Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) permits a district court to grant relief from a fnal judgment in limited circumstances. The Rule includes fve provisions setting out specifc grounds upon which parties may seek such relief. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 60(b)(1)–(5). It also includes a catchall provision that allows a district court to relieve a party from a fnal judgment for “any other reason that justifes relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(6). We have consistently held that only “extraordinary circumstances” can justify relief under the Rule 60(b)(6) catchall. The question presented is whether this rigorous standard applies when a Rule 60(b)(6) movant seeks to reopen a case for the purpose of fling an amended complaint. We hold that it does.
I
A
Plaintiffs (respondents here) are victims and the families of victims of terrorist attacks carried out by Hamas between December 2001 and August 2003. On January 1, 2019, plainPage Proof Pending Publication tiffs sued petitioner BLOM Bank SAL (BLOM), an international bank, under the Anti-Terrorism Act, as amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), 18 U. S. C. § 2333(d). They alleged that BLOM aided and abetted Hamas's commission of the terrorist attacks by providing fnancial services to customers who were allegedly affliated with Hamas and who had helped further Hamas's goals. In the District Court, BLOM repeatedly argued that the facts alleged in plaintiffs' complaint were insuffcient to state a claim of aiding and abetting under JASTA. Before moving to dismiss the complaint, BLOM made this argument to the District Court in a required premotion letter. See 1 App. 142–147. Plaintiffs responded that they would stand on their allegations as pleaded. See id., at 148–155. At a subsequent, premotion conference, plaintiffs' counsel reaffrmed their clients' position, telling the District Court that they were “prepared to brief [their opposition to a motion to dismiss] based on the arguments presented in the pre-motion letter,” and that they “would not seek leave to amend” if the court dismissed their complaint. App. to Pet. for Cert. 93–94.
BLOM moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). At a hearing on the motion, the District Court reminded plaintiffs' counsel that they had not requested an opportunity to replead and specifcally asked whether this meant that the complaint contained everything the court would “need to consider in terms of suffciency of [plaintiffs'] pleading.” Id., at 124. Plaintiffs' counsel confrmed that they did not intend to add any additional facts. Id., at 125.
The District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice and so denied leave to amend. The court held, as relevant here, that plaintiffs had not “plausibly allege[d] the general awareness . . . elemen[t] necessary to plead JASTA aidingand-abetting liability.” 432 F. Supp. 3d 253, 257 (EDNY 2020). In the District Court's view, “it [was] not enough for Page Proof Pending Publication Plaintiffs to plausibl[y] allege that BLOM was generally aware of [its] role in terrorist activities, from which terrorist attacks were a natural and foreseeable consequence.” Id., at 264 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, plaintiffs needed to “plausibly alleg[e] that, by providing fnancial services to [specifc customers], BLOM generally assumed a role in Hamas' violent or life-endangering activities,” and plaintiffs had failed to do so. Id., at 265. And, the court explained, leave to amend was unwarranted because “Plaintiffs . . . d[id] not request leave to amend”; “specifcally declined the Court's offer to do so at the pre-motion conference”; and further failed to “identif[y] any additional facts they could allege which would address the defciencies in their complaint.” Id., at 270–271. The District Court thus made an exception to its usual practice of “grant[ing] plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaints following dismissal.” Id., at 270.
Plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit, arguing that they had pleaded facts suffcient to support their aiding-andabetting claim.* The Second Circuit concluded that the District Court had misinterpreted the general-awareness element to impose an unduly high foreseeability requirement. 6 F. 4th 487, 497–498 (2021). But, even applying its less exacting standard, the Second Circuit determined that the facts alleged in the complaint “d[id] not plausibly support an inference that [BLOM] had the requisite general awareness at the time that it provided banking services” to the customers allegedly affliated with Hamas. Id., at 501. The court thus affrmed the District Court's judgment of dismissal. Id., at 503.
