”

Id.,at802(emphasisadded).

It alsoreasonedthatKonan’sclaimsdidnotarisefromthe “miscarriage”ofmail“becausetherewasnoattemptata carriage.”

Ibid. AnditreasonedthatKonan’sclaimsdid notarisefromthe“negligenttransmission”ofmailbecause “thepostalworkers’actionswereintentional.”

Ibid. TheFifthCircuit’sdecisionconflictswiththoseofthe First and Second Circuits, which have interpreted the postal exception toapply tosuits evenwhen theyarise fromharms causedbyintentionalmisconduct.

SeeLevasseurv.United StatesPostalServ.,543F.3d23,23–24(CA12008)(percu- riam);MarineIns.Co.v.UnitedStates,378F.2d812,813– 814(CA21967).

Wegrantedcertioraritoresolvethesplit.

604U. S.1256(2025).

II

ThepostalexceptionretainstheFederalGovernment’s sovereignimmunityfor“[a]nyclaimarisingoutoftheloss, miscarriage,ornegligenttransmissionoflettersorpostal matter.”

28U. S. C.§2680(b).

Thepostalexceptionre- flectsCongress’sjudgmentthatredressfor“harms”of“the sortprimarilyidentifiedwiththePostalService’sfunction oftransportingmailthroughouttheUnitedStates”should notcomefromtortsuits.

Dolan,546U. S.,at489.

Given thefrequencyofpostalworkers’interactionswithcitizens, thosesuitswouldarisesooftenthattheywouldcreatea significantburdenfortheGovernmentandthecourts.

And their cost to taxpayers would depend on the value and impor- tance of the mail’s contents, over which the Government typ- icallyhasnocontrol.

See,e. g.,MarineIns.Co.,378F.2d, at813(theftfrommailofsixemeraldsvaluedat$152,190in 1967dollars).

AccordingtoKonanandthedissent,thepostalexception doesnotapplytoKonan’sclaimsbecausesheallegesthat postalworkersintentionallyrefusedtodeliverhermail.

Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:607U. S.391(2026) OpinionoftheCourt Wedisagree.

Both“miscarriage”and“loss”ofmailunder the postal exception can occur as a result of the Postal Serv- ice’sintentionalfailuretodeliverthemail.

A

Absent a reason to think otherwise, we interpret statutory termsaccordingtotheordinarymeaningstheyhadwhen theywereenacted.

WisconsinCentralLtd.v.United States,585U. S.274,277(2018).

WhenCongressenacted theFTCAin1946,the“miscarriage”ofmailordinarilyin- cludedanyfailureofmailtoproperlyarriveatitsintended destination.

Konanwouldlimit“miscarriage”touninten- tionalfailuresorfailureswherethemailwenttothewrong address.

Neitherlimitationiswellfounded.

DictionariespublishedaroundthetimeCongressenacted theFTCAconfirmthata“miscarriage”ofmailhappened whenmailfailedtoarriveproperly.

Twodictionariesindi- catethat“miscarriage”ofmailmeantthe“failureofaletter ...toreachitsdestination.”

2NewCenturyDictionaryof theEnglishLanguage1069(1927);accord,6OxfordEnglish Dictionary497(1933)(“Thefailure(ofaletter,etc.)toreach its destination”).

In a third, “miscarriage” meant the “[f]ail- ure(ofsomethingsent) toarrive.”

Webster’sNewInterna- tionalDictionary1568(2ded.1934)(Webster’sSecond).

Definitionsof“miscarry”weresimilarlybroad.

Ibid.(“To failofreachingthedestination”);6OxfordEnglishDiction- ary, at 498 (“To fail to reach its proper destination”). Some- thingcan“fail”tohappenasaresultofintentionalmiscon- duct.

See,e. g.,26U. S. C.§291(1940ed.)(imposinga penaltyfor“failuretomakeandfile[atax]return”“unless itisshownthatsuchfailureisduetoreasonablecauseand notduetowillfulneglect”).

Becausea“miscarriage”in- cludes any failure of mail to arrive properly, a person experi- encesamiscarriageofmailwhenhismailisdeliveredtohis neighbor,heldatthepostoffice,orreturnedtothesender— Page Proof Pending Publication POSTALSERVICEv.KONAN OpinionoftheCourt regardlessofwhyithappened.

Konan’sclaimsaboutthe PostalService’swillfulfailuretodeliverhermailtherefore resultfromthemiscarriageofhermail.

WedisagreewithKonan’sattempttolimit“miscarriage” tonegligentfailuresofmailtoarriveproperly.

Brieffor Respondent19–20;accord,post,at414(Sotomayor,J.,dis- senting).

Neither Konan nor the dissent cites any dictionar- iesimposingthislimitation.

Instead,Konancitesexamples ofusesoftheterm“miscarriage”thatsuggestthatthemis- carriageinquestionwasunintentional,suchasan1868 telegraph-lawdecisionexplainingthatatelegraphcompany shouldnotbeliable“foreverymistake,miscarriage,oracci- dental delay that may occur.”

United States Tel. Co. v. Gild- ersleve,29Md.232,246(1868).

Weagreethatmiscarriage ofmailcanbeunintentional,but“thefactthatthephrase wascommonlyusedinaparticularcontextdoesnotshow thatitislimitedtothatcontext.”

DistrictofColumbiav.

Heller,554U. S.570,588(2008).

Infact,ordinaryspeakersused“miscarriage”toreferto problemswithmailcausedbyintentionalmisconduct.

Whenamailpouchwas“stolen,”anewspaperreportedthat theletters“[m]iscarried.”

KansasCityStar,Oct.20,1911, p.6A.

Whenapriestfailedtoreceiveasummonsbecause itwas“burnedbyanecclesiastic,”theheadlineread“His LetterMiscarried.”

TheCarbondaleLeader,Jan.3,1893, p.1.

Andwhenlitigants’documentsfailedtoarrive,courts classified“miscarriage”ofmailasanexcuse,withoutany suggestionastowhetherthecarrieractedintentionally.

See,e. g.,Lakev.Lake,63Wyo.375,402,182P.2d824,835 (1947)(percuriam);Wagnerv.Lucas,79Okla.231,232–233, 193P.421,422–423(1920).

Weseenoreasontosuppose thattheseusesof“miscarriage”wereextraordinary.

