Pursuant to the Clean Air Act, the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency approved California regulations requiring automakers to alter their feets of new vehicles. Under those California regulations, automakers must manufacture more electric vehicles and fewer gasoline-powered vehicles. The goal is to decrease emissions from the use of gasoline and other liquid fuels. Producers of gasoline and other liquid fuels sued EPA, arguing that EPA's approval of the California regulations violated the Clean Air Act.
The sole issue before this Court is whether the fuel producers have standing to maintain their suit.
The fuel producers assert that the California regulations reduce the manufacture and sale of cars powered by gasoline and other liquid fuels, thereby causing a decrease in sales of those fuels by the fuel producers. So fuel producers take *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the American Petroleum Institute by Paul D. Clement and C. Harker Rhodes IV; for the Cato Institute by Thomas A. Berry and Brent Skorup; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by Jaime A. Santos, William M. Jay, Benjamin Hayes, Jennifer B. Dickey, and Andrew R. Varcoe; for the Foothill Church et al. by Rory T. Gray and John J. Bursch; for the Sulphur Institute by Patrick F. Philbin and Chase Harrington; for the Texas Oil & Gas Association et al. by James K. Vines and Samuel P. Funk; for the Texas Royalty Council et al. by Ivan L. London; for The Two Hundred for Homeownership by Rafe Petersen; and for the Western States Petroleum Association et al. by Katherine C. Yarger. Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the International Council on Clean Transportation et al. by Matthew D. Zinn; and for F. Andrew Hessick, pro se, and Richard A. Simpson.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for Advancing American Freedom et al. by J. Marc Wheat; for ConservAmerica Inc. by John A. Sheehan; for Our Children's Trust et al. by Julia A. Olson, Andrea K. Rodgers, Philip L. Gregory, and Lucia Goin; and for Heather Elliott et al. by Benjamin W. Berkowitz and Andrew F. Dawson.
Page Proof Pending Publication in less revenue than they would in a free market. Invalidating the regulations, they say, would remove a regulatory impediment to their ability to fully compete in the market. And without California's regulations in effect, manufacturers would likely make more cars powered by gasoline and other liquid fuels, thereby increasing purchases of those fuels and redressing the fuel producers' injury.
EPA and California dispute redressability. They suggest that, even if the regulations are invalidated, car manufacturers nonetheless would not manufacture more gasoline- powered cars. They posit that the California regulations no longer have any impact because, in a free market, consumer demand for and manufacturers' supply of electric vehicles would still supposedly exceed what the California regulations mandate.
Based on this Court's precedents and the evidence in the record, we hold that the fuel producers have standing. We therefore reverse the contrary judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit and remand for that court to consider the merits of the fuel producers' legal claims.
I
A
As relevant here, the Clean Air Act requires the Environmental Protection Agency, or EPA, to periodically “prescribe . . . standards” that limit emissions of certain air pollutants from new motor vehicles. 42 U. S. C. § 7521(a)(1). To promote uniformity in vehicle emissions regulations, the Act also preempts state standards “relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles.” § 7543(a).
But the Act's preemption provision exempts California.
Under certain circumstances, California may adopt emissions standards for new motor vehicles that are more stringent than EPA's. California may do so when it concludes that more stringent standards are needed to meet “compelling and extraordinary conditions.”
§ 7543(b)(1)(B). Other Page Proof Pending Publication DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC v. EPA States may also adopt California's stricter limits on emissions from new motor vehicles, but may not adopt or enforce state standards that differ from California's. § 7507.
The upshot of this system is that EPA sets nationwide emissions standards for new motor vehicles; California in limited circumstances may set more stringent emissions standards for vehicles sold in the State; and other States may either follow EPA's standards or adopt California's but may not set their own.
Over the years, California has often requested and received EPA approval for stricter emissions standards to combat local California air-quality problems like smog. See, e. g., 38 Fed. Reg. 10319 (1973).
Beginning in 2005, California also attempted to use its unique preemption exception as one means to address global climate change. As relevant here, the State asked EPA for approval of regulations that limit greenhouse-gas emissions and force electrifcation of the new vehicle feet sold in the State. See 73 Fed. Reg. 12157 (2008).
In 2008, under the George W. Bush administration, EPA denied California's frst such request. EPA explained that the Clean Air Act permits California to enact standards to address local and regional pollution where the causal factors are tied to California. But EPA reasoned that the authority granted to California did not extend to efforts to combat global climate change. See id., at 12156–12157, 12168.