B
Plaintiffs returned to the District Court, and moved under Rule 60(b)(6) to vacate the court's then-affrmed fnal judg*Plaintiffs did not appeal the “with prejudice” aspect of the District Court's dismissal.
Page Proof Pending Publication ment so that they could fle an amended complaint. They argued that the District Court should give them an opportunity to meet the standard outlined by the Second Circuit. 2022 WL 1062315, *3 (EDNY, Apr. 8, 2022).
The District Court denied their request. Specifcally, it rejected plaintiffs' contention that “the Second Circuit's clarifcation of the aiding-and-abetting standard” constituted “ `extraordinary circumstances' ” suffcient to justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Ibid. That argument, according to the District Court, ignores the principle that “ `a mere change in decisional law does not constitute an “extraordinary circumstance.” ' ” Ibid. In any event, the District Court continued, any amendment would likely be futile because it was “not clear” that plaintiffs could succeed “[e]ven under the clarifed standard” laid out by the Second Circuit. Ibid., n. 3.
The District Court added that plaintiffs' litigation choices further counseled against relief under Rule 60(b)(6). The court explained that plaintiffs “had ample opportunity to pursue all legal avenues available to them for relief,” and sought postjudgment amendment despite having “declin[ed] two prior opportunities” to amend their complaint in the ordinary course, and “after unsuccessfully appealing the dismissal of that complaint with prejudice.” Id., at *3. The District Court declined to overlook “Plaintiffs' documented series of deliberate choices not to cure the defciencies identifed in their pleading.” Id., at *4.
On appeal, the Second Circuit again disagreed with the District Court. It acknowledged that “[a] plaintiff is ordinarily entitled to Rule 60(b)(6) relief” only under “ `extraordinary circumstances.' ” 2024 WL 852265, *2 (Feb. 29, 2024). But, it asserted, when a party seeks vacatur under Rule 60(b) “ `to obtain leave to fle an amended complaint, special considerations come into play.' ” Ibid. In that circumstance, the court held, “the district court must give `due regard' to `both [Rule 60(b)'s] philosophy favoring fnality of Page Proof Pending Publication judgments . . . and the liberal amendment policy of Rule 15(a),' ” ibid., which requires courts to “freely give leave” to amend pleadings before trial “when justice so requires,” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15(a)(2). In other words, courts must “balance” the competing standards by “consider[ing] Rule 60(b) fnality and Rule 15(a) liberality in tandem.” 2024 WL 852265, *2. The Second Circuit held that the District Court had abused its discretion by “incorrectly treat[ing] Plaintiffs' motion to vacate and amend as calling for two distinct analyses, requiring Plaintiffs to successfully navigate Rule 60(b)'s fnality gauntlet before they could invoke Rule 15(a)'s liberal repleading policy.” Ibid. We granted certiorari. 603 U. S. 949 (2024).
II
Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circumstances. That standard does not become less demanding when a Rule 60(b)(6) movant also hopes to amend his complaint. Rather, a party seeking to reopen his case and re- plead must frst satisfy Rule 60(b) on its own terms and obtain Rule 60(b) relief before Rule 15(a)'s liberal amendment standard can apply. Because the Second Circuit's balancing approach confates this order of operations and dilutes Rule 60(b)(6)'s well-established standard, we must reject it.
