Within the federal government, Congress “alone has access to the pockets of the people.” The Federalist No. 48, p. 334 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison). The Constitution affords only our elected representatives the power to decide which taxes the government can collect and at what rates. See Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Throughout the Nation's history, Congress has almost invariably respected this assignment. As this Court observed some decades ago, it would represent “a sharp break with our traditions” for Congress to abdicate its responsibilities and “besto[w] on a federal agency the taxing power.” National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. United States, 415 U. S. 336, 341 (1974).
Today, the Court departs from these time-honored rules.
When it comes to “universal service” taxes, the Court concludes, an executive agency may decide for itself what rates to apply and how much to collect. In upholding that arrangement, the Court defes the Constitution's command that Congress “may not transfer to another branch `powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative.' ” Gundy v. United States, 588 U. S. 128, 135 (2019) (plurality opinion) (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 42–43 (1825)).
Still, things could be worse. Because today's misadventure “sits unmoored from surrounding law,” I have reason to hope its approach will not stand the test of time. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U. S. 369, 425 (2024) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). And even as the Court swallows a delegation beyond anything yet seen in the U. S. Reports, it also signals, unmistakably, that there are some abdications of congressional authority, including in the very statute before us, that the present majority isn't prepared to stomach.
Page Proof Pending Publication FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH
I
If you look closely at your phone bill, you will likely notice a charge for “universal service.” Perhaps you have wondered what that is and why you are paying for it. As it turns out, in 47 U. S. C. § 254, Congress has authorized the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to subsidize a number of disparate programs under the umbrella of “universal service.” The FCC selects which programs to pursue and how much they should cost. To fund them, the agency taxes telecommunications companies at a rate it controls. By regulation, those companies are then free to pass the charges along to consumers like you. This case involves a challenge to that scheme. To appreciate the questions it poses for us, some background helps.
A
The phrase “universal service” has carried different meanings at different times. Originally, it referred to “a telephone network that covers all of a country.” M. Mueller, Universal Service: Competition, Interconnection, and Monopoly in the Making of the American Telephone System 1 (1997). And it meant one network in particular: the Bell System owned by the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T). AT&T's president coined the slogan in 1907—“One System, One Policy, Universal Service”—to boost Bell's nascent monopoly. Id., at 4, 96. “Universal,” as AT&T used it, focused less on telephone service for all than on making sure AT&T provided all the service. And the slogan proved apt: By the 1920s, the Bell System, fghting “under the banner of universal service,” had conquered the U. S. telephone market. Id., at 146.
Over time, “the term `universal service' took on a new meaning.” P. Huber, M. Kellogg, & J. Thorne, Federal Telecommunications Law § 6.1.1.2 (3d ed. Supp. 2022) (Huber). For much of the 20th century, it referred to a policy aimed at making landline local phone service “available to all conPage Proof Pending Publication sumers at a reasonable cost.” Ibid. Even so, AT&T's monopoly remained at the heart of it all. As with other monopolistic public utilities, federal and state governments regulated the rates the Bell System could charge. See Veri zon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U. S. 467, 477 (2002). And, for decades, that was the key to universal service: Regulators manipulated rates to expand Americans' access to telephones. See Huber §6.1.1.2. So, for example, “[l]ongdistance rates were used to subsidize local rates, business rates to subsidize residential rates, and urban rates to subsidize rural rates.” Ibid. That system of implicit subsidies worked as long as the same family of companies served all telephone customers.
See Verizon Communications, 535 U. S., at 480–481. But the scheme began to falter in the 1970s and 1980s, as new long-distance carriers entered the picture, and an antitrust consent decree spun off AT&T's long-distance business into a separate company, with newly independent “Baby Bells” now providing local service. See NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U. S. 128, 130–131 (1998); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544, 549 (2007). At that point, regulators could no longer depend on the Bell System to subsidize local rates by infating long-distance rates. See Huber § 6.2.1.2. Still, parts of the old universal-service regime hung on. Because the Baby Bells continued to enjoy regional monopolies over local phone service, regulators could still rely on them to provide some implicit subsidies, charging higher rates to some customers while offering below-cost service to others. See id., § 6.2.1. The FCC pitched in, too, by requiring long-distance carriers to subsidize local providers, and by establishing a “Lifeline” program to help low-income households afford local phone service. See Rural Telephone Co alition v. FCC, 838 F. 2d 1307, 1311–1312 (CADC 1988); Huber § 6.2.2.3; ante, at 666.
Eventually, however, Congress decided that universal service had to be “ripped apart and rebuilt afresh.” Huber Page Proof Pending Publication FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH § 2.10. In the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 56, Congress “fundamentally restructure[d]” the local telephone market. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U. S. 366, 371 (1999). No more, Congress declared, should the Baby Bells enjoy regional monopolies over local phone service; now, they must face competition, too. See ibid. To achieve that objective, Congress required the Baby Bells to share their networks with new entrants seeking to offer landline local phone services. See Twombly, 550 U. S., at 549.1 But Congress also recognized that its new approach would deal “a fatal blow” to “the preexisting system of universal service,” for there would no longer be monopolies whose rates regulators could adjust to subsidize some customers at the expense of others. R. Krotoszynski, Reconsidering the Nondelegation Doctrine: Universal Service, the Power To Tax, and the Ratifcation Doctrine, 80 Ind. L. J. 239, 282 (2005).
So Congress had to reimagine “universal service” again.
In § 254 of the Telecommunications Act, Congress used the term “universal service” for the frst time and invested it with a new meaning. See Huber § 6.3. Gone was Bell's old idea that universal service meant a single network of wires covering the country. Gone, too, was the idea that the Bell monopoly should subsidize basic telephone service by infating other customers' rates. Repurposing the slogan of universal service once more, Congress told the FCC to decide 1That solution may seem quaint today, when three quarters of American adults live in households without a landline telephone. See S. Blum- berg & J. Luke, National Center for Health Statistics, Wireless Substitution 2 (June 2024). But in 1996, things looked different. Local phone service depended on a network of copper wires connecting each home and business. See Huber § 1.2.2. That network seemed impossible to duplicate, and for decades, “local phone service was thought to be a natural monopoly.” AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U. S. 366, 371 (1999). Congress responded by requiring the Baby Bells to share their infrastructure with new rivals. See Huber § 1.11.2. As it turned out, of course, cell phones soon became ubiquitous, and that web of copper became less relevant. See id., § 10.1.
Page Proof Pending Publication for itself what the concept meant and to fund programs consistent with its understanding. See § 254(c)(1). And to pay for those programs, Congress authorized the agency to tax a broad base of interstate “telecommunications carrier[s]” and “provider[s].” § 254(d).
B
To understand how the scheme works, start with the programs the FCC may fund. Section 254 describes “universal service” as “an evolving level of telecommunications services” that the agency must both “preserve” and “advance.” §§ 254(b)(5), (c)(1). To determine which specifc services to fund and at what level, § 254(c)(1) directs the FCC to “consider” four factors. Those factors look to “the extent to which” a service (A) is “essential to education, public health, or public safety,” (B) has “been subscribed to by a substantial majority of residential customers,” (C) is “being deployed . . . by telecommunications carriers,” and (D) is “consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity.” §§ 254(c) (1)(A)–(D).
On top of those four factors, the statute supplies six further “principles” in § 254(b). So, for instance, the agency must “base” its funding decisions on the principles that “[q]uality services should be available at just, reasonable, and affordable rates,” § 254(b)(1), and that “[a]ccess to advanced telecommunications and information services should be provided in all regions of the Nation,” § 254(b)(2). In addition, the FCC may adopt other new “principles” that it “determine[s]” to be “necessary and appropriate.”
