The Court today holds that the Fourth Circuit erred in treating the 30-day deadline in 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(1) as jurisdictional. Ante, at 263. I agree and join the Court's opinion Page Proof Pending Publication in full. I write separately to note that the Fourth Circuit may nevertheless lack jurisdiction over this suit for a different reason. Petitioner Pierre Riley sought review of an “Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals . . . entered on May 31, 2022.” 1 App. 42 (emphasis deleted). Today's opinion makes clear that this May 31 order is not a “ `fnal order of removal.' ” Ante, at 267. Instead, it is an order denying relief under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). Congress has specifed that federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to review CAT orders “except as part of the review of a fnal order of removal.” § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681–822, note following 8 U. S. C. § 1231 (emphasis added). Thus, on remand, the Fourth Circuit should consider whether it has jurisdiction to review a CAT order when the court is not conducting that review “as part of the review of a fnal order of removal.” Ibid.
I
Through a series of statutory enactments, Congress has established a comprehensive framework for “[j]udicial review of a fnal order of removal.” 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(1). “[A] `fnal order of removal' is a fnal order `concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.' ” Nasral lah v. Barr, 590 U. S. 573, 579 (2020) (quoting 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(47)(A)).
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) grants the federal courts of appeals jurisdiction to review an alien's “fnal order of removal.” § 1252(a)(1). The statute makes the fling of a “petition for review” in accordance with the procedures outlined in IIRIRA the “sole and exclusive means” for an alien to obtain judicial review of such an order. § 1252(a)(5). IIRIRA contemplates that an alien facing removal may bring a “claim” under the CAT. § 1252(a)(4). The CAT is an international human rights treaty that, as relevant here, Page Proof Pending Publication prohibits the removal of an alien to a country where the alien is likely to be tortured. CAT claims are addressed in the frst instance by an immigration judge. The immigration judge's decision is appealable to the Board of Immigration Appeals, an administrative body within the Executive Branch.
This Court has made clear that “CAT orders are not the same as fnal orders of removal.” Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 582 (emphasis deleted). “An order granting CAT relief means only that, notwithstanding the order of removal, the [alien] may not be removed to the designated country of removal, at least until conditions change in that country.” Ibid. “A CAT order is not itself a fnal order of removal because it is not an order `concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.' ” Ibid. While IIRIRA acknowledges that an alien may bring a “claim” under the CAT, see § 1252(a)(4), jurisdiction for judicial review of CAT claims comes from a different statute— the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA), see § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681–822, note following 8 U. S. C. § 1231. FARRA specifes that no federal court shall have “jurisdiction to consider or review claims raised under the [CAT] except as part of the review of a fnal order of removal pursuant to [8 U. S. C. § 1252].” § 2242(d), 112 Stat. 2681–822; see also 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(4) (stating that the fling of “a petition for review fled with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with [§ 1252]” is the “sole and exclusive means for judicial review” of any CAT claim).
IIRIRA also contains a “zipper clause,” which provides for consolidation in judicial review. The zipper clause states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section,” judicial review of “all questions of law and fact . . . arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien” shall be “available only in judicial review of a fnal order under this section.” § 1252(b)(9). The upshot is straightforward: Federal courts generally lack jurisdiction over all questions Page Proof Pending Publication of law and fact that arise from removal proceedings unless the court is reviewing “a fnal order” under § 1252(a)(1) or exercising jurisdiction “otherwise provided” in § 1252. § 1252(b)(9).
The zipper clause plainly covers CAT claims because CAT claims “aris[e] from” removal proceedings. Ibid.; see also Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 585. It follows that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review CAT claims “unless they are reviewing `a fnal order' under § 1252(a)(1) or exercising jurisdiction `otherwise provided' in § 1252.” Jennings v. Rodri guez, 583 U. S. 281, 316 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Section 1252 does not contain “a specifc grant of jurisdiction over CAT claims.” Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 591–592 (Thomas, J., dissenting). FARRA—not § 1252—“provides for judicial review of CAT claims.” Id., at 580 (majority opinion). Thus, on my reading of the relevant statutes, courts cannot review CAT claims unless they are reviewing a fnal order of removal.
II
Riley has never petitioned for judicial review of a fnal order of removal. See Brief for Petitioner 10–12. He petitioned the Fourth Circuit only for “review of the Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals . . . entered on May 31, 2022.” 1 App. 42 (emphasis deleted). And, as the Court today holds, this May 31 order addressing Riley's CAT claim is not a fnal order of removal. Ante, at 267.
I do not see how the Fourth Circuit has jurisdiction to review a CAT order in isolation when the petitioner does not seek review of a fnal order of removal. Congress has provided that federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to review an order denying CAT relief “except as part of the review of a fnal order of removal.” § 2242(d), 112 Stat. 2681–822 (emphasis added). “In other words, a fnal order of removal is required if a court is to review a CAT order at all.” Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 592 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Page Proof Pending Publication Riley has undoubtedly received a fnal order of removal. But, he has never sought judicial review of that order pursuant to the procedures outlined in § 1252. This Court has held that “CAT orders may be reviewed together with fnal orders of removal in a court of appeals.” Id., at 581 (emphasis added). But, as far as I am aware, we have never held that judicial review of CAT orders is available when an alien does not petition for review of a fnal order of removal. “[W]e can address jurisdictional issues in any order we choose.” Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer, 601 U. S. 1, 4 (2023); see also Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U. S. 574, 584 (1999) (there is no mandatory “sequencing of jurisdictional issues”). In this case, we decide only the issue on which we granted certiorari: the correctness of the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction based on the timing of Riley's petition for review. We do not decide whether Riley's case is otherwise free of jurisdictional defects.
