Syllabus
ANDREWv.WHITE,WARDEN onpetitionforwritofcertioraritotheunited statescourtofappealsforthetenthcircuit No.23–6573.
DecidedJanuary21,2025 AnOklahomajuryconvictedpetitionerBrendaAndrewofmurderingher husbandandsentencedhertodeath.
Andrewappealed,arguingthat the introduction of irrelevant evidence at trial (about her sex life, extra- maritalaffairs,andprovocativeattire)wassoprejudicialastoviolate the Federal Due Process Clause.
Despite acknowledging that some evi- denceintroducedagainstAndrewwasirrelevant,theOklahomaCourt ofCriminalAppeals(OCCA)deniedreliefonthegroundthatthetrial court’serrorshadbeenharmless.
Andrewreiteratedherdueprocess claiminafederalhabeaspetition,buttheDistrictCourtdeniedrelief. AdividedTenthCircuitaffirmedonthegroundthatAndrewhadfailed toidentify“clearlyestablishedfederallawgoverningherclaim,”asre- quired under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).
28U. S. C.§2254(d)(1).
Themajorityacknowledgedthat Andrew’sdueprocessclaimreliedonPaynev.Tennessee,501U. S.808, in which this Court said that the Due Process Clause “provides a mecha- nismforrelief ”whentheintroductionofundulyprejudicialevidence “renders[a]trialfundamentallyunfair,”id.,at825,butconcludedthat thisstatement wasnota holdingandthus didnotreflect “clearlyestab- lishedfederallaw.”
Held:AtthetimeoftheOCCA’sdecision,clearlyestablishedfederallaw providedthattheDueProcessClauseforbidstheintroductionofevi- dencesoundulyprejudicialastorenderacriminaltrialfundamentally unfair.
Asrelevanthere,AEDPAprovidesthatafederalcourtmay grant habeas relief as to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court ifthestate courtunreasonablyapplied“clearly establishedFederallaw, asdeterminedby”thisCourt.
§§2254(d)(1)–(2).
Apetitionermust showthatthestatecourtunreasonablyappliedtheholdingsofthis Court’sdecisions,notmeredicta.
SeeWhitev.Woodall,572U. S.415, 419.
WhenthisCourtreliesonalegalprincipletodecideacase,that principleisa“holding”oftheCourtforpurposesofAEDPA.
ThelegalprincipleonwhichAndrewrelies—thattheDueProcess Clausecanincertaincasesprotectagainsttheintroductionofunduly prejudicialevidenceatacriminaltrial—wasindispensabletothe Court’sdecisioninPaynev.Tennessee,andwasthusaholdingofthis CourtforpurposesofAEDPA.
InPayne,thisCourtconsidered Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:604U. S.86(2025) PerCuriam whethertooverruleasetofpriorcasesthathadcategoricallybarred the introduction of victim impact evidence during the sentencing phases ofacapitaltrial.
TheCourtconcludedthatacategoricalbarwasnot necessarytoprotectdefendantsbecauseanotherprotection(theDue ProcessClause)remainedavailabletochallengetheintroductionofevi- dence“thatissoundulyprejudicialthatitrendersthetrialfundamen- tallyunfair.”
501U. S.,at825(citingDardenv.Wainwright,477U. S. 168, 179–183).
Importantly, Payne broke little new ground in recogniz- ing that the Due Process Clause protects against the use of unduly prej- udicialevidence.
See,e. g.,Donnellyv.DeChristoforo,416U. S.637; Caldwellv.Mississippi,472U. S.320,338–340;Darden,477U. S.,at 178–183.
IftheTenthCircuitthoughtitselfconstrainedbyAEDPAto limitPaynetoitsfacts,itwasmistaken.
Generallegalprinciplescan constituteclearlyestablishedlawforpurposesofAEDPAsolongas theyareholdingsofthisCourt.
SeeLockyerv.Andrade,538U. S.63, 72.
AlthoughthisCourthasnotpreviouslyreliedonPaynetoinvali- dateaconvictionforimproperlyadmittedprejudicialevidence,more- over, “certainprinciples are fundamentalenough that whennew factual permutationsarise,thenecessitytoapplytheearlierrulewillbebe- yonddoubt.”
White,572U. S.,at427(internalquotationmarksomit- ted); see also Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U. S.7, 9 (per curiam) (“ ‘[A] general constitutionalrulealreadyidentifiedinthedecisionallawmayapply withobviousclaritytoaspecificsetoffacts’ ”(quotingHopev.Pelzer, 536U. S.730,741)).
BecausetheTenthCircuitheldthatnorelevant clearlyestablishedlawexisted(arulingtheCourtreviewsdenovo),it neverconsideredwhetherthestatecourt’sapplicationofthatlawwas reasonableastoeithertheguiltorsentencingphase.
Thecaseisre- mandedfortheTenthCircuittodosointhefirstinstance.
Certiorarigranted;62F.4th1299,vacatedandremanded.
PerCuriam.
An Oklahoma jury convicted Brenda Andrew of murdering her husband, Rob Andrew, and sentenced her to death.
The Statespentsignificanttimeattrialintroducingevidence aboutAndrew’ssexlifeandaboutherfailingsasamother and wife, much of which it later conceded was irrelevant. In afederalhabeaspetition,Andrewarguedthatthisevidence had been so prejudicial as to violate the Due Process Clause. The Court of Appeals rejected that claim because, it thought, noholdingofthisCourtestablishedageneralrulethatthe Page Proof Pending Publication ANDREWv.WHITE PerCuriam erroneous admission of prejudicial evidence could violate due process.
Thatwaswrong.
BythetimeofAndrew’strial, this Court had made clear that when “evidence is introduced thatissoundulyprejudicialthatitrendersthetrialfunda- mentallyunfair,theDueProcessClauseoftheFourteenth Amendmentprovidesamechanismforrelief.”
Paynev.
Tennessee,501U. S.808,825(1991).
I
A
OnNovember20,2001,RobAndrewwasfatallyshotin hisgarage.
BrendaAndrew,whoherselfhadbeenshotin thearmduringtheincident,toldthepolicethattwoarmed assailantshadcommittedtheshooting.
Andrewfurtherex- plainedthatshehadseparatedfromherhusbandandwas now datingJames Pavatt, butthat she andRob continued to seeeachotherastheyhadtwochildrentogether.
Pavatt and Andrew traveled to Mexico together after Rob Andrew’sdeathandsoonbecamesuspectsinhismurder.
Eventually,Pavattconfessedtocommittingtheshooting withafriend.
PavattdeniedthatAndrewhadbeenin- volved.
TheStatethereafterchargedbothPavattandAn- drewwithcapitalmurder,andajuryconvictedPavattand sentencedhimtodeath.
AtAndrew’strial,theprosecutionsoughttoprovethat AndrewhadconspiredwithPavatt,aninsuranceagent,to murderherhusbandfortheproceedsofhislifeinsurance policy.
Amongotherthings,theprosecutionelicitedtesti- monyaboutAndrew’ssexualpartnersreachingbacktwo decades;abouttheoutfitssheworetodinnerorduringgro- cery runs;about theunderwear shepacked forvacation; and abouthowoftenshehadsexinhercar.
Atleasttwoofthe prosecution’sguilt-phasewitnessestookthestandexclu- sivelytotestifyaboutAndrew’sprovocativeclothing,and otherswereaskedtocommentonwhetheragoodmother woulddressorbehavethewayAndrewhad.
Initsclosing Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:604U. S.86(2025) PerCuriam statement,theprosecutionagaininvokedthesethemes,in- cludingbydisplayingAndrew’s“thongunderwear”tothe jury,byremindingthejuryofAndrew’sallegedaffairsdur- ingcollege,andbyemphasizingthatAndrew“hadsexon [her husband] over and over and over” while “keeping a boy- friend on the side.”
Tr. 4103, 4124–4125 (July 12, 2004).
At both theguilt and sentencing phases,prosecutors contrasted Andrew with the victim, whom they asserted had been “com- mittedtoGod.”