§ 254(b)(7). To date, the FCC has exercised that authority twice. One new principle requires “competitive neutrality” among providers and technologies,2and the other encourages 2“COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY—Universal service support mechanisms and rules should be competitively neutral. In this context, competitive neutrality means that universal service support mechanisms and rules neither unfairly advantage nor disadvantage one provider over anPage Proof Pending Publication FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH “support for advanced services” including “broadband networks.” 3 From this mash of four factors and six (now eight) principles, the FCC must discern which programs it wishes to fund and to what degree. And it falls to the FCC to “ `balance' ” these “factors” and “ `principles' ” “ `against one another when they confict.' ” Reply Brief for Federal Petitioners 11–12 (quoting Qwest Corp. v. FCC, 258 F. 3d 1191, 1200 (CA10 2001)). So, for instance, if the FCC fnds that a particular service is “essential to education,” § 254(c)(1)(A), but not “subscribed to by a substantial majority of residential customers,” § 254(c)(1)(B), the agency must pick which part of the statute prevails. As the FCC has long put it: “[A]ll four criteria enumerated in section 254(c)(1) must be considered, but not each necessarily met.” In re Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 12 FCC Rcd. 8776, 8809 (1997). Still, that is not quite the end of it. At least when it comes to schools, libraries, and healthcare providers, two additional provisions—§ 254(c)(3) and § 254(h)(2)—permit the agency to pay for “advanced” and “additional” services that go “above the baseline of what's been considered universal service.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 42, 47. Consistent with these provisions, the FCC has funded programs without regard to whether they satisfy the four factors outlined in § 254(c)(1). See 12 FCC Rcd., at 9008–9011.
Over time, the services the agency has funded have evolved considerably. So, for example, in 1996 the FCC debated whether to subsidize “touch-tone service,” not just old other, and neither unfairly favor nor disfavor one technology over another.” In re Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 12 FCC Rcd. 8776, 8801 (1997).
3In re Connect America Fund, 26 FCC Rcd. 17663, 17679 (2011); see also ibid. (“ `Support for Advanced Services—Universal service support should be directed where possible to networks that provide advanced services, as well as voice services' ”).
Page Proof Pending Publication rotary phones. 61 Fed. Reg. 10503 (1996). (The answer: Yes. 12 FCC Rcd., at 8809.) By 2011, the FCC “comprehensively reform[ed] and modernize[d]” its universal-service goals to include expanding access to internet services nationwide. In re Connect America Fund, 26 FCC Rcd. 17663, 17667 (2011). More recently, the agency has announced that the Universal Service Fund will help put Wi-Fi on school buses. In re Modernizing the E-Rate Program for Schools and Libraries, FCC No. 23–84 (2023) (declaratory ruling). Once the FCC decides which programs to support, it must fgure out how to pay for them. On that score, § 254(d) offers this instruction: “Every telecommunications carrier that provides interstate telecommunications services shall contribute, on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis, to the specifc, predictable, and suffcient mechanisms established by the Commission to preserve and advance universal service.” § 254(d); see § 254(b)(4). In addition to those “mandatory” contributions from common carriers, the statute also grants the FCC “permissive” authority to compel contributions from “[a]ny other provider of interstate telecommunications,” including noncommon carriers, “if the public interest so requires.” § 254(d); 12 FCC Rcd., at 9178. Essentially, the agency must fgure out whom to tax and how much.
Taking up the question whom to tax, the agency has said that every telecommunications carrier must “contribute” a share of its revenue from interstate and international telecommunications services (think long-distance calls). 47 CFR § 54.706 (2024). But over time, the FCC has also expanded the roster of companies who must contribute, so that it now includes providers of prepaid calling cards and internet-based calling. See 71 Fed. Reg. 38781, 43667 (2006). Currently, the FCC does not tax carriers' broadband revenues (think internet). But some have suggested Page Proof Pending Publication FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH that, too, should change. See In re Report on the Future of the Universal Serv. Fund, 37 FCC Rcd. 10041, 10088– 10094 (2022).
After deciding whom to tax, the agency must determine how much to collect from each carrier. For that, the FCC relies on the Universal Service Administrative Company, a Delaware not-for-proft corporation. Congress has not expressly authorized the FCC to outsource its responsibilities under § 254. But in 1997, the FCC directed an association of carriers to create the Administrative Company, and the agency has assumed the task of defning that company's structure and role. See Brief for Federal Petitioners 4; 47 CFR §§ 54.703, 54.705; ante, at 669–670. Among other things, FCC regulations ensure that a supermajority of the Administrative Company's board consists of directors who represent industry insiders (like carriers) and groups that beneft fnancially from universal-service programs (like libraries and schools). § 54.703(b)(1).
How does the Administrative Company help calculate the tax each carrier must pay? Each quarter, the company estimates the upcoming expenses of the FCC's universal-service programs. § 54.709(a)(3). Once the FCC approves that fgure, the company next estimates carriers' total revenues from interstate telecommunications, based on their self- reported fgures. This is known as the “contribution base.” Ibid. Finally, the FCC calculates the ratio of projected expenses to the contribution base, which yields the “contribution factor,” or the percentage of its revenue each carrier must pay. § 54.709(a)(2); ante, at 668–669.
As the scope of the FCC's programs has expanded, so have the taxes the agency collects to fund them. In 1998, universal-service disbursements totaled about $2.29 billion. Universal Service Administrative Co., 1999 Annual Report 2. In 2024, that fgure swelled to about $8.59 billion—nearly double, adjusted for infation. Universal Service Administrative Co., 2024 Annual Report 4. To pay for that increase, Page Proof Pending Publication the “contribution factor” (or tax rate) has risen, too. In 1998, carriers paid less than 4% of their revenue from interstate and international telecommunications. 63 Fed. Reg.
35931 (1998). Today, that fgure is nearly 37%. FCC, Public Notice, DA 25–223 (Mar. 13, 2025).4 One might wonder why the Administrative Company, dominated as it is by industry insiders, has allowed universal- service contributions to grow so dramatically. FCC regulations supply at least a partial explanation: “Federal universal service contribution costs may be recovered . . . through a line item on a customer's bill.” 47 CFR § 54.712(a). So, in the end, it is consumers who pay for the agency's universal- service programs.
II
A
In 2022, a carrier, a non-proft group, and several consumers (collectively, respondents) challenged the present universal-service scheme. Under the Constitution, they observed, Congress must set the federal government's tax poli4The skyrocketing contribution factor is attributable in part—but only in part—to a shrinking contribution base. To fund its programs, remember, the FCC presently taxes revenue from interstate and international telecommunications, such as long-distance calling. Over time, carrier revenue from phone service has shrunk. As a result, tax rates must rise just to keep receipts constant. But this is only a partial explanation for the rising contribution factor. As we have seen, FCC receipts have done far more than keep constant. Seeking to downplay the growth of the FCC's programs, the Court fddles with the fgures. It suggests that we should treat 1999, rather than 1998, as the baseline, “because in 1998, some of the new statute's universal-service programs were just getting off the ground.” Ante, at 686, 687, and n. 8. But I would have thought that's the point. To assess whether the FCC's program contains anything resembling a “cap” on total tax collections, as the Court maintains, surely it helps to understand exactly how much the agency has grown that program in the years since Congress acted. See ante, at 682–687. Really, using 1998 as the baseline spots the FCC a good bit of ramp-up time, too: After all, Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act in 1996. Page Proof Pending Publication FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH cies. And, they argued, § 254 offends that rule because it allows the FCC and the Administrative Company to decide how much tax to collect and at what rate. The Fifth Circuit largely agreed with respondents' submissions. See 109 F. 4th 743 (2024) (en banc). The FCC, an association of carriers, and others (collectively, petitioners) then sought our review.
As the dispute comes to us, it presents three questions.
First, did Congress violate the Constitution by delegating to the FCC the power to tax? Second, did the FCC violate the Constitution by subdelegating some of its authority to the private Administrative Company? And third, even if neither of those features independently offends the Constitution, does their combination? As I see it, this case begins and ends with the frst question. Section 254 impermissibly delegates Congress's taxing power to the FCC, and knowing that is enough to know the Fifth Circuit's judgment should be affrmed.5 Even when it comes to that frst question, there is much we need not address. Elsewhere, I have urged the Court to reconsider its approach to assessing legislative delegations in light of the Constitution's original meaning and historic practice. See Gundy, 588 U. S., at 149 (dissenting opinion). But respondents tell us we need not do so here. Instead, they argue, § 254's delegation of authority to the FCC cannot survive even the most forgiving standard this Court has devised for analyzing delegations: The modern version of the “intelligible principle” test. See Brief for Respondents 65– 66. So I will focus on that test, how it applies here, and why § 254 fails it.6 5When granting certiorari, we also asked the parties to address whether this dispute is moot. I agree with the Court that it is not. See ante, at 671–672, n. 1.