On remand, the Fourth Circuit must assure itself of its jurisdiction before it can proceed to the merits of Riley's petition. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 101–102 (1998). I encourage the Fourth Circuit to consider whether it has jurisdiction to review a CAT order—and only a CAT order—when the petitioner does not seek review of a fnal order of removal.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Kagan and Justice Jackson join, and with whom Justice Gorsuch joins as to all but Part IV, dissenting in part.
Sometimes, to ask a question is to answer it. When petitioner Pierre Riley received an order from the Department of Homeland Security notifying him it would seek to deport him to Jamaica, he timely sought deferral of that removal on the ground that he would likely be killed upon his return there. After initially winning such relief from an Immigration Judge, Riley lost before the Board of Immigration ApPage Proof Pending Publication peals. The question is when Riley should have petitioned for judicial review of the Board's order. Was his petition due 30 days after the Government frst notifed him he would be deported, well over a year before the Board issued the order Riley sought to challenge? Or was it instead due 30 days after the order denying his claim for deferral of removal? The answer is clear: One should not be required to appeal an order before it exists.
Incomprehensibly, the Court disagrees. It acknowledges that the immigration laws required Riley to appeal the Department's decision that he was “deportable” together with the Board's (much later) order denying him relief from removal to Jamaica. It admits that the only way to review both orders is to do so after the latter of the two issues. Yet it concludes Riley's appeal was due before the Board issued the second order. Because Congress did not write so incoherent a judicial-review provision, I respectfully dissent.*
I
A
Petitioner Pierre Riley grew up in Kingston, Jamaica. In 1995, at age 16, he entered the United States on a visitor's visa to live with his father, a U. S. citizen. Riley overstayed his visa, because (he says) he thought his father had arranged for his naturalization. Eventually, Riley got involved in marijuana traffcking, and in 2008, a federal jury convicted him of conspiring to distribute marijuana and possessing a frearm in furtherance of that conspiracy. For those offenses, a Federal District Court sentenced him to 25 years' imprisonment.
In January of 2021, after serving nearly 15 years of his sentence, Riley moved for compassionate release, arguing that his Type 2 diabetes and the COVID–19 pandemic consti*The majority correctly holds that the deadlines in this case are not jurisdictional, ante, at 272–277, so I join Part II–B of its opinion. Page Proof Pending Publication tuted extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying his release. The District Court agreed.
A few days later, the Department of Homeland Security served Riley with notice that it would seek to remove him from the United States. Because Riley had been convicted of an aggravated felony, the Government could pursue his removal “without a hearing before an immigration judge.” 8 CFR § 238.1(b)(2)(i) (2024); 8 U. S. C. § 1228(c). Instead, after providing Riley an opportunity to contest his removability in writing, an immigration offcer simply issued a “Final Administrative Removal Order,” fnding him “deportable” and ordering him “removed from the United States t[o] Jamaica.” 1 App. 7–8. Riley received this removal order on January 28, 2021.
B
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), Art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20, 1465 U. N. T. S. 113, categorically prohibits signatory states from returning any person “to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” The United States has been a party to the Convention since 1994, and federal statutes and regulations implement its requirements. See ante, at 265; 8 CFR § 208.16(c). “A conviction of an aggravated felony has no effect on CAT eligibility” and “the Attorney General has no discretion to deny relief to a noncitizen who establishes his eligibility.” Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U. S. 184, 188, n. 1 (2013). That is why even noncitizens like Riley, who are statutorily ineligible for administrative hearings on removability, are nonetheless entitled to a hearing before an immigration judge if they express a credible fear of torture in their country of removal. Such hearings are known as withholding-only or CAT proceedings, and their result can be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 8 CFR § 208.31(e).
Page Proof Pending Publication After receiving his removal order, Riley told an asylum offcer that a powerful drug dealer affliated with the Jamaican Government had been targeting his family and had murdered two of his cousins. 2 App. 66. Riley feared that he, too, would be killed upon his return to Jamaica. The offcer found Riley “credible,” but nonetheless concluded he was ineligible for CAT relief. Id., at 59.
At a subsequent hearing before an Immigration Judge, Riley again testifed that he feared removal to Jamaica. Riley explained that, following his compassionate release, “a big drug kingpin” who functioned as a major political leader in his Kingston neighborhood and was “tied in with all facets of law enforcement” had threatened repeatedly to kill him. Administrative Record in Riley v. Garland, No. 22–1609 (CA4), p. 194; see id., at 204–207. In 2008, Riley said, the same kingpin had ordered the killing of his cousin, Oneil Spencer, after Spencer stopped “donat[ing]” money “to fund political campaigns and pay off government offcials.” Id., at 201. When another cousin, Darrel Scott, was deported from the United States to Jamaica two years later and urged the local police to investigate Spencer's murder, he too was shot and killed. Id., at 203–204.