Konanseparatelycontendsthata“miscarriage”ofmail happens only when the mail goes to the “wrong address,” not whenitis(likehermail)heldatthepostofficeorreturned tothesender.

BriefforRespondent15.

Weagaindecline Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:607U. S.391(2026) OpinionoftheCourt toimposealimitationthathasnobasisinthedictionaries orordinaryusage.

Speakersusedtheterm“miscarriage” whenthemailfailedtoreachitsintendeddestination,re- gardless of where it ended up.

One newspaper, for example, explainedthataletter“ ‘[m]iscarried’ ”becauseitwas“ ‘de- layed.’ ” MuskogeeTimes-Democrat,June15,1934,p.1.

Anotherranastoryinwhichacorrespondent’s“lettermis- carriedandcametoolate.”

JerseyCity,N.J.,TheEvening Journal,June10,1907,p.10.

Andacourtdescribedmail mistakenlyleft“inthepostoffice”ashaving“miscarried.”

Heinrichv.FirstNat.Bank,219N.Y.1,4,6,113N.E.531, 531–532(1916).

Wedecline Konan’sinvitationsto“artificially narrowordi- narymeaning.”

Bartenwerferv.Buckley,598U. S.69,77 (2023).

A“miscarriageofmail”includesfailureofthemail toarriveatitsintendeddestination,regardlessofthecarri- er’sintentorwherethemailgoesinstead.

B

Konan’swithholdingclaimsalsoariseoutofthe“loss”of mailandarethereforewithinthepostalexception.

U. S. C.§2680(b).

WhenCongressenactedtheFTCA,the “loss” of mail ordinarily meant a deprivation of mail, regard- lessofhowthedeprivationwasbroughtabout.

So,like “miscarriage,”intentionalrefusaltodelivermailcouldcause the“loss”ofmail.

A“loss”ofmailisadeprivationofmail.

“Lossisage- nericandrelativeterm;itisnotawordoflimited,hardand fastmeaning.”

Black’sLawDictionary1094(rev.4thed.

1968).

But it is commonly used to refer to any “deprivation” or“thatwhichiswithheld,”id.,at1095,suchaswhensome- one suffers the loss of property in a fire or the loss of income from being laid off.

Webster’s defined “loss”as the “[a]ct or factoflosing(invarioussenses)orsufferingdeprivation.”

Webster’sSecond1460.

OxfordEnglishDictionarydefined itas“beingdeprivedof,orthefailuretokeep”something.

Page Proof Pending Publication POSTALSERVICEv.KONAN OpinionoftheCourt 6 Oxford English Dictionary, at 452.

One can, of course, suf- feradeprivationofsomethingwhenanotherintentionally keepsthatthingforhimself.

Konanallegedthatshewas “entitledto possession”ofhermail butthatthe PostalServ- ice “converted” it.

App. to Pet. for Cert. 58a–59a.

Conver- sionmeansthatKonanwas“deprivedoftheuseandposses- sionoftheproperty”inquestion.

Black’sLawDictionary 421(12thed.2024).

Konan’sclaimsthereforeariseoutof thelossofhermail.

Aswith“miscarriage,”wedisagreewithKonan’sattempt tolimit“loss”toonlyinadvertentlosses.

SeeBriefforRe- spondent27–28;post,at411–413(opinionofSotomayor,J.).

Alosscanbetheresultofanotherperson’sintentionalmis- conduct.

Onecan,forexample,sufferatax“loss”thatre- sultsfrom“embezzlement.”

See,e. g.,Burnetv.Huff,288 U. S.156,160(1933).

Anarmycansuffer“loss”ofsoldiers asa resultoftheintentional conductofthe enemy.

Funk& Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Language 1465 (1942 ed.).

And, in the mail context, ordinary speakers commonlydescribeda“loss”ofmailfromtheft,including theftbythecarrier.

JustayearbeforeCongressenacted theFTCA,theArmyexplainedthat“[v]irtuallyalllossof mailthrough theftoccursat terminaltransfer pointsoutside thiscountry.”

Pittsfield,Mass.,BerkshireEveningEagle, Feb.9,1945,p.3(emphasisadded).

Afewyearsearlier,a reported “[l]oss of [l]ocal [m]ail” was caused by a rogue “mail handler,whoadmittedthetheftofconsiderablemailduring thepastfewmonths.”

BelvidereNews,Dec.3,1936,p.1.

Pre-FTCA decisions also described a “loss” of mail when the carrierstoleit.

E. g.,Boernerv.UnitedStates,117F.2d 387, 387–388 (CA2 1941); Martin v. United States, 280 F. 513, 514(CA41922).

We also disagree with Konan’s, and the dissent’s, rejoinder that the postal exception applies only when the Postal Service lostthemail.

Seepost,at411–412.

Congresscouldhave writtenthepostalexceptiontoapplyonlywhen“thePostal Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:607U. S.391(2026) OpinionoftheCourt Servicelost,miscarried,ornegligentlytransmitted”mail.

ButCongressappliedthepostalexceptiontoall“claim[s] arisingoutoftheloss,miscarriage,ornegligenttransmis- sion”ofmail.

Itdescribedkindsofharms,notkindsofac- tionsbythepostalworkers.

SeeDolan,546U. S.,at489; contra,post,at409(opinion ofSotomayor,J.).Wedeclineto rescueKonan’sclaimsbyinsertingthePostalServiceasthe sentence’ssubjectandthenconvertingthethreenounsinto threeverbs.

Cf.Terryv.UnitedStates,593U. S.486,494 (2021)(“[W]ewillnotconvertnounstoadjectivesandvice versa”).

Ourinterpretationof“loss”isalsoconsistentwiththe principalprovisionoftheFTCA.

Underthatprovision,a plaintiffmustallegea“lossofproperty...causedbythe negligent or wrongful act or omission” of a federal employee. 28U. S. C.§1346(b)(1).

Allagreethatthisprovisionin- cludeslossescausedbyintentionalmisconductanddoesnot require that the Government “lost” anything.

Because Con- gress used “loss” in this sense in the FTCA’s principal provi- sion,ourinterpretationadherestotheunrebuttedpresump- tionthat“thetermbearsaconsistentmeaningthroughout” theFTCA.

SeeAzarv.AllinaHealthServices,587U. S. 566,576(2019).