6Before proceeding further, note some of the questions this case does not present. First, while respondents argue that the FCC's subdelegation to the Administrative Company offends the Constitution, they do not Page Proof Pending Publication The Court and I approach our task from common ground.
As the Court acknowledges, the Constitution vests “[a]ll” federal legislative power in Congress. Art. I, § 1; see ante, at 672. Necessarily, that assignment means “no other” branch of government may exercise legislative power.
Ante, at 672. To enforce that rule, this Court has developed the “intelligible principle” test. Ante, at 673 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928). All agree, too, that the test must do something to stop Congress from giving the President or an executive agency a blank check to legislate.
See ibid.
On top of all that, the Court and I agree that the intelligible principle test is not one size fts all. Ante, at 673. Instead, “contex[t]” matters. Ante, at 684. Among other things, that means that the “ `degree of agency discretion that is acceptable' ” depends on “ `the scope of the power congressionally conferred.' ” Ante, at 673 (quoting Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 475 (2001)). So, for instance, Congress might permissibly give an agency wide leeway in designing a tax stamp. See In re Kollock, 165 U. S. 526, 537 (1897). But Congress must give far more press a statutory argument that the FCC lacks authority under § 254 to pass some of its responsibilities on to a private corporation. See 109 F. 4th 743, 774–777, and n. 21 (CA5 2024) (en banc). Second, the Administrative Company's directors overwhelmingly represent entities with a fnancial stake in expanding universal service: those who beneft from universal-service programs (like schools and hospitals) and those who get paid to supply the benefts (the carriers). See Part I–B–2, supra. Some amici suggest that seemingly conficted arrangement may offend the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See, e. g., Brief for Reason Foundation as Amicus Curiae 18–23. But neither the court of appeals nor respondents took up that argument. See 109 F. 4th, at 768, n. 14. Third, one might ask whether the Administrative Company's leaders qualify as offcers of the United States and, if so, whether their role complies with the Appointments Clause, U. S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See Brief for Reason Foundation as Amicus Curiae 13–18. But, again, neither the court of appeals nor the parties addressed those questions.
Page Proof Pending Publication FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH detailed instructions if it wants an agency to regulate an entire industry. See A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 541–542 (1935).
B
From that common ground, however, my path and the Court's begin to diverge. I would start by examining the nature of the power Congress assigned to the FCC. Under § 254, the FCC may compel carriers to “contribute” money to support what everyone agrees is a government program.
See Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Heath, 604 U. S. 140, 144 (2025). That is a quintessential tax—a “compulsory contribution to the support of government.” 17 Oxford English Dictionary 677 (2d ed. 1989) (defning “tax”). Several FCC commissioners, including at least two FCC chairmen, have seen it the same way, referring to universal- service “contributions” as “taxes.” 7 So have academics and other informed commentators.8 Before us, as well, the FCC has said that it is “willing” to have this Court treat universal-service contributions “as a tax.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 53. Really, if this compulsory contribution is not a tax, “[w]hat else would you call it?” Bondi v. VanDerStok, 604 U. S. 458, 479 (2025).
7See, e. g., B. Carr, Ending Big Tech's Free Ride, Newsweek, May 24, 2021, https://www.newsweek.com/ending-big-techs-free-ride-opinion1593696; In re Lifeline and Link Up Reform and Modernization, 31 FCC Rcd. 3962, 4165 (2016) (Comm'r Pai, dissenting); In re Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 13 FCC Rcd. 14915, 14980 (1998) (Comm'r Furchtgott-Roth, dissenting).
8See, e. g., S. Benjamin, B. Richman, & J. Speta, Internet and Telecommunications Regulation 225–226 (2d ed. 2023); T. Narechania & E. Stall- man, Internet Federalism, 34 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 547, 612 (2021); W. Roger- son, New Economic Perspectives on Telecommunications Regulation, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1489, 1502–1503 (2000); G. Gekas & J. Harper, Annual Regulation of Business Focus: Regulation of Electronic Commerce, 51 Admin. L. Rev. 769, 782 (1999).
Page Proof Pending Publication Taxation ranks among the government's greatest powers.
Indeed, it is arguably the federal government's “most important . . . authorit[y].” The Federalist No. 33, p. 205 (A. Hamilton). As this Court has put it, the “power to tax is the one great power upon which the whole national fabric is based.” Nicol v. Ames, 173 U. S. 509, 515 (1899); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431 (1819) (“[T]he power to tax involves the power to destroy”). Refecting as much, the Constitution provides that all legislation “for raising Revenue” must “originate in the House of Representatives,” the only popularly elected chamber at the time of the Constitution's adoption. Art. I, § 7, cl. 1; see Amdt. 17. As the framers saw it, “the Chamber that is more accountable to the people should have the primary role in raising revenue.” United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U. S. 385, 395 (1990). That context matters. To survive the intelligible principle test, a delegation involving such a signifcant power must supply more signifcant limits on an agency's discretion than when Congress confers some lesser authority. That is not to say some “different and stricter” test applies when Congress delegates the power to tax. See Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U. S. 212, 222–223 (1989). It is instead to recognize that what qualifes as an intelligible principle depends on “context” and “the nature of the particular constitutional powers” at issue. Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742, 778 (1948).
What exactly does the intelligible principle test require in this context? Surely, history must count for something. And it supplies at least one clear standard. As far as I can tell, and as far as petitioners have informed us, this Court has never approved legislation allowing an executive agency to tax domestically unless Congress itself has prescribed the tax rate. See, e. g., Michigan Central R. Co. v. Powers, 201 U. S. 245, 297 (1906) (suggesting that “a direct legislative determination of the rate” avoids “abdication of the legislative Page Proof Pending Publication FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH function”); 1 T. Cooley & C. Nichols, Law of Taxation 194 (4th ed. 1924) (Cooley & Nichols) (“The nondelegable powers . . . include . . . the fxing of the rate of taxation”); J. Hines & K. Logue, Delegating Tax, 114 Mich. L. Rev. 235, 239 (2015) (Hines & Logue) (“[D]elegating some control over income tax rates . . . would be unprecedented in U. S. history”); cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39–40, 57, 78.9 Applying that insight here poses petitioners with a serious problem. “[A]ll agree” that Congress has not set the rate at which the FCC may exact contributions. Ante, at 674.
Instead, § 254 delegates to the FCC the power to determine which services to fund and thus the amount of money to collect. See Part I–B–1, supra. To secure those funds, the agency uses the Administrative Company to set a “contribution factor”—i. e., the percentage of its revenues a carrier must pay. See Part I–B–2, supra. That's a tax rate. And, remember, that rate has grown from less than 4% of carriers' applicable revenues in 1998 to nearly 37% today—all based on the agency's say-so and without any change to the statute. Ibid. Nothing in the U. S. Reports suggests that an executive agency may exercise that kind of power over taxation. To be sure, petitioners identify an exception to the historic rule that only Congress may set tax rates. Sometimes, they point out, Congress has declined to supply a rate and instead opted to cap the total sum the Executive may collect. See 9The frst federal income tax statute, the Revenue Act of 1861, created a fat tax of 3% on income exceeding $800. 12 Stat. 309. The frst income tax created after the Sixteenth Amendment's ratifcation provided for progressive rates ranging from 1% to 7%. 38 Stat. 166. Income tax rates have become more complicated over time, but Congress still sets them. See, e. g., 26 U. S. C. § 1. The same pattern holds true for other kinds of taxes. In 1791, for instance, the frst federal excise on distilled spirits set rates to the penny. 1 Stat. 202–203. So do excise taxes today. See, e. g., §§ 4251(a)–(b) (imposing a 3% excise tax on local telephone service). In some cases, Congress has set the tax as a dollar amount rather than a percentage rate. See, e. g., § 4481(a) ($550 tax on the use of highway motor vehicles with a gross weight over 75,000 pounds).
Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication Brief for Petitioner SHLB Coalition et al. 38–39; Brief for Respondents 33–36; Reply Brief for Federal Petitioners 6–7; see Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 542 (1869). But none of this solves petitioners' problem. For one thing, petitioners identify no example of a lump-sum delegation outside of direct taxes on property—a unique context where the Constitution's apportionment requirement makes it practically impossible for Congress to set taxes by rate.10 For another, and even setting aside that diffculty, the lump-sum exception still would not save § 254. As the Court acknowledges, the statute before us “contains no determinate cap.” Ante, at 674. Instead, the FCC gets to decide for itself how much to collect—and, over time, has exercised that authority to double that amount. See Part I–B, supra.
III
Having failed to identify a single example where this Court has approved a tax delegation like this one, petitioners and the Court propose a workaround. Yes, they concede, § 254 “imposes no quantitative . . . limits on how much money 10Congress must apportion direct taxes among the States according to population. Art. I, § 2, cl. 3; § 9, cl. 4. That requirement makes it diffcult to set uniform tax rates across the Nation, since a State's share of the national population rarely corresponds to its share of wealth. See Moore v. United States, 602 U. S. 572, 582 (2024). But that challenge does not extend to “indirect” taxes, such as the tax before us, which need not be apportioned. See id., at 582–583. And because the Uniformity Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, requires indirect taxes to apply “at the same rate” across the country, United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U. S. 74, 84 (1983), it is not clear that Congress could simply cap receipts from an indirect tax, without also providing guidance to ensure it applies equally everywhere. That uniformity requirement might explain why petitioners have identifed no historical example, outside the direct tax arena, where Congress declined to set a tax rate. Note, too, that even when Congress has employed a lump-sum approach, it has usually supplied signifcant guidance in addition to the cap. See N. Parrillo, A Critical Assessment of the Originalist Case Against Administrative Regulatory Power, 130 Yale L. J. 1288, 1324, 1449– 1455 (2021).
FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH the FCC can raise.” Ante, at 681. But, they contend, Congress has provided guidance that amounts to a “qualitative” cap. Ibid.; see, e. g., Brief for Federal Petitioners 29–30. To support that claim, petitioners and the Court emphasize that § 254(d) requires the FCC to collect taxes “suffcient . . . to preserve and advance universal service.” The word “suffcient,” they submit, “imposes an obligation” on the FCC “to ensure that the [Universal Service] Fund is large enough, but not too large, to achieve the statutory goals” Congress supplied. Brief for Petitioner SHLB Coalition et al. 23.
And, they continue, Congress has laid out those goals in a “detailed” way that “cabin[s] the FCC's exercise of delegated authority.” Id., at i.
Even taken on its own terms, I fnd that response unpersuasive. For argument's sake, assume that, instead of fxing the rate at which the FCC can tax, Congress may permissibly impose a numerical limit on receipts. Assume, too, that “qualitative” instructions may sometimes provide guidance functionally equivalent to a numerical limit. Even then, § 254's “qualitative” instructions hardly measure up. Really, the numbers speak for themselves. Recall that in 1998, the FCC disbursed about $2.29 billion. Part I–B–2, supra.
A
quarter century later, that fgure hit about $8.59 billion. Ibid. Even adjusting those fgures for infation, the FCC has nearly doubled the amount of tax it collects. Ibid. Far from supplying “qualitative” directions akin to a numerical cap, § 254 supplies little more than a blank check.
Truth be told, the Court does not fnd its own response entirely persuasive, either. It upholds the ability of the FCC to tax and spend for universal-service programs under § 254(c)(1). See ante, at 682–687. But, recall, §§ 254(c)(3) and (h)(2) also allow the FCC to support “advanced” and “additional” services without regard to § 254(c)(1)'s factors. See Part I–B–1, supra. And in a remarkable footnote, the Court scruples to say those two provisions suffciently constrain the agency's taxing power. See ante, at 687, n. 9. All the Court Page Proof Pending Publication is willing to defend, in other words, is whatever level of taxation suffces to support universal service as defned under § 254(c)(1), and no more. Consider each of these moves in turn.
A
Start with the parts of § 254 the Court does defend—the programs the FCC supports pursuant to § 254(c)(1). Together with § 254(d), that provision merely tells the FCC to tax carriers in an amount “suffcient” to “preserve and advance universal service.” To my eyes, it's hard to see how that direction might be fairly analogized to a numerical cap. The statute, remember, does not say what “universal service” is, and the phrase bears no established meaning. To be sure, I have a good sense of what “universal service” meant when the Bell System used it to protect its monopoly. See Part I–A, supra. I have an idea, too, of what the phrase came to mean later, as a shorthand for the practice of regulating rates so most Americans could afford basic phone service. See ibid. But, as we have seen, the 1996 Act “ripped apart” the old notion of universal service. Huber § 2.10. Going forward, Congress declared, the meaning of universal service would “evolv[e].” § 254(c)(1). In what directions? Congress left that for the FCC to work out.
Of course, the statute proceeds to offer some direction to the agency about what qualifes as “universal service,” and thus how much it can tax and spend. But, even viewed charitably, that guidance can hardly be described as the functional equivalent of a numerical cap. Just recall what the statute actually says. It instructs the FCC to discern the “evolving” meaning of “universal service” from the primordial soup of four factors found in § 254(c)(1), as supplemented by six principles discussed in §§ 254(b)(1)–(6), as well as whatever further principles (two and counting) the agency chooses to devise under § 254(b)(7). See Part I–B–1, supra. Many of these factors and principles address competing goods, and any effort to weigh them all can yield no more Page Proof Pending Publication FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH certainty than asking “ `whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.' ” National Pork Producers Council v. Ross, 598 U. S. 356, 381 (2023) (plurality opinion). Recognizing as much, the FCC acknowledges that it falls to the agency to decide how best to proceed (and therefore how much to tax) when the statute's abundance of factors and principles “confict.” Brief for Federal Petitioners 31 (internal quotation marks omitted). In no way can this “preface of generalities as to permissible aims” be fairly compared to a frm cap. Schechter Poultry, 295 U. S., at 537.
Experience proves the point. In 1996, recall, the hot debate was whether to subsidize “touch-tone service.” 61 Fed. Reg. 10503. But in 2011, the FCC steered the Universal Service Fund away from simply making basic telephone service available and toward expanding access to “broadband, both fxed and mobile.” 26 FCC Rcd., at 17670. By 2019, the FCC's Connect America Fund was spending nearly $5 billion annually on high-speed internet services for rural or remote “areas that are costly to serve.” GAO, A. Von Ah, Telecommunications, FCC Should Enhance Performance Goals and Measures for Its Program To Support Broadband Service in High-Cost Areas 1 (GAO–21–24, Oct. 2020). And why stop there? Nothing, it seems, would prevent the FCC from choosing to tax and spend to provide a mobile satellite internet device (like Starlink) to everyone who owns a business, home, or hunting cabin in rural America. Cf. In re Application for Review of Starlink Servs., LLC, 38 FCC Rcd. 12201, 12205–12206 (2023) (revoking a previous $885 million award to Starlink).
Searching for some way (any way) to support the notion that § 254(c)(1) contains a “qualitative” cap on how much the FCC can tax and spend, the Court eventually resorts to rewriting the statute. Now, it says, the FCC can fund a service only if it meets all of subsection (c)(1)'s four factors. Ante, at 684– 685, 688–689. So, the Court stresses, subsection (c)(1)(B) asks whether a particular service “has `been subscribed to Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication by a substantial majority of residential customers.' ” Ante, at 684. As a result, the Court reasons, the FCC cannot fund any service unless most Americans already have it. Ibid. Likewise, the Court asserts, § 254(b)'s instruction that the FCC “shall base” its funding decisions on the principles discussed there means that the FCC “must” satisfy all of those principles before funding any program. See ante, at 684–685, 687–688. It's a nice theory. But it bears no resemblance to the law Congress adopted. By its terms, § 254(c)(1) requires the FCC only to “consider the extent to which” each factor applies. The statute nowhere says each (or any) of those criteria “has to be met” before the agency can fund a particular service. Ante, at 688. In fact, the FCC has long and consistently understood the statute to mean the opposite: “[A]ll four criteria enumerated in section 254(c)(1) must be considered, but not each necessarily met.” 12 FCC Rcd., at 8809 (emphasis added).11 The same goes for subsection (b). It says that the FCC “shall base” funding decisions on various “principles.” But each of those principles is framed as a “should,” not a “must.” So, for example, subsection (b)(1) provides that the FCC “should” make “[q]uality services . . . available at . . . affordable rates.” And subsection (b)(2) says that the FCC “should” ensure “[a]ccess to advanced . . . services” is “provided in all regions of the Nation.” In this context, “[t]he term `should' indicates a recommended course of action, but does not itself imply the obligation associated with `shall.' ” Qwest Corp., 258 F. 3d, at 1200. Refecting that understand11That statement refects the FCC's consistent reading of the statute over nearly two decades. See, e. g., FCC, Public Notice, Rural Digital Opportunity Fund Phase I Auction, 35 FCC Rcd. 6077, 6121, and n. 278 (2020); In re Uniendo a Puerto Rico Fund and Connect USVI Fund, 34 FCC Rcd. 9109, 9184–9185, and n. 523 (2019); In re Connect America Fund, 32 FCC Rcd. 1624, 1631 (2017); In re Requests for Waiver of Deci sions, 31 FCC Rcd. 7731, 7734, n. 22 (2016); In re Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 18 FCC Rcd. 15090, 15091 (2003).
FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH ing, the FCC has long read § 254(b) as requiring it to consult all of that provision's various principles, but not as “impos[ing] infexible requirements” on universal-service programs. Connect America Fund Phase II Auction, 33 FCC Rcd.
1428, 1468, n. 229 (2018). Instead, each provision supplies “ `only a principle, not a statutory command,' ” which the agency may “ `ignore' ” in service of other principles found in the statute. Rural Digital Opportunity Fund Phase I Auction, 35 FCC Rcd. 6077, 6119, n. 262 (2020) (quoting Alenco Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 201 F. 3d 608, 621 (CA5 2000)); see also In re Lifeline & Link Up Reform & Modernization, 27 FCC Rcd. 6656, 6759, n. 636 (2012); Rural Cellular Assn. v. FCC, 588 F. 3d 1095, 1103 (CADC 2009).12 In its zeal to save subsection (c)(1) programs (why else ignore what the statute actually says?), the Court throws all that aside and seizes the drafting pen. So the meaning of “universal service” evolves once more. Only now, it is the 12The Court suggests that, at oral argument, the government endorsed its novel reading of subsections (b) and (c). Ante, at 688–689. But what does that prove? Courts must exercise independent judgment when interpreting the law. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U. S. 369, 394 (2024). Traditionally, too, this Court has accorded special respect not to advocacy from the podium, but to a coordinate branch's “consistent” and “contemporaneous construction” of a law. See id., at 386; id., at 430 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). And here, the FCC's historic understanding of § 254 is the only one the statute's language tolerates. Notably, too, the government's arguments before us ran both ways. See, e. g., Reply Brief for Federal Petitioners 11 (“The word `should' [in § 254(b)] allows the FCC to balance the principles against one another when they confict” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id., at 12 (“The FCC [has] argued that it need not implement a particular principle in light of other valid statutory objectives. . . . That comports with the government's position here” (emphasis deleted; alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)). Nor can I discern any sensible reason why we should prefer one strand of the government's present (inconsistent) submissions over the FCC's longstanding (consistent) views that honor the statute's actual terms. “[W]hen the government (or any litigant) speaks out of both sides of its mouth, no one should be surprised if its latest utterance isn't the most convincing one.” Bittner v. United States, 598 U. S. 85, 97–98, n. 5 (2023). Page Proof Pending Publication Court's creation through and through. And if that were not bad enough, the Court's late-night rewrite hardly helps its cause. Even as revised, the statute still falls well short of imposing anything like a numerical cap on how much the FCC can tax and spend. Suppose tomorrow the agency decides to ensure “every American [has] a cell phone and a cell phone plan.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 62–63. Could anyone complain that “a substantial majority of residential customers” do not use cell phones? § 254(c)(1)(B). I doubt it.
Not only does the Court's new statute fail to deliver on its only assignment, it promises to backfre, too. Rather than preserve the status quo, as the Court so clearly desires, its revisions threaten to render existing programs illegal—all while leaving the FCC (and program benefciaries) guessing about the implications for future initiatives. Take an example. Back in 2017, the FCC launched a multibillion-dollar effort to promote “broadband service in unserved high-cost areas.” In re Connect America Fund, 32 FCC Rcd. 1624 (2017). Among other things, the program subsidizes certain high-speed services that, the FCC has acknowledged, are not yet embraced by “a substantial majority of residential customers.” Id., at 1631 (internal quotation marks omitted). If we had simply confessed the obvious—that this statute is unconstitutional—Congress could have responded easily with the simple addition of a rate or, perhaps, a cap. But now? Now, the FCC can fund a program only if it satisfes all subsection (b) principles and all subsection (c) factors—a novel requirement that calls existing programs into question and promises profound implications for future ones as well. Far from avoiding any short-term disruption, the Court's new statute promises plenty of chaos of its own.13 13By interpreting “shall consider the extent to which,” § 254(c)(1), to mean “shall ensure that,” the Court threatens chaos well beyond universal service, too. “As a general rule,” courts have long thought that “when a statute requires an agency to `consider' a factor, the agency must reach an express and considered conclusion about the bearing of the factor, but Page Proof Pending Publication FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH
B
So much for the Court's renovation of § 254(c)(1). Now consider the two provisions the Court cannot bring itself to defend. Sections 254(c)(3) and (h)(2), recall, permit the FCC to fund “additional” and “advanced” services for “schools, libraries, and health care providers.” See Part I–B–1, supra. Even the Court is unwilling to say that these provisions impose a “qualitative” cap—and understandably so. When it comes to deciding what programs to fund under § 254(c)(3) and § 254(h)(2), the FCC is unconstrained by any of the subsection (c)(1) factors the Court rewrites and leans on so heavily today. See In re Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 12 FCC Rcd., at 9008–9011; Tr. of Oral Arg. 42, 47. Subsection (c)(3) makes that explicit: The FCC may designate services for support under that provision “[i]n addition to the services included in the defnition of universal service under paragraph (1).”
Here, too, experience illustrates just how uncapped the FCC's § 254(c)(3) and § 254(h)(2) programs really are. For some years, the FCC has relied on those provisions to fund internet access at schools and libraries. 89 Fed. Reg. 67304– 67305 (2024). But, in 2024, the FCC announced that it would also begin funding “Wi-Fi hotspots and services to be used off-premises by students, school staff, and library patrons.” Id., at 67304, 67318. As far as the FCC sees it, subsections (c)(3) and (h)(2) might allow it to collect enough taxes to sup- need not give any specifc weight” to it. Central Vermont R., Inc. v. ICC, 711 F. 2d 331, 336 (CADC 1983) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted); see Covad Communications Co. v. FCC, 450 F. 3d 528, 539 (CADC 2006) (“[W]hen the [FCC] is obligated to consider certain factors, that means only that the FCC must reach an express and considered conclusion about the bearing of a factor, but is not required to give any specifc weight to it” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). Does all that case law now get thrown out the window? Has the Court transformed every instruction to “consider” some criterion into a mandate the agency must satisfy? What a gift to regulated industries, or at least to their lawyers.
Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication ply take-home hotspots to anyone with a library card. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 43–44. Or maybe even take-home Starlink devices for library patrons nationwide, to help shrink the “digital divide between [Americans] with access to broadband at home and those without.” In re Addressing the Homework Gap Through the E-Rate Program, FCC No. 24– 76, p. 12 (2024).
Rather than address the constitutionality of the FCC's power to tax and spend for § 254(c)(3) and § 254(h)(2) programs, the Court dodges the question. Buried in a footnote midway through its opinion, it offers this: “We have no occasion to address any nondelegation issues raised by Sections 254(c)(3) and (h)(2),” the Court says, because while respondents challenged “the contribution scheme generally,” they did not name those provisions “in particular.” Ante, at 687, n. 9.
It is a perplexing maneuver, and I suspect the parties will fnd it quite the surprise. Not one of them suggested cleaving off portions of the statute in this way. Still, the Court's late-breaking move is, in one sense, to its credit. Though it is unwilling to say aloud that any part of § 254 fails the intelligible principle test, neither can the Court bring itself to bless such a lavish delegation of taxing authority. As a result, respondents remain free on remand, or in a future proceeding, to renew their attack on the constitutionality of whatever contributions the FCC demands for its subsection (c)(3) and (h)(2) programs. And that in itself is a notable development: Today marks the frst time in a long time that the Court has confronted a statutory delegation and found no way to save it.
