Joseph Kennedy lost his job as a high school football coach because he knelt at midfeld after games to offer a quiet of Alabama, Leslie Rutledge of Arkansas, Christopher M. Carr of Georgia, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Theodore E. Rokita of Indiana, Derek Schmidt of Kansas, Daniel Cameron of Kentucky, Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, Eric S. Schmitt of Missouri, Austin Knud sen of Montana, Douglas J. Peterson of Nebraska, John M. Formella of New Hampshire, Drew H. Wrigley of North Dakota, Dave Yost of Ohio, John M. O'Connor of Oklahoma, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Jason R. Ravnsborg of South Dakota, Herbert H. Slatery III of Tennessee, Sean D. Reyes of Utah, Jason Miyares of Virginia, Patrick Morrisey of West Virginia, and Bridget Hill of Wyoming; for Advancing American Freedom et al. by Matthew J. Sheehan; for the Alabama Center for Law and Liberty by Matthew J. Clark; for the America First Legal Foundation by Jonathan F. Mitchell, Adam K. Mortara, and Gene P. Hamilton; for the America First Policy Institute by James Baehr, Pamela Jo Bondi, Jessica Hart Steinmann, and Rachel Jag; for the American Center for Law and Justice by Jay Alan Sekulow, Stuart J. Roth, Colby M. May, and Laura B. Her nandez; for the American Constitutional Rights Union by John J. Park, Jr.; for the American Cornerstone Institute by Edward M. Wenger; for the American Legion by Noel J. Francisco, David T. Raimer, Christopher DiPompeo, and Eric C. Rassbach; for the Americans for Prosperity Foundation by Cynthia Fleming Crawford and Casey Mattox; for the Chaplain Alliance for Religious Liberty by John P. Elwood, Michael A. Johnson, Dirk C. Phillips, and Aaron P. Bowling; for the Christian Legal Society by Thomas R. McCarthy; for Current State Legislators by Ryan Anthony Krieghauser, Joshua Ney, and Alan Vester; for the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention et al. by Freder ick W. Claybrook, Jr., Steven W. Fitschen, and James A. Davids; for Former Attorneys General Edwin Meese II et al. by Prerak Shah; for Former Professional Football Players Steve Largent et al. by Gordon D. Todd; for the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education by Darpana M. Sheth; for the Foundation for Moral Law by John Eidsmoe; for the Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty et al. by Howard Slugh; for Liberty Counsel by Mathew D. Staver, Anita L. Staver, Horatio G. Mihet, and Roger K. Gan nam; for Members of Congress by Donald F. McGahn II, John M. Gore, and Robert Luther III; for the Mountain States Legal Foundation et al. by Cody J. Wisniewski; for the Notre Dame Law School Religious Liberty Initiative by Steven A. Engel, Michael H. McGinley, and Richard W. Gar nett IV; for the Protect the First Foundation by Gene C. Schaerr, Erik S. prayer of thanks. Mr. Kennedy prayed during a period when school employees were free to speak with a friend, call for a reservation at a restaurant, check email, or attend to other personal matters. He offered his prayers quietly Jaffe, H. Christopher Bartolomucci, Hannah C. Smith, and Kathryn E. Tarbert; for The Rutherford Institute by John W. Whitehead; for the Thomas More Society by Maura K. Quinlan, Thomas Brejcha, and Joan M. Mannix; for the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops by Lori H. Windham and William J. Haun; for the World Faith Foundation et al. by James L. Hirsen, Deborah J. Dewart, and Tami Fitzgerald; for Galen Black by Steven T. Collis; for Tommy Bowden by Adam M. Foslid and Daniel M. Samson; for Kirk Cousins et al. by Steffen N. Johnson, Michael McConnell, John J. Bursch, David A. Cortman, and Tyson C. Langhofer; for Elisabeth P. DeVos et al. by Matthew T. Martens; and for Darrell Green by William Wagner and Erin Elizabeth Mersino.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of New York et al. by Letitia James, Attorney General of New York, Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Anisha S. Dasgupta, Deputy Solicitor General, and Ester Murdukhayeva, Assistant Deputy Solicitor General, by Matthew J. Platkin, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Rob Bonta of California, Kathleen Jennings of Delaware, Karl A. Racine of the District of Columbia, Holly T. Shikada of Hawaii, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Brian E. Frosh of Maryland, Maura Healey of Massachusetts, Dana Nessel of Michigan, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Hector Balderas of New Mexico, and Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon; for AASA, The School Superintendents Association, et al. by Charles A. Rothfeld, Andrew J. Pincus, Paul W. Hughes, Michael B. Kimberly, and Eugene R. Fidell; for American Atheists by Geoffrey T. Blackwell; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Kathleen R. Hartnett, Adam S. Gershenson, David D. Cole, Daniel Mach, Heather L. Weaver, Cecillia D. Wang, Nancy Talner, and Taryn M. Darling; for the Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty et al. by Douglas Laycock, Christopher C. Lund, K. Hollyn Hollman, Jennifer L. Hawks, Heather E. Kimmel, and Marc Stern; for Bremerton Community Members et al. by Andrew D. Levy and Anthony J. May; for the California School Boards Association et al. by Mark Bresee and Marlon Wadlington; for Church-State Scholars by Joshua Matz, Raymond P. Tolentino, and Amit R. Vora; for City, County, and Local Public Employer Organizations by Michael R. Dreeben and Lisa E. Soronen; for Former Professional Football Players Obafemi D. Ayanbadejo, Sr., et al. by David M. Gossett; for the Forum on the Military ChapPage Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication while his students were otherwise occupied. Still, the Bremerton School District disciplined him anyway. It did so because it thought anything less could lead a reasonable observer to conclude (mistakenly) that it endorsed Mr. Kennedy's religious beliefs. That reasoning was misguided.