After Riley's release made the Jamaican news, his mother, sister, and brother each began receiving a constant stream of death threats directed at Riley. Id., at 207–209, 280–289. His mother reported the threats to the police, but (Riley testifed) she was told that “the reason why your son is getting threats is because it's payback,” that Riley was a “criminal,” and that he would have to “pay for protection.” Id., at 208. Riley also explained that he could not evade these threats by moving elsewhere in Jamaica. As a deportee with a criminal record, Riley would be required under Jamaican law to register his address upon his return, meaning he would be easily located.
Along with his CAT application for deferral of his removal to Jamaica, Riley submitted letters from his mother, sister, Page Proof Pending Publication brother, and stepfather corroborating his testimony. See id., at 280–289. Riley also submitted Spencer's death certifcate, which lists “multiple gunshot wounds” as the cause of death. Id., at 292.
The Immigration Judge found Riley's testimony credible, concluded that he was more likely than not to face torture or death upon his return to Jamaica, and granted CAT deferral of removal.
C
The Department of Homeland Security appealed the Immigration Judge's deferral order to the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Board discerned “no clear error in the Immigration Judge's credibility determination.”
1 App. 47.
Nevertheless, it concluded that Riley's claim was “based on the stringing together of a series of suppositions.” Id., at 50. Accordingly, the Board once again ordered Riley removed to Jamaica. The Board fled its order on May 31, 2022, 16 months after the frst administrative removal order. Three days after the Board denied relief, Riley petitioned the Fourth Circuit for review.
On its own motion, the Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court recognized that an order “denying CAT relief is reviewable `as part of the review of a fnal order of removal.' ” Riley v. Garland, 2024 WL 1826979, *2 (Apr. 26, 2024) (per curiam) (quoting Nas rallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. 573, 582 (2020)). By statute, noncitizens must fle their “petition[s] for review” of such fnal removal orders “not later than 30 days,” 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(1), a deadline the Fourth Circuit believed to be “ `jurisdictional and . . . not subject to equitable tolling,' ” 2024 WL 1826979, *1. The court concluded this 30-day window began to run on the date the original order of removal issued in January 2021, regardless of whether the associated CAT proceedings had concluded. By that logic, Riley would have been required to fle his appeal of both the January 2021 fnal order of removal and the Board's May 2022 order denying CAT Page Proof Pending Publication relief in February of 2021. Because he did not, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal. Ibid.
II
Should Riley have appealed the Board's order denying deferral of removal before the Board issued it? The answer ought to be easy. Yet the majority today renders the statute incoherent, holding that Riley should have appealed the order one year and three months before the Board entered it. According to the majority, “statutory text and our prior precedents” require this absurd result. Ante, at 272. Our Nation's immigration laws may be complex, but the irrational scheme the Court endorses today is a product entirely of its own creation. Statutory text and precedent overwhelmingly confrm what common sense tells us: Riley's appeal was timely.
A
Although the majority purports to be bound by the statute, its cursory analysis elides all but one of the relevant provisions. Ante, at 267. Background on the statutory scheme is accordingly necessary to understanding why the question in this case arises.
Early versions of the Immigration and Nationality Act granted the courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to review “all fnal orders of deportation,” Act of Sept. 26, 1961, § 5(a), 75 Stat. 651, an undefned term this Court interpreted to include “order[s] denying suspension of deportation,” Foti v. INS, 375 U. S. 217, 222 (1963). Under that framework, a noncitizen who received an order denying relief from removal (such as the Board's order denying Riley's CAT claim) could have appealed it as a standalone order of deportation, regardless of whether a prior order had resolved the issue of removability. Cf. Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U. S. 206, 211 (1968) (allowing separate petitions for review of “denials of discretionary relief” following an initial removal order). Page Proof Pending Publication A number of amendments intended to streamline the immigration laws changed that analysis. See Kolov v. Garland, 78 F. 4th 911, 922–924 (CA6 2023) (Murphy, J., concurring) (describing these developments). Specifcally, Congress “ `consolidate[d] judicial review of immigration proceedings into one action in the court of appeals.' ” Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221, 230 (2020) (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 313 (2001)). It did so by enacting the so-called zipper clause, ibid., which channels judicial review of all claims “arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States” into a single appeal: the appeal of a “fnal order [of removal],” 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(9); see also § 1252(a)(1). The zipper clause does not change the substance of what noncitizens may appeal. Monsalvo Velázquez v. Bondi, 604 U. S. 712, 724, and n. 1 (2025). Rather, it ensures that “a noncitizen's various challenges arising from the removal proceeding” are “ `consolidated in a petition for review and considered by the courts of appeals.' ” Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 580.
“Importantly,” the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 expressly “provides for judicial review of CAT claims.” Id., at 580. Thus, noncitizens (including those whose opportunities for judicial review are otherwise limited on account of criminal convictions) can obtain judicial review of orders denying CAT relief. Id., at 580–581. Because such challenges “aris[e]” out of the removal proceedings, however, the zipper clause applies to them.
§ 1252(b)(9). And the zipper clause would not achieve its goal, of “[c]onsolidat[ing]” the relevant appeals, ibid., if non- citizens had to appeal each issue separately. That is why, as the Act directs, “a petition for review fled with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with” the statute governing fnal orders of removal “shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of any cause or claim under the Page Proof Pending Publication [CAT].” § 1252(a)(4). A petition for review under § 1252, in turn, “must be fled not later than 30 days after the date of the fnal order of removal.” § 1252(b)(1).