Last, Konan proposes limiting “loss” to only “destruction.” Shecontendsthatthe“primary”meaningof“loss”in1946 was“destruction,”notanyotherkindofdeprivation.

Brief forRespondent25–26.

But,aswehaveexplained,ordinary speakers referred to “losses” of mail, even when the mail was not destroyed.

Judge Cardozo wrote that when an envelope fellbehindaradiatorinthepostoffice,itcausedthe“loss” ofthechecksinsideeventhoughtheywerelaterrecovered.

Heinrich,219N.Y.,at4,113N.E.,at531.

And,contempo- raneousregulationstreated“loss”and“destruction”sepa- rately,not,asKonansuggests,synonymously.

See,e. g., PostalLawsandRegulations§159(1940ed.)(delayingcer- tainproceduresuntilofficialshave“determinedthatsuch Page Proof Pending Publication POSTALSERVICEv.KONAN OpinionoftheCourt loss,destruction,ordamageresultedfromnofaultornegli- genceonthepartof”apostmaster).

Konanassertsthat “destruction”wasthe“primary”meaningoflossbecauseit waslistedasthefirstdefinitionindictionaries.

Brieffor Respondent25–26.

But,“[a]lthoughmanypeopleassume thatthefirstsenselistedinadictionaryisthe‘main’sense, thatisoftenquiteuntrue.”

A.Scalia&B.Garner,Reading Law:TheInterpretationofLegalTexts418(2012).

The definitionsKonanpointedtowerelistedfirstbecausethey weretheoldest,notbecausetheywereprimary.

See1Ox- fordEnglishDictionary,atxxxi (“[T]hatsenseisplacedfirst which was actually the earliest in the language . . . ”); 1 New CenturyDictionary,atiii(“Ingeneral,thesensesofeach wordarearranged,asfaraspossible,intheorderoftheir derivationanddevelopmentfromtheoriginalsource...”); Webster’sNewInternationalDictionaryix(1927)(following “[t]he principle of historical arrangement followed in the ear- liereditions”).

WedonotpresumethatCongressintended theoldestusage,butrathertheordinaryonein1946,and contemporaneous evidence shows that Konan’s usage was not theprimaryone.

III

Konanprofferstworemainingargumentsthatherclaims mustnotbebarredbythepostalexception.

Weaddress theminturn.

First,Konanarguesthatthepostalexception’s“negligent transmission”categorynarrowsthemeaningof“miscar- riage”and“loss.”

Shearguesthatthequalifier“negligent” intheterm“negligenttransmission”implicitlyqualifiesthe othertwoterms.

ButCongressintentionallylimitedthe “negligent”qualifierto“transmission”anddidnotuseitto qualify“loss”or“miscarriage.”

Konan’s“argumentseems to assume that pairing a broad statutory term with a narrow oneshrinksthebroadone,butthereisnosuchgeneral usage.”

S.D.WarrenCo.v.MaineBd.ofEnvironmental Protection,547U. S.370,379(2006).

Justlike“alimiting Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:607U. S.391(2026) OpinionoftheCourt clauseorphrase...shouldordinarilybereadasmodifying onlythenounorphrasethatitimmediatelyfollows,”anad- jectivebeforethefinalnouninalistcannotbetransplanted toqualifytheprecedingnouns.

Barnhartv.Thomas,540 U. S.20,26(2003).

Wealsodonotthinkthatthe“negli- gent”qualifiersuggeststhatCongresswastryingtoenable suits involving intentional misconduct.

Contra, post, at 410– 411 (opinion of Sotomayor, J.).

If Congress had written the postalexceptiontorefertoall“transmission”ofmail,the category—unlike“miscarriage”and“loss”—wouldhaveen- compassedclaimsthatinvolvedmaileventhoughnothing wentwrongwithitstransportordelivery.

SeeDolan,546 U. S., at 486 (acknowledging the broad meaning of “transmis- sion”inisolation).

Theinclusionof“negligent”toqualify “transmission”foreclosesthatresultandtherebykeepsthe focusofthepostalexceptiononmail-deliveryproblems,but, indoingso,itdoesnotlimittheothertwocategories.

Second,Konanarguesthatourinterpretationsof“miscar- riage”and“loss”runafoulofthepresumptionagainstsur- plusage.

Onourinterpretation,sheargues,manyclaims— including Konan’s here—will arise from both a “miscarriage” and a “loss” of mail, making one or the other redundant. To solvethesurplusage,Konanproposesthreenonoverlapping definitions:“Loss”covers“damage”tomail;“miscarriage” covers“whathappens”tomail“whenitleavestheUSPS’s custodyandendsupinthewrongplace”;and“negligent transmission”covers“detentionordelaysofthemailwhile stillintheUSPS’spossession.”

BriefforRespondent9.

Konan’sproposalisinconsistentwithordinarymeaning, which shows that these terms were often used in an overlap- pingmanner.

See,e. g.,Heinrich,219N.Y.,at4–6,113 N.E.,at531–532(describing“[t]helossofthechecks”that “miscarried in the mails”); Brevard v. Wimberly, 89 Mo. App. 331, 338–339 (1901) (“miscarriage of . . . packages” could lead to“thelossofaregisteredpackage”).

And,inDolan,the Courtinterpretedthetermsinthepostalexceptiontosub- Page Proof Pending Publication POSTALSERVICEv.KONAN Sotomayor,J.,dissenting stantially overlap.

See 546 U. S., at 487.

The canon against surplusage is subordinate to the “cardinal canon” that “a leg- islaturesaysinastatutewhatitmeansandmeansina statutewhatitsaysthere.”

ConnecticutNat.Bankv.

Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253–254 (1992).

We think that Con- gresslikelyusedbroad,overlappingtermstobetterkeep complaintsaboutmaildeliveryoutofcourt.

IV

Weholdthatthepostalexceptioncoverssuitsagainstthe UnitedStatesfortheintentionalnondeliveryofmail.

We donotdecidewhetherallofKonan’sclaimsarebarredby thepostalexception,orwhichargumentsKonanadequately preserved.

We vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals andremandthecaseforfurtherproceedingsconsistentwith thisopinion.

Itissoordered.

JusticeSotomayor,withwhomJusticeKagan,Jus- ticeGorsuch,andJusticeJacksonjoin,dissenting.

Fortwoyears,respondentLebeneKonanandhertenants didnotreceivemailaddressedtotherentalpropertiesthat Konanowned.