Since then, as Presidential administrations have come and gone, EPA has repeatedly altered its legal position on whether the Clean Air Act authorizes California regulations targeting greenhouse-gas emissions from new motor vehicles.
This case involves California's 2012 request for EPA approval of new California regulations. As relevant here, those regulations generally require automakers (i) to limit average greenhouse-gas emissions across their feets of new motor vehicles sold in the State and (ii) to manufacture a Page Proof Pending Publication certain percentage of electric vehicles as part of their vehicle feets. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 13, §§ 1961.3, 1962.2 (2022). The greenhouse-gas emissions limits remain in force indefnitely into the future, and the specifc requirements for electric vehicles in new vehicle feets run through model year 2025. See ibid. (EPA has separately approved a new California electric-vehicle mandate that applies through model year 2035 and beyond; that separate set of regulations is not at issue in this suit.1) Under President Obama, EPA reversed its legal position and, in 2013, allowed the California regulations to take effect. 78 Fed. Reg. 2112 (2013). Then in 2019, under President Trump, EPA fipped back and rescinded approval of the California regulations. 84 Fed. Reg. 51328 (2019). In 2022, under President Biden, EPA again reversed course and reinstated approval of California's regulations. 87 Fed. Reg. 14333 (2022). That is where things stand as of now, although President Trump has directed EPA to again reconsider its approval of California's standards. Exec. Order No. 14154, 90 Fed. Reg. 8353–8354 (2025).
To date, acting pursuant to the Clean Air Act, 17 States and the District of Columbia have copied California's greenhouse-gas emissions standards for new motor vehicles, the electric-vehicle mandate, or both. Together with California, those jurisdictions account for about 40 percent of America's market for new cars and light-duty trucks.
B
In 2022, after EPA reinstated approval of California's 2012 regulations, several fuel producers sued EPA in the D. C. Circuit. The fuel producers primarily argued that EPA lacked authority under the Clean Air Act to approve the California regulations. They reasoned that the regulations did 1Acting under the Congressional Review Act, Congress recently passed and the President signed legislation to block that separate set of California regulations. See H. J. Res. No. 88, 119th Cong., 1st Sess. (2025). Page Proof Pending Publication DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC v. EPA not target a local California air-quality problem—as they say is required by the Clean Air Act—but instead were designed to address global climate change.
The fuel producers manufacture and sell automobile fuels such as gasoline, diesel, and ethanol. For example, American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers is a national trade association that represents many American fuel companies that produce and sell gasoline and other liquid fuels for automobiles. Diamond Alternative Energy sells renewable diesel, an alternative to traditional petroleum-derived diesel. Valero Renewable Fuels Company manufactures and sells ethanol.
To establish Article III standing for their D. C. Circuit challenge, the fuel producers submitted 14 declarations and devoted two pages of their opening brief to standing. In one declaration, for example, an analyst for American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers explained that “the demand for gasoline and diesel fuel will be depressed” by California's regulations (also adopted by 17 other States) because they “require the sale of vehicles that use less gasoline and diesel fuel” or “use no liquid fuel at all.” App. 172–174. As support, the declaration quoted California's own estimate that “its regulations would cause `substantial reductions in demand for gasoline exceeding $1 billion beginning in 2020 and increasing to over $10 billion in 2030.' ” Id., at 173. Various fuel producers further stated that those “injuries would be substantially ameliorated if EPA's decision” to reinstate the waiver “were set aside.” Id., at 137, 181.
Notably, in the D. C. Circuit, EPA did not argue that the fuel producers lacked Article III standing. EPA's silence on standing was telling—the proverbial dog that did not bark— because EPA routinely challenges a party's standing when the agency believes that injury in fact, causation, or redress- ability is questionable. So EPA's failure to do so here tends to suggest that EPA believed that the fuel producers had standing.
Page Proof Pending Publication California, along with other States that chose to adopt California's regulations, intervened in the D. C. Circuit to defend EPA's approval of those regulations. To support its motion to intervene, California submitted declarations emphasizing the importance of the regulations—now and in the future— to meeting California's emissions-control goals. For example, a California offcial responsible for Clean Air Act compliance stated that, without the regulations, “it is reasonable to expect that there would be fewer” electric vehicles “produced and sold . . . , and thus additional gasoline-fueled vehicles produced and sold during these model years.” Id., at 110. All of that “would increase criteria pollutant emissions,” as California's own “modeling has confrmed.” Ibid. Another California offcial explained that invalidating the feet-wide emissions standards and electric-vehicle mandate “would result in higher greenhouse gas and criteria pollutant emissions” from the “additional gasoline-fueled cars” that would be produced and sold. Id., at 115.