IV
Return, now, to the portion of § 254 the Court is willing to defend—the programs the FCC supports pursuant to subsection (c)(1). No one disputes that part of the statute lacks a tax rate or a numerical cap. And rewritten or not, that provision lacks anything approaching a “qualitative” cap as well. Page Proof Pending Publication FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH Faced with these diffculties, in the end petitioners and the Court resort to changing the conversation. Now, they say, look to other felds. The Court has allowed agencies “to raise revenue” through fees “without specifying a numeric cap or . . . rate.” Ante, at 675. The Court has allowed agencies to set “ `just and reasonable' rates” and to regulate in the “ `public interest.' ” Ante, at 683–684. And, petitioners and the Court reason, if those delegations are permissible, this one must be, too. Ibid.; Brief for Federal Petitioners 11. Failing all else, petitioners and the Court add that they see no practical value in requiring Congress to speak more clearly about the scope of permissible universal-service taxes. Ante, at 679–680; Tr. of Oral Arg. 8–9.
But the Court's comparisons disregard its own insight that context matters in applying the intelligible principle test. Ante, at 673, 684. Nor, in my view, is it any answer to say that legislation supplying a rate or real cap might still leave the FCC with some measure of discretion. Though the Constitution does not require Congress to make every decision, there are some choices that belong to Congress alone— including setting a tax's rate or, at least, capping receipts.
A
Start with the Court's assertion that “Congress has often enacted statutes empowering agencies to raise revenue without specifying a numeric cap or tax rate.” Ante, at 675. To sustain that point, the Court relies on a list of nine examples offered by the government. Ibid. (citing Reply Brief for Federal Petitioners 7–9). The private petitioners highlight the same provisions, which, it seems, provide “the best precedents” for § 254. Tr. of Oral Arg. 82–84; see id., at 8, 31, 37–38.
Those provisions all have something in common: Each describes a fee. And that makes them poor benchmarks for a tax delegation. Fees, by defnition, are payments made in “compensation for a service provided to, or alternatively compensation for a cost imposed by, the person charged the fee.” Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F. 3d 1128, 1133 (CA7 2014); accord, Pace v. Burgess, 92 U. S. 372, 375–376 (1876). For that reason, fees carry a built-in intelligible principle: The government cannot collect more money than it needs to offset a real-world cost or beneft. See National Cable Televi sion Assn., 415 U. S., at 341–342.
Consider one of the government's examples, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). See ante, at 678.
The FDIC fnances its Deposit Insurance Fund through “[i]nsurance fees” paid by FDIC-insured banks. 12 U. S. C. § 1815(d). By statute, the fee each bank pays must be “keyed to the risk of the bank's insolvency.” M. Ricks, Money as Infrastructure, 2018 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 757, 803 (citing § 1817(b)). In other words, the fees offset a cost the banks impose on the FDIC—namely, their risk of failure, which the FDIC's insurance must underwrite. That need to compensate for a particular cost provides an intelligible principle cabining the FDIC's discretion and limiting the fees it can charge to what the agency needs to cover insurance payouts. See id., at 803–804.
A similar principle explains the fee-setting authority of federal courts. See Reply Brief for Federal Petitioners 8. By statute, courts of appeals may charge “fees” in amounts “prescribed from time to time by the Judicial Conference of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 1913. As the Judicial Conference has recognized, that provision authorizes courts to “charg[e] for services provided,” such as docketing an appeal or admitting an attorney to practice. Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 12, 14 (Sept. 16, 2008). So here, too, fee levels refect a cost imposed or a beneft received by the payor.
Take one more example from the government's brief. See Reply Brief for Federal Petitioners 8–9. Congress has authorized the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service to charge fees “suffcient” “to cover the cost of providing agPage Proof Pending Publication FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH ricultural . . . inspection” for certain “commercial aircraft.” 21 U. S. C. § 136a(a)(1)(A). That provision might sound broad because it lacks a numerical limit. In context, though, it leaves little for the agency to do except arithmetic: To set the fee, it “divid[es] the total costs of inspecting Commercial Aircraft by the total number of Commercial Aircraft.” Air Transp. Assn. of Am., Inc. v. United States Dept. of Agricul ture, 37 F. 4th 667, 675 (CADC 2022).14 Petitioners and the Court would set all that to the side. In their telling, this Court's decision in Skinner “rendered irrelevant” the question whether a particular exaction involves a tax or a fee. Ante, at 677 (citing 490 U. S., at 223). Not so. Skinner, to be sure, indicated that the intelligible principle test applies to tax delegations. Id., at 223. And under that test, Skinner presented an easy case. The statute at issue there told the government (numerically) how much money it could raise. Id., at 219–220 (“the ceiling on aggregate fees . . . is set at 105 percent of the aggregate appropriations made by Congress for that fscal year”). In light of that and other instructions, the Court held, the statute provided an intelligible principle regardless of whether it imposed a tax or a fee. Id., at 220–223. That is all the 14 The Court discusses two other examples from “the sphere of fnancial regulation.” Ante, at 675. Both follow a by-now familiar pattern. Congress has authorized the Offce of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) to fund its operations by “collect[ing] an assessment, fee, or other charge” from the banks it supervises. 12 U. S. C. § 16. While these fees are not assessed in exchange for specifc transactions, they offset the costs the OCC incurs in fulflling its statutory mandate to supervise, regulate, and charter national banks. See §§ 1, 21, 24. Funding for the Federal Reserve Board refects a similar dynamic. The Board may levy upon Federal Reserve Banks “an assessment suffcient to pay its estimated expenses . . . for the half year succeeding the levying of such assessment.” § 243. Again, such fees offset the Federal Reserve Board's regulatory costs. Cf. Trump v. Wilcox, 605 U. S. –––, ––– (2025) (noting the historically exceptional structure of the Federal Reserve).
Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication decision held. It certainly did not invite courts to ignore relevant context or disregard the basic distinction between fees (which incorporate an intelligible principle by nature) and taxes (which do not).15 Perhaps sensing as much, the Court ultimately retreats from precedent into pragmatism. Trying to distinguish taxes from fees, it contends, would risk plunging the Court into “a morass.” Ante, at 677. But the job is hardly some feat ft for Hercules alone. Courts must, and do, routinely distinguish between taxes and fees in many contexts. See, e. g., United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 523 U. S. 360, 366–370 (1998) (distinguishing between fees and taxes for purposes of the Export Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 5). Besides, any morass here is of the Court's own making.
In its view, the tax/fee distinction depends on whether the 15The Court charges me with downplaying J. W. Hampton. Ante, at 675, n. 3. But I do not see how casting a spotlight on that decision improves the picture for the Court. To start, J. W. Hampton involved a tariff, which arguably raises distinct nondelegation questions from domestic taxes. See J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 400 (1928); n. 19, infra. Even setting that complication aside, the statute in question imposed a tariff on barium dioxide at four cents per pound— and thus employed a straightforward tax rate. 42 Stat. 860. After setting the rate, Congress then authorized the President to adjust it by up to 50%, as needed to “ `equalize . . . differences in costs of production' ” between the United States and “ `competing foreign countries.' ” J. W. Hampton, 276 U. S., at 401 (quoting 42 Stat. 941). In other words, the statutory rate could move only within numerically defned bounds and only if the President found specifc facts. That is what suffced to provide an “intelligible principle” when the Court frst used the phrase. And nobody could compare that arrangement to § 254's open-ended tax-and-spend scheme. See Gundy v. United States, 588 U. S. 128, 158–159 (2019) (Gormake the effect of statutes conditional on facts found by the Executive). If lining this case up against J. W. Hampton proves anything, it is only that the phrase “intelligible principle” has taken on an entirely different meaning than it once held. See Gundy, 588 U. S., at 163–166 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH charge “is for a `beneft' granted to the payor that is `not shared by other members of society.' ” Ante, at 678 (quoting National Cable Television Assn., 415 U. S., at 341). But that formulation is not the usual one. In defning fees, the typical question is whether the fee compensates for a beneft or cost that sets the payor apart. See, e. g., United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U. S. 52, 60–61 (1989); Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444, 462–463, and n. 19 (1978); Pace, 92 U. S., at 375–376; Mueller, 740 F. 3d, at 1133; Hines & Logue 257, n. 107; GAO, S. Irving, Federal User Fees: A Design Guide 4, n. 4 (GAO–08–386SP, May 2008); 1 Cooley & Nichols 97–98, 109–110.16 Think back to the FDIC. The public undoubtedly benefts from the fees banks pay for deposit insurance; we all enjoy a safer banking system. But banks impose a cost on the FDIC (their risk of failure) that distinguishes them from the general public. Insurance fees compensate for that special cost. That is why they are fees, not taxes.