AccordingtoKonan,negligencewasnotto blame.

Quitetheopposite:SheallegesthatUnitedStates Postal Service employees intentionally withheld delivery be- causetheydidnotlike“ ‘thatablackpersonown[ed]’ ”the propertiesand“ ‘lease[d]rooms...towhitepeople.’ ” F.Supp.3d721,725(NDTex.2023).

KonanbroughtthisactionundertheFederalTortClaims Act(FTCA)againsttheUnitedStatestorecoverdamages shesustainedasaresultofthisallegedyears-longharass- mentcampaign.

TheUnitedStatesisgenerallyprotected bysovereignimmunity,butCongress,throughtheFTCA, hasenactedacapaciouswaiverofthatimmunityfortort suitswhenanindividualisharmedbyafederalemployee actingwithinthescopeofheremployment.

Thatwaiver, Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:607U. S.391(2026) Sotomayor,J.,dissenting however,issubjecttoseveralexceptions.

Today,theCourt holds that one exception—the postal exception—prevents in- dividualsfromrecoveringforinjuriesbasedonapostalem- ployee’sintentionalmisconduct,includingwhenanemployee maliciouslywithholdstheirmail.

Becausethisreadingof thepostalexceptiontransforms,ratherthanhonors,theex- ceptionCongressenacted,Irespectfullydissent.

I

TheFTCAservesasimplepurpose:“ ‘toremovethesov- ereignimmunityoftheUnitedStatesfromsuitsintort.’ ” Levinv.UnitedStates,568U. S.503,506(2013).

This “broadwaiver”ofimmunity,Millbrookv.UnitedStates,569 U. S.50,52(2013),allowsanindividualharmedbyafederal employee“actingwithinthescopeofhisofficeoremploy- ment”torecoverfor“injuryorlossofproperty,orpersonal injuryordeathcausedbythe”employee’s“negligentor wrongful act or omission,” 28 U. S. C. §1346(b)(1); see United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543, 547 (1951) (describing thewaiveras“sweeping”).

Congresshasalsoenactedseveralexceptionspreserving theUnitedStates’immunityinsomecircumstances.

See §2680(listing13suchexceptions).

Theexceptions“arede- signedtoprotectcertainimportantgovernmentalfunctions andprerogativesfromdisruption.”

Molzofv.United States,502U. S.301,311(1992).

Theythus“markthe ‘boundarybetweenCongress’willingnesstoimposetortlia- bility upon the United States and its desire to protect certain governmentalactivitiesfromexposuretosuitbyprivatein- dividuals.’ ” Ibid. Atthesametime,courtsmustbecarefulnottointerpret theseexceptionstoobroadly.

“ ‘[U]ndulygenerousinter- pretations,’ ” this Court has warned, “ ‘run the risk of defeat- ingthecentralpurposeofthestatute’ ”—to“ ‘waiv[e]the Government’simmunityfromsuitinsweepinglanguage.’ ” Dolanv.PostalService,546U. S.481,492(2006)(quoting Page Proof Pending Publication POSTALSERVICEv.KONAN Sotomayor,J.,dissenting Kosak v. United States, 465 U. S. 848, 853, n. 9 (1984); Yellow Cab,340U. S.,at547).

Toharmonizetheseconsiderations, “ ‘theproperobjectiveofacourtattemptingtoconstrueone of the’ ” exceptions “ ‘is to identify those circumstances which arewithinthewordsandreasonoftheexception—noless and no more.’ ” Dolan, 546 U. S., at 492 (quoting Kosak, 465 U. S.,at853–854,n.9(someinternalquotationmarks omitted)).

ThiscasecallsontheCourttointerpretthepostalexcep- tion, which covers “[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscar- riage,ornegligenttransmissionoflettersorpostalmatter.”

§2680(b).

Thewordingofthisexceptionisnoticeablynar- rowerthansomeofitsneighbors.

Forexample,allclaims for“damagescausedbythe fiscaloperationsoftheTreasury orbytheregulationofthemonetarysystem”arebarred.

§2680(i).

Sotooareall“claim[s]arisingfromtheactivities oftheTennesseeValleyAuthority,”the“PanamaCanal Company,” and “a Federal land bank, a Federal intermediate creditbank,orabankforcooperatives,”§§2680(l),(m),(n).

Bycomparison,Congressdidnotpaintwithasbroadofa brushindesigningthepostalexception.

Likeithadfor theseotheragenciesandactivities,Congresscouldhave granted immunity for all “claims arising from the mail activi- tiesofthePostalService.”

Instead,Congressidentified certain“misconductforwhichtheGovernmentwasnotas- sumingfinancialresponsibility—namely,‘theloss,miscar- riage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.’ ” Kosak, 465 U. S., at 855.

By using “specificity” over “gener- ality,”itfollowsthatCongressintendedforthisexception “tobelessencompassing”thanthecoverageprovidedby the broader exceptions, and for the Government to “assum[e] financialresponsibility”forcertainclassesof“misconduct” relatedtopostalactivities.

Ibid. ThisCourthasalreadyidentifiedsomeofthoseclasses.

InKosak,theCourtexplainedthatclaimsarisingfromcar accidentscausedbypostalemployeesdeliveringmailfall Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:607U. S.391(2026) Sotomayor,J.,dissenting outsidetheexception.

Ibid. InDolan,theCourtrecog- nizedasecondclassofclaimsforslipandfallscausedbyan employee negligently placing a package on a porch step. U. S.,at483.

Today,IwouldhaveaffirmedtheFifthCir- cuit’s well-reasoned decision that acknowledged a third class: claimsconcerningintentionalmisconductcommittedby postalemployees,whichwouldnecessarilyincludewithhold- ingaperson’smailformaliciousreasons.

II

A

Thepostalexception’stextshowsthatCongressdidnot intendtoimmunizeintentionalmisconduct.

Recallthatthe exceptioncoversthe“loss,”“miscarriage,”and“negligent transmission”ofmail.

§2680(b).

AsKosakobserved,the termsdescribethreecategoriesof“misconduct”thatpostal employeescancommitwithoutincurringliabilityforthe UnitedStates.

465U. S.,at855.

Themajority,however, contends that these terms focus on “harms” rather than Gov- ernmentwrongdoing,citingDolan.

Ante,at395,398,403.