Id.,at4124;seealso,e. g.,Tr.4402(July 14,2004)(suggestingnothingcouldmitigatemurderofRob Andrewbecausehejust“wantedtoloveGod”).1
B
ThejuryconvictedAndrewandsentencedhertodeath.
Onappeal,Andrewarguedthattheintroductionofirrele- vant evidence, including evidence “that she had extramarital sexualaffairswithtwoothermen,”thatshehad“ ‘comeon 1 The dissent recites what it insists was substantial evidence of Andrew’s guilt,contendingintheprocessthatthisCourt“inaccuratelyportrays” thatevidence.
Post,at98(opinionofThomas,J.).
Indoingso,itpre- judgestheprejudiceanalysisbycharacterizingasfacttheState’snarra- tiveattrial.
Thatnarrative,ofcourse,washotlycontestedthenandre- mainssonow.
Forexample,thedefenseelicitedtestimonyfrommultiple witnessesthatAndrewknewonthedayofthemurderthatshewasnot the beneficiary on the life insurance policy.
The Oklahoma Court of Crim- inalAppeals(OCCA)heldthatthecourtalsowronglyexcludedevidence Andrewarguedwouldcastdoubtonthetheorythatshehadstagedthe shooting, though the OCCA held that exclusion was harmless. Andrew v. State, 2007 OK CR 23, ¶¶89–92, 164 P. 3d 176, 197.
The Court today says nothingaboutthestrengthoftheevidenceagainstAndrewbecausethe issueofprejudiceinboththeguiltandsentencingphasesofthetrialis one for the Tenth Circuit to consider on remand.
See infra, at 96.
Simi- larly,thedissentassertsthatAndrewfalselyaccusestheprosecutionof callinghera“slutpuppy”inclosingargument.
Post,at103,n.3(opinion ofThomas,J.).
Whethertheprosecutionquotedsomethingitbelieved AndrewoncesaidtosuggesttothejurythatAndrewherselfwasa“slut puppy,”orsimplytoreciteanallegedabusivephonecall,isaquestionof factfortheTenthCircuittoresolve.
Page Proof Pending Publication ANDREWv.WHITE PerCuriam to’ ” another witness’s sons, and that she had dressed provoc- ativelyatarestaurant,Andrewv.State,2007OKCR23, ¶¶42–59,164P.3d176,190–193,violatedOklahomalawas wellastheFederalDueProcessClause.
TheOCCAheld thatadmissionofevidenceaboutAndrew’sextramaritalaf- fairshadbeenproperbecauseitshowedthat“[h]erco-de- fendantwasjustthelastinalonglineofmenthatshese- duced.”
Id.,at192.2 TheOCCA“struggl[ed],”however, “tofindanyrelevance...otherthantoshow[Andrew’s] character”fortheremainingchallengedevidence.
Ibid. Bynow,theState“agree[d]thatmostofthisevidencewas irrelevanttoanyissueinthiscase.”
Ibid. TheOCCA nonethelessdeniedreliefonthegroundthatthetrialcourt’s errorshadbeenharmless.
JudgeJohnsondissentedinpart.
Inherview,the“egre- gious...patternofintroducingevidencethatha[d]nopur- poseotherthantohammerhomethatBrendaAndrewisa badwife,abadmother,andabadwoman...trivialize[d] the value of her life in the minds of the jurors.”
Id., at 206– 207.
Shewouldthereforehavevacatedhersentence.
JudgeChapeldissentedseparately,indicatingthathewould havereversedtheconvictionandremandedforanewtrial.
Id.,at208.
2 ThedissentassertsthattheOCCAheldevidenceofAndrew’s“ ‘close personalrelationship’ ”withtwoofheraffairpartnerstoberelevantbe- causeitgavecredencetotestimonythatAndrewhad“ ‘sharedwithboth of these men her hatred for Rob Andrew and her wish that he was dead.’ ” Post,at102(opinionofThomas,J.)(quoting164P.3d,at192).
Andrew neverobjectedtoevidencethatshehada“closepersonalrelationship” withthesemen.
Infact,defensecounselstipulatedthatshehadaffairs withthem.
See,e. g.,Tr.338(June18,2004)(“We’renotcontestingthe affair.
WehavenevercontestedtheaffairwithNunleyorHiggins”).
Andrew’sclaiminsteadconcernedtheextensivetestimonyabouthowshe flirted with these men, how she dressed around them, and how many times (andwhere)shehadsexwiththem.
Thattestimonyappearstohaveno bearingonAndrew’sallegedexpressionsofhatredforherhusband. Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:604U. S.86(2025) PerCuriam Infederalcourt,Andrewreiteratedherclaimthatthead- missionofthisevidencerenderedtheguiltandpenalty phasesofhertrialfundamentallyunfair,inviolationofdue process.
62F.4th1299,1312–1313(CA102023).
TheDis- trictCourtdeniedrelief.
AdividedTenthCircuitaffirmed because,itheld,Andrewhadfailedtocite“clearlyestab- lishedfederallawgoverningherclaim.”
Id.,at1314.
The majorityacknowledgedthatAndrewhadcitedPayne,in which this Court said that the Due Process Clause “provides amechanismforrelief”whentheintroductionofunduly prejudicialevidence“renders[a]trialfundamentallyunfair.”
501U. S.,at825.
Accordingtothemajority,however,that hadbeena“pronouncement,”nota“holding,”ofthisCourt.
62 F. 4th, at 1314.
It therefore concluded Andrew had failed toidentify“clearlyestablishedfederallawgoverningher claim,”asrequiredundertheAntiterrorismandEffective DeathPenaltyActof1996(AEDPA).
Id.,at1316;28 U. S. C.§2254(d)(1).
Asaresult,themajoritydeclinedto considerwhethertheOCCAunreasonablyappliedPayne, i. e.,whetherafairmindedjuristcouldholdthattheadmis- sionofirrelevantevidenceaboutAndrew’sdemeanorasa womanwasnotsoprejudicialastodepriveherofafunda- mentallyfairtrial.
62F.4th,at1316(“ ‘Theabsenceof clearlyestablishedfederallawisdispositiveunder §2254(d)(1)’ ”(quotingHousev.Hatch,527F.3d1010,1018 (CA102008))).
Indissent,JudgeBacharachcondemnedtheState’sfocus “fromstarttofinishonMs.Andrew’ssexlife,”amovehe argued“portrayedMs.Andrewasascarletwoman,amod- ernJezebel,sparkingdistrustbasedonherloosemorals...
pluckingawayanyrealisticchancethatthejurywouldseri- ouslyconsiderherversionofevents.”
62F.4th,at1366.
JudgeBacharachthereforewouldhaveheldthatthecombi- nationofevidentiaryerrors“deprivedMs.Andrewofafun- damentallyfairtrial.”
Id.,at1377.
Page Proof Pending Publication ANDREWv.WHITE PerCuriam
II
A federal court may grant habeas relief as to a claim adju- dicatedonthemeritsinstatecourtonlyifthestatecourt reliedonanunreasonabledeterminationofthefactsorun- reasonably applied “clearly established Federal law, as deter- minedby”thisCourt.
28U. S. C.§§2254(d)(1)–(2).
To showthatastatecourtunreasonablyappliedclearlyestab- lishedfederallaw,apetitionermustshowthatthecourtun- reasonably applied “ ‘the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of thisCourt’sdecisions.’ ” Whitev.Woodall,572U. S.415, 419(2014)(quotingHowesv.Fields,565U. S.499,505 (2012)).
Anunreasonableapplication,inturn,isonewith whichnofairmindedjuristwouldagree.
Harringtonv.
Richter,562U. S.86,101(2011).
A
WhenthisCourtreliesonalegalruleorprincipletode- cideacase,thatprincipleisa“holding”oftheCourtfor purposesofAEDPA.
Lockyerv.Andrade,538U. S.63,71– 72(2003)(“[C]learlyestablishedFederallaw...isthegov- erninglegalprincipleorprinciplessetforthbytheSupreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision” (inter- nalquotationmarksomitted)).