All this explains why, though Riley seeks to appeal the denial of CAT relief and not the fnding that he is removable, the appellate deadline in his case nonetheless depends on identifying the “order of removal” and determining when it became “fnal.” Ibid. An “order of removal” is the same as an “ `order of deportation.' ” Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 579, 584. Along with the other 1990s amendments, Congress enacted a statutory defnition of that term, defning it as the order “concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.” § 1101(a)(47)(A). Subsequently, this Court held that a CAT order “is not itself a fnal order of removal” as defned in the statute. Id., at 582. In light of that holding, the majority correctly identifes the relevant “order of removal” as the January 2021 administrative order holding Riley removable. The only question, then, is when that order became fnal for purposes of the 30-day appeal window.
B
Riley's order of removal did not became fnal, for purposes of appeal, until the Board issued its order denying CAT relief. Congress expressly provided for judicial review of “any cause or claim” under CAT. § 1252(a)(4). Self- evidently, such review “cannot take place until the [Board] has denied . . . relief.” Ante, at 271. Meanwhile, Congress directed that CAT orders must be appealed alongside the underlying order of removal. The only way to adhere to both instructions is to hold that removal orders do not become fnal until withholding-only proceedings are complete. Centuries of precedent on fnality confrm that conclusion. Immigration laws defne fnality, but only with respect to orders of removal subject to direct Board review. Congress Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication provided that orders of removal “shall become fnal upon the earlier of . . . (i) a determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affrming such order; or (ii) the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals.”
§ 1101(a)(47)(B). Sensibly, then, the statute ties fnality to the close of the relevant agency proceedings.
In the mine run of cases, an immigration judge hears claims about removability together with claims about protection from or deferral of removal (such as CAT claims) in a single proceeding, which ends in a consolidated appeal to the Board. The fnality provision makes clear that, in those cases, the underlying removal order becomes fnal once the Board has concluded its review.
Expedited removal orders like the one issued in Riley's case, however, are not subject to Board review at all. § 1228(b). Rather, a noncitizen subject to expedited removal can appeal only a withholding claim to the Board, and not the removal order itself. By its plain terms, the statute's fnality provision does not apply to such removal orders. That is because, in such cases, there will never be “a determination by the Board” affrming the removal order, nor is there any “period in which the alien is permitted to seek review” of it. § 1101(a)(47)(B). Thus, the statutory defnition alone does not resolve this case.
The majority claims the statutory defnition renders the order of removal fnal immediately upon its issuance. That is so, the majority says, because when a removal order is not appealable, “the period to seek review [of it] `expir[es]' as soon as the [order] is issued.” Ante, at 267. In other words, the majority treats a nonexistent appeals period as if it were merely an infnitesimally short period, one so short as to “expir[e]” instantaneously.
That makes no sense. “Expiration,” after all, means the “conclusion [or] termination of a limited time.” See Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary 645 (2d ed. 1979); Black's Law Dictionary 579 (6th ed. 1990) (“Cessation; termination from mere lapse of time, as the expiration date of a lease, insurance policy, statute, and the like”); Black's Law Dictionary 722 (12th ed. 2024) (“The ending of a fxed period of time”). A period of time cannot “expire” if it never begins in the frst place. For example, a statute fning those who apply for a driver's license after “the expiration of the period” for which they hold the license plainly would not apply to a frst-time applicant. As to that applicant, there is no “period” (much less a limited or fxed one) that could “expir[e].” 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)(ii). So too here. The majority gives no argument for reaching the opposite conclusion. It stands alone, moreover, in asserting that a “straightforward reading of the statutory text” resolves this case. Ante, at 267. Even the courts of appeals that have attempted to defend the majority's position admit that “[t]he defnition of fnality in § 1101(a)(47)(B) does not squarely apply” to expedited orders of removal because noncitizens “may not appeal [those] decision[s] to the BIA (or even to an immigration judge).” Bhaktibhai-Patel v. Garland, 32 F. 4th 180, 192 (CA2 2022); Martinez v. Garland, 86 F. 4th 561, 568 (CA4 2023) (“An alien cannot appeal an immigration offcer's reinstatement decision to the Board, so at frst blush this defnition appears inapposite”).
Absent an unambiguous answer in the statute's defnition of fnality, the Court should turn to tools of statutory construction: the “ `ordinary or natural' meaning” of the term “fnal,” Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1, 9 (2004), “ ` “the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice” ' ” associated with fnality, Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U. S. 192, 200 (2025), and the relevant provisions' “ `place in the overall statutory scheme,' ” West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 721 (2022). Beginning with the ordinary meaning of “fnal,” this Court has previously recognized that term “clearly denotes some Page Proof Pending Publication kind of terminal event.” Smith v. Berryhill, 587 U. S. 471, 479 (2019).
Thus, an order becomes “final” when it “ `leav[es] nothing to be looked for or expected,' ” when it “ `leav[es] no further chance for action, discussion, or change.' ” Ibid., and n. 8 (quoting 5 Oxford English Dictionary 920 (2d ed. 1989) and Webster's New World College Dictionary 542 (5th ed. 2016)).
Of course, an order can be terminal in one sense and not another. Consider a conviction. Once a jury delivers, and the court enters, a guilty verdict, nothing remains “to be looked for or expected” from that court with respect to the conviction. In that sense, a conviction is as fnal as its gets. Nevertheless, “appellate review” is prohibited “until conviction and imposition of sentence.” Flanagan v. United States, 465 U. S. 259, 263 (1984). So for purposes of appeal, a conviction remains nonfnal until sentencing is complete as well. Yet another rule of fnality applies to the availability of collateral review. See Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U. S. 113, 119 (2009) (noting that, under 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), a state-court conviction is not fnal for purposes of federal collateral review until the end of direct review or of the time for seeking such review).
