The Court maintains that, “[s]tanding alone,” the text of 18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) “does not defnitively answer” the question presented in these cases. Ante, at 111. Instead, says the majority, we must look beyond the text to precedent, statutory context, and purpose—which apparently converge to persuade the majority that § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) requires sentencing courts to apply the drug schedules in effect at the time of a defendant's prior state drug conviction when determining the applicability of the 15-year mandatory minimum in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). But the relevant text does defnitively answer the question presented here. And it establishes that courts should apply the drug schedules in effect at the time of the federal frearms offense that triggers ACCA's potential application. Nothing else— not precedent, context, or purpose—requires a different result. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
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I
A
As relevant here, ACCA imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum for defendants who commit a violation of § 922(g) while having “three previous convictions . . . for . . . a serious drug offense.” 18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(1). Notably, Congress did not leave unanswered the question of which prior state convictions qualify as “a serious drug offense” for ACCA purposes. Rather, ACCA expressly defnes the term “serious drug offense” by direct reference to another federal law. To qualify as a “serious drug offense,” the prior state crime must be one “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as defned in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U. S. C. [§ ]802)).” § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).
The dispute in these cases arises from the fact that the meaning of the term “controlled substance”—as defned by federal law—can, and frequently does, change. Under the Controlled Substances Act, a controlled substance is “a drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V.” 21 U. S. C. § 802(6). Those fve schedules, which are not contained in the statute itself, are lists of substances that are “updated and republished on an annual basis” by the Attorney General. § 812(a). During this annual review, the Attorney General may add or remove drugs from the schedules based on various considerations, such as a drug's “actual or relative potential for abuse” or the “state of current scientifc knowledge regarding the drug.” § 811(c); see also, e.g., 21 CFR pt. 1308 (2023) (setting forth the most recent drug schedules). Congress itself can also categorically remove substances from the schedules. See, e.g., 21 U. S. C. § 802(16)(B) (excluding hemp from the schedules).
By directing that the term “controlled substance” in ACCA be determined on the basis of the Controlled SubPage Proof Pending Publication stances Act's defnition—which itself references the federal drug schedules—Congress has opted to rely on a federal statute that contains its own cross-reference to a dynamic list of prohibited substances. ACCA's “serious drug offense” defnition thus incorporates those oft-changing drug schedules by reference.
B
The majority and I are in full agreement that, consequently, a sentencing court deciding whether to impose ACCA's 15-year mandatory minimum for a violation of § 922(g) must consult those external drug schedules to determine whether the drug “ `involv[ed]' ” in a prior state offense is a controlled substance under federal law. See ante, at 105–106. Yet, somehow, the majority concludes that the pertinent drug schedules for ACCA's sentencing exercise are those that were in effect when the prior state drug crime occurred. In my view, a straightforward application of the aforementioned statutory text plainly establishes otherwise. First of all, ACCA expressly defnes “serious drug offense,” § 924(e)(2)(A), and “[w]hen a statute includes an explicit defnition, we must follow that defnition,” Burgess v. United States, 553 U. S. 124, 130 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Congress could have defned “serious drug offense” based solely on state law. It did not. Instead, Congress made clear that only state drug crimes that involve substances that qualify as “controlled substance[s]” under the Controlled Substances Act are suffciently serious to warrant ACCA's penalty.
Second, the defnition of “serious drug offense” that appears in ACCA cross-references the highly mutable federal drug schedules—a drafting device that does particular work in the legislative context. Consistent with the operation of cross-references elsewhere, the cross-reference in ACCA's “serious drug offense” defnition necessarily directs sentencing courts to consult the current federal drug schedules— Page Proof Pending Publication i. e., those in effect at the time of the federal offense for which the defendant is being sentenced—rather than some earlier version of those lists.
That is, quite simply, how cross-references work. When it comes time to interpret a statute, courts typically plug the referenced provision, as they fnd it, into the statutory text. They do not consider, much less account for, any amendments that might have taken place over the course of the referenced provision's existence. Nor does it matter that the referenced statute is a separate pronouncement that has its own legislative history and course of development.