Followingtheseprinciples, it is clear that Andrew properly identified clearly established federallaw.
InPayne,thisCourtconsideredwhethertooverruleaset ofpriorcasesthathadcategoricallybarredtheintroduction ofvictimimpactevidenceduringthesentencingphasesofa capitaltrial.
TheCourtnotedthat,inmanycircumstances, “victimimpactevidenceservesentirelylegitimatepur- poses,”501U. S.,at825,eventhoughinothersitcouldbe prejudicial.
It then concluded that a categorical bar was not necessary to protect against the risk of prejudicial testimony because“theDueProcessClauseoftheFourteenthAmend- mentprovidesamechanismforrelief”againsttheintroduc- tion of evidence “that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:604U. S.86(2025) PerCuriam thetrialfundamentallyunfair.”
Ibid.(citingDardenv.
Wainwright,477U. S.168,179–183(1986)).
Inlightofthat protection, the Court held, it could permit victim impact evi- dencewhereappropriatewithoutriskingundueprejudiceto defendants.
501U. S.,at825.
Inotherwords,theCourt removedoneprotectionforcapitaldefendants(theperse baronvictimimpactstatements)inpartbecauseanother protection(theDueProcessClause)remainedavailable againstevidencethatissoundulyprejudicialthatitrenders the trial fundamentally unfair.
The legal principle on which Andrewrelies,thattheDueProcessClausecanincertain casesprotectagainsttheintroductionofundulyprejudicial evidenceatacriminaltrial,wasthereforeindispensableto thedecisioninPayne.
Thatmeansitwasaholdingofthis CourtforpurposesofAEDPA.
Importantly, Payne did notinvent due process protections against undulyprejudicial evidence.
TheCourt hadseveral timesbeforeheldthatprosecutors’prejudicialormisleading statementsviolatedueprocessiftheyrenderatrialorcapi- talsentencingfundamentallyunfair.
Donnellyv.DeChris- toforo, 416 U. S. 637 (1974); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320,338–340(1985);Darden,477U. S.,at178–183.
Payne thusbrokelittlenewgroundinthisrespect.
Bythetime oftheOCCA’sdecisioninthiscase,itwasclearthatthe introductionofundulyprejudicialevidencecould,incertain cases,violatetheDueProcessClause.3 3 ThedissentarguesthatEstellev.McGuire,502U. S.62(1991),shows otherwise because it left open whether “ ‘it is a violation of the due process guaranteedbytheFourteenthAmendmentforevidencethatisnotrele- vant to be received in a criminal trial.’ ” Post, at 111 (opinion of Thomas, J.)(quotingEstelle,502U. S.,at70).
Tobesure,thisCourtdidnothold inPaynethattheintroductionofallirrelevantevidenceviolatestheDue ProcessClause.
Payneestablished,rather,thatdueprocessprotectsde- fendantsfromtheintroductionofevidencesoprejudicialastoaffectthe fundamentalfairnessoftheirtrials.
ThisCourtsquarelyacknowledged thatruleinEstelle,explainingthat“thechallengedevidence”atissue theredidnotwarrantreliefbecauseitdidnot“ ‘soinfus[e]thetrialwith Page Proof Pending Publication ANDREWv.WHITE PerCuriam
B
The Court of Appeals nonetheless held that Payne “merely establishedthattheEighthAmendmentdidnoterecta ‘persebar’totheintroductionofvictim-impactstatements incapitalcases.”
62F.4th,at1314(quotingPayne,501 U. S.,at827).
Asjustexplained,however,Payneexpressly reliedontheavailabilityofreliefundertheDueProcess Clause to reach that conclusion.
This Court has accordingly appliedPayne’sframeworktoaclaimmuchlikeAndrew’s: “thattheintroductionof[prejudicial]evidence”atthesen- tencing phases “violated the Due Process Clause of the Four- teenthAmendment.”
Romanov.Oklahoma, 512U. S.1,12 (1994).
Morerecently,theCourtreliedonPayneinthe samewaythatAndrewsoughttorelyonithere:forthe propositionthat“theDueProcessClause...wardsoffthe introductionofundulyprejudicialevidencethatwouldren- derthetrialfundamentallyunfair.”
Kansasv.Carr,577 U. S.108,123(2016)(quotingPayne,501U. S.,at825;inter- nalquotationmarksandalterationomitted).
ThisCourt hasalsoreliedontheunderlyingfundamentalfairnessprin- ciple in the jury-impartiality context.
See Rideau v. Louisi- ana,373U. S.723,726(1963);Skillingv.UnitedStates,561 U. S.358,379(2010).
To the extent that the Court of Appeals thought itself con- strainedbyAEDPAtolimitPaynetoitsfacts,itwasmis- taken.
General legal principles can constitute clearly estab- lishedlawforpurposesofAEDPAsolongastheyare holdingsofthisCourt.
Forexample,theEighthAmend- mentprinciplethatasentencemaynotbegrosslydispro- portionatetotheoffenseis“ ‘clearlyestablished’under §2554(d)(1),” even though it arises out of a “thicket of Eighth Amendmentjurisprudence”andlacks“ ‘precisecontours.’ ” unfairnessastodenydueprocessoflaw.’ ” 502U. S.,at75(quotingLi- senbav.California,314U. S.219,228(1941),andcitingDonnelly,416 U. S.,at643).
Inanyevent,andasrecountedbelow,thisCourthascon- tinuedtorelyonPayne’sfundamentalfairnessprinciplesinceEstelle. Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:604U. S.86(2025) PerCuriam Lockyer,538U. S.,at72.
AlthoughthisCourthasnot previouslyreliedonPaynetoinvalidateaconvictionforim- properly admitted prejudicial evidence, moreover, “ ‘[c]ertain principlesarefundamentalenoughthatwhennewfactual permutationsarise,thenecessitytoapplytheearlierrule willbebeyonddoubt.’ ” White,572U. S.,at427(quoting Yarboroughv.Alvarado,541U. S.652,666(2004));seealso Taylorv.Riojas,592U. S.7,9(2020)(percuriam)(“ ‘[A] generalconstitutionalrulealreadyidentifiedinthedeci- sional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific con- ductinquestion’ ”(quotingHopev.Pelzer,536U. S.730,741 (2002))).
TheCourtofAppealsthuserredbyrefusingeven toconsiderwhethertheOCCAunreasonablyappliedestab- lisheddueprocessprinciplestoAndrew’scase.
Thedissentmaintainsthatareasonablejuristcouldagree withtheTenthCircuit’sunderstandingofourprecedent.
Thatassertionconflatesthedeferencefederalhabeascourts mustextendtoastatecourt’s“applicationof”thisCourt’s precedentwiththefederalcourts’independentobligation tofirstidentifytherelevant“clearlyestablishedFederal law.”
28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1); Lockyer, 538 U. S., at 71 (iden- tifyingclearlyestablishedlaw“[a]sathresholdmatter”).
Alegalprincipleisclearlyestablishedforpurposesof AEDPAifitisaholdingofthisCourt.
White,572U. S., at419.
ThisCourthasnooccasiontodefertootherfederal courts’ erroneous interpretations of its own precedent.
Nor issuchdoubledeferencenecessarytopreventexpansion offederalhabeasrelieftothosewhorelyon“debatable” interpretationsorextensionsofourholdings.
Postat112– 113(opinionofThomas,J.).
Andrewdoesnotrelyonan interpretationorextensionofthisCourt’scasesbutona principlethisCourtitselfhasreliedonoverthecourseof decades.
BecausetheTenthCircuitnonethelessheldthatnorele- vantclearlyestablishedlawexisted(arulingthisCourt reviewsdenovo),itneverconsideredwhetherthestate Page Proof Pending Publication ANDREWv.WHITE Alito,J.,concurringinjudgment court’sapplicationofthatlawwasreasonable.
Onre- mand,theCourtofAppealsshouldconductthatinquiry inthefirstinstance.