Both the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment protect expressions like Mr. Kennedy's. Nor does a proper understanding of the Amendment's Establishment Clause require the government to single out private religious speech for special disfavor. The Constitution and the best of our traditions counsel mutual respect and tolerance, not censorship and suppression, for religious and nonreligious views alike.
I
A
Joseph Kennedy began working as a football coach at Bremerton High School in 2008 after nearly two decades of service in the Marine Corps. App. 167. Like many other football players and coaches across the country, Mr. Kennedy made it a practice to give “thanks through prayer on the laincy et al. by Jonathan K. Youngwood and David Elbaum; for the Freedom From Religion Foundation et al. by Patrick Elliott; for the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., et al. by Thomas A. Zaccaro, Jennifer C. Pizer, Stephen B. Kinnaird, and Gregory R. Nevins; for Members of the U. S. House of Representatives by Asim M. Bhansali; for the National Education Association et al. by Alice O'Brien, Jason Walta, Rhonda Weingarten, and David J. Strom; for Psychology and Neuroscience Scholars by Mark W. Mosier; for Religious and Denominational Organizations et al. by Gregory M. Lipper; for the Washington State Charter Schools Association et al. by Christopher A. Brook; for the Washington State School Directors' Association by Douglas Hallward-Driemeier and Samuel L. Brenner; for Robert D. Kamenshine by Mr. Kamenshine, pro se; and for Jo Ann Magistro et al. by Bruce P. Merenstein.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for The Claremont Institute's Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence by John C. Eastman and Anthony T. Caso; for the Family Policy Alliance et al. by Randall L. Wenger and Jeremy L. Samek; and for the Liberty Justice Center by Daniel R. Suhr. playing feld” at the conclusion of each game. Id., at 168, 171. In his prayers, Mr. Kennedy sought to express gratitude for “what the players had accomplished and for the opportunity to be part of their lives through the game of football.” Id., at 168. Mr. Kennedy offered his prayers after the players and coaches had shaken hands, by taking a knee at the 50-yard line and praying “quiet[ly]” for “approximately 30 seconds.” Id., at 168–169.
Initially, Mr. Kennedy prayed on his own. See ibid. But over time, some players asked whether they could pray alongside him. 991 F. 3d 1004, 1010 (CA9 2021); App. 169.
Mr. Kennedy responded by saying, “ `This is a free country. You can do what you want.' ” Ibid. The number of players who joined Mr. Kennedy eventually grew to include most of the team, at least after some games. Sometimes team members invited opposing players to join. Other times Mr. Kennedy still prayed alone. See ibid. Eventually, Mr. Kennedy began incorporating short motivational speeches with his prayer when others were present. See App., at 170. Separately, the team at times engaged in pregame or postgame prayers in the locker room. It seems this practice was a “school tradition” that predated Mr. Kennedy's tenure. Ibid. Mr. Kennedy explained that he “never told any student that it was important they participate in any religious activity.” Ibid. In particular, he “never pressured or encouraged any student to join” his postgame midfeld prayers. Ibid. For over seven years, no one complained to the Bremerton School District (District) about these practices. See id., at 63–64. It seems the District's superintendent frst learned of them only in September 2015, after an employee from another school commented positively on the school's practices to Bremerton's principal. See id., at 109, 229. At that point, the District reacted quickly. On September 17, the superintendent sent Mr. Kennedy a letter. In it, the superintendent identifed “two problematic practices” in which Page Proof Pending Publication Mr. Kennedy had engaged. Id., at 40. First, Mr. Kennedy had provided “inspirational talk[s]” that included “overtly religious references” likely constituting “prayer” with the students “at midfeld following the completion of . . . game[s].” Ibid. Second, he had led “students and coaching staff in a prayer” in the locker-room tradition that “predated [his] involvement with the program.” Id., at 41.
The District explained that it sought to establish “clear parameters” “going forward.” Ibid. It instructed Mr. Kennedy to avoid any motivational “talks with students” that “include[d] religious expression, including prayer,” and to avoid “suggest[ing], encourag[ing] (or discourag[ing]), or supervis[ing]” any prayers of students, which students remained free to “engage in.” Id., at 44. The District also explained that any religious activity on Mr. Kennedy's part must be “nondemonstrative (i. e., not outwardly discernible as religious activity)” if “students are also engaged in religious conduct” in order to “avoid the perception of endorsement.” Id., at 45. In offering these directives, the District appealed to what it called a “direct tension between” the “Establishment Clause” and “a school employee's [right to] free[ly] exercise” his religion. Id., at 43. To resolve that “tension,” the District explained, an employee's free exercise rights “must yield so far as necessary to avoid school endorsement of religious activities.” Ibid. After receiving the District's September 17 letter, Mr. Kennedy ended the tradition, predating him, of offering locker-room prayers. Id., at 40–41, 77, 170–172. He also ended his practice of incorporating religious references or prayer into his postgame motivational talks to his team on the feld. See ibid. Mr. Kennedy further felt pressured to abandon his practice of saying his own quiet, on-feld post- game prayer. See id., at 172. Driving home after a game, however, Mr. Kennedy felt upset that he had “broken [his] commitment to God” by not offering his own prayer, so he turned his car around and returned to the feld. Ibid. By that point, everyone had left the stadium, and he walked to Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication the 50-yard line and knelt to say a brief prayer of thanks. See ibid.