Courts proceed in this straightforward plug-and-play manner with respect to statutory cross-references because “the presumed temporal application of a statute” is when “the relevant activity that the [statute] regulates” occurs. Land graf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 291 (1994) (Scawith full force to any provisions cross-referenced in a statute, because “incorporating one statute or system of statutes into another . . . serves to bring into the latter all that is fairly covered by the reference.” Panama R. Co. v. John son, 264 U. S. 375, 392 (1924). And what is fairly covered is the referenced law as it exists when the statute's application is required. See Landgraf, 511 U. S., at 291.
Until today, that had been our consistent practice. See, e.g., Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation, 594 U. S. 338, 344–348 (2021) (applying the cross-referenced defnition then in effect); Astrue v. Capato, 566 U. S. 541, 547–549 (2012) (same); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U. S. 563, 566–570 (2010) (same); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S. 1, 8–9 (2010) (same). When a statute contains a cross-reference to another provision, we have always simply applied the version of the other provision in effect at the time the cross-referenced provision was needed, even if Congress amended that provision at some point in the past.
Page Proof Pending Publication Of course, this way of interpreting statutes with cross- references means that a change in the referenced provision has the effect of changing the statute that contains the cross- reference. But that is a feature, not a bug, of statutory cross-references. In fact, Congress often uses the cross- reference device in a statute “precisely because the [referenced provision] may be amended.” Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assoc., Inc., 978 F. 2d 978, 983 (CA7 1992) (Easterbrook, J.) (emphasis added). Far from being problematic, one useful feature of a statutory cross-reference from the standpoint of the legislative drafter is that it “permits the effect of a change in one section to propagate to other, related, sections without rewriting all of those related sections.” Ibid. That basic understanding of how cross-references work easily resolves these cases. ACCA mandates that, for the purpose of its “serious drug offense” defnition, a “controlled substance” must be determined in accordance with the Controlled Substances Act, 18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), and the Controlled Substances Act, in turn, looks to the substances on the drug schedules, 21 U. S. C. § 802(6). Congress's incorporation of the drug schedules by cross-reference in this manner means that a sentencing court must plug in the drug schedules as it fnds them based on when “the relevant activity that the [statute] regulates” occurs. Landgraf, 511 U. S., at 291. For ACCA, as with other federal criminal statutes, that means the court must apply the drug schedules in effect when the defendant “commits the underlying conduct that makes the offender liable.” Dorsey v. United States, 567 U. S. 260, 272 (2012).1 1Brown argues that, as a sentencing statute, ACCA incorporates the drug schedules that are in effect when a District Court gives legal effect to its provisions—i.e., at the time of the federal sentencing. See ante, at 119. While Congress determined that the Sentencing Guidelines should follow that approach, see 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii), we have recognized that the so-called federal saving statute, 1 U. S. C. § 109, generally requires Page Proof Pending Publication To be sure, one consequence of this approach is that, as the drug schedules change, so does the meaning of “controlled substance” under ACCA. See Herrmann, 978 F. 2d, at 983.
But, again, Congress seems to have intended that result, insofar as the statute it wrote pegs ACCA's “serious drug offense” defnition to lists of substances that the Attorney General is required to revisit on an annual basis. Indeed, Congress presumably chose to cross-reference those drug lists (rather than copying them directly into ACCA) precisely because of their dynamic nature.
The fact that ACCA's “serious drug offense” defnition uses the present tense, as the majority concedes, see ante, at 120, further bolsters the conclusion that Congress was consciously incorporating the annual updates that the federal drug schedules embody. As we have previously recognized, “the present tense generally does not include the past.”