Tobesure,Dolandescribedthesetermsas“harm[s],”but inthesamebreath,italsoemphasizedthatthethreeterms protect“onlyasubsetofpostalwrongdoing.”

546U. S., at490.

A focus on misconduct is consistent with most other FTCA exceptions,whichgenerallyaretriggeredbycertaintypes ofGovernmentconduct,ratherthanthetypeofharmthe plaintiffexperiences.

Forinstance,someexceptionsdi- rectlycoverdifferent“act[s]oromission[s]”ofGovernment employees,§§2680(a)(discretionaryacts),(e)(administering §§1–31ofTitle50).

Anotheraddressesintentionalactions byemployees,capturing,forexample,assault,battery,false imprisonment, and other intentional torts like them.

§2680(h).

Adifferentgroupimmunizesthe“activities”ofa givenGovernmentinstrumentality.

§§2680(j),(l),(m),(n).

YetadifferentsubsetdescribesaspecifictypeofGovern- Page Proof Pending Publication POSTALSERVICEv.KONAN Sotomayor,J.,dissenting mentaction, suchasthe“assessment orcollectionof anytax orcustomsduty,”§2680(c),the“impositionorestablishment ofaquarantine,”§2680(f),andthe“fiscaloperationsofthe Treasury,”§2680(i).

ThefocusofeachisontheGovern- mentconduct.

Thesameisnecessarilytrueofthepostal exception.

Thekeyquestionisthusasfollows:Whatkindofmiscon- ductfallswithinthe“ ‘wordsandreason’ ”ofthepostalex- ception?

Dolan,546U. S.,at492(quotingKosak,465U. S., at 854, n. 9).

All signs point to Congress leaving intentional misconductoutsideoftheexception’sscope.

Beginwith“negligenttransmission.”

Thistermcovers “negligencecausingmailtobelostortoarrivelate,indam- agedcondition,oratthewrongaddress.”

Dolan,546U. S., at 486.

It goes without saying that this term therefore does notimmunizeintentionalmisconduct.

Beyond that basic insight, however, Congress’s express in- clusion of “negligent transmission” provides other important cluesfordecipheringstatutorymeaningaboutthescopeof thepostalexception.

Asthemajorityrecognizes,ifCon- gresshadincludedallclaimsarisingoutofthe“transmis- sion”ofmailinthepostalexception,theterm“wouldhave encompassedclaimsthatinvolvedmaileventhoughnothing wentwrongwithitstransportordelivery.”

Ante,at405.

Toavoidthatoutcome,Congressneededtoaddanarrowing modifiertofocusonwhenthingsgowrong.¹ Critically,Congressdidnothavetochoose“negligent”as thatmodifier(ortheonlymodifier).

Congresscouldhave, forexample,modified“transmission”withboth“negligent” and“wrongful.”

Doingsowouldhaveavoidedtheproblem ¹ Congress did not need to add “negligent” before “miscarriage” or “loss” becausetheordinarymeaningofthoseterms,plusstatutorycontext,con- veyinadvertenceontheirown.

Seeinfra,at411–418.

Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:607U. S.391(2026) Sotomayor,J.,dissenting themajorityidentifieswhilealsoclarifyingthatbothclasses ofconductfallwithintheexception’sscope.

YetCongress electedtoimmunizenegligentconductalone.

Itschoiceto dosocarriessignificance.

Itraisesthenaturalinference thatCongressintendedforatleastsomeintentionalwrong- doing related to transmitting mail to fall outside the scope of theexception.

Indeed, before this Court,the Government emphasizes re- peatedlythat“negligenttransmission”is“significant”be- causetheterm“showsthatCongressknewhowtoexclude intentionalmisconductwhenitwantedto.”

BriefforPeti- tioners3,17,35.

Yet,accordingtotheGovernmentandthe majority,thiswasahollowchoice.

Intheirview,Congress excludedsomesetofintentionalconductthroughthe“negli- genttransmission”modifieronlytosweepthatconductback intotheexceptionthrough“miscarriage”and“loss.”

The majority adopts the Government’s definition of “miscarriage” ascapturingsituationswhere“mailfail[s]toarriveprop- erly,” regardless of the actor’s intent.

Ante, at 399.

It also adopts the Government’s definition of “loss” as capturing the “deprivationofmail,”regardless,again,ofthedepriver’sin- tent.

Ante,at401.

Itisdifficulttoseehowapostalem- ployee could intentionally transmit mail wrongfully—such as byrefusingtodeliverthemail,lightingitonfire,orshred- dingitintopieces—withoutfallingwithinthesedefinitions of“miscarriage”or“loss.”

Inthisworld,Congressdidnot evenneedtobotherwiththemodifiertotransmissionthat itadopted.

Congressdidnotmakethisoddchoice.

Asexplained below,“loss”and“miscarriage,”asusedinthepostalexcep- tion,donotcaptureintentionalmisconducteither.

Turn,then,to“loss.”

AstheGovernmentacknowledged initspetitionforcertiorari,“loss”isordinarilyunderstood Page Proof Pending Publication POSTALSERVICEv.KONAN Sotomayor,J.,dissenting tocaptureunintentionalconduct.

Pet.forCert.14;seealso Webster’sNewInternationalDictionary1460(2ded.1934) (defining“loss”asan“[a]ctorfactoflosing...esp[ecially], unintentionalpartingwithsomethingofvalue”).

Forgood reason:AstheFifthCircuitobservedbelow,“nooneinten- tionally loses something.”

96 F. 4th 799, 802 (2024).

People lose their keys when they misplace them, not when they give themtotheirchildren.

Peoplelosetheirmailwhenitgets stuckbehindadrawer,notwhentheyintentionallythrowit away.

Ifsomeonesaidthatthey“lost”theircar,noone wouldthinkitwasstolen,onlythatthepersonforgotwhere they had parked it.

The same is true when the Postal Serv- ice loses someone’s mail.

The reason is an error, not deliber- atewrongdoing.

Toreachitscontraryresult,themajoritydefines“loss” asany“deprivationofmail,”whichitconcludescapturesall situations where the individual does not receive mail, no mat- ter the cause.

Ante, at 401.

To do so, however, the majority mustshiftawayfromafocusonharmsthatbefallthemail toharmsthatbefallKonan.

Themajoritysaysthatthe postalexceptionencompassesthree“kindsofharms, notkindsofactionsbythepostalworkers.”