Once we understand fees correctly, the category plainly includes all the government's examples and excludes § 254 contributions. When carriers pay into the Universal Service Fund, they do not gain any special beneft, such as permission “to practice law or medicine or construct a house or run a broadcast station.” National Cable Television Assn., 415 U. S., at 340. (A different provision, 47 U. S. C. § 158, authorizes “application fees.”) Nor do § 254 contributions offset some regulatory cost that carriers impose on the FCC or on society. (That falls to “regulatory fees” the FCC collects under § 159.) Instead, § 254 takes money from some (carriers) and gives it to others (libraries, schools, and the like). See In re Incomnet, Inc., 463 F. 3d 1064, 1066–1067 (CA9 2006). In short: Section 254 creates a classic tax-and-spend 16In National Cable Television Assn., the Court focused only on the benefts side of the formulation because that suffced to make sense of the statute before it. See 415 U. S., at 342–343 (“The phrase `value to the recipient' is, we believe, the measure of the authorized fee”). Page Proof Pending Publication scheme, not a fee. Even the FCC does not dispute the point. Tr. of Oral Arg. 53; see Part II–A, supra.17
B
Beyond fees, petitioners and the Court offer a second reason to ignore the fact that § 254(c)(1) programs can be funded through taxes without a rate or fxed cap. After all, they observe, this Court has rejected nondelegation attacks on “authorizations to regulate in the `public interest' and to set `just and reasonable' rates.” Ante, at 684 (quoting National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 225–226 (1943), and FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 600 (1944)). And, set next to those vague standards, petitioners and the Court suggest, §254 offers “clear and limiting” guidance. Ante, at 691.
This argument neglects the Court's own admonition that the intelligible principle test is context dependent. See ante, at 673, 684. It begins by asking “what instructions” the statute in question provides to constrain an agency's discretion. Gundy, 588 U. S., at 136 (plurality opinion). Answering that question is a matter of statutory interpretation. Ibid. And “[i]t is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context,” West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 721 (2022) 17The Court never denies that universal-service “contributions” are taxes, but suggests in a footnote that they are not so different from FDIC fees because carriers enjoy a “special beneft” from them. See ante, at 679, n. 6. I do not see it. The FDIC program is an insurance plan that charges fees (premiums) in return for a service (payouts in the event of default). Universal-service contributions are nothing like that. To be sure, the FCC pays some carriers—and other vendors—to help it implement universal-service programs. But those are payments for services rendered, not a “special beneft” given in proportion to a fee payment, as with a broadcast license or FDIC insurance. Often, in fact, carriers that “contribute large sums” to the Universal Service Fund receive few universal-service payments, while those that “contribute little” end up receiving large ones. App. 98.
Page Proof Pending Publication FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH (internal quotation marks omitted), because language used in one setting may carry a meaning it does not have in others, see Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 537 (2015) (plurality opinion). So even if a particular statutory term evokes “well-known and generally acceptable standards” in one domain, that does not mean the same term will necessarily supply similar guidance when used in other “uncharted felds.” Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U. S. 245, 250 (1947); see also Schechter Poultry, 295 U. S., at 534 (new context may give terms “a much broader range and a new signifcance”). This Court has recognized this point many times, including when it comes to phrases like “public interest.” So, for example, the Court has held that phrase may contain enough “concrete” meaning to survive the intelligible principle test in the “context” of broadcast licensing, where the government has to allocate a limited spectrum of publicly owned airwaves. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U. S., at 216, 226 (internal quotation marks omitted); see M. McConnell, The President Who Would Not Be King 334 (2020) (McConnell).
But, the Court has also found, the same “public interest” criterion offers inadequate guidance to the FCC when it comes to raising revenue. National Cable Television Assn., 415 U. S., at 341.
The same goes for the phrase “ `just and reasonable.' ” Ante, at 684. This Court has sometimes found that phrase satisfes the intelligible principle test when it comes to setting rates for regulated monopolies like public utilities—a context where it incorporates “concepts with a long history at common law.” H. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Defnition of Standards, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 863, 873, n. 53 (1962); see, e. g., ICC v. Cincin nati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 167 U. S. 479, 501 (1897).18 Accord18As a rule, the “just and reasonable” standard requires agencies to balance “the investor and the consumer interests,” FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 603 (1944), in order to approximate the “bounds that would be drawn by market forces in a non-monopolistic market,” Jer Page Proof Pending Publication ingly, in that sphere, the “traditional regulatory notion of the `just and reasonable' rate” may mean something. Veri zon, 535 U. S., at 481. But outside that sphere, the same phrase may amount to little more than an instruction to go forth and do good. See Schechter Poultry, 295 U. S., at 539– 540; G. Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va.
L. Rev. 327, 386 (2002).
Here's the point: Just because a phrase carries a well- understood historic meaning in one context does not mean the same phrase “ `in the abstract' ” will suffce in every other setting to satisfy the intelligible principle test. Reply Brief for Federal Petitioners 3. So the fact that petitioners and the Court can point to past decisions approving the use of a broad phrase in a different domain proves nothing. Instead, it falls to petitioners and the Court to show that the statutory terms presently before us, properly understood in their particular context, do in fact provide signifcant constraints on the FCC as it exercises a signifcant power.
That is a burden petitioners and the Court have not carried and cannot carry. When § 254(c)(1) speaks of “universal service,” it does not invoke “ `concepts with a long history at common law.' ” Supra, at 740. To the contrary, everyone agrees that § 254 “ripped apart” the old understanding of “universal service” and cleared the ground for a new one. Huber § 2.10; see Part I–A, supra; Brief for Federal Petitioners 3; Brief for Petitioner SHLB Coalition et al. 3. Worse, even if one term or another in § 254(c)(1) or §§ 254(b)(1)–(7) might claim some meaning-giving ancestry, the statute's mix of four factors and six (or more) principles lacks any such pedigree. Whether those factors and principles need only be considered, as the statute says, or whether they must always be met, as the Court now suggests, the FCC truly must blaze its own trail.
sey Central Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F. 2d 1168, 1190 (CADC 1987) (Starr, J., concurring).