After the D. C. Circuit granted California's motion to intervene, however, California completely changed its tune about the continuing impact of the regulations. In its merits briefng in that court, California suddenly argued that the fuel producers lacked Article III standing because they had not “established any probability” that automobile “manufacturers would change course if EPA's decision were vacated.” Brief for State and Local Government Respondent- Intervenors in No. 22–1081 (CADC), p. 15. Specifcally, California suggested that because of supposed “surging consumer demand” for electric vehicles, invalidating the feet- wide emissions standards and electric-vehicle mandate would not cause vehicle manufacturers to make more gasoline-powered vehicles. Id., at 14. Therefore, California argued that judicial invalidation of the California regulations was not likely to redress the fuel producers' injuries. The D. C. Circuit agreed with California and held that the fuel producers lacked Article III standing. Ohio v. EPA, 98 Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC v. EPA F. 4th 288, 300 (2024). The court explained that redressability depended on how third-party automakers would act in the absence of California's feet-wide emissions standards and electric-vehicle mandate. According to the D. C. Circuit, the fuel producers failed to “cite any record evidence” or “fle additional affdavits or other evidence” demonstrating that automakers would respond to invalidation of the regulations by producing fewer electric vehicles and more gasoline-powered vehicles. Id., at 303 (quotation marks and alteration omitted).2 This Court granted certiorari limited to the question of whether the fuel producers have Article III standing. 604 U. S. 1065 (2024).
II
Article III of the Constitution confnes the jurisdiction of federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies.” § 2, cl. 1. For a lawsuit to constitute a case within the meaning of Article III, the plaintiff must have standing to sue. To demonstrate standing, plaintiffs must answer a basic question— “ `What's it to you?' ” FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S. 367, 379 (2024) (quoting A. Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 882 (1983)). In other words, plaintiffs must show that they possess “a `personal stake' in the dispute” and are not mere bystanders. 2The D. C. Circuit opined that the California regulations expire after model year 2025, making it unlikely that automakers would “change course” even if the court “were to vacate the waiver.” 98 F. 4th, at 302. In its briefng before this Court, EPA acknowledged that the D. C. Circuit was factually incorrect on that point—California in fact may keep its feet- wide emissions standards in place indefnitely into the future. Brief for Federal Respondents in Opposition 12–13; see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 13, § 1961.3(a). It may be that some of the D. C. Circuit's standing analysis stemmed from a misunderstanding about when the California feet-wide emissions standards expire.
602 U. S., at 379 (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. 413, 423 (2021)).
“By limiting who can sue, the standing requirement implements `the Framers' concept of the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.' ” 602 U. S., at 380 (quoting J. Roberts, Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 Duke L. J. 1219, 1220 (1993)). Standing doctrine also “ `tends to assure that the legal questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarifed atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.' ” 602 U. S., at 379 (quoting Val ley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Sepa ration of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 472 (1982)). This Court's “cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements”: injury in fact, causation, and redressability. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992).
The frst requirement, injury in fact, requires the plaintiff to demonstrate an injury that is “concrete,” “particularized,” and “actual or imminent, not speculative.” Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 381 (quotation marks omitted).
“Monetary costs are of course an injury.”
United States v. Texas, 599 U. S. 670, 676 (2023).
The second and third requirements, causation and redress- ability, are usually “fip sides of the same coin.” Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 380 (quotation marks omitted). Causation requires the plaintiff to show “that the injury was likely caused by the defendant,” and redressability requires the plaintiff to demonstrate “that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.” TransUnion, 594 U. S., at 423. “If a defendant's action causes an injury, enjoining the action or awarding damages for the action will typically redress that injury.” Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 381. To be sure, redressability “can Page Proof Pending Publication DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC v. EPA still pose an independent bar in some cases,” but “the two key questions in most standing disputes are injury in fact and causation.” Id., at 381, and n. 1. The additional redressability requirement generally serves to ensure that there is a suffcient “relationship between `the judicial relief requested' and the `injury' suffered.” California v. Texas, 593 U. S. 659, 671 (2021) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 753, n. 19 (1984)); see Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U. S. 255, 292–293 (2023).