Ante,at403.

Themajoritydefinesthefirsttwoterms,“miscarriage”and “negligenttransmission,”toencompass“harms”tothemail.

Yet, underthe majority’sinterpretation, “loss”is anentirely distinctkindof“harm.”

Thatisbecausethemaildoesnot “sufferadeprivation”inthesamewaythatmailfailstoar- rive (miscarriage) or mail is damaged due to negligence (neg- ligenttransmission).

Theonlyway“loss”couldmeana “deprivation” is if it were a harm experienced by Konan, not bythemail.

Nosuchinconsistency,however,arisesif(as explainedabove)allthreetermsarereadtorefertothe Government’smisconduct:thePostalService’sloss,miscar- riage,ornegligenttransmissionofmail.

Seesupra,at409– 410.

Whenusedinthissense,“loss”plainlyandsensibly Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:607U. S.391(2026) Sotomayor,J.,dissenting denotesunintentionalconduct,consistentwithitsordinary meaning.² Themajorityalsoinvokesthepresumptionofconsistent usage.

It points to the use of “loss” in the FTCA’s sovereign immunitywaiverasmeaning“deprivation,”andarguesthat “loss”asused inthepostalexceptionmusttake onthesame meaning.

Ante,at403.

Theconsistent-usagecanon,how- ever,“ ‘readilyyields’tocontext,”UtilityAirRegulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U. S. 302, 320 (2014), and here, comparing the context of the FTCA’s waiver to the context of the postal exceptionshowsthat“loss”isbeingusedintwodifferent ways.

The waiver uses “loss” to describe the form of damages an individual harmed by a federal employee can seek to recover. ItstatesthatplaintiffscanbringclaimsagainsttheUnited Statesfor“lossofproperty”“causedbythenegligentor wrongfulactoromissionofanyemployeeoftheGovern- ment”whileactingwithinthescopeoftheiremployment.

§1346(b)(1).

The plaintiff’s “loss” could be due to “negligent orwrongful”conduct,asthewaiverstatesexplicitly.

Ibid. Incontrast,thepostalexceptionuses“loss”todescribethe form of the employee’s misconduct that is protected from lia- bility.

Ifanemployeelostthemail,theplaintiffsuffereda “loss”underthewaiverandtheclaimarose“outoftheloss” of the mail, meaning the postal exception applies.

If an em- ployeeintentionallydestroyedthemail,thewaiverwould stillbeimplicatedbecausetheplaintiffsufferedarelevant “loss”forpurposesofthewaiver.

Thepostalexception ² TheGovernmentalsocontendsthat“loss”inthepostalexceptionin- corporatesintentionalmisconductbecauseitasks“whetherthealleged victims‘lost’mail.”

BriefforPetitioners41(emphasisdeleted);Tr.of OralArg.21(same).

Thatagainrequiresthesameshiftinperspective: asking,ononehand,whethermailwas“miscarr[ied]”or“negligently transmitted” by the Postal Service, and, on the other hand, whether Konan “los[t]”(andsowasdeprivedof)hermail.

Page Proof Pending Publication POSTALSERVICEv.KONAN Sotomayor,J.,dissenting wouldnotapply,however,becausetheemployeedestroyed themailanddidnotloseit.

“Loss”isthusbeingclearly usedintwodifferentwaysandcarriestwodifferent meanings.

Thatbringsusto“miscarriage.”

Themajorityiscorrect that“miscarriage”coversmisconductbythePostalService thatcausesmailto“fai[l]toarriveproperly,”ante,at399, butthemajorityiswrongtoextendthismeaningtocover situationsthatinvolveintentionalmisconduct.

Asthemajorityrecognizes,“miscarriage”commonlycov- ersnegligenceorinadvertence.

Ante,at400.

Indeed, therearemanyexamplesof“miscarriage”beingusedwhen mail“failstoarrive”duetonegligence,includingasillus- tratedbytheGovernment’sowncases.

See,e. g.,Heinrich v. First Nat. Bank, 219 N. Y. 1, 113 N. E. 531, 531–532 (1916); Elamv.St.Louis&S.F.R.Co.,117Mo.App.453,93S.W.

851(1906);seen.3,infra.

Fromhere,asthemajoritysees it,mailthat isintentionallynotdelivered, evenformalicious reasons,also“failedtoarriveproperly,”soCongressmust haveintendedtoincludeintentionalmisconductwithinthe exceptionbyusing“miscarriage.”

Ante,at399–400.

The majority,however,offersnopersuasiveevidencesuggesting that“miscarriage”iscommonlyusedinthisway.

Tostart,themajorityreliesonseveraldictionarydefini- tions.

Ante, at 399.

None of those definitions addresses an individual’s mens rea.

The phrase “failure to arrive,” more- over,doesnotimmediatelysuggestintentionalwrongdoing.

“Adiplomatmight‘failtoarrive’atatreatynegotiationif herflightwerecancelled,butnoonewoulddescribeheras ‘failingtoarrive’ifshedeliberatelyskippedthetalkstoun- derminethetreaty(‘refusedtoattend’wouldbemoreaccu- rate).”

BriefforRespondent23.

Next,themajorityturnstoreal-lifeexamples.

Here,the majority does not rely on any cases cited by the Government. Thatisnotasurprise,astheGovernmentfailedtoidentify Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:607U. S.391(2026) Sotomayor,J.,dissenting a single example of “miscarriage” being used to describe mail “failingtoarriveproperly”duetointentionalmisconduct.³ Themajoritythussearcheselsewhere,citingexamplesofits own:twocherry-pickednewspaperreferencesalmost20 yearsapart,andatleast30yearsbeforetheenactmentof the FTCA, that used “miscarried,” not “miscarriage.”

Ante, at400.

If“miscarriage”wereinfactordinarilyusedtode- scribeintentionalmisconduct,onemightexpectthatactual examplesoftheusagewouldbeeasiertocomeby.

Themajorityalsocitescasesinwhichthereasonbehinda “miscarriage”wasnotidentified,butthosecasesdonotsup- port its position.

Ibid. How a word is used when the cause isunknownhardlyinformswhetheranordinaryspeaker wouldusethesamewordwhenthecauseisknown.

Those cases, moreover, simply reflect the general presumption that issueswithmailaretypicallynotaresultofintentional misconductbypostalworkers.

Forexample,inLakev.