Page Proof Pending Publication FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH Notice, too, where trails like this lead. If context could be cast aside, and a phrase like “just and reasonable” might suffce in every season, nothing would stop Congress from granting agencies limitless legislative power. Congress might delegate to the Secretary of Education the authority to set a “just and reasonable” tax on university endowments in order to fund universal education—defned, of course, according to four factors and six (or more) incommensurable principles. Congress might instruct the Secretary of Health and Human Services to impose a “just and reasonable” tax on pharmaceutical sales in order to subsidize “universal health coverage,” defned as an “evolving level” of care that should be available “at just, reasonable, and affordable rates” to patients “in all regions of the Nation.” Or Congress might let the Treasury Department set whatever “just and reasonable” income tax rates were needed to trim the national debt to a level “consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity.” If these possibilities strike you as unhinged, it is because you appreciate that the permissible scope of delegation must depend on context and the nature and scope of the power conferred.19 19The Court declines to defend two other arguments petitioners advance. First, petitioners point to a tax enacted in 1798 as an early instance of broad tax delegation. Brief for Federal Petitioners 23; Brief for Petitioner Competitive Carriers Association et al. 27–28. But the 1798 tax was a direct tax, and it included an explicit numerical cap on total receipts ($2 million), apportioned by State. 1 Stat. 597–598; see also Part II–A; n. 10, supra. So it provides no precedent for § 254. Second, petitioners point to statutes “granting the President broad authority to set or change tariffs.” Brief for Federal Petitioners 36; see Reply Brief for Petitioner Competitive Carriers Association et al. 10–11. But it may be, as the Court's failure to invoke this argument suggests, that tariffs and domestic taxes present different contexts when it comes to the problem of delegation. Cf. Department of Transportation v. Association of Ameri can Railroads, 575 U. S. 43, 80 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); Gundy, 588 U. S., at 159–160 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Page Proof Pending Publication
C
Running out of precedents to work with, the Court suggests, fnally, that it would be “absurd” to ask Congress to provide more guidance than it has. Ante, at 679. The argument runs this way. Respondents suggest, and I agree, that Congress could readily cure § 254's nondelegation problem. All it needs to do is set a tax rate or (perhaps) specify a numerical cap or its equivalent. The Court does not dispute that a legislatively defned tax rate would amount to meaningful guidance. But, the Court contends, some hypothetical caps could be pointless. What if Congress capped receipts at $5 trillion? Ante, at 680. To suggest that such a law would provide an “intelligible principle,” while insisting that §§ 254(b) and (c)(1) do not, strikes the Court as mindless formalism. Ibid. Up to a point, I agree. It may well be that a rate is usually required to give a domestic tax law an intelligible principle outside the context of direct taxes. See Part II–A, supra. Imagine, for instance, that Congress told the IRS to collect $50 trillion of income tax from the American people and left it at that. Few, I suspect, would suggest that instruction supplies suffcient guidance. But even assuming that a cap alone might be permissible when it comes to § 254, the Court too readily dismisses its constitutional value. Forcing Congress to supply some cap, any cap, would advance the nondelegation doctrine's purpose of ensuring “that the lines of accountability [remain] clear.” Gundy, 588 U. S., at 155 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). If Congress adopted the Court's ludicrously hypothetical $5 trillion universal-service tax, the American people would at least know whom to thank when the corresponding charges showed up on their phone bills. Even if the FCC chose to collect only a fraction of that amount, every Member of Congress would have to explain to his constituents where he stood on a potential $5 trillion tax. Far more realistically, of course, Congress would never conPage Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH template such a silly law, precisely to avoid those awkward conversations (and the electoral consequences that could follow).
And that's exactly the point. The framers divided power among legislative, executive, and judicial branches not out of a desire for formal tidiness, but to ensure ours would indeed be a Nation ruled by “We the People.” See id., at 152. By vesting executive power in a single President, the framers hoped to ensure vigorous enforcement of the laws. See United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 594 U. S. 1, 28 (2021) (Gorvesting judicial power in life-tenured judges, they hoped to ensure laws would be applied fairly by those insulated from political pressure. See SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U. S. 109, 147– 148 (2024) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). But, as the framers saw it, the power to make the laws that govern our society belongs to elected representatives more accountable to the people in whose name they act. See Gundy, 588 U. S., at 154–157 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). And nowhere did the framers see that principle as applying with greater force than in the feld of taxation. See Part II–A, supra.
In so many other arenas, this Court vigorously polices the Constitution's allocation of power. We have refused to tolerate congressional intrusions on powers reserved to the President. See Gundy, 588 U. S., at 168 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). We have prohibited the Executive from encroaching on power vested in Congress. Ibid. We have found unconstitutional, too, legislation seeking to confer judicial power on the other branches. Ibid. Yet there is one exception. When Congress has willingly surrendered its power to the Executive Branch, this Court's responses can only be described as feeble. Always, to be sure, the Court dutifully recites the creed that “[l]egislative power . . . belongs to the legislative branch, and to no other.” Ante, at 672. Too often, though, these professions amount (at most) to faith without works, and the results are not hard to Page Proof Pending Publication see. Today, the “vast majority” of the rules that govern our society are not made by Congress, but by Presidents or agencies they struggle to superintend. J. Adler & C. Walker, Delegation and Time, 105 Iowa L. Rev. 1931, 1975 (2020).
Those rules refect not the public deliberations of elected representatives, but the concerns of small cadres of elites. And as those cadres turn over from administration to administration, the rules revolve, too, inficting whiplash on those who must live under them. If there is any consistency over time, it may be because Presidents and their deputies do not always call the shots: Lower level offcials, unknown to the public and sometimes even to the White House, now make many of the rules we live by. See N. Rao, The Hedgehog & the Fox in Administrative Law, 150 Daedalus 220, 228–229 (Summer 2021).
To its credit, the Court has sometimes mitigated its failure to police legislative delegations by deploying other tools, like the major questions doctrine and de novo review of statutory terms, to ensure the Executive “act[s] within the confnes set by Congress.” Ante, at 705 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); see Gundy, 588 U. S., at 166–168 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). But every doctrine has its limits. What happens when Congress, weary of the hard business of legislating and facing strong incentives to pass the buck, cedes its lawmaking power, clearly and unmistakably, to an executive that craves it? See id., at 156. No canon of construction can bar the way. Then, our anemic approach to legislative delegations leaves the Court with a choice. It can permit the delegation to stand and move us all one step further from being citizens in a self-governing republic and one step closer to being subjects of quadrennial kings and long-tenured bureaucrats.
Or the Court can, as it does today, usurp legislative power, rewrite the statute, and dictate its own terms for Congress's surrender. Either way, we wind up in much the same place, only now with judges, rather than Presidents or bureaucrats, making our laws.
FCC v. CONSUMERS' RESEARCH There is another way. The Constitution promises that our elected representatives in Congress, and they alone, will make the laws that bind us. To honor that commitment, historical practice and our cases suggest other guides, beyond the intelligible principle test, for assessing when Congress has impermissibly ceded legislative power, as I have pointed out before. See id., at 157–162. As I have observed, too, when Chief Justice Taft frst used the phrase “intelligible principle,” he did not aim to displace those traditional guides, only to summarize them. Id., at 162 (citing J. W. Hampton, 276 U. S., at 409); see also n. 15, supra. Someday, soon, we should fnd our way back. By employing the modern, enfeebled form of the intelligible principle test, we do the Constitution no favors. And by approving a delegation of Congress's taxing power unprecedented in this Court's history, we risk making matters worse yet.20 20Justice Kavanaugh submits that delegations to the President “have been a regular feature of American Government” since the founding. Ante, at 699 (concurring opinion). But in drawing conclusions from those precedents, precision matters. Like the modern intelligible principle test, traditional nondelegation doctrine paid close attention to the kind of power at stake. For instance, delegations posed fewer problems in the feld of foreign affairs, where many “powers are constitutionally vested in the president under Article II.” Gundy, 588 U. S., at 159 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see ante, at 706 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). More generally, while Congress could not delegate “powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative,” Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 42–43 (1825), it could assign other branches “certain non-legislative responsibilities,” particularly powers historically within the Executive's prerogative. Gundy, 588 U. S., at 159 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see McConnell 328–335. So, for instance, Congress could give the President broad “authority to lay embargoes” during a congressional recess. Ante, at 700, n. 2 (Kava99. Likewise, Congress could grant the President broad discretion over “military pensions,” “patents,” and “post roads”—for none of those things implicated traditionally legislative functions. Ante, at 699–700, n. 2 (Kavaheartland of legislative power, Congress could authorize the executive to fnd facts and “ `fll up the details' ” of whatever policies Congress had Page Proof Pending Publication Still, there is room for some optimism. The Court today cannot bring itself to say that §§ 254(c)(3) and (h)(2) survive even its milquetoast version of the intelligible principle test. The Court also refuses to sustain § 254(c)(1) as enacted, feeling obliged instead to rewrite that provision before upholding it. I can imagine worse outcomes than those small steps toward home. But we can and should do better. When it comes to other aspects of the separation of powers, we have found manageable ways to honor the Constitution's design. This one requires no less of us.
Respectfully, I dissent.
set. See Gundy, 588 U. S., at 157–159 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); cf. G. Lawson, A Private-Law Framework for Subdelegation, in The Administrative State Before the Supreme Court: Perspectives on the Nondelegation Doctrine 123 (P. Wallison & J. Yoo eds. 2022). So, historically, Congress could empower the executive and judicial branches to do quite a lot— except make the laws that govern us.
Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication Reporter’s Note The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional edits were made: None