This multiplicity of fnality rules makes clear that it is not enough to muse about fnality in the abstract. Rather, the Court must focus on the specifc sense of fnality relevant here, which (all agree) is fnality for purposes of appeal. Because “ `[f]inality as a condition of review is an historic characteristic of federal appellate procedure,' ” Flanagan, 465 U. S., at 263, centuries of precedent and practice inform that analysis.
As a general matter, an order is fnal for purposes of appeal “when the district court disassociates itself from the case, leaving nothing to be done at the court of frst instance save execution of the judgment.” Clay v. United States, 537 U. S. 522, 527 (2003). That understanding of fnality serves one central purpose: preventing piecemeal litigation. As Page Proof Pending Publication this Court put it long ago, “[f]rom the very foundation of our judicial system,” rules of fnality have ensured that “the whole case and every matter in controversy in it” is “decided in a single appeal.” McLish v. Roff, 141 U. S. 661, 665–666 (1891). That is why this Court's fnality jurisprudence is grounded “not in merely technical conceptions of `fnality,' ” but rather in the policy “against piecemeal litigation.” Cat lin v. United States, 324 U. S. 229, 233–234 (1945).
The reason for that focus is simple: The only way to ensure that orders are appealed together is to have them become fnal together as well. Otherwise, an expiring deadline on an earlier order (say, a conviction) would force individuals to appeal that order before the remaining issues in the case (say, a criminal sentence) have been resolved. So when two orders must be consolidated into the same appeal, it follows inescapably that they become final together, as well.
Whether a ruling is fnal for purposes of appeal therefore depends principally on whether that ruling can, consistent with the policy against piecemeal review, be appealed independently. See Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U. S. 148, 152–153 (1964) (collecting cases).
An example illustrates the point. Sometimes, a dispute over an award of attorney's fees follows the conclusion of litigation on the merits. At present, “[t]here is no question that awards of attorney's fees may be appealed separately as fnal orders after a fnal determination of liability on the merits.” García-Goyco v. Law Environmental Consultants, Inc., 428 F. 3d 14, 18 (CA1 2005). Thus, for example, when a party loses a civil case at trial, it may appeal the jury verdict before the fee litigation has concluded. See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat. Bank, 307 U. S. 161, 168–169 (1939). Because separate appeals are permitted, the fnality of the merits judgment does not depend on the status of the attorney's fees dispute.
Suppose, now, that Congress passed a law providing that an appeal from fnal judgment “shall be the sole and excluPage Proof Pending Publication sive means for judicial review of” an order awarding attorney's fees. Cf. 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(4). That law should have the effect of overruling the courts' present assessment that such orders are best appealed separately. Courts would undoubtedly recognize that merits judgments could no longer become fnal while fee litigation remained pending, because a statute now directs otherwise. The perceived need for separate appealability was, after all, the basis for the prior fnality rule. Keeping the old fnality rule in place in the face of the hypothetical statute, moreover, would force litigants to choose between appealing the merits judgment on time, thus forgoing their appeal of any eventual fee award, or fling their only appeal late. No court would adopt such a scheme.
Yet that is precisely what the Court does today with respect to appeals from CAT orders. Recall that withholding- only decisions (which now include CAT orders) once were independently appealable as orders of deportation. See supra, at 286. Congress then enacted § 1252(a)(4), which says that “a petition for review” under the section governing fnal orders of removal “shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of any cause or claim under the [CAT].” In other words, Congress directed that appeals from orders of removal and CAT orders be “ `consolidated in a [single] petition for review.' ” Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 580. That should only mean one thing. Because a statute ties appeals of the CAT order to appeals of the removal order, their fnality should be tied together, too. Accordingly, the order of removal in this case should become fnal, for purposes of appeal, only after the Board issued its order denying CAT relief.
That the majority nonetheless adopts the opposite position, contrary to every one of this Court's fnality precedents, might suggest there is reason to doubt that CAT orders are appealable at all. Yet statutory text and this Court's precePage Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication dent are crystal clear on this point: Congress provided for judicial review of CAT claims.
Section 1252(a)(4) provides that “a petition for review” under that section “shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of any cause or claim under the [CAT].” No “exclusive means” for review would be possible if review were unavailable. That is why this Court held in Nasrallah that “a noncitizen may obtain judicial review of . . . CAT orders,” 590 U. S., at 583, even as the dissent complained that the Court wrongly “view[ed] § 1252(a)(4) as a specifc grant of jurisdiction over CAT claims.” Id., at591 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Perhaps the idea is that noncitizens may seek judicial review of their CAT claims only if, by luck or happenstance, they also have a challenge to the underlying order of removal. The majority's fnality rule, however, prevents CAT appeals even under those circumstances. After all, courts will likely fnish reviewing the removal order before the Board ever hears the associated CAT claim.
Section 1252(a)(4) also does not direct courts to limit review of CAT claims in this way; it simply requires that review of the two kinds of orders be consolidated. Nor would this reading make any sense. Consider its effect on the attorney's fees hypothetical, where that reading would mean litigants could appeal a fee award only if, by luck or happenstance, they also had a meritorious challenge to the unrelated merits judgment.