On October 14, through counsel, Mr. Kennedy sent a letter to school officials informing them that, because of his “sincerely-held religious beliefs,” he felt “compelled” to offer a “post-game personal prayer” of thanks at midfeld. Id., at 62–63, 172. He asked the District to allow him to continue that “private religious expression” alone. Id., at 62. Consistent with the District's policy, see id., at 48, Mr. Kennedy explained that he “neither requests, encourages, nor discourages students from participating in” these prayers, id., at 64. Mr. Kennedy emphasized that he sought only the opportunity to “wai[t] until the game is over and the players have left the feld and then wal[k] to mid-feld to say a short, private, personal prayer.” Id., at 69. He “told everybody” that it would be acceptable to him to pray “when the kids went away from [him].” Id., at 292. He later clarifed that this meant he was even willing to say his “prayer while the players were walking to the locker room” or “bus,” and then catch up with his team. Id., at 280–282; see also id., at 59. However, Mr. Kennedy objected to the logical implication of the District's September 17 letter, which he understood as banning him “from bowing his head” in the vicinity of students, and as requiring him to “fee the scene if students voluntarily [came] to the same area” where he was praying.
Id., at 70. After all, District policy prohibited him from “discourag[ing]” independent student decisions to pray. Id., at 44.
On October 16, shortly before the game that day, the District responded with another letter. See id., at 76. The District acknowledged that Mr. Kennedy “ha[d] complied” with the “directives” in its September 17 letter. Id., at 77. Yet instead of accommodating Mr. Kennedy's request to offer a brief prayer on the feld while students were busy with other activities—whether heading to the locker room, boarding the bus, or perhaps singing the school fght song—the District issued an ultimatum. It forbade Mr. Kennedy from engaging in “any overt actions” that could “appea[r] to a reasonable observer to endorse . . . prayer . . . while he is on duty as a District-paid coach.” Id., at 81. The District did so because it judged that anything less would lead it to violate the Establishment Clause. Ibid.
B
After receiving this letter, Mr. Kennedy offered a brief prayer following the October 16 game. See id., at 90.
When he bowed his head at midfeld after the game, “most [Bremerton] players were . . . engaged in the traditional singing of the school fght song to the audience.” Ibid. Though Mr. Kennedy was alone when he began to pray, players from the other team and members of the community joined him before he fnished his prayer. See id., at 82, 297.
This event spurred media coverage of Mr. Kennedy's dilemma and a public response from the District. The District placed robocalls to parents to inform them that public access to the feld is forbidden; it posted signs and made announcements at games saying the same thing; and it had the Bremerton Police secure the feld in future games. Id., at 100– 101, 354–355. Subsequently, the District superintendent explained in an October 20 email to the leader of a state association of school administrators that “the coach moved on from leading prayer with kids, to taking a silent prayer at the 50 yard line.” Id., at 83. The offcial with whom the superintendent corresponded acknowledged that the “use of a silent prayer changes the equation a bit.” Ibid. On October 21, the superintendent further observed to a state offcial that “[t]he issue is quickly changing as it has shifted from leading prayer with student athletes, to a coaches [sic] right to conduct” his own prayer “on the 50 yard line.” Id., at 88. On October 23, shortly before that evening's game, the District wrote Mr. Kennedy again. It expressed “appreciation” for his “efforts to comply” with the District's directives, including avoiding “on-the-job prayer with players in the . . . football program, both in the locker room prior to games as Page Proof Pending Publication well as on the feld immediately following games.” Id., at 90. The letter also admitted that, during Mr. Kennedy's recent October 16 postgame prayer, his students were otherwise engaged and not praying with him, and that his prayer was “feeting.” Id., at 90, 93. Still, the District explained that a “reasonable observer” could think government endorsement of religion had occurred when a “District employee, on the feld only by virtue of his employment with the District, still on duty” engaged in “overtly religious conduct.” Id., at 91, 93. The District thus made clear that the only option it would offer Mr. Kennedy was to allow him to pray after a game in a “private location” behind closed doors and “not observable to students or the public.” Id., at 93–94.
After the October 23 game ended, Mr. Kennedy knelt at the 50-yard line, where “no one joined him,” and bowed his head for a “brief, quiet prayer.” 991 F. 3d, at 1019; App. 173, 236–239. The superintendent informed the District's board that this prayer “moved closer to what we want,” but nevertheless remained “unconstitutional.” Id., at 96. After the fnal relevant football game on October 26, Mr. Kennedy again knelt alone to offer a brief prayer as the players engaged in postgame traditions. 443 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1231 (WD Wash. 2020); App. to Pet. for Cert. 182. While he was praying, other adults gathered around him on the feld. See 443 F. Supp. 3d, at 1231; App. 97. Later, Mr. Kennedy rejoined his players for a postgame talk, after they had fnished singing the school fght song. 443 F. Supp. 3d, at 1231; App. 103.
C
Shortly after the October 26 game, the District placed Mr. Kennedy on paid administrative leave and prohibited him from “participat[ing], in any capacity, in . . . football program activities.” Ibid. In a letter explaining the reasons for this disciplinary action, the superintendent criticized Mr. Kennedy for engaging in “public and demonstrative religious conduct while still on duty as an assistant coach” by Page Proof Pending Publication offering a prayer following the games on October 16, 23, and 26. Id., at 102. The letter did not allege that Mr. Kennedy performed these prayers with students, and it acknowledged that his prayers took place while students were engaged in unrelated postgame activities. Id., at 103. Additionally, the letter faulted Mr. Kennedy for not being willing to pray behind closed doors. Id., at 102.
