Per Curiam.
A group of Colorado voters contends that Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits former President Donald J. Trump, who seeks the Presidential nomi- State of Wyoming, by Judd E. Stone II, Ari Cuenin, and Gene P. Hamil ton; for America's Future et al. by William J. Olson, Jeremiah L. Morgan, Robert J. Olson, Patrick McSweeney, J. Mark Brewer, and John I. Harris III; for Christian Family Coalition (CFC) Florida, Inc., by Dennis Gross man; for the Claremont Institute's Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence by John Yoo; for Former Attorney General Edwin Meese III et al. by Gene C. Schaerr, Kenneth A. Klukowski, Michael Boos, and Daniel H. Jorjani; for Former U. S. Attorney Robert S. Brewer, Jr. et al. by R. Trent Shores; for the James Madison Center for Free Speech by James Bopp, Jr.; for Judicial Watch, Inc., et al. by T. Russell Nobile, Robert D. Popper, and H. Christopher Coates; for the Kansas Republican Party et al. by Craig L. Uhrich; for the Landmark Legal Foundation by Michael J. O'Neill, Matthew C. Forys, and Richard P. Hutchison; for the Public Interest Legal Foundation et al. by J. Christian Adams and Kaylan Phillips; for the Republican National Committee et al. by Patrick N. Strawbridge, Gilbert C. Dickey, Christopher O. Murray, and Julian R. Ellis, Jr.; for Sen. Ted Cruz et al. by R. Trent McCotter and Gene P. Hamilton; for Sen. Steve Daines et al. by Noel J. Francisco, John M. Gore, E. Stewart Crosland, and Hashim M. Mooppan; for Jack Coben by Larry E. Coben; for William Jones by Stephen Yag man; for Larry Kidd by Larry J. Obhof, Jr., and Mark D. Wagoner, Jr.; for Kurt T. Lash by Christopher E. Mills; for James T. Lindgren by Benjamin M. Flowers; for Pearl O. Madrial by Harold Emmett Lucas; for Terpsehore “Tore” Maras et al. by Warner Mendenhall; for Peter Meijer by Charles R. Spies; for Vivek Ramaswamy by Jonathan Lien- hard, Phillip M. Gordon, and Edward Wenger; for Seth Barrett Tillman by Josh Blackman, C. Thomas Ludden, Robert W. Ray, R. Scott Reisch, and Jessica L. Hays; for Devin Watkins et al. by Devin Watkins, pro se; for Gavin M. Wax et al. by Edward Andrew Paltzik and Serge Krimnus; and for 102 Colorado Registered Electors by J. Gregory Troutman.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for Common Cause by Gregory L. Diskant, Jonah M. Knobler, and Kathay Feng; for the Constitutional Accountability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra and Brianne J. Gorod; for Former Colorado Secretary of State Mary Estill Buchanan by Mi chael A. Caplan; for Former Republican Governors by Jeffrey A. Mandell, Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication nation of the Republican Party in this year's election, from becoming President again. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed with that contention. It ordered the Colorado secre- Douglas M. Poland, and Rachel E. Snyder; for Former Republican Members of Congress by Faith E. Gay; for Retired State Supreme Court Justices by Ronald A. Fein, John C. Bonifaz, Ben T. Clements, Courtney Hostetler, and Charles N. Nauen; for the San Francisco Taxpayers Association et al. by Paul D. Scott; for Floyd Abrams et al. by Steven A. Hirsch; for Carol Anderson et al. by Erica Grossman and John Holland; for Josh Autry, pro se; for Jeremy Bates, pro se; for David P. Cullenberg et al. by Robert A. Stein; for David M. Driesen et al. by David M. Driesen, pro se; for G. Antaeus B. Edelsohn by Joan D. B. Edelsohn; for Sherrilyn A. Ifll, pro se; for J. Michael Luttig et al. by Richard D. Bernstein and Nancy A. Temple; for Brian J. Martin by Wallace K. Lightsey; for Kermit Roosevelt by Robert S. Peck; for Ilya Somin by Gerson H. Smoger; and for David B. Tatge, pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for Michigan Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson by Ann M. Sherman, Solicitor General, Heather S. Meingast, Division Chief, and Erik A. Grill, Assistant Attorney General; for the Secretaries of State of Missouri et al. by Barbara A. Smith, Jesus A. Osete, and Robert M. Thompson; for American Historians by Jonathan B. Miller, Joshua A. Rosenthal, and Michael