It is no secret that when processing applications, licenses, and permits the government sometimes makes mistakes.
Often, they are small ones—a misspelled name, a misplaced application. But sometimes a bureaucratic mistake can have life-changing consequences. Our case is such a case. An immigrant to this country applied for legal residency. The government rejected his application. Allegedly, the government did so based on a glaring factual error. In circumstances like that, our law has long permitted individuals to petition a court to consider the question and correct any mistake.
Not anymore. Today, the Court holds that a federal bureaucracy can make an obvious factual error, one that will result in an individual's removal from this country, and nothPage Proof Pending Publication ing can be done about it. No court may even hear the case. It is a bold claim promising dire consequences for countless lawful immigrants. And it is such an unlikely assertion of raw administrative power that not even the agency that allegedly erred, nor any other arm of the Executive Branch, endorses it. Today's majority acts on its own to shield the government from the embarrassment of having to correct even its most obvious errors. Respectfully, I dissent.
I
A
Pankajkumar Patel has lived in the United States for nearly 30 years. He and his wife Jyotsnaben Patel currently reside in Georgia. They have three sons—one who is already a U. S. citizen, and two who are lawful permanent residents and spouses of U. S. citizens. As a young man, Mr. Patel entered the country illegally. But in 2007, he tried to make things right by applying for an adjustment of his immigration status to a lawful permanent resident (also known as a green card).
Mr. Patel had at least some reason to hope. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) expressly authorizes the Attorney General to grant relief in cases like his. The statute sets forth a two-step process. At the frst step, the government must determine if an individual is statutorily eligible for an adjustment of status. Various circumstances specifed by law, including prior criminal convictions, may render an applicant ineligible for relief. See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1255(i) (2)(A), 1182. At the second step, once an individual has established his statutory eligibility for relief, the Attorney General or his designee is entitled to grant or deny an adjustment of status “in his discretion.” §§ 1255(a), (i)(2); see also 8 CFR § 1240.1(a) (2021) (delegating this authority to immigration judges). Because this second step is discretionary, “mere eligibility” for relief does not “automatically Page Proof Pending Publication result in a grant of the application.” Matter of Arai, 13 I. & N. Dec. 494, 495 (BIA 1970). Instead, “the actual granting of relief . . . is in all cases a matter of grace.” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 308 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Seeking relief under this scheme, Mr. Patel fled an application with the necessary paperwork. Soon, the government responded by returning a document allowing Mr. Patel to continue to work and remain in the country while it processed his application. So far, so good.
But then a problem emerged. Several months after fling his application, Mr. Patel sought to renew his Georgia driver's license. When flling out the renewal form, Mr. Patel answered the question “Are you a U. S. citizen?” by checking a box that said “yes.” After discovering Mr. Patel's erroneous checkmark, Georgia authorities charged him with willfully falsifying his driver's license application. Later, however, the State dropped its prosecution after concluding it lacked suffcient evidence to prove a crime. Not only has Mr. Patel consistently claimed that he intended to deceive no one and that he simply ticked the wrong box by mistake. Under Georgia law, Mr. Patel was eligible to receive a license without being a citizen because he had a pending application seeking lawful permanent residence and a valid employment authorization document. See Ga. Comp. Rules & Regs., Rules 375-3-1-.02(3)(e), (7) (2022).
Apparently, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) saw things differently. Operating through United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the agency denied Mr. Patel's application for adjustment of status, citing his faulty driver's license application. According to USCIS, Mr. Patel's conduct rendered him statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status under a provision that excludes any alien who “falsely represents . . . himself . . . to be a citizen of the United States” to obtain a “beneft under . . . State law.” 8 U. S. C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I), 1255(i)(2)(A). On Page Proof Pending Publication USCIS's view, Mr. Patel's application for adjustment of status failed at the frst step—and the Attorney General was wholly without discretion to afford him relief at the second.
B
Some months later, the government elected to bring removal proceedings against Mr. Patel. As a defense to removal, Mr. Patel renewed his application for adjustment of status consistent with regulations permitting him to do so. See 8 CFR § 245.2(a)(5)(ii).
