F. 3d 947—“put him on notice that his conduct constituted excessive force.”

Held: Rivas-Villegas is entitled to qualifed immunity, which “attaches when an offcial's conduct ` “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ' ” White v. Pauly, 580 U. S. 73, 78–79. Because the question whether an offcer has used excessive force depends on “the facts and circumstances of each particular case,” Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 396, Cortesluna must identify a case that put Rivas-Villegas on notice that his specifc conduct was unlawful. A case directly on point is not required, but “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” White, 580 U. S., at 79 (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither Cortesluna nor the Court of Appeals has identifed any Supreme Court case that does so. Even assuming that circuit precedent can clearly establish law for § 1983 purposes, the facts in this case are materially different from those in LaLonde, where the offcers were responding to a noise complaint and encountered an unarmed LaLonde, who later testifed that an offcer deliberately dug his knee into LaLonde's back. On the facts of this case, neither La- Londe nor any decision of this Court is suffciently similar to provide Rivas-Villegas notice that his specifc use of force was excessive. Certiorari granted; 979 F. 3d 645, reversed.

Per Curiam.

Petitioner Daniel Rivas-Villegas, a police offcer in Union City, California, responded to a 911 call reporting that a woman and her two children were barricaded in a room for fear that respondent Ramon Cortesluna, the woman's boyfriend, was going to hurt them. After confrming that the family had no way of escaping the house, Rivas-Villegas and the other offcers present commanded Cortesluna outside and onto the ground. Offcers saw a knife in Cortesluna's left pocket. While Rivas-Villegas and another offcer were in the process of removing the knife and handcuffng Cortesluna, Rivas-Villegas briefy placed his knee on the left side of Cortesluna's back. Cortesluna later sued under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging, as relevant, that Rivas- Villegas used excessive force. At issue here is whether Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication Rivas-Villegas is entitled to qualifed immunity because he did not violate clearly established law.

The undisputed facts are as follows. A 911 operator received a call from a crying 12-year-old girl reporting that she, her mother, and her 15-year-old sister had shut themselves into a room at their home because her mother's boyfriend, Cortesluna, was trying to hurt them and had a chainsaw. The girl told the operator that Cortesluna was “ `always drinking,' ” had “ `anger issues,' ” was “ `really mad,' ” and was using the chainsaw to “ `break something in the house.' ” Cortesluna v. Leon, 979 F. 3d 645, 649 (CA9 2020). A police dispatcher relayed this information along with a description of Cortesluna in a request for offcers to respond.

Rivas-Villegas heard the broadcast and responded to the scene along with four other offcers. The offcers spent several minutes observing the home and reported seeing through a window a man matching Cortesluna's description. One offcer asked whether the girl and her family could exit the house. Dispatch responded that they “ `were unable to get out' ” and confrmed that the 911 operator had “ `hear[d] sawing in the background' ” and thought that Cortesluna might be trying to saw down the door. Cortesluna v. Leon, 2018 WL 6727824, *2 (ND Cal., Dec. 21, 2018).

After receiving this information, Rivas-Villegas knocked on the door and stated loudly, “ `police department, come to the front door, Union City police, come to the front door.' ” Ibid. Another officer yelled, “ `he's coming and has a weapon.' ” Ibid. A different offcer then stated, “ `use less- lethal,' ” referring to a beanbag shotgun. Ibid. When Rivas-Villegas ordered Cortesluna to “ `drop it,' ” Cortesluna dropped the “weapon,” later identifed as a metal tool. Ibid. Rivas-Villegas then commanded, “ `come out, put your hands up, walk out towards me.' ” 979 F. 3d, at 650. Cortesluna put his hands up and Rivas-Villegas told him to Page Proof Pending Publication RIVAS-VILLEGAS v. CORTESLUNA “ `keep coming.' ” Ibid. As Cortesluna walked out of the house and toward the offcers, Rivas-Villegas said, “ `Stop. Get on your knees.' ” Ibid. Plaintiff stopped 10 to 11 feet from the offcers. Another offcer then saw a knife sticking out from the front left pocket of Cortesluna's pants and shouted, “ `he has a knife in his left pocket, knife in his pocket,' ” and directed Cortesluna, “ `don't put your hands down,' ” “ `hands up.' ” 2018 WL 6727824, *2. Cortesluna turned his head toward the instructing offcer but then lowered his head and his hands in contravention of the offcer's orders. Another offcer twice shot Cortesluna with a beanbag round from his shotgun, once in the lower stomach and once in the left hip.

After the second shot, Cortesluna raised his hands over his head. The offcers shouted for him to “ `get down,' ” which he did. Another offcer stated, “ `left pocket, he's got a knife.' ” Ibid. Rivas-Villegas then straddled Cortesluna. He placed his right foot on the ground next to Cortesluna's right side with his right leg bent at the knee. He placed his left knee on the left side of Cortesluna's back, near where Cortesluna had a knife in his pocket. He raised both of Cortesluna's arms up behind his back. Rivas-Villegas was in this position for no more than eight seconds before standing up while continuing to hold Cortesluna's arms. At that point, another offcer, who had just removed the knife from Cortesluna's pocket and tossed it away, came and handcuffed Cortesluna's hands behind his back. Rivas-Villegas lifted Cortesluna up and moved him away from the door.