Adame; for the Association of the Bar of the City of New York by Susan J. Kohlmann, Benjamin D. Alter, Marcy L. Kahn, Stephen L. Kass, and Jerry H. Goldfeder; for the Brennan Center for Justice et al. by Michelle S. Kallen, Wendy R. Weiser, Thomas P. Wolf, Eliza M. Sweren-Becker, Paul M. Smith, Adav Noti, Kevin P. Hancock, Benjamin L. Berwick, and Cameron O. Kistler; for the Capitol Police Offcers Present at the U. S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, by Damon Hewitt, Jon M. Greenbaum, Marc P. Epstein, William J. Blech man, Elizabeth B. Honkonen, Lauren M. Blas, Lee R. Crain, and Mark J. Cherry; for Children's Rights Legal Scholars et al. by Julia A. Olson, Mathew W. dos Santos, Philip L. Gregory, and Catherine Smith, pro se; for Condemned USA by George T. Pallas; for Experts in Democracy by John Vail; for the League for Sportsmen et al. by Earl N. “Trey” Mayfeld III; for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., by Anuja D. Thatte, Burt M. Rublin, Janai S. Nelson, and Samuel Spital; for Professors and Legal Scholars by Mari Newman; for U. S. Term Limits by David H. Thompson and Brian W. Barnes; for Akhil Reed Amar et al. by Vikram David Amar, pro se; for Ryan Binkley et al. by Erick G. Kaardal; for David Boyle, pro se; for Orville Vernon Burton et al. by Michael J. Kasper; tary of state to exclude the former President from the Republican primary ballot in the State and to disregard any write-in votes that Colorado voters might cast for him. Former President Trump challenges that decision on several grounds. Because the Constitution makes Congress, rather than the States, responsible for enforcing Section 3 against federal offceholders and candidates, we reverse.
I
Last September, about six months before the March 5, 2024, Colorado primary election, four Republican and two unaffliated Colorado voters fled a petition against former President Trump and Colorado Secretary of State Jena Griswold in Colorado state court. These voters—whom we refer to as the respondents—contend that after former President Trump's defeat in the 2020 Presidential election, he disrupted the peaceful transfer of power by intentionally organizing and inciting the crowd that breached the Capitol as Congress met to certify the election results on January 6, 2021. One consequence of those actions, the respondents maintain, is that former President Trump is constitutionally ineligible to serve as President again.
Their theory turns on Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 3 provides: “No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any offce, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an offcer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial offcer of any State, to support the for Edward B. Foley et al. by Michael B. Kimberly; for Mark A. Graber by Nelson Boyle; for Edward J. Larson, by J. Carl Cecere and Edward J. Larson, pro se; for Jordan L. Michelson by Anthony Robert Zelle; for Derek T. Muller by Heather Gebelin Hacker; for David E. Weisberg, pro se; and for Michael T. Worley by Burt M. Rublin.
Page Proof Pending Publication Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.”
According to the respondents, Section 3 applies to the former President because after taking the Presidential oath in 2017, he intentionally incited the breaching of the Capitol on January 6 in order to retain power. They claim that he is therefore not a qualifed candidate, and that as a result, the Colorado secretary of state may not place him on the primary ballot. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 1–1–113(1), 1–4–1101(1), 1–4–1201, 1–4–1203(2)(a), 1–4–1204 (2023).
After a fve-day trial, the state District Court found that former President Trump had “engaged in insurrection” within the meaning of Section 3, but nonetheless denied the respondents' petition. The court held that Section 3 did not apply because the Presidency, which Section 3 does not mention by name, is not an “offce . . . under the United States” and the President is not an “offcer of the United States” within the meaning of that provision. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 184a–284a.