Carr v. United States, 560 U. S. 438, 448 (2010). If Congress had wanted to reference a past version of the drug schedules, it easily could have indicated as much in the text of ACCA. But Congress used the present tense instead, directing sentencing courts to look to the meaning of “controlled substance” in effect when a defendant commits the federal crime requiring ACCA's application, not at some previous point in time.2 courts to apply the criminal statutes in effect at the time the defendant committed the federal crime, see Dorsey, 567 U. S., at 272. Only Jackson's approach is consistent with that precedent. See ante, at 109. 2The majority attributes ACCA's use of the present tense to a mere “stylistic” choice by Congress, relying primarily on a contemporaneous legislative drafting manual as support for that conclusion. Ante, at 120. But the wholly speculative suggestion that ACCA's drafters actually relied on the cited manual's tense-related directives conveniently comes out of nowhere. Moreover, to the extent the majority now believes that verb tense is irrelevant when a court undertakes to interpret the text of a statute, it has taken a strange and unwarranted departure from this Court's ordinary interpretive practices. Before today, we have consistPage Proof Pending Publication
II
The Government rejects the foregoing description of how statutory cross-references operate. Tr. of Oral Arg. 58 (expressing “disagree[ment] that the background rule is that we always look to the contemporaneous referenced law”). The Government insists that, instead of merely calling for insertion of the referenced law, the appearance of a cross- reference in a statute “raises a temporal question” that requires a court to determine “which version of [the cross- referenced provision] Congress intend[ed] to reference.”
Id., at 56. As the Government sees it, every statutory cross-reference can thus have “different temporal branches depending on context.” Id., at 58; see also ante, at 119 (appearing to adopt this temporally fexible approach to cross- references).
That cannot be right. We have never viewed statutory cross-references as a gateway to the multiverse. Cf. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U. S. 371, 382 (2005) (rejecting an approach that “would render every statute a chameleon”). No case that I am aware of has ever asked whether some past version of the statute applies when the court is interpreting a provision that contains a cross-reference—and neither the majority nor the Government cites any. In fact, our actual practices establish the contrary. Whenever we have addressed a statutory cross-reference, we have always taken the same tried-and-true approach that we employ with respect to statently used all aspects of a statute's text to ascertain its meaning, including the verbs that Congress chooses. See, e. g., Barton v. Barr, 590 U. S. 222, 236 (2020); Carr v. United States, 560 U. S. 438, 448 (2010); United States v. Wilson, 503 U. S. 329, 333 (1992); Gwaltney of Smithfeld, Ltd. v. Chesa peake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U. S. 49, 57 (1987). An objection to this approach has surfaced only once before, in dissent. See Carr, 560 U. S., at 462–464 (opinion of Alito, J.) (relying on legislative drafting manuals to suggest that the tense of the verbs in a statute was not relevant to the provision's interpretation).
Page Proof Pending Publication utory defnitions: We plug in the referenced provision as it exists at the moment the statute's provisions become applicable. See Part I–B, supra.
Any other approach risks chaos. Again, Congress often uses cross-references in statutes “precisely because the [referenced provision] may be amended,” thereby allowing that amendment “to propagate to other, related, sections without rewriting all of those related sections.” Herrmann, 978 F. 2d, at 983. The Government's view would unsettle that longstanding drafting convention, injecting uncertainty into what Congress must do to amend statutes using cross- references. What is more, if every cross-reference raised a question about which version of the referenced statute applies—past or present—interpretation of federal statutes with cross-references would become entirely unworkable.
Cross-references are legion in the U. S. Code, and cross- referenced statutes are regularly amended. Under the Government's approach, every one of those amendments would become a jump ball, inviting competing interpretations about which version of the referenced statute applies.
The Government claims that this disordered way of applying cross-references stems from the so-called reference canon, which sometimes directs courts to apply a past version of a referenced statute. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 56, 58.3 3The reference canon has two strains, general and specifc. First, “when a statute refers to a general subject, the statute adopts the law on that subject as it exists whenever a question under the statute arises.” Jam v. International Finance Corp., 586 U. S. 199, 209 (2019). Second, when there is “a statute that refers to another statute by specifc title or section number,” that cross-reference “in effect cuts and pastes the referenced statute as it existed when the referring statute was enacted, without any subsequent amendments.” Id., at 209–210; see also Hassett v. Welch, 303 U. S. 303, 314 (1938). It is not clear that this latter, specifc form of the canon even applies in the absence of uncertainty about what, exactly, is being cross-referenced, such as “a facial defect with the cross- reference or target statute being interpreted.” United States v. Head, Page Proof Pending Publication But even if the reference canon applies under these circumstances, it seems to cut against the Government's interpretation. The Government asserts that, because ACCA references a specifc section—“section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act,” 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(A)(ii)—the reference canon “would suggest that the ACCA incorporated the schedules as they existed in 1986, when the cross-reference was enacted.” Brief for United States 42. But conspicuously missing from this discussion (as well as the majority's discussion of the reference canon, see ante, at 115–116) is the actual text of the cross-referenced provision at issue in these cases, which comes nowhere near incorporation of a static, historical list of substances.