At his removal hearing, Mr. Patel repeated points he had made to state offcials, insisting that he had harbored no intent to deceive anyone, and submitting that he remained statutorily eligible for relief. See Matter of Richmond, 26 I. & N. Dec. 779, 784 (BIA 2016) (inadmissibility is triggered when a misrepresentation is made “with the subjective intent of obtaining . . . benefts” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
None of this moved the immigration judge. Relevant here, the immigration judge rested his decision on a factual fnding. He said he did not believe Mr. Patel's testimony that he checked the wrong box mistakenly. Instead, the immigration judge found, Mr. Patel intentionally represented himself falsely to obtain a beneft under state law. According to the immigration judge, Mr. Patel had a strong incentive to deceive state offcials because he could not have obtained a Georgia driver's license if he had disclosed he was “neither a citizen [n]or a lawful permanent resident.” And because intentionally deceiving state offcials to obtain a beneft is enough to render an applicant statutorily ineligible for relief at step one, the immigration judge concluded, there was no need to reach the second-step question whether Mr. Patel warranted a favorable exercise of discretion. Mr. Patel appealed the immigration judge's ruling to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). In his appeal, Mr. Patel argued that the immigration judge's fnding that Page Proof Pending Publication he had an incentive to deceive state offcials was simply wrong—under Georgia law he was entitled to a driver's license without being a citizen or a lawful permanent resident given his pending application for adjustment of status and permission to work. Mr. Patel submitted, too, that all the record evidence pointed to the conclusion he simply checked the wrong box by mistake; even state offcials agreed they had no case to bring against him for deception. In the end, however, a divided panel of the BIA rejected the appeal by a vote of 2 to 1.
Mr. Patel next petitioned for review in the Eleventh Circuit. There, he argued that the BIA's fnding that he intentionally sought to deceive state offcials was wholly unreasonable given the evidence before the agency. In response, the federal government agreed that the Eleventh Circuit had the power to hear Mr. Patel's case but asked the court to affrm the BIA's decision on the merits. Instead, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit charted its own path, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's factual fndings no matter how wrong they might be. See Patel v. United States Atty. Gen., 917 F. 3d 1319, 1324 (2019). Eventually, the full court agreed to rehear the case and, by a vote of 9 to 5, reached the same conclusion. See Patel v. United States Atty. Gen., 971 F. 3d 1258 (2020). In doing so, the court acknowledged that it had to overrule “numerous” circuit precedents holding that it possessed the power to review cases like Mr. Patel's. Id., at 1262. It acknowledged, too, that its new ruling conficted with the holdings of most other courts of appeals. Id., at 1277, and n. 22.
II
As it comes to us, this case poses the question: Does a federal court have statutory authority to review and correct a BIA decision holding an individual ineligible for relief when that decision rests on a glaring factual error? Today, the Page Proof Pending Publication majority insists the answer is no. It does not matter if the BIA and immigration judge in Mr. Patel's case erred badly when they found he harbored an intent to deceive state offcials. It does not matter if the BIA declares other individuals ineligible for relief based on even more obvious factual errors. On the majority's telling, courts are powerless to correct bureaucratic mistakes like these no matter how grave they may be.
It is an eye-catching conclusion. Normally in this country, federal courts shoulder the responsibility of reviewing agency decisions to ensure they are at least supported by “substantial evidence.” 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(E). A similar, if surely more deferential, principle fnds voice in the INA. As relevant here, that statute endows federal courts of appeals with the power to review “all questions of law and fact . . . arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States.” 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(9). And the law further provides that a court may reject the agency's factual fndings underlying an order of removal if it concludes that no “reasonable adjudicator” could adopt them. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U. S. –––, ––– (2021).
That is exactly the sort of argument Mr. Patel seeks to pursue. He hopes to persuade a court of law that the BIA's factual errors in his case are so obvious no reasonable fact- fnder could adopt them. It is a claim expressly permitted by statute. Tellingly, in the proceedings before us the government has continued to maintain that, however his case is fnally resolved, Mr. Patel is entitled to his day in court. Nor is this some new position. For at least 20 years the government has taken the view that the law permits judicial review in cases like these. Yet even in the face of all this, the majority balks. It holds that no court may entertain Mr. Patel's challenge. And its reasoning promises that countless future immigrants will be left with no avenue to correct even more egregious agency errors.