In December, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed in part and affrmed in part by a 4 to 3 vote. Reversing the District Court's operative holding, the majority concluded that for purposes of Section 3, the Presidency is an offce under the United States and the President is an offcer of the United States. The court otherwise affrmed, holding (1) that the Colorado Election Code permitted the respondents' challenge based on Section 3; (2) that Congress need not pass implementing legislation for disqualifcations under Section 3 to attach; (3) that the political question doctrine did not preclude judicial review of former President Trump's eligibility; (4) that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence portions of a congressional Report on the events of January 6; (5) that the District Court Page Proof Pending Publication did not err in concluding that those events constituted an “insurrection” and that former President Trump “engaged in” that insurrection; and (6) that former President Trump's speech to the crowd that breached the Capitol on January 6 was not protected by the First Amendment. See An derson v. Griswold, 543 P. 3d 283 (2023).
The Colorado Supreme Court accordingly ordered Secretary Griswold not to “list President Trump's name on the 2024 presidential primary ballot” or “count any write-in votes cast for him.” Id., at 342. Chief Justice Boatright and Justices Samour and Berkenkotter each fled dissenting opinions. Id., at 342, 346, 361.
Under the terms of the opinion of the Colorado Supreme Court, its ruling was automatically stayed pending this Court's review. See id., at 342. We granted former President Trump's petition for certiorari, which raised a single question: “Did the Colorado Supreme Court err in ordering President Trump excluded from the 2024 presidential primary ballot?” See 601 U. S. ––– (2024). Concluding that it did, we now reverse.
II
A
Proposed by Congress in 1866 and ratifed by the States in 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment “expand[ed] federal power at the expense of state autonomy” and thus “fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal power struck by the Constitution.” Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44, 59 (1996); see also Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 345 (1880). Section 1 of the Amendment, for instance, bars the States from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” or “deny[ing] to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.” And Section 5 confers on Congress “power to enforce” those prohibitions, along with the other provisions of the Amendment, “by appropriate legislation.”
Page Proof Pending Publication Section 3 of the Amendment likewise restricts state autonomy, but through different means. It was designed to help ensure an enduring Union by preventing former Confederates from returning to power in the aftermath of the Civil War. See, e. g., Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2544 (1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens, warning that without appropriate constitutional reforms “yelling secessionists and hissing copperheads” would take seats in the House); id., at 2768 (statement of Sen. Howard, lamenting prospect of a “State Legislature . . . made up entirely of disloyal elements” absent a disqualifcation provision). Section 3 aimed to prevent such a resurgence by barring from offce “those who, having once taken an oath to support the Constitution of the United States, afterward went into rebellion against the Government of the United States.” Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 1st Sess., 626 (1869) (statement of Sen. Trumbull). Section 3 works by imposing on certain individuals a preventive and severe penalty—disqualifcation from holding a wide array of offces—rather than by granting rights to all. It is therefore necessary, as Chief Justice Chase concluded and the Colorado Supreme Court itself recognized, to “ `ascertain[ ] what particular individuals are embraced' ” by the provision. 543 P. 3d, at 316 (quoting Griffn's Case, 11 F. Cas. 7, 26 (No. 5,815) (CC Va. 1869) (Chase, Circuit Justice)). Chase went on to explain that “[t]o accomplish this ascertainment and ensure effective results, proceedings, evidence, decisions, and enforcements of decisions, more or less formal, are indispensable.” Id., at 26. For its part, the Colorado Supreme Court also concluded that there must be some kind of “determination” that Section 3 applies to a particular person “before the disqualifcation holds meaning.” 543 P. 3d, at 316.
The Constitution empowers Congress to prescribe how those determinations should be made. The relevant provision is Section 5, which enables Congress, subject of course to judicial review, to pass “appropriate legislation” to “enPage Proof Pending Publication force” the Fourteenth Amendment. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 536 (1997). Or as Senator Howard put it at the time the Amendment was framed, Section 5 “casts upon Congress the responsibility of seeing to it, for the future, that all the sections of the amendment are carried out in good faith.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2768. Congress's Section 5 power is critical when it comes to Section 3. Indeed, during a debate on enforcement legislation less than a year after ratifcation, Sen. Trumbull noted that “notwithstanding [Section 3] . . . hundreds of men [were] holding offce” in violation of its terms. Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 1st Sess., at 626. The Constitution, Trumbull noted, “provide[d] no means for enforcing” the disqualifcation, necessitating a “bill to give effect to the fundamental law embraced in the Constitution.” Ibid. The enforcement mechanism Trumbull championed was later enacted as part of the Enforcement Act of 1870, “pursuant to the power conferred by § 5 of the [Fourteenth] Amendment.” General Building Contractors Assn., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U. S. 375, 385 (1982); see 16 Stat. 143–144.