Instead, as explained above, ACCA's “serious drug offense” defnition cross-references § 102 of the Controlled Substances Act, see 18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), and under that provision, a “controlled substance” is “a drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V,” 21 U. S. C. § 802(6) (emphasis added). This juxtaposition turns what appears to be a specifc statutory reference into a more general one, since it is impossible to determine which substances fall under the statutory defnition without knowing what the fve schedules contain. And because those schedules are designed to change over time, it is hard to view ACCA's reference to the controlled substances defnition of the Controlled Substances Act as anything other than an instruction for courts to consult “an external body of potentially evolving law” and “adop[t] the law on that subject as it exists whenever a question under the statute arises.” Jam v. International Finance Corp., 586 U. S. 199, 209–210 (2019).
552 F. 3d 640, 647 (CA7 2009) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Ho, 984 F. 3d 191, 202 (CA2 2020) (forgoing “unnecessary resort to the reference canon” and instead interpreting the statute consistent with its plain language).
Page Proof Pending Publication The upshot is that proper application of the reference canon here leads to the same conclusion that I reached above. The cross-reference in ACCA incorporates drug schedules that are updated annually and does so in the present tense, thereby requiring sentencing courts to merely plug in the drug schedules in effect at the time of the defendant's federal frearms offense—i. e., the relevant timeframe for the purpose of the court's interpretation of ACCA's “serious drug offense” language.
III
In rejecting the typical, straightforward understanding of ACCA's cross-reference, the majority pivots away from the text of the statute entirely, and purportedly bases the Court's conclusion on “precedent and statutory context.”
Ante, at 111. Neither our precedents nor the context of this statute actually compels a different conclusion than the text does, for the reasons explained below.
A
To start, the majority misreads our precedent. In Mc- Neill v. United States, 563 U. S. 816 (2011), we considered how to determine whether a state drug crime involved “a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more” under state law. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). McNeill instructed sentencing courts making this determination to undertake a “backwardlooking” inquiry by “consult[ing]” “the law under which the defendant was convicted”—that is, “the version of state law that the defendant was actually convicted of violating.” 563 U. S., at 820–821.
The majority contends that this same “ `backwardlooking' ” approach should apply to the federal drug schedules. Ante, at 111–112 (quoting McNeill, 563 U. S., at 820). But the federal drug schedules are not “the law under which the defendant was convicted.” Id., at 820. And of course Mc- Neill was “backward-looking”; any inquiry into a defendant's Page Proof Pending Publication statute of conviction is necessarily so. Here, both the Government and petitioners take as a given “the version of state law that the defendant was actually convicted of violating,” as McNeill instructs. Id., at 821. The question presented in these cases—on which the parties disagree—is how to evaluate whether that prior state-law conviction qualifes as a “serious drug offense” under federal law.
In other words, McNeill asked what state crime the defendant committed, while today's cases ask how ACCA assesses that conviction. The latter is an entirely distinct inquiry. And for all the reasons discussed above, the federal benchmark that Congress has selected is not “backwardlooking” in the least—it rationally incorporates the currently applicable drug schedules, not ones from the past. See Part I, supra.