A
Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek relief from fnal judgment and reopen a case based on mistake or excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, or the void or prospectively inequitable status of a judgment. See Rules 60(b)(1)– (5). Rule 60(b) also includes a “catchall” provision—Rule 60(b)(6)—that allows a district court to reopen a case for “ `any other reason that justifes relief.' ” Kemp v. United States, 596 U. S. 528, 533 (2022). A party seeking relief based on the grounds covered by paragraphs (1) through (3)—i. e., mistake or excusable neglect, new evidence, or fraud—faces a 1-year limitations period. See Fed. Rule Civ. Page Proof Pending Publication Proc. 60(c)(1). That time bar, however, does not apply to motions for relief fled under Rule 60(b)'s other paragraphs, including Rule 60(b)(6). Ibid. The text and structure of Rule 60 make clear that relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is available only in narrow circumstances. Rule 60(b)(6) is a catchall that follows paragraphs (1) through (5). It covers “any other reason” that justifes relief; that is, Rule 60(b)(6) provides only grounds for relief not already covered by the preceding fve paragraphs. Were it otherwise, the catchall provision could swallow the preceding paragraphs and “b[e] used to circumvent” their time bars. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U. S. 847, 863, n. 11 (1988). Such a broad interpretation of Rule 60(b)(6) would thus violate a “cardinal principle of statutory construction” by making the preceding paragraphs and their limitations periods “superfuous.” Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 174 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fischer v. United States, 603 U. S. 480, 493 (2024) (avoiding an “unbounded interpretation” of catchall provision that would “render superfuous” a “reticulated list” of provisions). Thus, we have repeatedly held that relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is available “only when Rules 60(b)(1) through (b)(5) are inapplicable.” Kemp, 596 U. S., at 533 (citing Liljeberg, 486 U. S., at 863, n. 11).
But, “[e]ven then, ` “extraordinary circumstances” ' must justify reopening.” Kemp, 596 U. S., at 533. The Court identifed such circumstances for the frst time in Klapprott v. United States, 335 U. S. 601 (1949), decided shortly after Rule 60(b)(6)'s adoption. There, the petitioner sought to set aside a default judgment entered in denaturalization proceedings. See id., at 603 (opinion of Black, J.). His “allegations set up an extraordinary situation”: The petitioner was “in jail . . . , weakened from illness, without a lawyer in the denaturalization proceedings or funds to hire one,” and “disturbed and fully occupied in efforts to protect himself against the gravest criminal charges” in separate proceedings. Id., Page Proof Pending Publication at 613–614. He was therefore “no more able to defend himself” in the denaturalization proceedings “than he would have been had he never received notice of the charges.” Id., at 614. On these facts, the Court found that relief under Rule 60(b)(6) was justifed. Id., at 614–616.
The Court underscored the stringency of the “extraordinary circumstances” test a year later in Ackermann v. United States, 340 U. S. 193 (1950). The petitioner there had suffered an adverse denaturalization judgment and declined to appeal. Id., at 195. Four years later, he sought to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b)(6), alleging that it was erroneous, and that he had declined to appeal due to expense and the advice of a third party. Id., at 195–197. The Court held these circumstances insuffcient to satisfy Rule 60(b)(6)'s strict standard. Id., at 197. Compared to the situation in Klapprott, the Ackermann petitioner's allegations highlighted “the difference between no choice and choice; imprisonment and freedom of action; no trial and trial; no counsel and counsel; no chance for negligence and inexcusable negligence.” 340 U. S., at 202. The Court emphasized the importance of a Rule 60(b)(6) movant's faultlessness, explaining that “[t]here must be an end to litigation someday, and free, calculated, deliberate choices are not to be relieved from.” Id., at 198; see also, e. g., 12 J. Moore, D. Coquillette, G. Joseph, G. Vairo, & C. Varner, Moore's Federal Practice § 60.48[3][b], p. 60–188 (3d ed. 2024) (“In a vast majority of the cases fnding that extraordinary circumstances do exist . . . , the movant is completely without fault for his or her predicament”).
Our more recent cases have consistently reaffrmed that Rule 60(b)(6) “should only be applied in `extraordinary circumstances.' ” Liljeberg, 486 U. S., at 864; see Kemp, 596 U. S., at 533; Tharpe v. Sellers, 583 U. S. 33, 35 (2018) (per curiam); Buck v. Davis, 580 U. S. 100, 123 (2017); Christeson v. Roper, 574 U. S. 373, 380 (2015) (per curiam); Pioneer In vestment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates L. P., 507 Page Proof Pending Publication U. S. 380, 393 (1993). “ `This very strict interpretation of Rule 60(b) is essential if the fnality of judgments is to be preserved.' ” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. 524, 535 (2005) (quoting Liljeberg, 486 U. S., at 873 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting)).