Specifically,thequestionnowis whetherafairmindedjuristreviewingthisrecordcoulddis- agreewith Andrewthatthe trialcourt’s mistakenadmission ofirrelevantevidencewasso“undulyprejudicial”astoren- derhertrial“fundamentallyunfair.”
Payne,501U. S.,at 825.
TheCourtofAppealsmustaskthatquestionseparately fortheguiltandsentencingphases.
Astoeachphase,it mightconsidertherelevanceofthedisputedevidencetothe chargesorsentencingfactors,thedegreeofprejudiceAn- drewsufferedfromitsintroduction,andwhetherthetrial courtprovidedanymitigatinginstructions.
Cf.Romano, 512U. S.,at13.
Theultimatequestioniswhetherafair- mindedjuristcoulddisagreethattheevidence“soinfected thetrialwithunfairness”astorendertheresultingconvic- tionorsentence“adenialofdueprocess.”
Ibid. * * * At the time of the OCCA’s decision, clearly established law providedthattheDueProcessClauseforbidstheintroduc- tion of evidence so unduly prejudicial as to render a criminal trialfundamentallyunfair.
ThisCourtaccordinglygrants the petition for certiorari and the motion for leave to proceed informapauperis,vacatesthejudgmentbelow,andre- mandsthecaseforfurtherproceedingsconsistentwiththis opinion.
Itissoordered.
JusticeAlito,concurringinthejudgment.
Iconcurinthejudgmentbecauseourcaselawestablishes thatadefendant’sdue-processrightscanbeviolatedwhen theproperlyadmittedevidenceattrialisoverwhelmedbya floodofirrelevantandhighlyprejudicialevidencethatren- dersthetrialfundamentallyunfair.
SeePaynev.Tennes- Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:604U. S.86(2025) Thomas,J.,dissenting see, 501 U. S. 808, 825 (1991); Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U. S. 1, 12 (1994); cf. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723, 726 (1963). Iexpressnoviewonwhetherthatveryhighstandardis methere.
JusticeThomas,withwhomJusticeGorsuchjoins, dissenting.
OurprecedentundertheAntiterrorismandEffective DeathPenaltyActof1996(AEDPA)establishesseveral rulesforidentifyingclearlyestablishedfederallaw.
U. S. C.§2254(d)(1).
Wehaveinstructedlowercourtsto avoidframingourprecedentsattoohighalevelofgeneral- ity;tocarefullydistinguishholdingsfromdicta;andtore- frainfromtreatingreservedquestionsasthoughtheyhave alreadybeenanswered.
TheTenthCircuitfollowedthese rules.
TheCourttodaydoesnot.
Instead,itsummarily vacatestheopinionbelowforfailingtoelevateto“clearly established”lawthebroadestpossibleinterpretationofa one-sentenceasideinPaynev.Tennessee,501U. S.808 (1991).
Indoingso,theCourtblowspastEstellev.Mc- Guire,502U. S.62(1991),which,monthsafterPayne,re- servedtheveryquestionthattheCourtsaysPaynere- solved.
And,worstofall,itredefines“clearlyestablished” lawtoincludedebatableinterpretationsofourprecedent.
ItisthisCourt,andnottheTenthCircuit,thathasdeviated fromsettledlaw.
Irespectfullydissent.
I
TheCourt’serrorsbeginwithitsrecitationofthefacts.
Contrarytothemajority’sinsinuations,theStatepresented “overwhelmingevidence”thatAndrewparticipatedinthe murderofherhusband.
SeeAndrewv.State,2007OKCR 23,¶56,164P.3d176,192;accord,id.,at207(A.Johnson,J., concurring in resultin part and dissenting inpart).
In fact, theStatepresentedan“unusuallystrongevidentiarycase, whichleaveslittleornodoubtthat[Andrew]isguiltyofthe Page Proof Pending Publication ANDREWv.WHITE Thomas,J.,dissenting crimescharged,crimescommittedaftermethodicalplan- ning.”
Id.,at206(Lumpkin,P.J.,concurringinresult).
TheCourtinaccuratelyportraystheState’sevidence,the prosecution’sclosingarguments,andthereasoningofthe OklahomaCourtofCriminalAppeals(OCCA).
A
BrendaAndrew(Andrew)marriedRobertAndrew(Rob) in1984.
InFebruary2000,Robpurchasedan$800,000life insurancepolicythroughagentJimPavatt,withAndrewas thebeneficiary.
TheAndrewsandPavattattendedthe samechurch.
PavattandAndrewbothservedasSunday schoolteachers.
But,byAugust2001,theyhadbegunan affair.
TheaffaircausedtheAndrews’alreadystrained marriage to reach a breaking point.
Around late September AndrewinitiateddivorceproceedingsandtoldRobtomove outofthehouse.
One morning in October, Rob discovered that someone had cutthebrakelinesinhiscar.
Severalhourslater,here- ceivedphonecallsfromtwounknowncallers—oneofwhom turnedouttobePavatt’sadultdaughter,JannaLarson— falselyclaimingthatAndrewwasinthehospitalandur- gentlyneededhim.
PhonerecordsrevealthatPavattand Andrew exchanged 82 phone calls that day and more than 50 callsthenextday.
Thenextday,AndrewtoldRobshehad readinthenewspaperabouthisbrakelinesbeingcut,but nosuchnewsstoryexisted.
And,aroundthistime,Pavatt told Larson that Andrew had asked him to kill Rob.
Pavatt laterthreatenedtokillherifsheeverrevealedthis information.
Afterthebrake-lineincident,RobsoughttoremoveAn- drew as the beneficiary of his life insurance policy, explaining toanotherinsuranceagentthathethoughtPavattandAn- drewweretryingtokillhim.
But,AndrewandPavattre- sorted to fraud to try to prevent this from happening, forging Rob’ssignatureonaformtransferringownershipofthepol- Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:604U. S.86(2025) Thomas,J.,dissenting icytoAndrew.
Thepolicythenbecameaseriouspointof contentioninthedivorceproceedings,eventhoughRobwas only38yearsoldandhealthy.
The Andrews had two young children who, after their sep- aration,continuedtolivewithAndrewintheformerfamily home.
Robwouldsometimesmeetthemoutsidethehouse andtakethemforvisitation.
When Rob came to pick up the children for the Thanksgiv- ingholiday,however,Andrewaskedhimtocomeintothe garagetohelpherlightthepilotlightofherfurnace.
As hestartedtodoso,someonepointeda16-gaugeshotgunat himfromacrossthegarage.
Seeingthis,Robturnedand grabbed a trash bag filled with aluminum cans, apparently in adesperateattempttoprotecthimself.
Theperpetrator shothimthroughthebag.
Reloadingtheshotgun,theper- petrator(oranaccomplice)thenmovedwithinthreefeetof Rob,andshothimasecondtimeashelayonthefloor.
An- drewwasalsoshotwitha.22-caliberweapon,butsuffered onlyasuperficialwoundonherarm.
Andrewcalled911aftertheshootings,claimingthattwo maskedmenhadcomeintothegarageandattackedherand Rob.
SherelatedonthecallthatRobwasstillconscious and trying to speak.
By the time emergency responders ar- rived,however,hewasdead.
Duringtheshootings,the childrenwereinthemasterbedroomwatchingtelevision withthevolumeturneduphigh,unawareofwhatwashap- peninginthegarage.
AnambulancethentookAndrewto the hospital, where witnesses described her demeanor as un- usuallycalm.
Police discovered substantial evidence linking Andrew and Pavatttothemurder.
Robowneda16-gaugeshotgun,but hadtoldfriendsthatAndrewrefusedtolethimtakeitwith himwhenhemovedout.
Onewitnesstestifiedthat,eight daysbeforethemurder,hehadseenAndrewinaruralarea commonlyusedfortargetpractice.
Thewitnessalsosaid thatlaterhefound16-gaugeshotgunshellsatthesite.
Pa- Page Proof Pending Publication ANDREWv.WHITE Thomas,J.,dissenting vattowneda.22-caliberhandgun,whichhehadpurchased about a week before the murder.