The majority's opinion not only misconstrues McNeill, it also fatly contradicts other precedents from this Court outlining how to determine whether a prior state conviction qualifes as an ACCA predicate. See, e. g., Mathis v. United States, 579 U. S. 500, 504 (2016); Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575, 599–602 (1990). As the majority only scantly mentions, to determine whether a state crime is a “serious drug offense,” courts are not supposed to rely on the actual or alleged facts related to the prior state drug crime. Rather, they ask “if the State's defnition of the drug in question `matche[s]' the defnition under federal law.” Ante, at 106 (quoting Shular v. United States, 589 U. S. 154, 158 (2020); alteration in original). We have referred to this matching process as the “ `categorical approach.' ” Id., at 157 (quoting Taylor, 495 U. S., at 600).
Under that methodology, “[a] court must look only to the state offense's elements, not the facts of the case or labels pinned to the state conviction.” Shular, 589 U. S., at 160. Thus, we do not ask how the State classifed or categorized the prior offense. Nor does it matter what type of drug a Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication defendant actually manufactured, possessed, or sold. Such facts are “extraneous to the crime's legal requirements,” and “ACCA, as we have always understood it, cares not a whit about them.” Mathis, 579 U. S., at 504. Properly applied, the categorical approach mandates that a court's sole focus must be on identifying the state crime's statutory elements and determining whether they categorically match the ACCA predicate.
By appearing to fxate on the facts of petitioners' prior state drug offenses, the majority's opinion thus diverges from our precedents. For example, the majority puzzlingly suggests that our standard methodology for assessing state crimes in relation to federal law provides a loophole for these petitioners, because “Brown and Jackson were themselves convicted of crimes involving substances that are still on the federal schedules, marijuana and cocaine, not hemp or [123I]iofupane.” Ante, at 114. But, again, the entire point of the categorical approach is that courts may consider only the state crime's elements, not the substances actually involved in that crime, when undertaking to determine whether the state crime matches the federal standard.
This matters because ensuring adherence to the categorical approach, which the majority fails to do here, serves important objectives. We employ the categorical approach not only because Congress commanded it, see Taylor, 495 U. S., at 589, but also because it “avoids unfairness to defendants,” Mathis, 579 U. S., at 512, who may not have sought to have the state records accurately refect the details of the crime they committed.
Suppose, for example, that Brown—whose conviction was reportedly for marijuana—was, in fact, prosecuted by the State for conduct involving hemp, as some defendants were. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Harrelson, 14 S. W. 3d 541, 544 (Ky. 2000); see also New Hampshire Hemp Council, Inc. v. Marshall, 203 F. 3d 1, 5 (CA1 2000) (noting that “the threat of federal prosecution [was] realistic” when hemp was still on the federal schedules). The distinction between a conviction for a drug crime involving marijuana versus one involving hemp could be a signifcant one for purposes of a future frearms prosecution that might trigger ACCA. But a defendant in Brown's position would likely have “no incentive to contest” that his conduct involved hemp, not another form of marijuana, during the state prosecution because that fact did “not matter under the law” at that time. Mathis, 579 U. S., at 512. Indeed, he might well have been “precluded from doing so by the [state] court.” Ibid. It is highly unlikely that such a defendant could even contemplate that his state conviction would be relevant to a future ACCA conviction, because most state crimes have “no signifcance under federal law for years to come.” Johnson v. United States, 544 U. S. 295, 305 (2005).
Unfairness arises without the categorical approach, because such a defendant's punishment would be signifcantly increased under ACCA for a prior state crime involving hemp simply due to his failure to anticipate, at the time of his state convictions, a future change in the federal drug schedules. The categorical approach responds to that unfairness by relying exclusively on the elements of the state crime, rather than the underlying facts of the crime.
So, as long as the drug substances expressly prohibited by state law differ from those that the federal law proscribes, then that state law is not a categorical match to ACCA's “serious drug offense” defnition, and a conviction under that statute cannot be used as an ACCA predicate. Here, however, the majority suggests that the categorical mismatch is irrelevant because, regardless, petitioners' state crimes actually involved types of drugs that have remained on the federal schedules during all potentially pertinent time periods. Ante, at 114. That reasoning not only fails to follow our well-established methodology, it also perpetuates the same unfairness that the categorical approach is designed to mitigate.