In an October 28 Q&A document provided to the public, the District admitted that it possessed “no evidence that students have been directly coerced to pray with Kennedy.”
Id., at 105. The Q&A also acknowledged that Mr. Kennedy “ha[d] complied” with the District's instruction to refrain from his “prior practices of leading players in a pre-game prayer in the locker room or leading players in a post-game prayer immediately following games.” Ibid. But the Q&A asserted that the District could not allow Mr. Kennedy to “engage in a public religious display.” Id., at 105, 107, 110. Otherwise, the District would “violat[e] the . . . Establishment Clause” because “reasonable . . . students and attendees” might perceive the “district [as] endors[ing] . . . religion.” Id., at 105.
While Mr. Kennedy received “uniformly positive evaluations” every other year of his coaching career, after the 2015 season ended in November, the District gave him a poor performance evaluation. Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist., 869 F. 3d 813, 820 (CA9 2017). The evaluation advised against rehiring Mr. Kennedy on the grounds that he “ `failed to follow district policy' ” regarding religious expression and “ `failed to supervise student-athletes after games.' ” Ibid. Mr. Kennedy did not return for the next season. Ibid.
II
A
After these events, Mr. Kennedy sued in federal court, alleging that the District's actions violated the First Amendment's Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses. App. 145, Page Proof Pending Publication 160–164. He also moved for a preliminary injunction requiring the District to reinstate him. The District Court denied that motion, concluding that a “reasonable observer . . .
would have seen him as . . . leading an orchestrated session of faith.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 303. Indeed, if the District had not suspended him, the court agreed, it might have violated the Constitution's Establishment Clause. See id., at 302–303. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affrmed. Kennedy, 869 F. 3d, at 831.
Following the Ninth Circuit's ruling, Mr. Kennedy sought certiorari in this Court. The Court denied the petition.
But Justice Alito, joined by three other Members of the Court, issued a statement stressing that “denial of certiorari does not signify that the Court necessarily agrees with the decision . . . below.” Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist., 586 U. S. –––, ––– (2019). Justice Alito expressed concerns with the lower courts' decisions, including the possibility that, under their reasoning, teachers might be “ordered not to engage in any `demonstrative' conduct of a religious nature” within view of students, even to the point of being forbidden from “folding their hands or bowing their heads in prayer” before lunch. Id., at –––.
B
After the case returned to the District Court, the parties engaged in discovery and eventually brought cross-motions for summary judgment. At the end of that process, the District Court found that the “ `sole reason' ” for the District's decision to suspend Mr. Kennedy was its perceived “risk of constitutional liability” under the Establishment Clause for his “religious conduct” after the October 16, 23, and 26 games. 443 F. Supp. 3d, at 1231.
The court found that reason persuasive too. Rejecting Mr. Kennedy's free speech claim, the court concluded that because Mr. Kennedy “was hired precisely to occupy” an “infuential role for student athletes,” any speech he uttered Page Proof Pending Publication was offered in his capacity as a government employee and unprotected by the First Amendment. Id., at 1237. Alternatively, even if Mr. Kennedy's speech qualifed as private speech, the District Court reasoned, the District properly suppressed it. Had it done otherwise, the District would have invited “an Establishment Clause violation.” Ibid. Turning to Mr. Kennedy's free exercise claim, the District Court held that, even if the District's policies restricting his religious exercise were not neutral toward religion or generally applicable, the District had a compelling interest in prohibiting his postgame prayers, because, once more, had it “allow[ed]” them it “would have violated the Establishment Clause.” Id., at 1240.
C
The Ninth Circuit affrmed. It agreed with the District Court that Mr. Kennedy's speech qualifed as government rather than private speech because “his expression on the feld—a location that he only had access to because of his employment—during a time when he was generally tasked with communicating with students, was speech as a government employee.” 991 F. 3d, at 1015. Like the District Court, the Ninth Circuit further reasoned that, “even if we were to assume . . . that Kennedy spoke as a private citizen,” the District had an “adequate justifcation” for its actions. Id., at 1016. According to the court, “Kennedy's on-feld religious activity,” coupled with what the court called “his pugilistic efforts to generate publicity in order to gain approval of those on-feld religious activities,” were enough to lead an “objective observer” to conclude that the District “endorsed Kennedy's religious activity by not stopping the practice.” Id., at 1017–1018. And that, the court held, would amount to a violation of the Establishment Clause.
Ibid. The Court of Appeals rejected Mr. Kennedy's free exercise claim for similar reasons. The District “concede[d]” that its policy that led to Mr. Kennedy's suspension was not “neutral Page Proof Pending Publication and generally applicable” and instead “restrict[ed] Kennedy's religious conduct because the conduct [was] religious.” Id., at 1020. Still, the court ruled, the District “had a compelling state interest to avoid violating the Establishment Clause,” and its suspension was narrowly tailored to vindicate that interest. Id., at 1020–1021.
Later, the Ninth Circuit denied a petition to rehear the case en banc over the dissents of 11 judges. 4 F. 4th 910, 911 (2021). Among other things, the dissenters argued that the panel erred by holding that a failure to discipline Mr. Kennedy would have led the District to violate the Establishment Clause. Several dissenters noted that the panel's analysis rested on Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), and its progeny for the proposition that the Establishment Clause is implicated whenever a hypothetical reasonable observer could conclude the government endorses religion. 4 F. 4th, at 945–947 (opinion of R. Nelson, J.). These dissenters argued that this Court has long since abandoned that “ahistorical, atextual” approach to discerning “Establishment Clause violations”; they observed that other courts around the country have followed suit by renouncing it too; and they contended that the panel should have likewise “recognized Lemon's demise and wisely left it dead.” Ibid., and n. 3. We granted certiorari. 595 U. S. ––– (2022).