Importantly, if a plaintiff is “an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue,” then “there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it.” Lujan, 504 U. S., at 561–562.
When the plaintiff is not the object of a government regulation, however, causation and redressability often depend on how regulated third parties not before the court will act in response to the government regulation or judicial relief. See Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 383. Courts must distinguish the “predictable” from the “speculative” effects of government action or judicial relief on third parties. Ibid.; see also Department of Commerce v. New York, 588 U. S. 752, 768 (2019). With respect to causation (and redressability), a court must conclude that “ `third parties will likely react' ” to the government regulation (or judicial relief) “ `in predictable ways' ” that will likely cause (or redress) the plaintiff's injury. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 383 (quoting California, 593 U. S., at 675).
Here, the fuel producers say that they suffered injury in fact caused by the California regulations. They point out that the entire purpose of California's feet-wide emissions standards and electric-vehicle mandate is to reduce the use of gasoline and other liquid fuels in motor vehicles as compared to what otherwise would occur in a free market. The regulations cause automakers to, among other things, produce fewer gasoline-powered vehicles. That in turn causes Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication fewer gasoline sales, leading to a monetary injury in fact for producers of gasoline and other liquid fuels.
As to redressability, the fuel producers say that invalidating the California regulations would likely redress their injury because it would remove a regulatory impediment to the sale and use of their products. They further contend that, absent the regulations, automakers would likely produce fewer electric vehicles and more gasoline-powered vehicles. Production of those vehicles would predictably lead to more purchases of gasoline and other liquid fuels sold by the fuel producers. In short, they argue that when the government tells automakers to make more cars that use less gasoline, there should be little question that the gasoline producers have standing to sue.
In this Court, neither EPA nor California meaningfully disputes injury in fact or causation. But they argue that the fuel producers did not establish redressability. According to EPA and California, even if the California regulations are invalidated, the fuel producers have not shown that vehicle manufacturers would reduce the percentage of their feets that consist of electric vehicles (or otherwise stated, increase the percentage that consists of gasoline-powered vehicles). EPA and California suggest that the automobile market has changed—apparently permanently in their view—and strong consumer demand for (and manufacturers' supply of) electric vehicles means that automakers are unlikely to manufacture or sell any additional gasoline-powered cars even if the California regulations are invalidated.
III
We hold that the fuel producers have standing to sue.
To begin, the injury in fact and causation elements of the fuel producers' standing, which no party disputes, are straightforward.
As for injury in fact, the fuel producers make money by selling fuel. Therefore, the decrease in purchases of gasoline and other liquid fuels resulting from the California reguDIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC v. EPA lations hurts their bottom line. Those monetary costs “are of course an injury.” United States v. Texas, 599 U. S. 670, 676 (2023).
As for causation, EPA's approval authorized California (and ultimately 17 other States) to enforce regulations that require lower feet-wide greenhouse-gas emissions and the electrifcation of automakers' vehicle feets, thereby reducing purchases of liquid fuels such as gasoline. The regulations likely cause fuel producers' monetary injuries because the regulations likely cause a decrease in purchases of gasoline and other liquid fuels for automobiles. Indeed, that is the whole point of the regulations.
As for redressability, invalidating the California regulations would likely redress at least some of the fuel producers' monetary injuries.3 Even “one dollar” of additional revenue for the fuel producers would satisfy the redressability component of Article III standing. Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 592 U. S. 279, 292 (2021). And as we will explain, it is “likely” that invalidating the California regulations would result in more revenue for the fuel producers from additional sales of gasoline and other liquid fuels. FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S. 367, 380 (2024).
A
When a plaintiff is the “object” of a government regulation, there should “ordinarily” be “little question” that the regulation causes injury to the plaintiff and that invalidating the regulation would redress the plaintiff's injuries. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 561 (1992).
The fuel producers here might be considered an object of the California regulations because the regulations explicitly 3In this opinion, we use the term “invalidated” as shorthand to describe the result from setting aside EPA's approval of the California regulations. Under D. C. Circuit precedent, setting aside EPA's approval would mean that California may not enforce its greenhouse-gas emissions limits and electric-vehicle mandate for new vehicle feets.