Importantly, this Court rejected a nearly identical argument about § 1252 just months ago. In Monsalvo Velázquez, the Government argued that noncitizens seeking judicial review of questions arising out of their orders of removal could do so only by challenging their removability. 604 U. S., at 721–722; see also id., at 760 (Barrett, J., dissenting) (“[J]udicial review is available under § 1252(a)(1) only if there is a challenge to a `fnal order of removal' ”). This Court held that, “[i]nstead, § 1252 authorizes courts to review `fnal order[s] of removal' and address `questions of law . . . arising from' them.” Id., at 722 (quoting §§ 1252(a)(1), (b)(9); emphasis added). Nasrallah, the zipper clause, and § 1252(a)(4) each make clear that questions about one's eligibility for CAT relief are questions “arising from” the order of removal. Thus, “§ 1252 authorizes courts to review” such questions. 604 U. S., at 722.
Under the “ `well-settled' and `strong presumption' ” favoring judicial review, “when a statutory provision `is reasonably susceptible to divergent interpretation, we adopt the reading that accords with traditional understandings and basic principles: that executive determinations generally are subject to judicial review.' ” Guerrero-Lasprilla, 589 U. S., at 229. “The presumption can only be overcome by `clear and convincing evidence' of congressional intent to preclude judicial review.” Ibid.; see also Bowen v. Michigan Acad emy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, 670 (1986) (“ `[J]udicial review of a fnal agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress' ” (quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140 (1967))). It is hard to imagine any plausible reading of § 1252(a)(4) on which it cuts off judicial review of CAT claims (either completely or in the arbitrary sense rejected in Monsalvo Veláz quez), much less a “ `clear and convincing' ” one. Guerrero- Lasprilla, 589 U. S., at 229; see also Parrish v. United States, 605 U. S. 376, 384 (2025) (reiterating this Court's consistent holdings “that `decisions on the merits' ought not be `avoided on the basis of . . . mere technicalities' ” (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U. S. 178, 181 (1962))).
The majority, perhaps aware of precedent's constrains, does not dispute any of this. It acknowledges, as it must, that CAT claims are reviewable. Ante, at 271–272. Yet once the majority accepts that premise, it is left with no way to justify its construction of the judicial-review provision as requiring petitions for review to be fled well before the relePage Proof Pending Publication vant CAT orders are issued. If judicial review is available, then it must be available after the relevant order is issued and not before. And if review is available after the relevant orders issue, then there is no conceivable reason to require applicants to fle their petitions beforehand.
III
A
Besides its halfhearted attempt to invoke the inapplicable statutory defnition, the majority offers a single thought about the dispositive issue of fnality. The original order, it says, “was . . . the Executive's fnal determination on the question of removal,” so it “constituted `the fnal order of removal' in this case.” Ante, at 267. The implication is that, because this order was a “fnal determination,” ibid., it became fnal the moment it was issued.
This argument confates two different questions: when the agency made its fnal decision on the question of removability, and when the “order of removal” became fnal for appellate purposes. This Court explained just months ago that “a fnding of `removability' ” is only “one term in a fnal order of removal.” Monsalvo Velázquez, 604 U. S., at 722. That the agency's removability fnding is fnal therefore does not mean that the order containing it is fnal for purposes of appeal.
The majority's skewed reasoning betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the fnal-judgment principle. Every interlocutory order fnally determines the limited question it decides, but of course that does not mean every order becomes instantly fnal for purposes of appeal. When a district court declines to certify an expert witness, that is its fnal word on the matter, yet the order remains nonfnal for purposes of appeal until the entire case has been litigated to judgment. When a district court disqualifes a litigant's counsel, that order is the court's “fnal determination on the question” of disqualifcation, ante, at 267; counsel could not Page Proof Pending Publication show up to trial again the next day. Yet the order remains nonfnal for purposes of appeal until the underlying case is over. See Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U. S. 424, 430 (1985); Flanagan, 465 U. S., at 263. Few decisions, moreover, are more fnal than a guilty verdict, yet a conviction remains nonfnal for purposes of appeal until the district court has pronounced a sentence. See supra, at 291.
In failing to recognize as much, the majority breaks with basic principles of fnality and appellate review, holding (seemingly for the frst time) that two orders that statutorily must be appealed together nonetheless do not become fnal together. Inexplicably, the majority admits that “review of removability and withholding of removal should occur in a single appellate proceeding,” and that “review of the denial of CAT relief cannot take place until the [Board] has denied such relief.” Ante, at 271. Yet it refuses to accept the inevitable conclusion: If the orders must be reviewed “in a single appellate proceeding,” ibid., then they become fnal for purposes of appeal together as well. The result: Noncitizens facing expedited removal will be forced to fle immediate appeals of their removal orders in every case, simply to protect their right to judicial review in the event they lose their ongoing withholding-only proceedings.