III
Now before us, Mr. Kennedy renews his argument that the District's conduct violated both the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment. These Clauses work in tandem. Where the Free Exercise Clause protects religious exercises, whether communicative or not, the Free Speech Clause provides overlapping protection for expressive religious activities. See, e. g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 269, n. 6 (1981); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 841 (1995). That the First Amendment doubly protects religious speech is no accident.
Page Proof Pending Publication It is a natural outgrowth of the framers' distrust of government attempts to regulate religion and suppress dissent.
See, e. g., A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in Selected Writings of James Madison 21, 25 (R. Ketcham ed. 2006). “[I]n Anglo–American history, . . .
government suppression of speech has so commonly been directed precisely at religious speech that a free-speech clause without religion would be Hamlet without the prince.”
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U. S. 753, 760 (1995).
Under this Court's precedents, a plaintiff bears certain burdens to demonstrate an infringement of his rights under the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses. If the plaintiff carries these burdens, the focus then shifts to the defendant to show that its actions were nonetheless justifed and tailored consistent with the demands of our case law. See, e. g., Fulton v. Philadelphia, 593 U. S. –––, ––– – –––, ––– (2021); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155, 171 (2015); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410, 418 (2006); Church of Lukumi Ba balu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 546 (1993); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 403 (1963). We begin by examining whether Mr. Kennedy has discharged his burdens, frst under the Free Exercise Clause, then under the Free Speech Clause.
A
The Free Exercise Clause provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. Amdt. 1. This Court has held the Clause applicable to the States under the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940). The Clause protects not only the right to harbor religious beliefs inwardly and secretly. It does perhaps its most important work by protecting the ability of those who hold religious beliefs of all kinds to live out their faiths in daily life through “the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts.”
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 877 (1990).
Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication Under this Court's precedents, a plaintiff may carry the burden of proving a free exercise violation in various ways, including by showing that a government entity has burdened his sincere religious practice pursuant to a policy that is not “neutral” or “generally applicable.” Id., at 879–881.
Should a plaintiff make a showing like that, this Court will fnd a First Amendment violation unless the government can satisfy “strict scrutiny” by demonstrating its course was justifed by a compelling state interest and was narrowly tailored in pursuit of that interest. Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 546.1 That Mr. Kennedy has discharged his burdens is effectively undisputed. No one questions that he seeks to engage in a sincerely motivated religious exercise. The exercise in question involves, as Mr. Kennedy has put it, giving “thanks through prayer” briefy and by himself “on the playing feld” at the conclusion of each game he coaches. App.
168, 171. Mr. Kennedy has indicated repeatedly that he is willing to “wai[t] until the game is over and the players have left the feld” to “wal[k] to mid-feld to say [his] short, private, personal prayer.” Id., at 69; see also id., at 280, 282. The contested exercise before us does not involve leading prayers with the team or before any other captive audience. Mr. Kennedy's “religious beliefs do not require [him] to lead any prayer . . . involving students.” Id., at 170. At the District's request, he voluntarily discontinued the school tradition of locker-room prayers and his postgame religious talks to students. The District disciplined him only for his decision to persist in praying quietly without his players 1A plaintiff may also prove a free exercise violation by showing that “offcial expressions of hostility” to religion accompany laws or policies burdening religious exercise; in cases like that we have “set aside” such policies without further inquiry. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n, 584 U. S. –––, ––– (2018). To resolve today's case, however, we have no need to consult that test. Likewise, while the test we do apply today has been the subject of some criticism, see, e. g., Fulton v. Philadelphia, 593 U. S. –––, ––– (2021), we have no need to engage with that debate today because no party has asked us to do so.
after three games in October 2015. See Parts I–B and I– C, supra.
Nor does anyone question that, in forbidding Mr. Kennedy's brief prayer, the District failed to act pursuant to a neutral and generally applicable rule. A government policy will not qualify as neutral if it is “specifcally directed at . . . religious practice.” Smith, 494 U. S., at 878. A policy can fail this test if it “discriminate[s] on its face,” or if a religious exercise is otherwise its “object.” Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 533; see also Smith, 494 U. S., at 878. A government policy will fail the general applicability requirement if it “prohibits religious conduct while permitting secular conduct that undermines the government's asserted interests in a similar way,” or if it provides “a mechanism for individualized exemptions.” Fulton, 593 U. S., at –––. Failing either the neutrality or general applicability test is suffcient to trigger strict scrutiny. See Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 546.
In this case, the District's challenged policies were neither neutral nor generally applicable. By its own admission, the District sought to restrict Mr. Kennedy's actions at least in part because of their religious character. As it put it in its September 17 letter, the District prohibited “any overt actions on Mr. Kennedy's part, appearing to a reasonable observer to endorse even voluntary, student-initiated prayer.” App. 81. The District further explained that it could not allow “an employee, while still on duty, to engage in reli gious conduct.” Id., at 106 (emphasis added). Prohibiting a religious practice was thus the District's unquestioned “object.” The District candidly acknowledged as much below, conceding that its policies were “not neutral” toward religion. 991 F. 3d, at 1020.
The District's challenged policies also fail the general applicability test. The District's performance evaluation after the 2015 football season advised against rehiring Mr. Kennedy on the ground that he “failed to supervise student- athletes after games.” App. 114. But, in fact, this was a Page Proof Pending Publication bespoke requirement specifcally addressed to Mr. Kennedy's religious exercise. The District permitted other members of the coaching staff to forgo supervising students briefy after the game to do things like visit with friends or take personal phone calls. Id., at 205; see also Part I–B, supra. Thus, any sort of postgame supervisory requirement was not applied in an evenhanded, across-the-board way. Again recognizing as much, the District conceded before the Ninth Circuit that its challenged directives were not “generally applicable.” 991 F. 3d, at 1020.