Cortesluna brought suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, claiming, as relevant here, that Rivas-Villegas used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment to Rivas-Villegas, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 979 F. 3d, at 656. The Court of Appeals held that “Rivas-Villegas is not entitled to qualifed immunity because existing precedent put him on notice that his conduct constituted excessive force.” Page Proof Pending Publication Id., at 654. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied solely on LaLonde v. County of Riverside, 204 F. 3d 947 (CA9 2000). The court acknowledged that “the offcers here responded to a more volatile situation than did the offcers in LaLonde.” 979 F. 3d, at 654. Nevertheless, it reasoned: “Both LaLonde and this case involve suspects who were lying face-down on the ground and were not resisting either physically or verbally, on whose back the defendant offcer leaned with a knee, causing allegedly signifcant injury.” Ibid. Judge Collins dissented. As relevant, he argued that “the facts of LaLonde are materially distinguishable from this case and are therefore insuffcient to have made clear to every reasonable offcer that the force Rivas-Villegas used here was excessive.” Id., at 664 (internal quotation marks omitted).

We agree and therefore reverse. Even assuming that controlling Circuit precedent clearly establishes law for purposes of § 1983, LaLonde did not give fair notice to Rivas- Villegas. He is thus entitled to qualifed immunity.

“Qualifed immunity attaches when an offcial's conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” White v. Pauly, 580 U. S. 73, 78–79 (2017) (per cu riam) (internal quotation marks omitted). A right is clearly established when it is “suffciently clear that every reasonable offcial would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U. S. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although “this Court's case law does not require a case directly on point for a right to be clearly established, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” White, 580 U. S., at 79 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). This inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specifc context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 RIVAS-VILLEGAS v. CORTESLUNA U. S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“[S]pecifcity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context, where . . . it is sometimes diffcult for an offcer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the offcer confronts.” Mullenix, 577 U. S., at 12 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Whether an offcer has used excessive force depends on “the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the offcers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by fight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 396 (1989); see also Tennessee v. Gar ner, 471 U. S. 1, 11 (1985) (“Where the offcer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the offcer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force”). However, Graham's and Garner's standards are cast “at a high level of generality.” Brosseau, 543 U. S., at 199. “[I]n an obvious case, these standards can `clearly establish' the answer, even without a body of relevant case law.” Ibid. But this is not an obvious case. Thus, to show a violation of clearly established law, Cortesluna must identify a case that put Rivas-Villegas on notice that his specifc conduct was unlawful.

Cortesluna has not done so. Neither Cortesluna nor the Court of Appeals identifed any Supreme Court case that addresses facts like the ones at issue here. Instead, the Court of Appeals relied solely on its precedent in LaLonde. Even assuming that circuit precedent can clearly establish law for purposes of § 1983, LaLonde is materially distinguishable and thus does not govern the facts of this case. In LaLonde, offcers were responding to a neighbor's complaint that LaLonde had been making too much noise in his apartment. 204 F. 3d, at 950–951. When they knocked on Page Proof Pending Publication LaLonde's door, he “appeared in his underwear and a T-shirt, holding a sandwich in his hand.” Id., at 951. LaLonde testifed that, after he refused to let the offcers enter his home, they did so anyway and informed him he would be arrested for obstruction of justice. Ibid. One offcer then knocked the sandwich from LaLonde's hand and “grabbed LaLonde by his ponytail and knocked him backwards to the ground.” Id., at 952. After a short scuffe, the offcer sprayed La- Londe in the face with pepper spray. At that point, La- Londe ceased resisting and another offcer, while handcuffng LaLonde, “deliberately dug his knee into LaLonde's back with a force that caused him long-term if not permanent back injury.” Id., at 952, 960, n. 17.

The situation in LaLonde and the situation at issue here diverge in several respects. In LaLonde, offcers were responding to a mere noise complaint, whereas here they were responding to a serious alleged incident of domestic violence possibly involving a chainsaw. In addition, LaLonde was unarmed. Cortesluna, in contrast, had a knife protruding from his left pocket for which he had just previously appeared to reach. Further, in this case, video evidence shows, and Cortesluna does not dispute, that Rivas-Villegas placed his knee on Cortesluna for no more than eight seconds and only on the side of his back near the knife that offcers were in the process of retrieving. LaLonde, in contrast, testifed that the offcer deliberately dug his knee into his back when he had no weapon and had made no threat when approached by police. These facts, considered together in the context of this particular arrest, materially distinguish this case from LaLonde.

“Precedent involving similar facts can help move a case beyond the otherwise hazy borders between excessive and acceptable force and thereby provide an offcer notice that a specifc use of force is unlawful.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U. S. –––, ––– (2018) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). On the facts of this case, neither LaLonde nor any Page Proof Pending Publication RIVAS-VILLEGAS v. CORTESLUNA decision of this Court is suffciently similar. For that reason, we grant Rivas-Villegas' petition for certiorari and reverse the Ninth Circuit's determination that Rivas-Villegas is not entitled to qualifed immunity.

It is so ordered.

Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication Reporter’s Note The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional edits were made: None