B
The Rule 60(b)(6) standard does not change when a party seeks to reopen his case to amend his complaint. In that circumstance, satisfaction of Rule 60(b)(6) necessarily precedes any application of Rule 15(a). Cf. Waetzig v. Hallibur ton Energy Services, Inc., 604 U. S. 305, 311 (2025) (explaining that motion to vacate under Rule 60(b) “must be addressed before any subsequent jurisdictional questions [are] considered”). Rule 15(a)'s liberal amendment policy therefore cannot weaken Rule 60(b)(6)'s “extraordinary circumstances” standard.
Rules 60(b) and 15(a) apply at different stages of litigation and demand separate inquiries. Rule 15(a) governs pretrial amendments, and sets forth a standard under which courts “should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Rule 15(a)(2). The Rule's “purpose is to provide maximum opportunity for each claim to be decided on its merits rather than on procedural technicalities.” 6 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1471, p. 587 (3d ed. 2010) (Wright & Miller). That standard, however, does not govern when, following a fnal judgment, the case is closed and there is no pending pleading to amend. Accord, e. g., Boyd v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, 114 F. 4th 1232, 1237 (CA11 2024) (“[O]nce the court has entered fnal judgment, Rule 15(a) no longer applies and no amendment is possible unless the judgment is frst set aside”). A contrary approach “would enable the liberal amendment policy of Rule 15(a) to be employed in a way that is contrary to the philosophy favoring fnality of judgments and the expeditious termination of litigation.” 6 Wright & Miller §1489, at 816.
Page Proof Pending Publication Thus, we disagree with the Second Circuit's holding that the District Court should have used a hybrid standard to “consider Rule 60(b) fnality and Rule 15(a) liberality in tandem.” 2024 WL 852265, *2. It is Rule 60(b)'s standard— and only Rule 60(b)'s standard—that applies when a party seeks relief from fnal judgment. A party seeking Rule 60(b)(6) relief must always demonstrate “extraordinary circumstances” justifying relief, see Kemp, 596 U. S., at 533 (internal quotation marks omitted); what he intends to do if his case is reopened does not alter that standard, see supra, at 211, 213; cf., e. g., In re Ferro Corp. Derivative Litigation, 511 F. 3d 611, 624 (CA6 2008) (“Plaintiffs must frst meet the threshold requirement of 60(b)(6)'s extraordinary or exceptional circumstances to vacate the judgment before seeking to conduct discovery”). In other words, the District Court was correct to “trea[t] Plaintiffs' motion to vacate and amend as calling for two distinct analyses,” with the question of vacatur under Rule 60(b)(6) preceding that of repleading under Rule 15(a). 2024 WL 852265, *2; accord, e. g., Daulat zai v. Maryland, 97 F. 4th 166, 179 (CA4 2024) (“[W]hen the motion to vacate is fled under Rule 60(b), the more restrictive standard for granting that motion must be satisfed before consideration can be given to the motion to amend”). None of our analysis, however, should be taken to suggest that a district court contravenes Rule 60(b) merely by con sidering a movant's desire to amend his complaint. For example, where a party seeks vacatur in order to amend its pleadings, a district court is free to cite Rule 15 and acknowledge amendment-related considerations, such as whether a movant has had the opportunity to amend, and the amendment standard that the party will eventually have to meet if the Rule 60(b) motion is granted. What a district court may not do is what the Second Circuit demanded here: dilute Rule 60(b)(6)'s stringent standard by “balanc[ing]” it with “Rule 15(a)'s liberal pleading principles.” 2024 WL 852265, *2. Page Proof Pending Publication
C
Plaintiffs insist that the Second Circuit's approach is consonant with Rule 60(b)(6) and our precedents interpreting that provision, but their arguments are unpersuasive.