B
This case raises the question whether the States, in addition to Congress, may also enforce Section 3. We conclude that States may disqualify persons holding or attempting to hold state offce. But States have no power under the Constitution to enforce Section 3 with respect to federal offces, especially the Presidency.
“In our federal system, the National Government possesses only limited powers; the States and the people retain the remainder.” Bond v. United States, 572 U. S. 844, 854 (2014). Among those retained powers is the power of a State to “order the processes of its own governance.”
Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 752 (1999). In particular, the States enjoy sovereign “power to prescribe the qualifcations of their own offcers” and “the manner of their election . . . Page Proof Pending Publication free from external interference, except so far as plainly provided by the Constitution of the United States.” Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U. S. 548, 570–571 (1900). Although the Fourteenth Amendment restricts state power, nothing in it plainly withdraws from the States this traditional authority. And after ratifcation of the Fourteenth Amendment, States used this authority to disqualify state offcers in accordance with state statutes. See, e. g., Worthy v. Barrett, 63 N. C. 199, 200, 204 (1869) (elected county sheriff); State ex rel. Sandlin v. Watkins, 21 La. 631, 631– 633 (1869) (state judge).
Such power over governance, however, does not extend to federal offceholders and candidates. Because federal offcers “ `owe their existence and functions to the united voice of the whole, not of a portion, of the people,' ” powers over their election and qualifcations must be specifcally “delegated to, rather than reserved by, the States.” U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779, 803–804 (1995) (quoting 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 627, p. 435 (3d ed. 1858)). But nothing in the Constitution delegates to the States any power to enforce Section 3 against federal offceholders and candidates. As an initial matter, not even the respondents contend that the Constitution authorizes States to somehow remove sit ting federal offceholders who may be violating Section 3. Such a power would fout the principle that “the Constitution guarantees `the entire independence of the General Government from any control by the respective States.' ” Trump v. Vance, 591 U. S. 786, 800 (2020) (quoting Farmers and Me chanics Sav. Bank of Minneapolis v. Minnesota, 232 U. S. 516, 521 (1914)). Indeed, consistent with that principle, States lack even the lesser powers to issue writs of mandamus against federal offcials or to grant habeas corpus relief to persons in federal custody. See McClung v. Silliman,6 Wheat. 598, 603–605 (1821); Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397, 405– 410 (1872).
Page Proof Pending Publication The respondents nonetheless maintain that States may enforce Section 3 against candidates for federal offce. But the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, on its face, does not affrmatively delegate such a power to the States. The terms of the Amendment speak only to enforcement by Congress, which enjoys power to enforce the Amendment through legislation pursuant to Section 5.
This can hardly come as a surprise, given that the substantive provisions of the Amendment “embody signifcant limitations on state authority.” Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 456 (1976). Under the Amendment, States cannot abridge privileges or immunities, deprive persons of life, liberty, or property without due process, deny equal protection, or deny male inhabitants the right to vote (without thereby suffering reduced representation in the House). See Amdt. 14, §§ 1, 2. On the other hand, the Fourteenth Amendment grants new power to Congress to enforce the provisions of the Amendment against the States. It would be incongruous to read this particular Amendment as granting the States the power—silently no less—to disqualify a candidate for federal offce.
The only other plausible constitutional sources of such a delegation are the Elections and Electors Clauses, which authorize States to conduct and regulate congressional and Presidential elections, respectively. See Art. I, § 4, cl. 1; Art. II, § 1, cl. 2.1 But there is little reason to think that these Clauses implicitly authorize the States to enforce Section 3 against federal offceholders and candidates. Granting the States that authority would invert the Fourteenth Amendment's rebalancing of federal and state power.