Lake,63Wyo.375,182P.2d824(1947)(percuriam),the courtexplainedthatwhenamotionarrivedincourt“aday ³ SeeReplyBrief8–10(citingBowenv.Wilson,15F.2d733,734(DC 1926)(“miscarriage”whendeliverywasattemptedbutreturnedbecause therecipientcouldnotbefound);Heinrichv.FirstNat.Bank,219N.Y. 1,113N.E.531,531–532(1916)(mailwas“miscarried”whenitwasmis- placedbehindaradiatordueto“thenegligenceofemployeesofthepost- office”);SouthernExpressCo.v.Hill,81Ark.1,98S.W.371,372–373 (1906)(“miscarriage”duetothesendermistakenlywritingthewrongad- dress);Elamv.St.Louis&S.F.R.Co.,117Mo.App.453,93S.W.851 (1906)(“miscarriage”duetothe“negligence”ofthepostalcarrier);West- ern Home Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 40 Neb. 1, 58 N. W. 597, 598 (1894) (cause unknown);Fostersv.McKibben,14Pa.168,170(1850)(describingaletter that“miscarrie[s]forwantofpublication”);Peopleexrel.Holdsworthv. SuperiorCt.,18Wend.675,678(N.Y.Sup.Ct.1837)(causeunknown)). SeealsoMissouri,K.&T.R.Co.v.Ellis,53Okla.264,156P.226,228 (1916) (although the cause of the mail arriving late was unknown, the court referredtothe“miscarriageofthemail”asan“accident”);Kelloggv. Smith, 171 Okla. 355, 42 P. 2d 493, 495 (1935) (per curiam) (similar); Hogan v.Bailey,27Okla.15,110P.890,891(1910)(similar);Chichesterv.Cande, 3Cow.39,48(N.Y.Sup.Ct.1824)(similar).

Page Proof Pending Publication POSTALSERVICEv.KONAN Sotomayor,J.,dissenting toolate” duetoa“miscarriage ofthemails,” withnofurther causeexplained,that“ ‘mereaccident’ ”shouldnotbeheld againsttheparty.

Id.,at402,182P.2d,at835.

Similarly, inWagner v.Lucas, 79Okla. 231,193P. 421(1920), thecourt described“miscarriageofthemails”asasituationthat “humanprudence,foresight,andsagacity...couldnotpre- vent,” like a “mistake in the wording of a telegram.”

Id., at 232–233,193P.,at423.

Accordingly,theuseoftheterm “miscarriage”inthesecasesdoesnotprovethattheterm covers intentional misconduct; in context, had the courts sus- pectedthatthelatedelivery,forinstance,wasaresultof suchmisconduct,theylikelywouldhaveusedadifferent word.

ThecontemporaneousPostalLawsandRegulationsfrom beforetheFTCAwasenacted—the“backdrop”against which“Congressenactedthepostalexception,”Brieffor Petitioners 35—further undermine the majority’s interpreta- tion.

Forexample,thoseregulationsdirectedtheDivision of Stamps to make adjustments in “cases of loss, miscarriage, ordetentionofstampedsuppliesintransit.”

PostOffice Dept.,PostalLaw&Regs.§12.6(1940ed.).

Thissuggests that when the stamped supplies were intentionally held back and not delivered (i. e., failed to arrive), “detention” was used insteadof“miscarriage,”eventhough,onthemajority’s reading,“miscarriage”wouldhavesufficed.

Theregula- tionsalsodirectedpostalemployeesto“hold”packages droppedofffor“forwarding”iftheycontained“destructive mailmatter,”to“notifythesender”ofthe“detentionofthe package,”andtoletthemknowitcannotbe“transported bymail.”

§728.

Thisisanotheruseof“detention”inthe contextwhere,underthemajority’sview,“miscarriage” wouldhavebeenappropriatebecausethemail“failedtoar- rive” at its destination.

Yet, in each, the cause of the nonde- liverywasknown,itwasnotinadvertence,andadifferent termwasused.

Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:607U. S.391(2026) Sotomayor,J.,dissenting Atmost,themajorityshowsthatcertaindictionarydefi- nitionsof“miscarriage”couldconceivablycaptureintention- allywithholdingmail,ortearingupaletterintopieces,or lightingapackageonfire—inallthosesituations,themail “failed to arrive properly.”

Ante, at 399.

“That a definition is broad enough to encompass one sense of a word,” however, “doesnotestablishthatthewordisordinarilyunderstood inthatsense.”

Taniguchiv.KanPacificSaipan,Ltd.,566 U. S.560,568(2012).

Here,neitherthemajoritynorthe Government has offered any meaningful evidence supporting the view that “miscarriage” was commonly used in situations whenthemailfailedtoarriveproperlyduetointentional wrongdoing,andthat,byincluding“miscarriage”within thepostalexception,Congressintendedtocapturesuch wrongdoing.

Iftherewereanydoubt,thewordssurrounding“miscar- riage”resolveit.

AstheCourtinDolanexplained,when construedincontext,“[a]wordinastatutemayormaynot extendtotheouterlimitsofitsdefinitionalpossibilities.”

546U. S.,at486.

Forexample,“ ‘[a]wordisknownbythe companyitkeeps,’ ”and“ ‘[w]ordsgroupedinalistshould begivenrelatedmeaning.’ ” Id.,at486–487.

Withoutthis rule,courtsrisk“ ‘ascribingtoonewordameaningsobroad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying words, thus giv- ingunintendedbreadthtotheActsofCongress.’ ” Yatesv.

UnitedStates,574U. S.528,543(2015)(pluralityopinion).

Here, reading “miscarriage” to capture intentional miscon- ductdoespreciselythat.

Asnotedabove,theword“loss” typically connotesnegligence, seesupra, at 411–412,and the majority’sreadingmakesCongress’sspecificinclusionofthe “negligent”modifierfor“transmission”entirelyineffective atservingitspurpose—excludingintentionalmisconduct.

Seesupra,at410–411.

Therealsodoesnotappeartobe any good reason why Congress wouldhave wanted one term (“miscarriage,”alone)tocoverintentionalmisconductand Page Proof Pending Publication POSTALSERVICEv.KONAN Sotomayor,J.,dissenting nottheothertwoterms.

Indeed,underthemajority’s broaddefinition of“miscarriage,”the words“loss” and“neg- ligenttransmission”becomenomorethan“misleadingsur- plusage.”