Page Proof Pending Publication
A
How does the majority manage to reach such an unlikely conclusion? It depends on a Court-appointed amicus who offers arguments for the government that even the government refuses to advance on its own behalf. It turns out, too, that all of those arguments hinge on a narrow exception to the usual rule of judicial review—one found in 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). As relevant here, that exception reads: “Denials of discretionary relief “Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . and regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction to review—(i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section . . . 1255 of this title.” This language does not begin to do the work the majority demands of it. Recall that requests for adjustment of status involve a two-step process. First, the Attorney General, acting through the BIA, must determine whether an individual is statutorily eligible for adjustment of status. See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1255(a), (i). If so, the Attorney General may proceed to the second step and decide whether to grant an adjustment request “in his discretion.” §§ 1255(a), (i)(2)(A). Undoubtedly, the exception in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) creates a special rule insulating from judicial review the second and purely discretionary decision. But nothing in it disturbs the general rule that courts may entertain challenges to the BIA's factual fndings and legal analysis associated with its frst-step eligibility determination.
This much follows directly from the statute's terms. Subparagraph (B)(i) renders unreviewable only those judgments “regarding the granting of relief.” That phrase has a well- understood meaning. To “grant relief ” is to supply “redress or beneft.” United States v. Denedo, 556 U. S. 904, 909 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). And where, as here, Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication the BIA issues a judgment only at step one, it never reaches the question whether to grant relief or supply some redress or beneft. Instead, the agency resolves only the antecedent question whether an individual is statutorily eligible to peti tion for relief, redress, or a beneft. As the BIA has explained, a judgment at step one can never “result in a grant of the application.” Arai, 13 I. & N., at 495. Any “judgment regarding the granting of relief” comes only at step two where the INA expressly vests the Attorney General with substantial discretion. See St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 307 (noting the traditional and longstanding “distinction between eligibility for discretionary relief, on the one hand, and the favorable exercise of discretion, on the other hand” (emphasis added)).
All of which leads us back to Mr. Patel's case. Before the Eleventh Circuit, Mr. Patel sought to challenge the BIA's step-one determination that he was statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status, arguing that no reasonable adjudicator could have found the facts as the agency did. The INA expressly authorizes courts to hear claims like his. 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Unprompted, however, the Eleventh Circuit held that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) effectively undoes this arrangement. That court's self-directed legal analysis was mistaken. Subparagraph (B)(i) only deprives courts of jurisdiction to review the Attorney General's step-two discretionary decision to grant or deny relief, not the BIA's step-one judgments regarding whether an individual is eligible to be considered for such relief.
B
The majority, of course, offers a different view. Following the Eleventh Circuit's lead, the majority contends that subparagraph (B)(i)'s phrase “any judgment regarding the granting of relief” under §1255 sweeps more broadly. On its account, the statute denies courts the power to correct all agency decisions with respect to an adjustment-of-status application under § 1255—both the agency's step-one eligibilPage Proof Pending Publication ity decisions and its step-two discretionary decisions. Ante, at 338–339.
As a result, no court may correct even the agency's most egregious factual mistakes about an individual's statutory eligibility for relief. It is a novel reading of a 25year-old statute. One at odds with background law permitting judicial review. And one even the government disavows. It is easy to see why. We do not normally suppose that Congress blithely includes words in its laws that perform no work. See, e. g., Liu v. SEC, 591 U. S. –––, ––– (2020) (noting the “ `cardinal principle of interpretation that courts must give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute' ”). Yet that is exactly what the majority's interpretation requires of us. If subparagraph (B)(i) operated as the majority imagines, Congress would have had no need to deny courts jurisdiction over “any judgment regarding the grant ing of relief under section 1255.” Instead, Congress could have simply omitted the italicized words and denied jurisdiction over “any judgment under section 1255.” Plainly, all those additional words must do something. And the work they perform is clear—the phrase directs us to the Attorney General's second-step discretionary judgment to grant relief. That alone is a judgment “regarding the granting of relief.” And under the statute's terms, that judgment alone is shielded from judicial review.