Balancing the strict standards of Rule 60(b)(6) against the more relaxed standards of Rule 15 necessarily weakens the former, and is thus incompatible with our long line of precedents holding that Rule 60(b)(6) “should only be applied in `extraordinary circumstances.' ” Liljeberg, 486 U. S., at 864; accord, 6 Wright & Miller § 1489, at 816. Even the Second Circuit appeared to acknowledge that its test departed from the “ordinar[y]” approach to Rule 60(b)(6) under which a plaintiff may receive relief only by demonstrating “ `extraordinary circumstances' ” and showing that “ `the asserted grounds for relief are not recognized in clauses (1)–(5) of the Rule.' ” 2024 WL 852265, *2.
Nor does this Court's decision in Foman v. Davis, 371 U. S. 178 (1962), help plaintiffs. The Foman Court held that the District Court's denial of the petitioner's motions to vacate the court's judgment and amend her complaint rested on “technicalities” that ran contrary to “the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id., at 181–182. But, Foman dealt with Rule 59(e), not Rule 60(b), id., at 181, and “Rule 60(b) differs from Rule 59(e) in just about every way that matters to the inquiry here,” Banister v. Davis, 590 U. S. 504, 518 (2020). Most relevant, a Rule 60(b) motion “threaten[s] an already fnal judgment with successive litigation,” id., at 519, and a motion under Rule 60(b)(6) in particular may threaten fnal judgments years after they are entered. See Rule 60(c)(1). In contrast, “[t]he fling of a Rule 59(e) motion within the 28-day period `suspends the fnality of the original judgment,' ” and “[o]nly the disposition of that motion `restores th[e] fnality' of the original judgment.” Banister, 590 U. S., at 508. Because Rule 59(e) does not threaten the fnality of judgments to the same degree that Page Proof Pending Publication Rule 60(b)(6) does, we do not require a movant to show the same “extraordinary circumstances” to receive relief. See Foman, 371 U. S., at 181–182.
III
We also disagree with the Second Circuit's disposition of this case. District courts' Rule 60(b) rulings are reviewed “only for abuse of discretion.” Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections of Ill., 434 U. S. 257, 263, n. 7 (1978). That standard is “limited and deferential.” Gonzalez, 545 U. S., at 535. To be upheld, a district court's decision need only “ `appl[y] the correct legal standard and offe[r] substantial justifcation' ” for its conclusion. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U. S. 384, 405 (1990). The District Court's determination that plaintiffs failed to “demonstrat[e] any extraordinary circumstances warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(6),” 2022 WL 1062315, *3, easily clears that bar.
For the reasons we have explained, the District Court was correct to “evaluat[e] Plaintiffs' motion under only Rule 60(b)'s standard.” 2024 WL 852265, *2; see supra, at 211– 214. And, the District Court offered persuasive justifcations for fnding that standard unsatisfed—that the Second Circuit's clarifcation of the test for aiding-and-abetting liability did not “constitute extraordinary circumstances,” particularly when plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed under that standard, and that plaintiffs' “series of deliberate choices not to cure the defciencies identifed in their pleading” also cut against them. 2022 WL 1062315, *3–*4, and n. 3; see supra, at 209. Those justifcations follow from core tenets of Rule 60(b) doctrine. See, e. g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 239 (1997) (“Intervening developments in the law by themselves rarely constitute the extraordinary circumstances required for relief under Rule 60(b)(6)”); Pioneer Investment Services, 507 U. S., at 393 (“ `extraordinary circumstances' ” must suggest that the movant is “faultless in the delay”). Page Proof Pending Publication The District Court's decision therefore fell within the “ `wide range of choice' ” afforded under the abuse-ofdiscretion standard. McLane Co. v. EEOC, 581 U. S. 72, 83 (2017). The Second Circuit erred in holding otherwise. * * * The judgment of the Second Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.