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B
The majority fares no better with statutory context. The majority's opinion points to ACCA's other defnition of “serious drug offense,” 18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(i), which classifes certain federal crimes as “serious drug offenses.” That provision defnes a “serious drug offense” as “an offense under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U. S. C. [§ ]801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U. S. C. [§ ]951 et seq.), or chapter 705 of title 46 for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.” § 924(e)(2)(A)(i). As the majority notes, this defnition turns solely on “whether a defendant was convicted and sentenced for such an offense, and a later change in a federal drug schedule cannot change that fact.” Ante, at 112 (footnote omitted). In the majority's view, we should avoid “treat[ing] . . . federal and state offenses differently,” so the applicability of ACCA's penalty to prior state crimes, too, must be based simply on whether the federal drug schedules matched state law at the time of the defendant's prior state conviction. Ibid. Whatever the merits of treating federal and state offenses the same way might be, Congress did not draft ACCA to achieve that result. When this Court previously addressed these same two ACCA provisions in response to a similar argument, it recognized that “the divergent text of the two provisions of the serious-drug-offense defnition . . . makes any divergence in their application unremarkable.” Shular, 589 U. S., at 164 (internal quotation marks omitted). Congress certainly could have used the same classifcation metric for federal and state priors—say, by classifying federal crimes as “serious drug offenses” based on the particular controlled substances involved, as it did with state crimes— but did not do so. And we generally “ `presume differences in language . . . convey differences in meaning,' ” especially “when the same Congress passed both statutes to handle much the same task.” Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United Page Proof Pending Publication States, 585 U. S. 274, 279 (2018) (quoting Henson v. San tander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U. S. 79, 86 (2017)). Congress's choice to phrase the two “serious drug offense” defnitions in ACCA differently “requires respect, not disregard.” Wisconsin Central, 585 U. S., at 279.
At any rate, unlike the frst subsection of ACCA's “serious drug offense” defnition, the second subsection involves classifying state crimes based on federal law—a circumstance that, as I previously explained, requires the categorical approach. See supra, at 134–135. This means that some federal-state discrepancy as to the kinds of crimes that are deemed “serious drug offenses” is not at all surprising or unusual; it is par for the course. See Shular, 589 U. S., at 164.
To see why, consider one example. The Controlled Substances Act provides that “it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally . . . to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.” 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1). We have previously recognized that “the statute's word `knowingly' . . . appl[ies] to all the subsequently listed elements of the crime” in this provision, meaning that the Government must prove that a defendant knew he was dealing with a controlled substance. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U. S. 646, 650 (2009). State law, by contrast, does not always include such a knowledge requirement. See United States v. Smith, 983 F. 3d 1213, 1223 (CA11 2020). We have nonetheless recognized that ACCA applies differently to state and federal drug crimes on this basis. See Shular, 589 U. S., at 164.
Thus, the ultimate question is not whether ACCA requires consistency between the classifcation of federal and state crimes, as the majority suggests. Instead, given some inevitable inconsistency between state and federal law, our inquiry is “which form of consistency Congress intended.”
Id., at 165. Here, Congress's use of an express crossPage Proof Pending Publication reference to the Controlled Substance Act's mutating drug schedules in the state-crime defnition—coupled with its omission of such a cross-reference in the federal-crime defnition—indicates that inconsistency based on drug type was not only anticipated but intended.
In short, the presence of a differently worded § 924(e)(2)(A)(i) does not overcome the plain meaning of § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).
IV
Finally, the majority contends that its reading “best fulflls ACCA's statutory objectives.” Ante, at 113. But that assertion fails to appreciate ACCA's actual goals. Congress has plainly designated serious drug offenses in a defendant's criminal history as triggers for ACCA's 15-year mandatory minimum for a reason—because the seriousness of the defendant's prior drug-related history is indicative of that defendant's future dangerousness, given the present frearms offense. The majority's analysis falters because it does not, and frankly cannot, explain how future dangerousness is best assessed by reference to outdated drug schedules.