The day of the murder, he borrowedLarson’scar,claiminghewouldgetitservicedfor her.
Whenhe returnedit thefollowing day,shenoticed the car had not been serviced.
And, she found a .22-caliber shell onthefloorboardofhercar.
ForensicevidencealsounderminedAndrew’saccountthat shehadbeenshotatadistance.
Powderburnsonher clothes and body revealed the shot had been fired within two inchesofherarm.
Anexpertwitnesslatertestifiedthat Andrew’s injury—a superficial, close-range gunshot wound— wasstagedtomakeitlookasifshehadbeenavictimofthe attackandtherebyavoidsuspicion.
TheAndrews’neighborswereoutoftownonthedayof themurder.
Whentheyreturned,theyfoundsuspicious itemsin theirhomeand contactedthe police.
Policediscov- ered that someone had left a 16-gauge shotgun shell and sev- eral.22-caliberbulletsinthehome,boththesamebrandas thoseusedinRob’smurder.
Therewasnoevidenceofa break-in,but Andrewhada keyto theirhome.
Prosecutors suggestedthat,aftertheshooting,Pavatthidinthehome untilpolicehadleftthecrimescene.
Ratherthanattendherhusband’sfuneral,Andrewtrav- eledwithPavattandherchildrentoMexico.
Sheappar- ently hadno plansto return.
Beforethe trip,Andrew tried totransferfundsfromheraccounttoLarson’s,sothatLar- soncouldwiremoneytoherandPavatt.
Thepairalso askedLarsontohelpthemforgeRob’ssignatureonadocu- mentgrantingAndrewpermissiontotakethechildren abroad.
Andrewabandonedhercarinanapartmentcom- plexbeforeleaving.
Shealsostoppedmakingpaymentson herhome.
PavattresearchedtravelingtoArgentinaafter hearingthatArgentinadidnotextradite.
Larson,however,cooperatedwiththeFBIandrefusedto wirePavattorAndrewanymoney,despitetheirrepeated requests.
Whentheyranoutofmoneythreemonthslater, Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:604U. S.86(2025) Thomas,J.,dissenting theyreturnedtotheUnitedStatesandwereimmediately arrested.
WhileinMexico,PavattwrotealetteraddressedtoAn- drew’sdaughterclaimingthatheandanunnamed“friend” hadkilledRob,andthatAndrewhadnothingtodowithit.
Ante,at88.
HestatedhedidsobecauseAndrewhadtold himfourdaysbeforethemurderthatsheplannedtobeg RobtotakeherbackafterThanksgiving.
Thiswasapecu- liarclaim,giventhathoursbeforethemurderPavatthad movedhiswasheranddryerintoherhome.
And,farfrom adopting a conciliatory attitude toward Rob, the night before themurderAndrewhadcalledafriendjusttosay,“Ihate him.
Ihatehim.
Ihatehim.”
Tr.2662–2663(July1, 2004).
Thefriendrecalledthatthecomment“madethe hairsonthebackofmyneckstandup.
Shehatedthat man.”
Id.,at2664.
B
AjuryconvictedAndrewofcapitalmurder,andshewas sentencedtodeath.
SotoowasPavattinaseparatetrial.
Sex and marriage were unavoidable issues at Andrew’s trial, and the State introduced a variety of evidence about her sex- ualbehavior.
Ondirectappeal,Andrewchallengedsomeof thesex-basedevidenceintroducedduringtheguiltphaseof hertrial,arguingthatitwasirrelevantandundulyprejudi- cial.1 Giventhat“thistrialwasprimarilyaboutthemotive 1 As the Court notes, in federal habeas proceedings, Andrew has “reiter- ated her claim that the admission of this evidence” rendered both her guilt and penalty phases fundamentally unfair.
Ante, at 91.
But, Andrew also objectsnowtotheadmissionofcertainevidencefromthepenaltyphase, aswellasitemsofguilt-phaseevidenceshedidnotchallengeondirect appeal.
Thesechallengesfailforlackofexhaustion.
See28U. S. C. §2254(b)(1)(A).
To preserve an evidentiary claim, an Oklahoma defendant mustraiseaspecificobjectionwhentheevidenceinquestionisadmitted. Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4, ¶32, 994 P. 2d 61, 68–69. The OCCA will reviewondirectappealonlythoseobjectionsbroughttoitsattention. Stoufferv.State,2006OKCR46,¶126,147P.3d245,270.
BecauseAn- drewdidnotraisethesenewobjectionsinherdirectappeal,shehasnot Page Proof Pending Publication ANDREWv.WHITE Thomas,J.,dissenting andintentof[Andrew]tokillherhusbandwiththeaidof Pavatt,”theOCCAheldthatmuchofthisevidence,particu- larlyconcerningherrelationshipwithPavatt,wasnotjust admissible,but“highlyrelevant”and“probative.”
Andrew, 164P.3d,at194.
But,notallofitwasso.
TheOCCArec- ognizedthatsomeevidence,likethesortofoutfitsAndrew woretodinneroutings,wasnotrelevant.
Id.,at192.
Given“theoverwhelmingevidenceinthiscase,”however,it determinedthattheintroductionoftheirrelevantevidence “washarmless.”
Ibid. TheCourtsuggeststhattheOCCApermittedevidence ofAndrew’stwoprioraffairssimplybecauseitshowedshe had a penchant for adultery.
See ante, at 89–90.
In reality, the OCCA concluded that this evidence helped to prove “mo- tiveandintent.”
Andrew,164P.3d,at192.
Andrew had“sharedwithbothofthesemenherhatredforRobAn- drew and her wish that he was dead.”
Ibid. Evidence that Andrewhad“aclosepersonalrelationship”withthese mengavecredencetotheirtestimonythatshehadre- vealedtothemthese“intimatedetailsof[her]marriage.”
Ibid.2 TheCourtalsoinsinuatesthattherewassomethingim- properabouttheState’sintroductionofevidenceonAn- drew’s“failingsasamother.”
Ante,at87.
But,itconven- ientlyomitsthecontext.
Andrewassertedthatshewasa “goodmother”aspartofherdefenseinboththeguiltand presentedtheminstatecourt“inaccordancewithstateprocedures,”and sohasnotexhaustedthem.
Shinnv.MartinezRamirez,596U. S.366, 378(2022).
BecausetheCourttodaydoesnotaddressexhaustion,the TenthCircuitisfreetodosoonremand.
2 FacedwiththisreasonableholdingbytheOCCA,themajorityinsists thatAndrew’sclaimconcernedcertaingratuitousdetailsabouttheseaf- fairsratherthantheaffairs’existence.
Ante,at90,n.2.
Thetruthis justtheopposite.
Andrew’ssoleargumenttotheOCCAwasthatthe fact “[t]hat [she] had once had affairs with these men provided no evidence of her motive” or “intent” or any other relevant fact.
App. to Reply Brief 62a–64a.
Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:604U. S.86(2025) Thomas,J.,dissenting penaltyphasesofhertrial.
Tr.62–63(June17,2004);Tr.
4179(July14,2004);Andrew,164P.3d,at205.
Inpresent- ingevidencetothecontrary,theStatewassimplyrebutting apointthatAndrewhadplacedinissue,asitclearlyisenti- tled to do.
See 1 R. Mosteller et al., McCormick on Evidence §191,p.1188(8thed.2020)(“[O]ncethedefendantgivesevi- denceofpertinentcharactertraitstoshowthatheisnot guilty,hisclaimofpossessionofthesetraits...isopento rebuttal”).
Duringitsclosingargument,theprosecutiondidnotrely on any of the sexual evidence that the OCCA would later find irrelevant.3 Theprosecution’sreferencetotheunderwear AndrewbroughttoMexico,seeante,at88,isnoexception.
TheOCCArecognizedthatthisevidenceboreonPavatt’s andAndrew’s“intentionsinfleeingtoMexico,”akeyissue inthecase.
Andrew,164P.3d,at194.
Finally,theCourtiswrongtoimplythattheprosecution drewanykindof“contras[t]”betweenRobandAndrewin termsofreligiouscommitment.