Across a wide variety of statutory contexts, courts have recognized that protective appeals are “procedural hoops” that “serve no function.” West Penn Power Co. v. EPA, 860 F. 2d 581, 585, 586 (CA3 1988) (explaining, in Clean Air Act case, the need “to avoid a de facto requirement of protective appeals”); Outland v. CAB, 284 F. 2d 224, 227–228 (CADC 1960) (declining to read the Administrative Procedure Act to require protective appeals while reconsideration is pending); Newark, New Castle and Seaford, Del. v. FERC, 763 F. 2d 533, 544–545 (CA3 1985) (same, in Federal Power Act case); Rosler v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 241, 245–246 (1991) (explaining, in Veterans' Judicial Review Act case, that reading protective appeal requirement into statute “would . . . pose Page Proof Pending Publication a substantial administrative problem” and cause “many” claimants to “lose their right to judicial review”). Protective appeal requirements “set a trap for the unwary, who, if they are not intimately familiar with the intricacies of the fnality doctrine, may inadvertently lose their right to judicial review.” West Penn Power Co., 860 F. 2d, at 585.
For that reason, too, this Court has rejected statutory readings that would result in similar protective-appeal requirements, even in the face of seemingly contrary textual commands. Consider § 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides: “Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise fnal is fnal for purposes of this section whether or not there has been presented or determined an application . . . for any form of reconsideration.” 5 U. S. C. § 704. Taken literally, “[t]his would seem to mean that the pendency of reconsideration motions does not render [agency] orders nonfnal for purposes of triggering the Hobbs Act limitations period.” ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, 482 U. S. 270, 284 (1987). Yet “[t]hat language has long been construed by this and other courts merely to relieve parties from the requirement of petitioning for rehearing before seeking judicial review . . . but not to prevent petitions for reconsideration that are actually fled from rendering the orders under reconsideration nonfnal.” Id., at 284–285; see also American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service, 397 U. S. 532, 541 (1970). By contrast, in Stone v. INS, 514 U. S. 386 (1995), we held that motions to reopen orders of removal did not render nonfnal the underlying removal order, precisely because petitioners “[c]ould fle a separate petition to review that second fnal [reconsideration] order.” Id., at 395.
More recently, this Court has twice refused to read a protective-appeal requirement into § 1252. In Santos- Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U. S. 411 (2023), the Government advanced a reading of that section that would “food the Board with reconsideration motions that noncitizens otherPage Proof Pending Publication wise would not fle” and “food the courts with pointless premature petitions,” fled simply to preserve the right to review. Id., at 429. This Court declined to “render the statutory scheme incoherent” in that way. Id., at 428. And earlier this year, the Government argued that, under the zipper clause, noncitizens could challenge the terms of their removal order only if they “press[ed] a challenge to [the] fnding of `removability.' ” Monsalvo Velázquez, 604 U. S., at 722. This Court rejected that argument, too, noting it would have put noncitizens to the choice of “either adorn[ing] their judicial petitions with a pointless challenge . . . or forfeit[ing] the right to review altogether.” Ibid. Mere months later the Court seems to have forgotten all these lessons.
B
The Court overlooks Santos-Zacaria, Monsalvo Veláz quez, and the wealth of precedent on fnality, claiming instead that two other cases are “instructive” and require a different outcome here. Ante, at 268. Neither case supports the majority's conclusion.
First, the majority points to Nasrallah's holding that “a CAT order is not a fnal order of removal,” does not disturb or affect the validity of a fnal order of removal, and does not merge into such an order. Ante, at 268. The majority does not explain, however, why this holding supports its conclusion. An order need not “ `affect the validity' ” of a decision (or merge into it) to impact its fnality for purposes of appeal. Ibid. As noted, a sentence does not affect the validity of a conviction (and the two do not “merge”), yet a conviction cannot be fnal for purposes of appeal until the sentence is fnal as well. Notably, Nasrallah itself compared the relationship between removal and CAT orders to that between a criminal conviction and sentence. 590 U. S., at 583. Nas rallah is therefore hardly dispositive here.
In any event, it should be clear by now that the majority's discussion of Nasrallah misses the point. Whether CAT orPage Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication ders disturb or affect the substance of removal orders would certainly be relevant if the Court conducted its fnality analysis without guidance from Congress, as it did in the case of fee awards. See Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527, 531 (1882) (fee orders are “so far independent” of the merits “as to make the decision substantially a fnal decree for the purposes of an appeal”). But here, Congress dictated that the two orders must be consolidated for purposes of appeal. 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(4). The Court is required to respect that decision and move on.
The majority next points to Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U. S. 523 (2021), as supporting its conclusion. Ante, at 269. That case concerned the 90-day removal period following an order of removal, during which the Government is required to detain noncitizens. See § 1231(a)(2). The point of such detention is to provide the Government with a reasonable period of time to “secure [the noncitizen's] removal.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678, 699 (2001). The removal period does not begin, Congress has specifed, until the removal order is “administratively fnal.” § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i). The question was whether ongoing withholding-only proceedings prevented a removal order from being administratively fnal for purposes of the mandatory detention period. This Court held that the administrative fnality of an order of removal “does not depend in any way on the outcome of the withholding-only proceedings.” Guzman Chavez, 594 U. S., at 539. Thus, the detention period begins after the agency has fnalized its removability fnding, not after further proceedings over the specifc country of removal have concluded. Id., at 534–535. Yet whether an order is “administratively fnal” for purposes of detention and whether it is “fnal” for purposes of appeal are two entirely different questions. “Finality is variously defned; like many legal terms, its precise meaning depends on context.” Clay, 537 U. S., at 527. That is why this Court recognized in Guzman Chavez that § 1252 “uses different language than § 1231 and relates to judicial review of removal orders rather than detention.” 594 U. S., at 535, n. 6. The Court thus “express[ed] no view on” the question of fnality for purposes of appeal. Ibid. Nor is it at all surprising that “administratively fnal” in § 1231 and “fnal” in § 1252 should have different meanings. “In a given statute, the same term usually has the same meaning and different terms usually have different meanings.” Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U. S. 124, 149 (2024). Because the point of detention is to ensure that a noncitizen does not fee pending his deportation, moreover, arguably all that matters for purposes of the detention statute is that the noncitizen is removable from the United States, not whether he is removable to any particular country. Guzman Chavez, 594 U. S., at 536, 539. There is “no reason to import the understanding of fnality that applies” to detention into the separate “feld” of appellate review. Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., 604 U. S. 305, 315 (2025) (majority opinion of Alito, J.) (discussing the different “role[s]” of fnality across contexts). Indeed, precisely the same two senses of fnality apply to criminal convictions. A conviction becomes fnal for purposes of presentencing detention once the jury has delivered its verdict. 18 U. S. C. § 3143(a). Yet it does not become fnal for purposes of appeal until the district court has imposed a sentence.