Page Proof Pending Publication seek to restrict the use of gasoline and other liquid fuels in automobiles. When the government prohibits or impedes Company A from using Company B's product, then both Company A and Company B might be deemed objects of the government action at issue. For example, if the government bans hot dog sales in stadiums, then hot dog manufacturers, not just stadiums, might be considered objects of the regulation. If the government prohibits aluminum bats in Little League, then aluminum bat manufacturers, not only Little League, might be objects of the regulation. If the government bans bookstores from selling certain publishers' books, then those publishers, not just bookstores, might be objects of the regulation. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U. S. 154, 169 (1997); Energy Future Coalition v. EPA, 793 F. 3d 141, 144–145 (CADC 2015).
This Court has applied principles of that kind in various contexts. For example, when a State prohibited parents from sending their children to private schools, affected schools had standing to sue, even though parents were the directly regulated parties. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535–536 (1925). And when the Federal Communications Commission announced that it would deny a license to any broadcasting station that conducted certain business with broadcasting networks, a broadcasting network (CBS) had standing to sue even though broadcasting stations were the directly regulated parties. See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, 316 U. S. 407, 422 (1942).
According to the fuel producers, when a regulation targets the provider of a product or service by limiting another entity's use of that product or service, the targeted provider ordinarily has standing—without the need for much additional analysis. See Bennett, 520 U. S., at 169. So too here, according to the fuel producers. As they see it, the government is targeting the use of gasoline and other liquid fuels by regulating at the assembly line rather than the gas pump. Page Proof Pending Publication DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC v. EPA Either way, they say that the California regulations pose a legal barrier to the fuel producers' sale of their products and deny them the opportunity to compete in the marketplace without government interference. And the fuel producers assert that removing a coercive government standard that restricts the use of their products would allow them to compete more fully in the marketplace and thus provide redress for purposes of Article III. See ibid.; Energy Future Coali tion, 793 F. 3d, at 144–145.
That argument is not without force and, at a minimum, highlights how the government might seek to indirectly target a product or service “through a conduit” in addition to regulating it directly. Brief for Petitioners 43. But we ultimately need not further consider that argument in this case because, regardless, the fuel producers have readily demonstrated their standing.
B
This case presents what the Court has described as the “familiar” circumstance where government regulation of a business “may be likely” to cause injuries to other linked businesses. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 384. As the Court has explained, “when the government regulates (or under-regulates) a business, the regulation (or lack thereof) may cause downstream or upstream economic injuries to others in the chain, such as certain manufacturers, retailers, suppliers, competitors, or customers.” Ibid. In cases of that kind, this Court's analysis of causation and redressability has recognized commonsense economic realities. When third party behavior is predictable, commonsense inferences may be drawn. Importantly, EPA agrees that “commonsense economic principles” can be useful when evaluating Article III standing. Brief for Federal Respondents 39.
In this case, those commonsense economic principles support the fuel producers' standing. The California regulations force automakers to manufacture more electric vehicles Page Proof Pending Publication and fewer gasoline-powered vehicles. See Bennett, 520 U. S., at 169.4 The standards force automakers to produce a feet of vehicles that, as a whole, uses signifcantly less gasoline and other liquid fuels. California's regulation of automakers' vehicle feets in turn will likely “cause downstream or upstream economic injuries to others in the chain,” such as producers of gasoline and other liquid fuels. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 384.
By the same token, the fuel producers persuasively contend that invalidating California's regulations would likely mean more gasoline-powered automobiles, which would in turn likely mean more sales of gasoline and other liquid fuels by the fuel producers. See Bennett, 520 U. S., at 170–171. Because the fuel producers have suffered classic monetary injury caused by a government regulatory action, it would be surprising and unusual if invalidating the regulations did not redress the fuel producers' injuries. See Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 381 (“If a defendant's action causes an injury, enjoining the action . . . will typically redress that injury”). After all, the fact that a regulation was designed to produce a particular effect on the market ordinarily means that the likely result of vacating that regulation would be to reduce that effect on the market. Cf. Lujan, 504 U. S., at 561–562.
EPA and California push back on that reasoning, asserting that this case is unusual and does not ft the typical pattern. They suggest that the new vehicle market has developed in a way that even if the California regulations are invali4Recall that the California regulations at issue impose a direct electric- vehicle mandate along with feet-wide limits on average greenhouse-gas emissions from new motor vehicles. Automakers may comply with the feet-wide emissions limits by producing more electric vehicles, more low- emission vehicles, or both. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 13, §§ 1961.3(a)(1), (a)(4). For the sake of simplicity, we refer to the production of additional electric vehicles, recognizing that some manufacturers may also (or alternatively) manufacture additional low-emission vehicles to comply with California's feet-wide emissions limits.