The majority's attempt to resolve its surplusage problem only underscores the gravity of its error. First, the majority tells us that, as used in subparagraph (B)(i), the words “any judgment” mean “any authoritative decision.” Ante, at 336, 337. Then the majority tells us that the phrase “regarding the granting of relief” expands the universe of covered judgments further, because the word “regarding” “ `generally has a broadening effect.' ” Ante, at 338–339. But how could that be? Under the majority's reading of the word “judgment,” the statute already precludes judicial review of any authoritative decision “under section 1255.” There is no further corner of the universe left to explore. Once more, the words regarding the granting of relief are left without work to perform. Rather than sort out its surplus- age problem, the majority's answer only highlights its bind. What is more, the majority's argument rests on a faulty premise. The majority insists that the word “regarding” has “a broadening effect.” Ibid. It even suggests that failing to give the term that effect would be to read it “out of the statute entirely.” Ante, at 344. But in truth, the word can have either a broadening or narrowing effect depending on context. Cf. Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 537 (2015) (plurality opinion) (“In law as in life . . . the same words, placed in different contexts, sometimes mean different things”). And in subparagraph (B)(i), “regarding” is much more likely to serve a narrowing function, focusing our attention on a specifc subset of judgments—namely, those step-two discretionary judgments “regarding the granting of relief.”
To appreciate the point, consider a hypothetical. Imagine I said: “Please bring me any book regarding the history of the American West from that shelf of history books.” In this sentence, the phrase “regarding the history of the American West” does not broaden the referenced set. Instead, it directs you to a narrow subset of books: those regarding the history of the American West. Any other interpretation misses the point and leaves me with a pile of unwanted volumes.
What is true of this hypothetical is true of subparagraph (B)(i). The phrase “regarding the granting of relief” does not expand the set—again, the sentence already speaks of “any judgment . . . under section . . . 1255.” Instead, it functions as “limiting language” that narrows the kind of judgments under § 1255 the command means to cover. iTech U. S., Inc. v. Renaud, 5 F. 4th 59, 65 (CADC 2021). And here that means limiting our attention to the agency's step- two decision, the only place where it can issue a “judgment Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication regarding the granting of relief.” Any other reading renders the statute a garble.1
III
A
To the extent doubt remains about the proper construction of subparagraph (B)(i), it dissipates quickly with a look to the larger statutory context. Here the clues are many—yet the majority pauses to consider almost none of them.
Take frst a neighboring statutory provision. After denying courts the power to review “any judgment regarding the granting of relief” in subparagraph (B)(i), Congress proceeded in the very next clause to deny courts jurisdiction to entertain another category of cases: “any other decision . . . the authority for which is specifed ... to be in the discre tion of the Attorney General.” § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). That phrasing has a clear implication: “The proximity of clauses (i) and (ii), and the words linking them—`any other decision'—suggests that Congress had in mind decisions of the same genre, i. e., those made discretionary by legislation.” Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233, 246–247 (2010). And as we have seen, the only judgment under 1Perhaps sensing that its textual arguments cannot bear the weight it seeks to place on them, the majority suggests that, right or wrong, existing precedent commands its reading, pointing us to Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. ––– (2020), and Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. ––– (2020). Ante, at 339–340. But neither case speaks to, much less resolves, the question before us. Guerrero-Lasprilla does not even discuss subparagraph (B)(i). As for Nasrallah's passing observation that an individual “may not bring a factual challenge to orders denying discretionary relief, including . . . adjustment of status,” 590 U. S., at –––, nothing about that statement conficts with a correct reading of subparagraph (B)(i). By its terms, Nasrallah's observation is explicitly limited to “determinations made discretionary by statute”—that is, step-two judgments “regarding the granting of relief,” not judgments regarding statutory eligibility. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Once more, the majority's arguments fold quickly under pressure.
§ 1255 that fts that description is the Attorney General's second-step decision to grant or deny adjustment of status “in his discretion.” §§ 1255(a), (i)(2); see also St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 308 (noting that second-step decisions to grant relief are “a matter of grace”).