Yates,574U. S.,at546.

B

For all these reasons, a faithful interpretation of the postal exception leads to the conclusion that intentional misconduct isexcludedfromitsreach.

Congressused“overlapping” termsintheexception,ante,at406,butCongressintended for that overlap to keep claims alleging negligence, not inten- tionalwrongdoing,outofcourt.

Thisreadinggivesmean- ing to Congress’s choice to put “negligent” before “transmis- sion”andtousethewords“miscarriage”and“loss”intheir common understanding, and it respects the “specificity” Con- gressusedinthepostalexceptionascomparedtothe broadly worded exceptions Congress used for other agencies. Kosak,465U. S.,at855.

Undeterred by this evidence, the majority gives the Postal ServicetheblanketexceptionCongresswithheld.

Inits view,theexceptionimmunizestheagencyforallintentional and nonintentional actions in the delivery of mail (apart from autoaccidentsandslipandfalls,asDolanandKosakre- quire).

Relyingon“loss,miscarriage,ornegligenttrans- mission”isanoddwaytocoverthiswaterfront.

IfCon- gresshadintendedthisoutcome,whynotfollowthesame approachthatitusedforotherbroadexceptionsinthe FTCA?

Seesupra,at408.

TheansweristhatCongress intendednosuchthing.

Byexpandingthe“wordsandrea- son”ofthepostalexceptionbeyondtheir“specifi[c]”scope, Kosak,565U. S.,at855,themajorityunderminesthe “ ‘sweeping’ ”waiverofimmunityCongressadopted,Dolan, 546U. S.,at492.

Contrarytothemajority’ssuggestionotherwise,adhering tothetextCongressenactedwouldnotfloodtheGovern- Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:607U. S.391(2026) Sotomayor,J.,dissenting ment or courts with frivolous lawsuits.⁴ That is because the FTCA has additional safeguards that bar many claims prem- isedonintentionalmisconduct.

LiabilityfortheUnited Stateswillariseonlyintheraresituationinwhichtheem- ployee’s intentional conduct is tortious, falls within the scope ofheremployment,andfallsoutsideofthedue-careand discretionary-functionexceptions.

See28U. S. C.§2680(a).

For example, the majority cites one case of an insurance com- pany suing after a federal employee stole an expensive pack- ageithadinsured,seeante,at398,butmostStateslikely donotconsiderintentionaltortslikethefttofallwithinan individual’sscopeofemployment,seeRestatement(Second) of Agency §228 (1957) (torts fall outside the scope of employ- mentwhentheyare“toolittleactuatedbyapurposeto serve” theemployer); Brieffor Respondent43, n.21 (collect- ingcaseswheretheftfelloutsidethescopeofemployment).

TheUnitedStates,accordingly,wouldnotincurliabilityin thosecircumstancesorothersinvolvingclaimsofsimilar misconduct.

Inaddition,thereareordinarylitigationtoolstoprevent anythreatofabuses,fromRule11oftheFederalRulesof Civil Procedure to the plausibility standards in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556U. S.662(2009).

Thesetoolssufficeinmanyothercir- ⁴ Themajoritypointstothe335,000complaintsfiledwiththePostal Serviceeachyeartosuggestthatthoseclaimsariseoutofmailfailingto “arriv[e]properlyandontime.”

Ante,at394.

Thisismisleading.

As Konanexplains,thosecomplaintsinclude“everythingfrom‘[r]udeorun- professional...employeebehavior’to‘[c]omplaintsabout...vehicle parking.’ ” BriefforRespondent43.

Submittinga“ ‘customercom- plaint,’ ”moreover,requires“typingafewsentencesintoanonlineform,” whereas“[f]ilinganFTCAclaimrequiresfirstexhaustingadministrative remediesandthenfilingsuitincourt.”

Ibid. Therawnumberofcom- plaintsthereforedoesnotprovideanaccurategaugeoftheconsequences forrecognizingthatintentionalmisconductdoesnotfallwithinthe postalexception.

Page Proof Pending Publication POSTALSERVICEv.KONAN Sotomayor,J.,dissenting cumstanceswherethethreatsofdisruptionposedbylarge volumesoflitigationarealsohigh.

Otherexceptions,like the intentional-tort exception, §2680(h), and the due-care ex- ception,§2680(a),turnonGovernmentofficials’mensrea, and courts are well equipped to assess the plausibility of any givencasebasedonthefactsbeforethem.

Finally,evenifrulingforKonantodaywouldmeanmore suitsagainsttheGovernmentformail-relatedintentional tortstomorrow,thatwouldnotprovidethisCourtwithau- thoritytochangethetextCongressenacted.

Ultimately, thisregimeistheconsequenceofCongress’schoicetohave theexceptionturnoncertaintypesofmisconduct,rather thanprovidingthePostalServicewithablanketexception.

ItisnottheroleoftheJudiciarytosupplantthechoiceCon- gressmadebecauseitwouldhavechosendifferently.

* * * Today,themajorityconcludesthatthepostalexception captures,andthereforeprotects,theintentionalnondelivery of mail,even whenthat nondeliverywas drivenby malicious reasons.

Becausethisinterpretationexpandsthescopeof theexceptionbeyondwhatitcanreasonablysupport,and underminestheFTCA’ssweepingwaiverintheprocess,I respectfullydissent.

Page Proof Pending Publication Reporter’sNote Theattachedopinionhasbeenrevisedtoreflecttheusualpublication andcitationstyleoftheUnitedStatesReports.

Therevisedpagination makesavailabletheofficialUnitedStatesReportscitationinadvanceof publication.

The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions fortheconvenienceofthereaderandconstitutesnopartoftheopinionof theCourt.

Alistofcounselwhoarguedorfiledbriefsinthiscase,and whoweremembersofthebarofthisCourtatthetimethiscasewas argued,hasbeeninsertedfollowingthesyllabus.

Otherrevisionsmay includeadjustmentstoformatting,captions,citationform,andanyerrant punctuation.

Thefollowingadditionaleditsweremade: p.397,line3frombottom:“no”isdeleted p.399,line15frombottom:“ed.”isdeleted p.408,line18:“land”isinsertedbetween“Federal”and“bank” p.411,line11:“conduct”ischangedto“misconduct” p.418,line12frombottom:“and”ischangedto“or”