Ante,at89.
Theprosecu- tionmentionedRob’sreligiousfaithtoemphasizethatthe world lost “a fine human being” when Rob was brutally mur- dered.
Tr.4401–4402(July14,2004).
But,theprosecution nevercastanysortofreligiousjudgmentagainstAndrew.
3 Andrew’sbriefingbeforethisCourt allegesthattheprosecutioncalled hera“ ‘slutpuppy’ ”whoisnota“ ‘womanofGod’ ”duringitsguilt-stage closingargument.
Pet.forCert.i,8,11,14(quotingTr.4125(July 12,2004));Pet.forCert.Reply5,13(same).
Thisaccusation—whichAn- drewdidnotmakeuntilalmost20yearsafterhertrial—isentirelyfalse. The prosecutor was not referring to Andrew.
Instead, he was recounting anabusivephonecallfromAndrewtoRob,duringwhichAndrewbase- lessly“accused[Rob]ofhaving”anaffairwitha“slutpuppy,”beforetell- ing him that he “can’t be a man of God and [Rob’s supposed affair partner] can’tbeawomanofGodbecauseshe’ssleepingwithamarriedmanand evenifyou’resinglethat’sadultery,whataslutpuppyshemustbe.” Tr.
4125.
For all its efforts to portray Andrew sympathetically, even the ma- jority stops short of endorsing her accusation.
See ante, at 89,n.1.
Page Proof Pending Publication ANDREWv.WHITE Thomas,J.,dissenting Tellingly, the Court is unable to cite even one example of the prosecutioncondemningAndrewinreligiousterms.
Therecordmakesclearthatitwasthedefense,notthe prosecution,thatrepeatedlyappealedtothejury’sreligious sentimentsatsentencing.
Forexample,thedefensecalled apastorasawitness,whotestifiedtotheimportanceof “mercy” as a “biblical” value.
Id., at 4333.
And, in its clos- ing, the defense repeatedly quoted the Bible; said that, if Rob couldspeaktothejury,hewouldaskthemto“forgive”An- drewas“JesusChristonthecross”forgaveHiskillers;and concludedwithaprayer.
Id.,at4429–4430,4471–4473.
Theprosecutionsimplyaskedthejuryduringrebuttalto ignorethedefense’sattemptsto“guilttrip”them.
Id., at4480.
II
TheCourt’slegalanalysisfaresnobetter.
Under AEDPA, Andrew may obtain federal habeas relief only if the OCCA’s resolution of her due process claim “was contrary to, orinvolvedanunreasonableapplicationof,clearlyestab- lishedFederallaw,asdeterminedby”theholdingsofthis Court.
28U. S. C.§2254(d)(1);seeLockyerv.Andrade,538 U. S.63,71(2003).
This“standardis,”and“wasmeantto be,” “difficult to meet.”
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 102(2011).
Itforeclosesreliefunlessall“fairmindedju- rists”wouldagreethattheOCCA’s“decisionconflictswith thisCourt’sprecedents.”
Ibid. TheCourttodayassertsthattheDueProcessClausefor- bidstheadmissionofevidencesoundulyprejudicialasto renderadefendant’strialfundamentallyunfair,andholds thattheTenthCircuiterredinfailingtorecognizethisrule asclearlyestablishedunderourprecedents.
Insoholding, the Court commits the error of “ ‘framing our precedents at’ ” too “ ‘high [a] level of generality.’ ” Lopez v. Smith, 574 U. S. 1,6(2014)(percuriam)(quotingNevadav.Jackson,569 U. S.505,512(2013)(percuriam)).
And,evensettingthat Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:604U. S.86(2025) Thomas,J.,dissenting aside,thisreadingofourprecedentsisonewithwhichfair- mindedjuristscouldeasily(andjustifiably)disagree.
A
“[H]oldingsthatspeakonlyatahighlevelofgenerality” “cannotsupplyagroundforrelief”underAEDPA.
Brown v. Davenport, 596 U. S. 118, 136 (2022).
We have repeatedly cautionedlowercourtsagainst“framingourprecedents”too generally.
Lopez,574U. S.,at6(internalquotationmarks omitted);see,e. g.,Woodsv.Donald,575U. S.312,318–319 (2015)(percuriam);Whitev.Woodall,572U. S.415,426 (2014);Nevada,569U. S.,at512;Harrington,562U. S.,at 101;Knowlesv.Mirzayance,556U. S.111,122(2009).
We haveinsteadrequiredcourtstoaskwhetherourprecedents “establishclearlythespecificrule[theprisoner]needs.”
Lopez,574U. S.,at6(emphasisadded).
TheTenthCircuit heededourrepeatedwarnings.
Themajoritydisregards them.
Payne“h[e]ld”that“theEighthAmendmenterectsno persebar”to“theadmissionofvictimimpactevidence”in capitalsentencingproceedings.
501U. S.,at827.
But,the Court included a caveat: “In the event that evidence is intro- ducedthatissoundulyprejudicialthatitrendersthetrial fundamentallyunfair,theDueProcessClauseoftheFour- teenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief.”
Id., at 825.
Significantly,thatcaveatdidnotapplyinPayneitself.
There,asin“themajorityofcases,”the“victimimpactevi- denceserve[d]entirelylegitimatepurposes.”
Ibid. TheTenthCircuitcorrectlyrejectedAndrew’sclaimthat Payne’scaveatclearlyestablishedthattheadmissionofany evidencesoprejudicialastorenderatrialfundamentally unfairwouldviolatedueprocess.
ItheldthatPayne’sbrief discussionofdueprocessonly“appl[ied]toscenariosin which...victimimpactstatements”are“unfairlyprejudi- cial.”
62F.4th1299,1314(2023)(internalquotationmarks omitted).
Page Proof Pending Publication ANDREWv.WHITE Thomas,J.,dissenting Nevertheless,theCourttodayvacatestheTenthCircuit’s decision,markingthefirsttimeithaseversummarilyset asidealowercourtdecisionforfailingtofindthatalegal ruleisclearlyestablishedunderAEDPA.
Yet,theCourt doesnotidentifyaspecificon-pointholdingfromPayne—or anyotherdecision—thattheTenthCircuitoverlooked.
Instead,itfaultstheTenthCircuitforfailingtodistilla “[g]enerallegal principl[e]”about fairnessfrom Payne’sone- sentencedueprocesscaveat.
Ante,at94.
Intheprocess, theCourtdoesnotoncemention,muchlessdistinguish,our manyprecedentsadmonishinglowercourtsnottodefine clearlyestablishedlawtooabstractly.
Thisspecificityrequirementservesanimportantfunction.
Definingclearlyestablishedlawatanoverlyhighlevelof generalitymakesitvirtuallyimpossibletofindanunreason- ableapplicationwarrantingrelief.
SeeBrown,596U. S.,at 136.
It “is not ‘an unreasonable application of’ ” a more gen- eral rule “fora state court to decline toapply a specific legal rulethathasnotbeensquarelyestablishedbythisCourt.”
Knowles, 556 U. S., at 122.
“[I]f a habeas court must extend arationalebeforeitcanapplytothefactsathand,thenby definitiontherationalewasnotclearlyestablishedatthe timeofthestate-courtdecision.”
White,572U. S.,at426 (internalquotationmarksomitted).
Whenalegalruleis definedattoohighalevelofgenerality,itbecomesimpossi- bletoapplyittothefactswithoutarticulatingsubsidiary legalprinciplesthatarenotthemselvesclearlyestablished, leaving no principled basis for granting relief under §2254(d). Totheextentsomecourtsnonethelessgrantreliefbased onanoverlygeneralprinciple,theydefyAEDPA.
Aswe haveexplained,whencourtsuse“ahighlevelofgenerality” to“transformeventhemostimaginativeextensionofcase law into ‘clearly established Federal law,’ ” they wrongly per- formordinaryerrorcorrectionundertheguiseofapplying §2254(d).
Nevada,569U. S.,at512.