Congress indisputably enacted ACCA to incapacitate what it viewed to be a class of especially dangerous defendants— “the eponymous `armed career criminal.' ” Wooden v. United States, 595 U. S. 360, 375 (2022). The 15-year mandatory minimum that ACCA imposes is among the harshest mandatory penalties in the Federal Criminal Code, and “the length of the mandatory minimum was set at 15 years” specifcally “to incapacitate the armed career criminal for the rest of the normal time span of his career[,] which usually starts at about age 15 and continues to about age 30.”
S. Rep. No. 97–585, p. 7 (1982). This means that ACCA is not a simple recidivist statute that merely tallies up past offenses, as the majority suggests, see ante, at 114–115, thereby imposing a drastically increased penalty for illegal frearms possession based on a “once a criminal, always a criminal” perspective. Rather, Congress designed ACCA to Page Proof Pending Publication help courts identify a certain category of defendants—those who, having a particular kind of criminal history and now unlawfully possessing a gun, pose such a distinct risk of future dangerousness that a lengthy term of incapacitation is warranted.4 “In order to determine which offenders fall into this category,” ACCA directs a sentencing court to conduct a review of a defendant's “past crimes” under state law, looking for violent felonies or serious drug offenses, “because . . . criminal history is relevant . . . to the kind or degree of danger the offender would pose were he to possess a gun.” Begay v. United States, 553 U. S. 137, 146 (2008). But, importantly, ACCA does not deem every state crime a predicate for the 15-year mandatory minimum. Instead, the statute specifes certain categories of crimes that trigger application of the prescribed penalty, due to the “prior crime's relevance to the possibility of future danger with a gun.” Ibid. ACCA's focus on incapacitating certain defendants based on their potential future dangerousness makes it entirely sensible that the statute directs courts to identify “serious drug offense[s]” (as well as “violent felon[ies]”) in a defendant's background. 18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(1). What does not make sense is the majority's suggestion that ACCA requires the extended incapacitation of defendants based on past criminal conduct that federal law does not deem serious today. In other words, if the point of ACCA is the incapacitation of certain defendants—those whose histories of serious criminality indicate a propensity to commit future dangerous crimes in light of their unlawful possession of a weapon—how does a record that contains past crimes involving drugs that are no longer controlled substances help to identify especially dangerous defendants? It does not.
4“Of course, to say that Congress had reasons” to enact ACCA's sentencing scheme “is not to endorse those policy choices.” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Assn. of America, Ltd., 601 U. S. 416, 447 (2024) (Jackson, J., concurring). Page Proof Pending Publication In reality, that goal is achieved only by determining whether a defendant's past crimes are considered serious by today's standards. The federal drug schedules are specifcally updated to account for current views of dangerousness. See Part I–A, supra. And a drug's removal from those schedules refects a determination that the drug is no longer deemed dangerous based on criteria such as “[i]ts actual or relative potential for abuse” and “[t]he state of current scientifc knowledge regarding the drug.” 21 U. S. C. § 811(c). Accordingly, ACCA is best interpreted as referencing the drug schedules that are effective as of the date of the commission of the gun crime that triggers ACCA's applicability, rather than those that would have signaled seriousness at some prior time. “Indeed, it would be illogical to conclude that federal sentencing law attaches `culpability and dangerousness' to an act that . . . Congress has concluded is not culpable and dangerous.” United States v. Bautista, 989 F. 3d 698, 703 (CA9 2021) (Fletcher, J.).
Meanwhile, the majority's view misses the mark that Congress set for ACCA's sentencing scheme in another respect as well: It leaves out many defendants who do warrant incapacitation for dangerousness—those who have prior convictions for traffcking drugs that were scheduled as controlled substances by the time their § 922(g) offenses were committed but were not on the federal drug schedules when their prior state convictions occurred. The majority concedes that its interpretation would exclude from ACCA's “serious drug offense” defnition state drug crimes that occur when “States . . . criminalize drugs before the Federal Government does so.” Ante, at 122. This happens not infrequently, such as when a State criminalizes new, cutting- edge drugs. See, e. g., ibid. (discussing the criminalization of bath salts and methoxetamine by States before the Federal Government); see also Brief for Petitioner Jackson 34– 35 (citing other examples); Brief for Petitioner Brown 17 (same).