Next, consider the other statutes subparagraph (B)(i) addresses. It doesn't just bar review of “judgments regarding the granting of relief” under §1255 for adjustment of status. Subparagraph (B)(i) also bars review of “judgment[s] regarding the granting of relief under section[s] 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, [and] 1229c.” § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). These provisions bear many differences. But they all have one thing in common: a two-step structure in which the Attorney General makes a statutory determination, followed by a step-two discretionary decision whether to grant relief.2 That hardly seems a coincidence. More likely, it is further indication that subparagraph (B)(i) focuses on step-two discretionary determinations, not threshold judgments about eligibility. Here, too, subparagraph (B)(i) refects our law's longstanding distinction between “[e]ligibility [determinations under] specifc statutory standards” and subsequent decisions about whether to grant “ultimate relief” through an “exercise of discretion.” Jay v. Boyd, 351 U. S. 345, 353–354 (1956). Still other clues confrm that subparagraph (B)(i) targets second-step discretionary decisions. Take the title Congress chose in § 1252(a)(2)(B). It labeled this provision “Denials of discretionary relief.” In doing so, Congress left little doubt that subparagraph (B) and its accompanying clauses (i) and (ii) are designed to bar review of only those 2Section 1229b says the Attorney General “may” in his discretion cancel removal, but only where an alien satisfes certain statutory criteria. §§ 1229b(a), (b). Section 1229c says the Attorney General “may permit” voluntary departure, but only if an alien meets certain legal requirements. §§ 1229c(a), (b). Likewise, §§ 1182(h) and 1182(i) say the Attorney General “may, in his discretion,” waive certain forms of inadmissibility, but only for those aliens who satisfy the specifed criteria.
Page Proof Pending Publication decisions invested to the Attorney General's discretion, not antecedent statutory eligibility determinations.
Consider as well the statute's history. When Congress borrows words from an established legal context, it “presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached” to them. Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 263 (1952). And that's exactly what happened here. Before Congress enacted subparagraph (B)(i), courts reviewed both first-step “eligibility” determinations and second-step “discretionary” determinations. Foti v. INS, 375 U. S. 217, 228–230, and n. 15 (1963) (holding second-step judgments reviewable “for arbitrariness and abuse of discretion”). By adding subparagraph (B)(i) in 1996, Congress clearly altered that regime. Yet Congress did so carefully. In precluding review of judgments “regarding the granting of relief,” Congress used language very similar to the language this Court had long used to describe second-step discretionary determinations. See, e. g., INS v. Doherty, 502 U. S. 314, 323 (1992) (distinguishing “the discretionary grant of relief” from prima facie eligibility); id., at 333 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (distinguishing “the Attorney General's power to grant . . . relief” from judgments of “statutory ineligibility”); INS v. Abudu, 485 U. S. 94, 105 (1988) (distinguishing “the ultimate grant of relief” from prima facie eligibility in adjustment-ofstatus cases specifcally); INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U. S. 24, 26 (1976) (per curiam) (statute authorized “the Attorney General in his discretion to grant relief,” but only “if certain eligibility requirements are met”). All of which provides still one more strong indication that Congress used the phrase “regarding the granting of relief” to target step-two discretionary decisions alone.
B
Not only does the majority ignore most of these contextual clues. Its own arguments from statutory context do more Page Proof Pending Publication to hurt than help its cause. The majority frst directs us to § 1252(a)(2)(D).
That provision says that “[n]othing in subparagraph (B) or (C), or in any other provision of this chapter . . . which limits or eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review fled with an appropriate court of appeals.” According to the majority, this language would make no sense and do no work unless we read subparagraph (B)(i) to bar judicial review of any decision under § 1255. As the majority puts it, subparagraph (D)'s directive preserving judicial review for constitutional claims and questions of law necessarily implies that “something” must remain unamenable to judicial review under subparagraph (B)(i). Ante, at 339. And the only “remaining category” that could be immune from judicial review is subparagraph (B)(i) cases involving “questions of fact” like Mr. Patel's. Ibid. This argument falters almost immediately. Everyone agrees that, at the very least, subparagraph (B)(i) precludes judicial review of the Attorney General's second-step discretionary judgments “regarding the granting of relief.” And everyone agrees that subparagraph (D) restores judicial review of these discretionary judgments only to the extent a legal question or constitutional claim is in play. So, for example, if the Attorney General sought to exercise his discretion to discriminate against an applicant on the basis of race, subparagraph (D) would allow judicial review despite the terms of subparagraph (B)(i). But if no legal or constitutional defect is alleged, judicial review would be impermissible. It is hardly necessary to adopt the majority's interpretation to ft these two provisions together and give each real work to do.