The majority claims to “appreciate th[e] difference” between the two sorts of fnality. Ante, at 271. But, the majority explains, “the meaning of fnality” is not “necessarily” different, even when Congress uses different words to serve different purposes. Ibid. That truism hardly helps. The majority gives up shortly afterward, simply asserting by ipse dixit that the differences do not matter here. In light of 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(4) and our fnality precedents, they clearly should.
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IV
Today's holding deals untold damage to basic principles of fnality and judicial review. Time will tell whether the Court will extend its illogic beyond politically disfavored noncitizens. Cf. McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 604 U. S. 146, 158, n. 5 (2025) (recognizing “unfairness . . . potentially ris[ing] to the level of a constitutional due process problem,” of rule that would require regulated businesses to seek judicial review before the applicability of an agency order to them was “reasonably foreseeable”). As it stands, the chaos the majority causes to our system of immigration appeals is considerable. The effects on non- citizens subject to expedited removal proceedings should by now be clear enough. The majority suggests a number of workarounds for that chaos, including by allowing protective appeals and notice about the need to fle such appeals long before CAT proceedings have concluded. See ante, at 271– 272. To be clear, the Government is obligated by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause to provide noncitizens with adequate notice about the need for an immediate appeal to preserve the right to judicial review of CAT claims. See A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 605 U. S. 91, 94 (2025) (per curiam) (“ `[T]he Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in the context of removal proceedings' ” (quoting Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U. S. 670, 673 (2025) (per curiam); alteration in original)). That guarantee includes “notice that is `reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,' ” to enable “ `interested parties' ” to “pursue appropriate relief.” A. A. R. P., 605 U. S., at 94–95 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314 (1950)). So too, courts of appeals should not arbitrarily decline to hold in abeyance any premature appeals of yet-to-be-decided withholding claims. See ante, at 271–272.
In addition, the courts of appeals should consider applying standard principles of equitable tolling, which are likely available now that the Court has recognized that Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication § 1252(b)(1)'s appeal deadline is not jurisdictional. See ante, at 272–277.
Today's decision may have consequences beyond expedited removal proceedings, too. Recall that, in the typical case, an immigration judge decides all questions related to both removal and withholding in the same proceeding. See supra, at 289. The Board of Immigration Appeals then reviews all aspects of the immigration judge's decision. As things stand today, the noncitizen may petition for review of the Board's decision once agency review has completed. See ibid.; § 1101(a)(47)(B). Yet what if the Board affrms “an immigration judge's removability fnding but remand[s] for further consideration of withholding claims”? Kolov, 78 F. 4th, at 927 (Murphy, J., concurring). Would the majority hold as well that such fndings become fnal before the remand is concluded, requiring noncitizens to fle premature protective appeals whenever a CAT claim is remanded? As with so much else, the majority does not say. To avoid further chaos, the Board would be well counseled to remand cases in their entirety.
Finally, lest one think today's decision will at least allow the Government to conduct its immigration policies more cheaply or effciently, even that is not the case. It is not by accident that the Government, across the past and present administration, stands frmly with Riley here, even as it rarely fails to press colorable jurisdictional objections. See Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA, 606 U. S. 100, 108 (2025). As the Government knows, “[a] whole train of unnecessary consequences” follows from requiring noncitizens to appeal in every expedited removal case, simply to protect their eventual right to appeal future withholding- only decisions. Outland, 284 F. 2d, at 228. In each of these unnecessary appeals, “the Board and other parties may be called upon to respond and oppose the motion for review; when the Board acts, the petition for review must be amended to bring the petition up to date,” or dismissed if the Board grants the noncitizen's CAT claim. Ibid. All the while, courts must manage countless cases that otherwise might never have been opened. The Government recognizes all these consequences. Brief for Respondent 36–38. This Court is blind to them. Today's decision is the rare holding that benefts no one.
* * * Not long ago, this Court described delays in regulatory approvals of construction projects as “ `borde[ring] on the Kafkaesque.' ” Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, 605 U. S. 168, 184 (2025). In holding that Riley was required to fle his appeal 16 months before the order he sought to challenge existed, the Court surely moves from the border well into the heartland of illogic and absurdity. Respectfully, I dissent.
Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication Reporter’s Note The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional edits were made: p. 266, line 8: “Argueta-Herandez” is changed to “Argueta-Hernandez” p. 272, line 18: “the” is inserted before “Government” p. 290, line 24: “the” is changed to “this”