Page Proof Pending Publication DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC v. EPA dated, automakers would not likely manufacture or sell more gasoline-powered cars than they do now.
To begin with, that is an odd argument for EPA and California to advance. After all, if invalidating the regulations would change nothing in the market, why are EPA and California enforcing and defending the regulations? The whole point of the regulations is to increase the number of electric vehicles in the new automobile market beyond what consumers would otherwise demand and what automakers would otherwise manufacture and sell. And EPA and California are presumably defending the regulations because they think that the regulations still make a difference in the market. In all events, record evidence confrms what common sense tells us: Invalidating the regulations likely (not certainly, but likely) would make a difference for fuel producers because automakers would likely manufacture more vehicles that run on gasoline and other liquid fuels.
First, the fuel producers' standing declarations explain that California's regulations have historically harmed the fuel producers by causing a decrease in purchases of fuel. The declarations further quote California's estimate that its standards would produce “ `substantial reductions in demand for gasoline exceeding $1 billion beginning in 2020 and in creasing to over $10 billion in 2030.' ” App. 173 (emphasis added). The fuel producers' declarations emphasize, moreover, that California itself asserted that the State's standards would reduce emissions partly through “ `reductions in fuel production.' ” Id., at 148. The declarations also note that California recognized that the “oil and gas industry” and “fuel providers” would likely be “most adversely affected” by the regulations due to “the resulting substantial reductions in demand for gasoline.” Id., at 137 (quotation marks omitted).
Second, the record reveals that California itself stated in 2021, when asking EPA to reinstate the regulations, that the regulations are “critical not just for immediate emissions rePage Proof Pending Publication ductions” but also for “greater emission reductions in the future.” Id., at 66 (emphasis added). And after the fuel producers sued EPA in 2022, California moved to intervene and attached expert declarations stating that California's standards are likely to decrease fuel use. Specifcally, California's experts opined that absent California's regulations, “fewer” electric vehicles “are likely to be sold than would otherwise have been . . . and thus additional gasoline-fueled vehicles would be sold.” Id., at 115; see also id., at 110. California itself therefore acknowledged that its regulations were still having an impact and that invalidating the regulations would likely affect the automobile market and increase demand for gasoline and other liquid fuels.
Third, EPA too has stated that the California regulations are likely to reduce consumption of fuel. When approving California's regulations, EPA repeatedly affrmed that California “needs” its standards “to address compelling and extraordinary air quality conditions in the state.” 87 Fed. Reg. 14334; see id., at 14353. And in proposing to amend California's state implementation plan under the Clean Air Act more than two years after this suit was fled, EPA credited California's estimates that the regulations would continue reducing greenhouse-gas emissions in California through at least 2037. 89 Fed. Reg. 82558 (2024).
Fourth, fve automakers who have invested heavily in electric vehicles—and thus have an interest in the government continuing to support and favor that market—intervened on the side of EPA and California in the Court of Appeals.
Their motion to intervene predicted that, absent California's regulations, other automakers would seek a competitive advantage over them by selling fewer electric vehicles and more gasoline-powered vehicles. See Motion To Intervene of Ford Motor Co. et al. in No. 22–1081 (CADC), pp. 4, 11–12, 14. As with California's motion to intervene, the automakers' assessment that the regulations make a difference—and that invalidating them would make a difference— Page Proof Pending Publication DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC v. EPA indicates that the regulations are still likely having a real- world impact on the automobile market.
In short, the commonsense economic inferences about the operation of the automobile market—combined with the statements of the fuel producers, California, EPA, and the vehicle manufacturers—make it suffciently “predictable” that invalidating California's regulations would likely redress the fuel producers' injury. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 383.
Article III's redressability requirement serves to align injuries and remedies. The primary goals of that requirement are to ensure that plaintiffs do not sue the wrong parties and that courts do not issue advisory opinions. The redressability requirement should not be misused, however, to prevent the targets of government regulations from challenging regulations that threaten their businesses. EPA and California cite no case where Article III's redressability requirement has been applied to prevent challenges to a regulation setting a permanent ceiling on the sale or use of a business's products. Here, the fuel producers have established their standing to challenge EPA's approval of the California regulations.5
C
EPA and California further argue, however, that the fuel producers had to introduce still more evidence—for example, affdavits either from expert economists or from directly regulated automakers explaining how they would respond to a court order invalidating California's regulations. See Brief for Federal Respondents 17–18, 43–44; Brief for State Respondents 13.