1The Elections Clause directs, in relevant part, that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.” Art. I, § 4, cl. 1. The Electors Clause similarly provides that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors,” who in turn elect the President. Art. II, §1, cl. 2. Page Proof Pending Publication The text of Section 3 reinforces these conclusions. Its fnal sentence empowers Congress to “remove” any Section 3 “disability” by a two-thirds vote of each House. The text imposes no limits on that power, and Congress may exercise it any time, as the respondents concede. See Brief for Respondents 50. In fact, historically, Congress sometimes exercised this amnesty power postelection to ensure that some of the people's chosen candidates could take offce.2 But if States were free to enforce Section 3 by barring candidates from running in the frst place, Congress would be forced to exercise its disability removal power before voting begins if it wished for its decision to have any effect on the current election cycle. Perhaps a State may burden congressional authority in such a way when it exercises its “exclusive” sovereign power over its own state offces. Taylor, 178 U. S., at 571. But it is implausible to suppose that the Constitution affrmatively delegated to the States the authority to impose such a burden on congressional power with respect to candidates for federal offce. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland,4 Wheat. 316, 436 (1819) (“States have no power . . . to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress”).
Nor have the respondents identifed any tradition of state enforcement of Section 3 against federal offceholders or candidates in the years following ratifcation of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 Such a lack of historical precedent is gener2Shortly after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratifed, for instance, Congress enacted a private bill to remove the Section 3 disability of Nelson Tift of Georgia, who had recently been elected to represent the State in Congress. See ch. 393, 15 Stat. 427. Tift took his seat in Congress immediately thereafter. See Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 4499–4500 (1868). Congress similarly acted postelection to remove the disabilities of persons elected to state and local offces. See Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 3d Sess., 29–30, 120–121 (1868); ch. 5, 15 Stat. 435–436. 3We are aware of just one example of state enforcement against a would-be federal offcer. In 1868, the Governor of Georgia refused to commission John Christy, who had won the most votes in a congressional Page Proof Pending Publication ally a “ `telling indication' ” of a “ `severe constitutional problem' ” with the asserted power. United States v. Texas, 599 U. S. 670, 677 (2023) (quoting Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. 477, 505 (2010)). And it is an especially telling sign here, because as noted, States did disqualify persons from holding state offces following ratifcation of the Fourteenth Amendment. That pattern of disqualifcation with respect to state, but not federal offces provides “persuasive evidence of a general understanding” that the States lacked enforcement power with respect to the latter. U. S. Term Limits, 514 U. S., at 826. Instead, it is Congress that has long given effect to Section 3 with respect to would-be or existing federal offceholders. Shortly after ratifcation of the Amendment, Congress enacted the Enforcement Act of 1870. That Act authorized federal district attorneys to bring civil actions in federal court to remove anyone holding nonlegislative offce—federal or state—in violation of Section 3, and made holding or attempting to hold offce in violation of Section 3 a federal crime. §§ 14, 15, 16 Stat. 143–144 (repealed, 35 Stat. 1153– 1154, 62 Stat. 992–993). In the years following ratifcation, the House and Senate exercised their unique powers under Article I to adjudicate challenges contending that certain prospective or sitting Members could not take or retain their seats due to Section 3. See Art. I, § 5, cls. 1, 2; 1 A. Hinds, Precedents of the House of Representatives §§ 459–463, pp. 470–486 (1907). And the Confscation Act of 1862, which predated Section 3, effectively provided an additional procedure for enforcing disqualifcation. That law made engaging in insurrection or rebellion, among other acts, a federal election, because—in the Governor's view—Section 3 made Christy ineligible to serve. But the Governor's determination was not fnal; a committee of the House reviewed Christy's qualifcations itself and recommended that he not be seated. The full House never acted on the matter, and Christy was never seated. See 1 A. Hinds, Precedents of the House of Representatives § 459, pp. 470–472 (1907).
Page Proof Pending Publication crime punishable by disqualifcation from holding offce under the United States. See §§ 2, 3, 12 Stat. 590. A successor to those provisions remains on the books today. See 18 U. S. C. §2383.