B
When it comes to Mr. Kennedy's free speech claim, our precedents remind us that the First Amendment's protections extend to “teachers and students,” neither of whom “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); see also Lane v. Franks, 573 U. S. 228, 231 (2014). Of course, none of this means the speech rights of public school employees are so boundless that they may deliver any message to anyone anytime they wish. In addition to being private citizens, teachers and coaches are also government employees paid in part to speak on the government's behalf and convey its intended messages.
To account for the complexity associated with the interplay between free speech rights and government employment, this Court's decisions in Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563 (1968), Garcetti, 547 U. S. 410, and related cases suggest proceeding in two steps. The frst step involves a threshold inquiry into the nature of the speech at issue. If a public employee speaks “pursuant to [his or her] offcial duties,” this Court has said the Free Speech Clause generally will not shield the individual from an employer's control and discipline because that kind of speech is—for constitutional purposes at least—the government's own speech. Id., at 421.
Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication At the same time and at the other end of the spectrum, when an employee “speaks as a citizen addressing a matter of public concern,” our cases indicate that the First Amendment may be implicated and courts should proceed to a second step. Id., at 423. At this second step, our cases suggest that courts should attempt to engage in “a delicate balancing of the competing interests surrounding the speech and its consequences.” Ibid. Among other things, courts at this second step have sometimes considered whether an employee's speech interests are outweighed by “ `the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the effciency of the public services it performs through its employees.' ” Id., at 417 (quoting Pickering, 391 U. S., at 568).
Both sides ask us to employ at least certain aspects of this Pickering–Garcetti framework to resolve Mr. Kennedy's free speech claim. They share additional common ground too.
They agree that Mr. Kennedy's speech implicates a matter of public concern. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 183; Brief for Respondent 44. They also appear to accept, at least for argument's sake, that Mr. Kennedy's speech does not raise questions of academic freedom that may or may not involve “additional” First Amendment “interests” beyond those captured by this framework. Garcetti, 547 U. S., at 425; see also Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y., 385 U. S. 589, 603 (1967); Brief for Petitioner 26, n. 2. At the frst step of the Pickering–Garcetti inquiry, the parties' disagreement thus turns out to center on one question alone: Did Mr. Kennedy offer his prayers in his capacity as a private citizen, or did they amount to government speech attributable to the District?
Our cases offer some helpful guidance for resolving this question. In Garcetti, the Court concluded that a prosecutor's internal memorandum to a supervisor was made “pursuant to [his] offcial duties,” and thus ineligible for First Amendment protection. 547 U. S., at 421. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on the fact that the prosecutor's speech “fulfll[ed] a responsibility to advise his supervisor about how best to proceed with a pending case.” Ibid. In other words, the prosecutor's memorandum was government speech because it was speech the government “itself ha[d] commissioned or created” and speech the employee was expected to deliver in the course of carrying out his job. Id., at 422.
By contrast, in Lane a public employer sought to terminate an employee after he testifed at a criminal trial about matters involving his government employment. 573 U. S., at 233. The Court held that the employee's speech was protected by the First Amendment. Id., at 231. In doing so, the Court held that the fact the speech touched on matters related to public employment was not enough to render it government speech. Id., at 239–240. Instead, the Court explained, the “critical question . . . is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee's duties.” Id., at 240. It is an inquiry this Court has said should be undertaken “practical[ly],” rather than with a blinkered focus on the terms of some formal and capacious written job description. Garcetti, 547 U. S., at 424. To proceed otherwise would be to allow public employers to use “excessively broad job descriptions” to subvert the Constitution's protections. Ibid. Applying these lessons here, it seems clear to us that Mr. Kennedy has demonstrated that his speech was private speech, not government speech. When Mr. Kennedy uttered the three prayers that resulted in his suspension, he was not engaged in speech “ordinarily within the scope” of his duties as a coach. Lane, 573 U. S., at 240. He did not speak pursuant to government policy. He was not seeking to convey a government-created message. He was not instructing players, discussing strategy, encouraging better Page Proof Pending Publication on-feld performance, or engaged in any other speech the District paid him to produce as a coach. See Part I–B, supra. Simply put: Mr. Kennedy's prayers did not “ow[e their] existence” to Mr. Kennedy's responsibilities as a public employee. Garcetti, 547 U. S., at 421.
The timing and circumstances of Mr. Kennedy's prayers confrm the point. During the postgame period when these prayers occurred, coaches were free to attend briefy to personal matters—everything from checking sports scores on their phones to greeting friends and family in the stands.
App. 205; see Part I–B, supra. We fnd it unlikely that Mr. Kennedy was fulflling a responsibility imposed by his employment by praying during a period in which the District has acknowledged that its coaching staff was free to engage in all manner of private speech. That Mr. Kennedy offered his prayers when students were engaged in other activities like singing the school fght song further suggests that those prayers were not delivered as an address to the team, but instead in his capacity as a private citizen. Nor is it dispositive that Mr. Kennedy's prayers took place “within the offce” environment—here, on the feld of play. Garcetti, 547 U. S., at 421. Instead, what matters is whether Mr. Kennedy offered his prayers while acting within the scope of his duties as a coach. And taken together, both the substance of Mr. Kennedy's speech and the circumstances surrounding it point to the conclusion that he did not.