We disagree. This Court has not demanded that plaintiffs introduce evidence from expert economists or from directly regulated third parties to show how third parties would 5We need not decide whether every piece of record evidence described above is necessary to establish standing here. The totality of record evidence, along with commonsense inferences about market realities, readily suffces to demonstrate standing.
Page Proof Pending Publication likely respond to a government regulation or invalidation thereof. Rather, to show redressability, the plaintiff must simply “show a predictable chain of events” that would likely result from judicial relief and redress the plaintiff's injury. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 385. In De partment of Commerce v. New York, to take just one example, this Court considered a challenge by several States and other plaintiffs to the Government's decision to reinstate a citizenship question on the census. 588 U. S. 752, 758–759 (2019). The States argued that reinstating the question would likely cause noncitizens to respond to the census at lower rates, thereby causing noncitizen residents of the States to be undercounted, and in turn leading to reduced representation and other harms for those States. Id., at 766–767. The Court did not require the States to produce affdavits or testimony from noncitizens explaining that they would not respond to the census in light of the citizenship question.
Requiring the plaintiff to produce affdavits from regulated parties would be especially problematic in cases of this kind. It would render the plaintiff 's ability to obtain judicial review dependent on the happenstance of whether the plaintiff and the relevant regulated parties are aligned and share litigation interests—and whether the regulated party is willing to publicly oppose (and possibly antagonize) the government regulator by supporting the plaintiff's suit. Such a rule would create incentives for gamesmanship and could make it diffcult or impossible to establish standing in cases where the standing analysis should be straightforward. A heightened “proof of redressability” requirement of that kind would ultimately close the courthouse doors to many traditional challenges to agency action. Cf. id., at 768. Such a rule has little to commend it, and we decline to adopt it.
D
In ruling against EPA and California, we recognize that there may conceivably be some atypical instances where a Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC v. EPA market has permanently and dramatically changed such that invalidating a challenged regulation would have no effect on the market in question, thereby defeating redressability.6 But that is likely to be a fairly rare and unusual scenario, for a couple of reasons.
First, we can assume that governments do not usually continue to enforce and defend regulations that have no continuing effect in the relevant market. EPA and California continue to enforce these regulations, and for three years, EPA and California have tenaciously defended them in court. So it is diffcult to put much stock in their suggestion that invalidating the regulations (in California and 17 other States) would have zero effect on the new vehicle market in America both now and in the future. Simply put, EPA's and California's own actions—their statements, their enforcement decisions, their litigation positions—undermine the central premise of their redressability argument. When as here a government seeks to justify its regulatory actions by, on the one hand, touting the consequences for fuel usage and emissions while, on the other, maintaining that those same regulations are unreviewable because there are no consequences, courts can appropriately be skeptical. Judges “are `not required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free.' ” Department of Commerce, 588 U. S., at 785 (quoting United States v. Stanchich, 550 F. 2d 1294, 1300 (CA2 1977) (Friendly, J.)).
Second, EPA and California's view of redressability fails to account for dynamic markets and the effects of interrelated economic forces and regulatory programs that change over time. Supply and demand may depend on, among other things, the strength of the overall economy, regulatory emissions standards, international developments, government subsidies to particular industries, and tax incentives, among many other factors. Predicting developments in complex 6Or a regulation may have expired, making the legal challenge moot. But that scenario is covered by mootness doctrine, not redressability. markets can be a diffcult and uncertain endeavor, particularly when various governments' regulatory, spending, and tax policies are at play.7 To deny standing based on a theory that invalidating an important regulation would actually have zero impact on a dynamic and heavily regulated market requires a degree of economic and political clairvoyance that is diffcult for a court to maintain. That is particularly so when the government regulation itself may be skewing the market at issue. So courts should exercise caution before denying standing because of a claimed lack of redressability rooted in questionable economic speculation.