Thus,atbest,today’s decision will simply create an extra, unnecessary step judges Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:604U. S.86(2025) Thomas,J.,dissenting mustperformbeforetheycandenyahabeasclaimthatis doomedtofail.
Atworst,itwillconfuselowercourtsinto misapplyingAEDPA’sstandardofreview.
ConsiderAndrew’scase.
Onremand,iftheTenthCircuit properly applies AEDPA, it still will find that the state court reasonablyappliedtheprincipletheCourthasidentified,no matterwhatitthinksofthespecificfactsofAndrew’strial.
Payneaddressedtheuseofvictim-impactevidenceatthe penaltyphaseofacapitaltrial.
501U. S.,at824–825.
An- drewchallengestheadmissionofevidencefromherguilt phase,aswellasnon-victim-impactevidencefromherpen- altyphase.
“[I]tisnotuncommonforaconstitutionalrule toapplysomewhatdifferentlyatthepenaltyphasethanit doesattheguiltphase.”
White,572U. S.,at421.
And,a fairmindedjuristcouldbelievethatvictim-impactevidence raisesuniquedueprocessconcerns;otherwise,thespecific questionwhethervictim-impactevidencecategoricallyvio- latestheEighthAmendmentwouldneverhavearisen.
So, it would be impossible for the Tenth Circuit to grant Andrew reliefwithoutimpermissibly“extend[ing]”Payne’s“ration- ale.”
Id.,at426(internalquotationmarksomitted).
Andrew’sclaimalsocannotsurviveonremandbecause Payne’slonesentenceondueprocessdoesnotestablisha test for determining when a trial is so infected by prejudicial evidence asto befundamentally unfair.
Itdoes notidentify whatfactorsacourtshouldconsider,howtoweighthem,or whatthegapisbetween,say,agarden-varietyFederalRule ofEvidence403errorandafundamentallyunfairtrial.
To consider the specific facts of Andrew’s trial, the Tenth Circuit wouldneedtodecidethesemattersforitself.
Butitwould then by definition be doing more than applying clearly estab- lishedlaw.
SeeKnowles,556U. S.,at122.
The Court defends its reliance on a broadly defined rule of lawbycitingLockyer,538U. S.,at73,whichrecognizedas clearlyestablishedthegeneralprinciplethatgrosslydispro- portionate sentences violate the Eighth Amendment.
Ante, Page Proof Pending Publication ANDREWv.WHITE Thomas,J.,dissenting at94–95.
But,inLockyertheCourtdeniedrelief,soitdid notcarefullyconsidertheappropriatelevelofgeneralityat whichtodefineclearlyestablishedlaw.
Indeed,itdenied relief precisely because it had identified a “broad” legal prin- ciplewhose“precisecontours”were“unclear.”
538U. S.,at 76–77 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Lockyer also was anearlyAEDPAdecision.
Inourmanysubsequentdeci- sions,wehavecometoappreciatetheneedtoaskwhether ourprecedents“establishclearlythespecificrule[thepris- oner]needs.”
Lopez,574U. S.,at6(emphasisadded).
“[H]oldingsthatspeakonlyatahighlevelofgenerality” cannot“supplyagroundforrelief”underAEDPA.
Brown, 596U. S.,at136.
Inanefforttoshowthatremandwillnotbefutile,the Courtobservesthatclearlyestablishedlawcanapplyto “ ‘ “new factual permutations.” ’ ” Ante, at (quoting White,572U. S.,at427).
Thatistrue,solongasonealso keepsinmindWhite’sadmonitionthatAEDPA“doesnot requirestatecourtstoextend[our]precedent”toanyargua- blydistinctcontext,aswouldbenecessarytograntAndrew relief.
Id.,at426.
TheCourtattemptstoescapeWhite’s strictlimitationbyinvokingTaylorv.Riojas,592U. S.7 (2020)(percuriam),tosuggestthata“ ‘generalconstitu- tionalrule’ ”canbeabasisforreliefinan“ ‘obvious’ ”case.
Ante,at95.
But,themajorityomitsthatTaylorisaquali- fiedimmunitydecision,renderingitutterlyinapposite.
Al- thoughbothqualifiedimmunityandAEDPAimposede- mandingstandardsbasedon“clearlyestablishedlaw,”the two aremeaningfully different.
A plaintiffovercomes qual- ifiedimmunitybyidentifyingcaselaw“findinga[constitu- tional]violationundersimilarcircumstances,”exceptthatin “anobviouscase...abodyofrelevantcaselawisnot needed.”
DistrictofColumbiav.Wesby,583U. S.48,65 (2018)(internalquotationmarksomitted).
InTaylor,this Courtfoundthattheobviousnessexceptionapplied.
U. S., at 8–9.
AEDPA, by contrast, permits relief only when Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:604U. S.86(2025) Thomas,J.,dissenting astate-courtdecisionundeniably“conflictswiththisCourt’s precedents.”
Harrington,562U. S.,at102.
Regardlessofwhatwethinkof“themeritsofthe[due process]principle”thatAndrewasserts,itdoesnotwarrant reliefunderAEDPAabsentapriorSupremeCourtholding thattheprinciple“appliestothecircumstancespresentedin thiscase.”
Woods,575U. S.,at319(internalquotation marksomitted).
Thereisnosuchholdinghere,andthe TenthCircuitwasrighttoinsistonone.
B
Evensettingasidethelevel-of-generalityproblem,the Court is wrong to find a clearly established rule of law. For atleastthreereasons,afairmindedjuristcoulddisagree withtheCourt’sreadingofPayne.
TheCourtholdsother- wiseonlybyredefining“clearlyestablished”lawtoinclude debatableinterpretationsofourprecedents.
First,afairmindedjuristcouldconcludethatPayne’slone sentenceondueprocessisnotaholdingatall.
Although Payneassertedthatvictim-impactevidencecouldviolate due process if it was unduly prejudicial, the Court found that “inthiscase”theevidence“servesentirelylegitimatepur- poses,”andsodeclinedto disturbthecapitalsentenceunder review.
501 U. S., at 825.
The Court’s statement that a dif- ferentcasepresentingdifferentfactscouldviolatedueproc- esswasthusdictabecauseitwasnot“ ‘necessaryto’ ”its “dispositionof[the]case.”
Tylerv.Cain,533U. S.656,663, n.4(2001)(quotingSeminoleTribeofFla.v.Florida,517 U. S.44,67(1996));seeStewartv.Winn,967F.3d534,539 (CA62020)(describingPayne’sdueprocessdiscussionasa “snippe[t]” of“ ‘dicta’ ”).
As we havepreviously recognized, because“ ‘clearlyestablished[f]ederallaw’...‘referstothe holdings’ ” of thisCourt, Andrew cannot premiseher habeas claimon“acaseinwhichwerejectedadueprocessclaim.”
Page Proof Pending Publication ANDREWv.WHITE Thomas,J.,dissenting Metrishv.Lancaster,569U. S.351,367(2013)(alteration inoriginal).
TheCourtinsistsPayne’sdueprocessstatementwas“in- dispensable” to its disposition, because without the existence ofadueprocessbackstop,thePayneCourtmighthavede- terminedthatacategoricalEighthAmendmentbaron victim-impactevidenceisnecessarytoprotectdefendants.
Ante,at93.
But,thisishardlytheonly“reasonableinter- pretatio[n]”ofPayne,whichnowheresetsforththereason- ingtheCourtascribestoit.
White,572U. S.,at423.
The Court’sinterpretationmakessenseonlyifweassumethat thePayneCourtwouldhaveseriouslyconsideredholding victim-impactevidencecategoricallyunconstitutionalde- spiteit“serv[ing]entirelylegitimatepurposes”in“thema- jorityofcases.”
501U. S.,at825.
Thatwouldbeahighly unusualapproachtoconstitutionallitigation.
Cf.United Statesv.Salerno,481U. S.739,745(1987)(requiringthata law be valid in “no set of circumstances” to be facially uncon- stitutional).