In reaching its contrary conclusion, the Ninth Circuit stressed that, as a coach, Mr. Kennedy served as a role model “clothed with the mantle of one who imparts knowledge and wisdom.” 991 F. 3d, at 1015. The court emphasized that Mr. Kennedy remained on duty after games. Id., at 1016.
Before us, the District presses the same arguments. See Brief for Respondent 24. And no doubt they have a point.
Teachers and coaches often serve as vital role models. But this argument commits the error of positing an “excessively broad job descriptio[n]” by treating everything teachers and Page Proof Pending Publication coaches say in the workplace as government speech subject to government control. Garcetti, 547 U. S., at 424. On this understanding, a school could fre a Muslim teacher for wearing a headscarf in the classroom or prohibit a Christian aide from praying quietly over her lunch in the cafeteria. Likewise, this argument ignores the District Court's conclusion (and the District's concession) that Mr. Kennedy's actual job description left time for a private moment after the game to call home, check a text, socialize, or engage in any manner of secular activities. Others working for the District were free to engage briefy in personal speech and activity. App. 205; see Part I–B, supra. That Mr. Kennedy chose to use the same time to pray does not transform his speech into government speech. To hold differently would be to treat religious expression as second-class speech and eviscerate this Court's repeated promise that teachers do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Tinker, 393 U. S., at 506.
Of course, acknowledging that Mr. Kennedy's prayers represented his own private speech does not end the matter.
So far, we have recognized only that Mr. Kennedy has carried his threshold burden. Under the Pickering–Garcetti framework, a second step remains where the government may seek to prove that its interests as employer outweigh even an employee's private speech on a matter of public concern. See Lane, 573 U. S., at 236, 242.2
IV
Whether one views the case through the lens of the Free Exercise or Free Speech Clause, at this point the burden 2Because our analysis and the parties' concessions lead to the conclusion that Mr. Kennedy's prayer constituted private speech on a matter of public concern, we do not decide whether the Free Exercise Clause may sometimes demand a different analysis at the frst step of the Pickering– Garcetti framework.
Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication shifts to the District. Under the Free Exercise Clause, a government entity normally must satisfy at least “strict scrutiny,” showing that its restrictions on the plaintiff's protected rights serve a compelling interest and are narrowly tailored to that end. See Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 533; n. 1, supra. A similar standard generally obtains under the Free Speech Clause. See Reed, 576 U. S., at 171. The District, however, asks us to apply to Mr. Kennedy's claims the more lenient second-step Pickering–Garcetti test, or alternatively intermediate scrutiny. See Brief for Respondent 44–48.
Ultimately, however, it does not matter which standard we apply. The District cannot sustain its burden under any of them.3
A
As we have seen, the District argues that its suspension of Mr. Kennedy was essential to avoid a violation of the Establishment Clause.
Id., at 35– 42.
On its account, Mr. Kennedy's prayers might have been protected by the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses. But his rights were in “direct tension” with the competing demands of the Establishment Clause. App. 43. To resolve that clash, the District reasoned, Mr. Kennedy's rights had to “yield.”
Ibid. The Ninth Circuit pursued this same line of thinking, insisting that the District's interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation “ `trump[ed]' ” Mr. Kennedy's rights to religious exercise and free speech. 991 F. 3d, at 1017; see also id., at 1020–1021.
But how could that be? It is true that this Court and others often refer to the “Establishment Clause,” the “Free 3It seems, too, that it is only here where our disagreement with the dissent begins in earnest. We do not understand our colleagues to contest that Mr. Kennedy has met his burdens under either the Free Exercise or Free Speech Clause, but only to suggest the District has carried its own burden “to establish that its policy prohibiting Kennedy's public prayers was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling state interest.” Post, at 566 (opinion of Sotomayor, J.).
Page Proof Pending Publication Exercise Clause,” and the “Free Speech Clause” as separate units. But the three Clauses appear in the same sentence of the same Amendment: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech.” Amdt. 1. A natural reading of that sentence would seem to suggest the Clauses have “complementary” purposes, not warring ones where one Clause is always sure to prevail over the others. See Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1, 13, 15 (1947).
The District arrived at a different understanding this way. It began with the premise that the Establishment Clause is offended whenever a “reasonable observer” could conclude that the government has “endorse[d]” religion. App. 81.
The District then took the view that a “reasonable observer” could think it “endorsed Kennedy's religious activity by not stopping the practice.” 991 F. 3d, at 1018; see also App. 80– 81; Parts I and II, supra. On the District's account, it did not matter whether the Free Exercise Clause protected Mr. Kennedy's prayer. It did not matter if his expression was private speech protected by the Free Speech Clause.
It did not matter that the District never actually endorsed Mr. Kennedy's prayer, no one complained that it had, and a strong public reaction only followed after the District sought to ban Mr. Kennedy's prayer. Because a reasonable observer could (mistakenly) infer that by allowing the prayer the District endorsed Mr. Kennedy's message, the District felt it had to act, even if that meant suppressing otherwise protected First Amendment activities. In this way, the District effectively created its own “vise between the Establishment Clause on one side and the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses on the other,” placed itself in the middle, and then chose its preferred way out of its self-imposed trap.
See Pinette, 515 U. S., at 768 (plurality opinion); Shurtleff v. Boston, 596 U. S. 243, 279–280 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment).
Page Proof Pending Publication To defend its approach, the District relied on Lemon and its progeny. See App. 43–45. In upholding the District's actions, the Ninth Circuit followed the same course. See Part II–C, supra. And, to be sure, in Lemon this Court attempted a “grand unifed theory” for assessing Establishment Clause claims. American Legion v. American Hu manist Assn., 588 U. S. –––, ––– (2019) (plurality opinion). That approach called for an examination of a law's purposes, effects, and potential for entanglement with religion.