Moreover, permitting state enforcement of Section 3 against federal offceholders and candidates would raise serious questions about the scope of that power. Section 5 limits congressional legislation enforcing Section 3, because Section 5 is strictly “remedial.” City of Boerne, 521 U. S., at 520. To comply with that limitation, Congress “must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing” the specifc conduct the relevant provision prohibits. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U. S. 627, 639 (1999). Section 3, unlike other provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, proscribes conduct of individuals. It bars persons from holding offce after taking a qualifying oath and then engaging in insurrection or rebellion—nothing more. Any congressional legislation enforcing Section 3 must, like the Enforcement Act of 1870 and § 2383, refect “congruence and proportionality” between preventing or remedying that conduct “and the means adopted to that end.” City of Boerne, 521 U. S., at 520. Neither we nor the respondents are aware of any other legislation by Congress to enforce Section 3. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 123.
Any state enforcement of Section 3 against federal offceholders and candidates, though, would not derive from Section 5, which confers power only on “[t]he Congress.” As a result, such state enforcement might be argued to sweep more broadly than congressional enforcement could under our precedents. But the notion that the Constitution grants the States freer rein than Congress to decide how Section 3 should be enforced with respect to federal offces is simply implausible.
Finally, state enforcement of Section 3 with respect to the Presidency would raise heightened concerns. “[I]n the conPage Proof Pending Publication text of a Presidential election, state-imposed restrictions implicate a uniquely important national interest.” Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 794–795 (1983) (footnote omitted). But state-by-state resolution of the question whether Section 3 bars a particular candidate for President from serving would be quite unlikely to yield a uniform answer consistent with the basic principle that “the President . . . represent[s] all the voters in the Nation.” Id., at 795 (emphasis added). Conficting state outcomes concerning the same candidate could result not just from differing views of the merits, but from variations in state law governing the proceedings that are necessary to make Section 3 disqualifcation determinations. Some States might allow a Section 3 challenge to succeed based on a preponderance of the evidence, while others might require a heightened showing. Certain evidence (like the congressional Report on which the lower courts relied here) might be admissible in some States but inadmissible hearsay in others. Disqualifcation might be possible only through criminal prosecution, as opposed to expedited civil proceedings, in particular States. Indeed, in some States— unlike Colorado (or Maine, where the secretary of state recently issued an order excluding former President Trump from the primary ballot)—procedures for excluding an ineligible candidate from the ballot may not exist at all. The result could well be that a single candidate would be declared ineligible in some States, but not others, based on the same conduct (and perhaps even the same factual record).
The “patchwork” that would likely result from state enforcement would “sever the direct link that the Framers found so critical between the National Government and the people of the United States” as a whole. U. S. Term Limits, 514 U. S., at 822. But in a Presidential election “the impact of the votes cast in each State is affected by the votes cast”— or, in this case, the votes not allowed to be cast—“for the various candidates in other States.” Anderson, 460 U. S., at 795. An evolving electoral map could dramatically change the behavior of voters, parties, and States across the country, Page Proof Pending Publication in different ways and at different times. The disruption would be all the more acute—and could nullify the votes of millions and change the election result—if Section 3 enforcement were attempted after the Nation has voted. Nothing in the Constitution requires that we endure such chaos— arriving at any time or different times, up to and perhaps beyond the Inauguration.
* * * For the reasons given, responsibility for enforcing Section 3 against federal offceholders and candidates rests with Congress and not the States. The judgment of the Colorado Supreme Court therefore cannot stand.
All nine Members of the Court agree with that result.
Our colleagues writing separately further agree with many of the reasons this opinion provides for reaching it. See post, Part I (joint opinion of Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson, JJ.); see also post, at 117–118 (opinion of Barrett, J.). So far as we can tell, they object only to our taking into account the distinctive way Section 3 works and the fact that Section 5 vests in Congress the power to enforce it. These are not the only reasons the States lack power to enforce this particular constitutional provision with respect to federal offces. But they are important ones, and it is the combination of all the reasons set forth in this opinion—not, as some of our colleagues would have it, just one particular rationale—that resolves this case. In our view, each of these reasons is necessary to provide a complete explanation for the judgment the Court unanimously reaches.
The judgment of the Colorado Supreme Court is reversed. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
It is so ordered.