Anotherreasonableinterpretation—andin- deed,afarmoreplausibleone—isthattheCourtsimply wantedtomakeclearthatitsrejectionofacategoricalrule againstvictim-impactevidencedidnotruleoutfuturefact- specificchallenges.
Thatkindofdictaiscommonincases rejectingcategoricalchallenges.
See,e. g.,UnitedStatesv.
Hansen,599U. S.762,784–785(2023).
Afairmindedjurist neednotagreethatPayne’ssingle-sentencecaveatconsti- tutesaholding.
Even if we were to treat Payne’s sentence about due proc- essasaholding,afairmindedjuristneednotreaditas broadly as the Court does.
“[G]eneral expressions, in every opinion,are tobetakenin connectionwiththe caseinwhich thoseexpressionsareused.
Iftheygobeyondthecase, they...oughtnottocontrolthejudgmentinasubsequent suit.”
Cohensv.Virginia,6Wheat.264,399(1821).
This principleapplieswithspecialforcewhenapartyclaims“a Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:604U. S.86(2025) Thomas,J.,dissenting singlesentence”in anopinionestablishesa broadlegalprin- ciple.
SeeArkansasGameandFishComm’nv.United States,568U. S.23,35(2012).
Afairmindedjuristcouldbelievethatthescopeofany holdingestablishedbyPayne’scursorydiscussionofdue processislimitedtoPayne’sanalysis.
Onthemajority’s telling,PayneeliminatedacategoricalEighthAmendment prohibitiononvictim-impactevidencebecauseoftheavail- abilityofanalternativedueprocessprotectionagainst such evidence.
See ante, at 92–93.
Because Payne was not consideringtheroleofdueprocessvis-à-visanyotherkind ofevidence,afairmindedjuristcouldconcludethatanydue processholdinglaiddownbyPayneextendsonlytovictim- impactevidence.
Finally,afairmindedjuristcould relyonthisCourt’slater decisioninEstelletoconcludethatPaynedidnotestablish anygeneraldueprocessprohibitionontheadmissionofun- dulyprejudicialevidence.
TheCourtofAppealsinEstellegrantedhabeasreliefon thegroundthattheadmissionofirrelevantandprejudicial prior-bad-act evidencehad helped render theprisoner’s trial “fundamentallyunfairinviolationofdueprocess.”
U. S.,at67(internalquotationmarksomitted).
ThisCourt reversed,holdingtheevidenceinquestion“wasrelevantto anissueinthecase.”
Id.,at70.
Havingreachedthiscon- clusion,theCourtaddedthat“weneednotexplorefurther theapparentassumptionoftheCourtofAppealsthatitisa violationofthedueprocessguaranteedbytheFourteenth Amendmentforevidencethatisnotrelevanttobereceived inacriminaltrial.”
Ibid. Thatis,theEstelleCourtex- presslyreservedtheveryquestionthemajorityasserts Payneresolved.
ThisCourtis“hardlyinthehabitof reservingseparatequestionsthathavealreadybeendefi- nitivelyanswered.”
White,572U. S.,at424(citation,al- teration,andinternalquotationmarksomitted).
Thus, Page Proof Pending Publication ANDREWv.WHITE Thomas,J.,dissenting “fairmindedjuristscouldconcludethat[Estelle]’sreserva- tionregarding”undulyprejudicialevidence“wouldhave served no meaningful purpose if [Payne] had created [a] rule against” it already.
Ibid.; accord, Kernan v. Cuero, 583 U. S. 1,8(2017)(percuriam).
ThelawhasnotchangedsincewedecidedEstelle.
The Courtcitesseveraldecisionspostdatingandpredating PayneandEstelle,butonlyforvague,atmosphericsupport.
Seeante,at93–94.
TheCourtdoesnotassertthatanyof themestablishesageneraldueprocessruleagainstunduly prejudicialevidence.
And,theCourtdoesnotexplainwhat work,ifany,thesecitationsdoinitsanalysis.
Norcouldit.
Our decision in Romano v. Oklahoma, U. S. 1, 13–14(1994),cannotmovetheneedlebecauseRomanore- jectedadueprocessclaim.
Thereferencetodueprocessin Kansasv.Carr,577U. S.108,123(2016),alsoisnotahold- ing.
As in Payne, it is a one-sentence aside in a case reject- inganEighthAmendmentclaim.
Regardless,Carrhasno possible bearing on this case, as it was decided after the con- clusionofAndrew’sdirectappeal.
SeeLockyer,538U. S., at 71–72.
So too, theCourt’s remaining citations are clearly inapposite,asnoneinvolvestheadmissionofevidence.
As theTenthCircuitcorrectlyrecognized,thisCourthasnever answeredthequestionitreservedinEstelle.
62F.4th, at1315.
Remarkably,theCourtdoesnotdenythat“areasonable juristcouldagree”thatPaynedoesnotestablishtheprinci- pleAndrewasserts.
Ante,at95.
Instead,itmaintains that the potentially differing views of reasonable, fairminded jurists do not matter.
According to the majority, federal ha- beascourtshavean“independentobligation”toidentifythe holdingsofthisCourt.
Ibid. Onlyafterwarddoes“defer- ence”kickin.
Ibid. Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:604U. S.86(2025) Thomas,J.,dissenting Thatviewispatentlywrong.
AEDPArequiresstate prisonerstobasetheirclaimson“ ‘clearlyestablished’ ”law.
Ibid.(quoting§2254(d)(1)).
Adebatableholdingdoesnot clearlyestablishanything.
AEDPApermitsreliefonly when “thestate court’s ruling. . .was solacking in justifica- tionthattherewasanerrorwellunderstoodandcompre- hendedinexistinglawbeyondanypossibilityforfairminded disagreement.”
Harrington, 562 U. S., at 103.
If one could fairlydisagreethattheruleaprisonerinvokesispartof “existinglaw,”onecouldfairlydisagreethatthestatecourt erredunderexistinglaw.
Ourprecedentsconfirmthatdebatablereadingsofthis Court’scasescannotbeclearlyestablishedlaw.
InWhite, weheldthatEstellev.Smith,451U. S.454(1981),didnot clearlyestablishtheprisoner’sassertedrule,becauseother “perfectlyreasonableinterpretationsofEstelle”existed.
572 U. S.,at 423.
In otherwords, the prisoner’sclaim failed because“fairmindedjuristscouldconclude”thatEstellehad not“created[the]across-the-boardrule”heinvoked.
U. S.,at424.
Tofindclearlyestablishedlawinthefaceof thesereasonablealternativeinterpretationswould“contra- ven[e]§2254(d)’sdeferentialstandardofreview.”
Id.,at 423–424.
Likewise, in Kernan, we reversed after the Ninth CircuitheldthatourdecisioninSantobellov.NewYork,404 U. S.257(1971),clearlyestablishedtheruleonwhichthe prisonerrelied.
See583U. S.,at6–9.
Because“ ‘fair- mindedjuristscoulddisagree’withtheNinthCircuit’sread- ing of Santobello,” we were “unable to find in Supreme Court precedentthat‘clearlyestablishedfederallaw’ ”thatthe NinthCircuithadclaimedtosee.
Id.,at7–8.
Thus,con- trarytowhatthemajoritysays,wehaveextended“defer- ence”bothatthethresholdstepofidentifyingclearlyestab- lishedlawandatthesubsequentstepofapplyingit.
Ante, at95.
Acontestableinterpretationofprecedentcannotbe clearlyestablishedlaw.
Page Proof Pending Publication ANDREWv.WHITE Thomas,J.,dissenting * * * Summaryvacatur“isararedisposition.”
Schweikerv.
Hansen,450U. S.785,791(1981)(Marshall,J.,dissenting).
ThisCourthastraditionallyreserveditfortheuncommon “situationsinwhichthelawissettledandstable,thefacts are not in dispute, and the decision below is clearly in error.” Ibid. Today,however,theCourtturnsthisapproachonits head,steamrollingsettledAEDPAprinciplestosetaside anentirelycorrectTenthCircuitdecision.
Irespectfully dissent.
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