Even more fundamentally, the majority's argument proceeds on a mistaken assumption. On its view, subparagraph (D) must leave something unreviewable under subparagraph (B)(i) for the former to make any sense as an exception. But that takes far too blinkered a view of the statutory scheme; Page Proof Pending Publication it is not as if these are the only two provisions in our Nation's immigration laws. By its terms, subparagraph (D) operates across a whole chapter of the U. S. Code. And in fact, subparagraph (D) undoubtedly performs real work as an exception with respect to other provisions besides subparagraph (B)(i). To take just one example, this Court has already decided a case discussing subparagraph (D)'s implications for cases arising under subparagraph (C). See, e. g., Guerrero- Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. –––, ––– (2020) (explaining subparagraph (D)'s impact on § 1252(a)(2)(C)).
The majority's argument fails for still another reason. It overlooks the “basic principle of statutory construction that a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specifc subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more generalized spectrum.” Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U. S. 148, 153 (1976). Congress enacted subparagraph (B)(i) in 1996 to address the narrow question of judicial review over administrative “denials of discretionary relief.” Meanwhile, as the majority acknowledges, Congress adopted subparagraph (D) nearly a decade later and did so to address a much larger problem—the potential that many statutes in the INA foreclosing judicial review might be unconstitutional in certain applications. Ante, at 339. Congress responded to this potential problem by allowing legal and constitutional challenges under “any other provision of [an entire] chapter” of the U. S. Code. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
In doing so, subparagraph (D)'s later-in-time and more general reference to “constitutional claims or questions of law” across a full chapter of the U. S. Code did nothing to disturb subparagraph (B)(i)'s targeted application to judgments “regarding the granting of relief” under §1255. Instead, the statutes work in tandem. The majority's approach ignores this conclusion, and along with it subparagraph (B)(i)'s specifc language.3 3There's at least one more problem here yet. The majority says subparagraph (D) preserves constitutional and legal questions for judicial review, and the majority further assumes that Mr. Patel's petition poses Page Proof Pending Publication Perhaps sensing the weakness of its main contextual argument, the majority tries another. It insists that Mr. Patel “cannot explain” why subparagraph (B)(i) should be read to allow courts to review the BIA's factual fndings when subparagraph (C) prohibits courts from doing so. Ante, at 344. But there is no incongruity here. The two subparagraphs use different language and perform different work. Subparagraph (B)(i) only disallows judicial review of judgments “regarding the granting of relief” and covers the mine run of cases. Subparagraph (C) speaks more broadly, precluding review of “any fnal order of removal,” and addresses specifcally those aliens who are removable because of past criminal offenses. And it is hardly surprising that Congress might wish to use different language allowing greater judicial review in cases involving noncriminal aliens than in cases involving aliens who have been convicted of criminal offenses in this country.
Tellingly too, the majority's contextual arguments yield an inexplicable anomaly. On its view, subparagraph (B)(i) precludes judicial review of all adjustment-of-status applications, whether an individual seeks to challenge the agency's step-one eligibility determination or its step-two discretionary judgment. Subparagraph (D) then sweeps in to restore judicial review for legal and constitutional questions. But by its terms, subparagraph (D) applies only to “petition[s] for review fled with an appropriate court of appeals.”
only a factual question. Ante, at 339–340. But the question Mr. Patel seeks to pose in court is whether the agency's factual determinations are ones no “reasonable adjudicator” could have adopted given the record before it. 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see supra, at 352. The majority never explains why that question is something other than a question of law that subparagraph (D) expressly preserves for judicial review. But why wouldn't it be? Cf. Colorado Nat. Bank v. Commissioner, 305 U. S. 23, 25 (1938) (“It is settled law that a fnding of fact [made by an agency] will not be disturbed on review if it is supported by substantial evidence. But whether there is substantial evidence to support a fnding is a question of law”).
Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication This feature of the law has profound consequences under the majority's reading of the INA. Yes, on its account, those like Mr. Patel who are subject to removal orders can still challenge at least the agency's legal and constitutional errors by petitioning for review in a federal court of appeals. But individuals frequently seek to adjust their status and secure a green card outside the removal context. And when the government rejects an application for adjustment of status in these cases, individuals routinely seek judicial review in district court. See Brief for Respondent 39; see also San chez v. Mayorkas, 593 U. S. –––, ––– (2021) (reviewing one such challenge). There, subparagraph (D) does not apply to preserve review of legal and constitutional questions. So under the majority's construction of subparagraph (B)(i), individuals who could once secure judicial review to correct administrative errors at step one in district court are now, after its decision, likely left with no avenue for judicial relief of any kind. An agency may err about the facts, the law, or even the Constitution and nothing can be done about it. Nor is this some small sideshow. As the government, Mr. Patel, and amici stress, thousands of individuals seek to obtain a green card every year outside the removal context—the student hoping to remain in the country, the foreigner who marries a U. S. citizen, the skilled worker sponsored by her employer. In the last three months of 2021 alone, USCIS denied more than 13,000 green-card applications, with nearly 790,000 still pending.4 The agency issues decisions on those applications in unpublished and terse letters, which appear to receive little or no administrative review within DHS. See Brief for National Immigration Litigation Alliance et al. as Amici Curiae 25. With so many 4 See USCIS, Number of I–485 Applications to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status by Category, Case Status, and USCIS Field Office of Service Center Location, October 1, 2021–December 31, 2021, https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/fles/document/reports/I485_ performancedata_fy2022_qtr1.pdf (May 6, 2022).
applications receiving such abbreviated treatment, who can be surprised that DHS sometimes makes serious errors, or may even be tempted to take shortcuts inconsistent with the law? See id., at 23–27 (documenting DHS errors). Until today, courts could correct mistakes like these. But the majority's construction of subparagraph (B)(i) will almost surely end all that and foreclose judicial review for countless law- abiding individuals whose lives may be upended by bureaucratic misfeasance.
The majority's response is hardly satisfying. The majority does not try to explain how its interpretation fts with the usual presumption of judicial reviewability of administrative actions—a presumption it claims to endorse and no party before us questions. Ante, at 346–347. Instead, the majority muses that denying green-card applicants any ability to seek judicial review might be “consistent with Congress' choice to reduce procedural protections in the context of discretionary relief.” Ante, at 346. But a hunch about unexpressed legislative intentions is no response to our usual presumption of judicial review. Nor is it any answer to the mountain of textual and contextual evidence suggesting that Congress limited judicial review only with respect to second- step discretionary decisions, not decisions about statutory eligibility.
Just look, too, at all the guesswork lurking behind the majority's hunch. The majority's argument frst depends on a hypothesis that Congress intentionally designed a scheme that encourages individuals who receive erroneous rulings on their green-card applications to overstay their visas and remain in this country unlawfully. Next, it depends on a second-level hypothesis that Congress replaced a presumptive promise of judicial review with a scheme in which judicial review depends on the happenstance of a governmental decision to seek removal. Finally, the majority's position relies on a third supposition—that Congress might have withdrawn judicial review for thousands upon thousands of lawPage Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication fully present persons annually, and done so without expressly discussing the question. Often this Court rejects as implausible statutory interpretations that seek to squeeze elephants into mouseholes. See, e. g., Whitman v. Ameri can Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 468 (2001). Today's interpretation seeks to cram a veritable legislative zoo into one clause of one subparagraph of one subsection of our Nation's vast immigration laws.
* The majority concludes that courts are powerless to correct an agency decision holding an individual ineligible for relief from removal based on a factual error, no matter how egregious the error might be. The majority's interpretation has the further consequence of denying any chance to correct agency errors in processing green-card applications outside the removal context. Even the government cannot bring itself to endorse the majority's arresting conclusions. For good reason. Those conclusions are at war with all the evidence before us. They read language out of the statute and collapse the law's clear two-step framework. They disregard the lessons of neighboring provisions and even ignore the statute's very title. They make no sense of the statute's history. Altogether, the majority's novel expansion of a narrow statutory exception winds up swallowing the law's general rule guaranteeing individuals the chance to seek judicial review to correct obvious bureaucratic missteps. It is a conclusion that turns an agency once accountable to the rule of law into an authority unto itself. Perhaps some would welcome a world like that. But it is hardly the world Congress ordained.
Page Proof Pending Publication Reporter’s Note The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional edits were made: None