Page Proof Pending Publication Under the majority's approach, ACCA's intended assessment of future dangerousness via the consideration of past state drug crimes would not apply to defendants if their prior state convictions took place before the drugs they traffcked were federally scheduled. But under the statutory scheme Congress actually adopted, there is no reason a defendant's early engagement with dangerous new drug substances criminalized by state law should not qualify as ACCA predicates, especially since the federal drug schedules are frequently updated to account for precisely this sort of newfound danger, consistent with ACCA's broader approach. Ultimately, then, for all its talk of statutory goals, the majority's opinion elides the true purpose of ACCA's mandatory minimum scheme in multiple ways. It also downplays the means Congress adopted to advance its incapacitation objectives, by essentially ignoring the link the statute draws between potential future dangerousness, as partially evidenced by the seriousness of a defendant's past drug activity, and the need for lengthy incapacitation, which the statute provides. Breezing past these key nuances, the majority simply announces its own apparent view that “[a] prior drug conviction for an offense punishable by 10 years' imprisonment augurs a risk of future dangerousness even if the drug is no longer considered dangerous.” Ante, at 114.5 5The majority's opinion offers no concrete evidence for this empirical assertion. And its strained analogy to bootleggers at the end of Prohibition, who supposedly “shifted to other illegal enterprises,” ante, at 114, paints a woefully incomplete historical picture. Contrary to the majority's contentions, the end of Prohibition allowed many of those previously involved in the illegal alcohol trade to transition into successful, legitimate careers. See, e. g., D. Okrent, Last Call: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition 359–360 (2010) (discussing Samuel Bronfman, a former bootlegger who turned his company Seagram's into one of the largest liquor-distribution corporations in the world). Regardless, there is simply no evidence in ACCA's legislative history or otherwise that Congress drew the same historical lessons from Prohibition that the majority does, or that ACCA was motivated in any respect by our Nation's experiences during Prohibition. Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication * * * At bottom, the majority's reasoning appears to reduce to a disagreement with Congress's legislative judgment, embodied in the text of the Controlled Substances Act, that a change in the drug schedules is a change in the perceived dangerousness of a drug that should have a material impact on the determination whether incapacitation is warranted. See 21 U. S. C. § 811(a). The Court's ruling thus displaces Congress's decision to base ACCA's 15-year mandatory penalty on the evolving dangerousness determinations that the Controlled Substances Act incorporates rather than on static impressions about a defendant's recidivist tendencies based solely on the fact that they have previously committed crimes.
The majority's contrary holding seems to refect its own policy view that “Brown's and Jackson's multiple convictions” pose a signifcant risk of future dangerousness “despite the technical changes to the federal drug schedules.” Ante, at 115. But the choice of how to assess and address dangerousness belongs frst and foremost to Congress. And for the reasons I have explained, Congress designed ACCA to take a different approach—to measure future dangerousness by today's drug schedules, not outdated ones from the past. See Part I, supra. One might harbor doubts that the sentencing policy that Congress enacted is sensible, just, or effective. But it is the one that Congress wrote, and we remain dutybound to apply the law as written. In my view, the majority has failed to do so here.
Reporter’s Note The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional edits were made: p. 102, line 13: “conviction” is replaced with “offense” p. 109, n. 2, line 5: “Verdict” is replaced with “Judgment” p. 109, n. 2, line 6: “May 1, 2014” is replaced with “Oct. 8, 2015, recorded Oct. 19, 2015” p. 112, line 4 from bottom: “subsections” is replaced with “clauses” p. 112, line 3 from bottom: “(A)” is inserted after “(2)” p. 118, line 16: “current” is inserted before “federal”; “that are currently in effect” is deleted p. 118, line 17: “for sentencing purposes” is deleted; “that were” is replaced with “in”; “effective” is replaced with “effect” p. 123, line 11: “conviction” is replaced with “offense” p. 134, line 9 from bottom: “refected” is replaced with “refect” Page Proof Pending Publication