In advancing their argument, EPA and California also point out that some automakers are now in compliance with California's regulatory mandates. But that is not surprising. Compliance with government regulation usually suggests regulatory effect, not the absence of effect. Nor is such compliance especially probative of how all automakers are acting or would respond to a court order invalidating California's regulations—including in the 17 other States that have adopted those regulations. In the D. C. Circuit, California pointed to evidence that seven automakers had announced future plans to sell more electric vehicles than 7Even if it appears that a market may have temporarily rendered a regulation irrelevant, the market may shift again. This market may be an example. Even supposing that California's regulations as of 2022 were momentarily having no continuing effect on the automobile market due to surging consumer demand for electric vehicles, the demand for electric vehicles may have slowed or at least not matched what might have been anticipated. See, e. g., I. Penn, Electric Vehicles Died a Century Ago. Could That Happen Again? N. Y. Times, May 27, 2025, section B, p. 1; R. Felton, EV Sales Streak Grinds to a Sudden Halt, Wall Street Journal, May 8, 2025; Carmakers Scale Down Electrifcation Plans as EV Demand Slows, Reuters, Sept. 12, 2024; C. Otts, GM Delays Electric Vehicle Build- out in New Sign of Weakening Demand, Wall Street Journal, July 24, 2024; J. Ewing, Carmakers Downshift on E.V. Spending as Sales Growth Slows, N. Y. Times, Nov. 10, 2023, section B, p. 1.
Page Proof Pending Publication DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC v. EPA California's regulations required. Brief for State and Local Government Respondent-Intervenors in No. 22–1081, at 14. But California offered no evidence that the cited press releases from seven automakers represented commitments defnite enough to withstand potential future market fuctuations and regulatory changes. Nor did California offer evidence that the statements of those seven automakers represented the likely behavior of the entire automaking industry, including potential new market entrants. Recall that the automakers' own motion to intervene in the Court of Appeals suggested otherwise—that if the regulations were invalidated, other automakers would seek a competitive advantage by manufacturing more gasoline-powered cars.
In sum, this case does not present the unusual scenario where invalidating a challenged government restriction on businesses in a competitive market is not likely to have any effect. Here, it may not be certain, but it is at least “predictable” that invalidating the California regulations would likely result in the fuel producers ultimately selling more gasoline and other liquid fuels. See Alliance for Hippo cratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 383.
E
Two of our colleagues have filed dissenting opinions.
They primarily object to the Court's decision to grant certiorari in this case. But having granted certiorari, we proceed to decide the question presented for our review.
Justice Sotomayor suggests that the D. C. Circuit's erroneous standing analysis was attributable to its misunderstanding about the duration of California's feet-wide emissions standards. See post, at 127 (dissenting opinion). So in her view, the Court need only correct that factual misunderstanding and remand the case to the D. C. Circuit. See post, at 128. But the D. C. Circuit's standing analysis did not rest entirely on that misunderstanding. And neither EPA nor California asked for such a remand—even though they acPage Proof Pending Publication knowledged the D. C. Circuit's misunderstanding. Moreover, because this litigation has gone on for three years, we see no good reason to waste the parties' time and resources by remanding for further analysis of the standing issue in the Court of Appeals when the parties have comprehensively briefed it and we can readily resolve it now.
Justice Jackson separately argues that the Court does not apply standing doctrine “evenhandedly.” Post, at 128 (dissenting opinion). A review of standing cases over the last few years disproves that suggestion. See, e. g., Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 374; United States v. Texas, 599 U. S., at 674; Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U. S. 255, 291–292 (2023); Reed v. Goertz, 598 U. S. 230, 234 (2023); TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. 413, 417–418 (2021); California v. Texas, 593 U. S. 659, 666 (2021); Uzuegbunam, 592 U. S., at 282–283; Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A., 590 U. S. 538, 541–542 (2020); Department of Commerce, 588 U. S., at 766–768. In this case, as we have explained, this Court's recent standing precedents support the conclusion that the fuel producers have standing.
* * * This case concerns only standing, not the merits. EPA and California may or may not prevail on the merits in defending EPA's approval of the California regulations. But the justiciability of the fuel producers' challenge to EPA's approval of the California regulations is evident. Courts should not “make standing law more complicated than it needs to be.” Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A., 590 U. S. 538, 547 (2020). The government generally may not target a business or industry through stringent and allegedly unlawful regulation, and then evade the resulting lawsuits by claiming that the targets of its regulation should be locked out of court as unaffected bystanders. In light of this Court's precedents and the evidence before the Court of Appeals, the fuel producers established Article III standing to challenge Page Proof Pending Publication DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC v. EPA EPA's approval of the California regulations. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.