Lemon, 403 U. S., at 612–613. In time, the approach also came to involve estimations about whether a “reasonable observer” would consider the government's challenged action an “endorsement” of religion. See, e. g., County of Alle gheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pitts burgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 593 (1989); id., at 630 (O'ConShurtleff, 596 U. S., at 278 (opinion of Gorsuch, J.).
What the District and the Ninth Circuit overlooked, however, is that the “shortcomings” associated with this “ambitiou[s],” abstract, and ahistorical approach to the Establishment Clause became so “apparent” that this Court long ago abandoned Lemon and its endorsement test offshoot.
American Legion, 588 U. S., at ––– – ––– (plurality opinion); see also Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U. S. 565, 575–577 (2014). The Court has explained that these tests “invited chaos” in lower courts, led to “differing results” in materially identical cases, and created a “minefeld” for legislators. Pi nette, 515 U. S., at 768–769, n. 3 (plurality opinion) (emphasis deleted). This Court has since made plain, too, that the Establishment Clause does not include anything like a “modifed heckler's veto, in which . . . religious activity can be proscribed” based on “ `perceptions' ” or “ `discomfort.' ” Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U. S. 98, 119 (2001) (emphasis deleted). An Establishment Clause violation does not automatically follow whenever a public school or other government entity “fail[s] to censor” private religious speech.
Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U. S. 226, 250 (1990) (plurality opinion). Nor does the Clause “compel the government to purge from the public sphere” anything an objective observer could reasonably infer endorses or “partakes of the religious.” Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U. S. 677, 699 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). In fact, just this Term the Court unanimously rejected a city's attempt to censor religious speech based on Lemon and the endorsement test. See Shurtleff, 596 U. S., at 247–248; id., at 261–262 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 276, 279–280 (opinion of Gorsuch, J.).4 In place of Lemon and the endorsement test, this Court has instructed that the Establishment Clause must be interpreted by “ `reference to historical practices and understandings.' ” Town of Greece, 572 U. S., at 576; see also American Legion, 588 U. S., at ––– (plurality opinion). “ `[T]he line' ” 4Nor was that decision an outlier. In the last two decades, this Court has often criticized or ignored Lemon and its endorsement test variation. See, e. g., Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 591 U. S. ––– (2020); American Legion v. American Humanist Assn., 588 U. S. ––– (2019); Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U. S. ––– (2018); Trinity Lutheran Church of Co lumbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. 449 (2017); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U. S. 565 (2014); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U. S. 171 (2012); Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 563 U. S. 125 (2011); Hein v. Freedom from Reli gion Foundation, Inc., 551 U. S. 587 (2007); id., at 618 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U. S. 677 (2005); id., at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). A vast number of Justices have criticized those tests over an even longer period. See Shurtleff v. Boston, 596 U. S. 243, 282–283, and nn. 9–10 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment) (collecting opinions authored or joined by Roberts and Rehnquist, C. J., and Thomas, Breyer, Alito, Kavanaugh, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ.). The point has not been lost on our lower court colleagues. See, e. g., 4 F. 4th 910, 939–941 (2021) (O'Scannlain, J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc); id., at 945 (R. Nelson, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id., at 947, n. 3 (collecting lower court cases from “around the country” that “have recognized Lemon's demise”). Page Proof Pending Publication that courts and governments “ `must draw between the permissible and the impermissible' ” has to “ `accor[d] with history and faithfully refec[t] the understanding of the Founding Fathers.' ” Town of Greece, 572 U. S., at 577 (quoting School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 294 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)). An analysis focused on original meaning and history, this Court has stressed, has long represented the rule rather than some “ `exception' ” within the “Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.” 572 U. S., at 575; see American Legion, 588 U. S., at ––– (plurality opinion); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488, 490 (1961) (analyzing certain historical elements of religious establishments); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 437–440 (1961) (analyzing Sunday closing laws by looking to their “place . . . in the First Amendment's history”); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U. S. 664, 680 (1970) (analyzing the “history and uninterrupted practice” of church tax exemptions). The District and the Ninth Circuit erred by failing to heed this guidance.
B
Perhaps sensing that the primary theory it pursued below rests on a mistaken understanding of the Establishment Clause, the District offers a backup argument in this Court. It still contends that its Establishment Clause concerns trump Mr. Kennedy's free exercise and free speech rights.
But the District now seeks to supply different reasoning for that result. Now, it says, it was justifed in suppressing Mr. Kennedy's religious activity because otherwise it would have been guilty of coercing students to pray. See Brief for Respondent 34–37. And, the District says, coercing worship amounts to an Establishment Clause violation on any- one's account of the Clause's original meaning.
As it turns out, however, there is a pretty obvious reason why the Ninth Circuit did not adopt this theory in proceedings below: The evidence cannot sustain it. To be sure, this Page Proof Pending Publication Court has long held that government may not, consistent with a historically sensitive understanding of the Establishment Clause, “make a religious observance compulsory.”
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 314 (1952). Government “may not coerce anyone to attend church,” ibid., nor may it force citizens to engage in “a formal religious exercise,” Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577, 589 (1992). No doubt, too, coercion along these lines was among the foremost hallmarks of religious establishments the framers sought to prohibit when they adopted the First Amendment.5 Members of this Court have sometimes disagreed on what exactly qualifes as impermissible coercion in light of the original meaning of the Establishment Clause. Compare id., at 593, with id., at 640– 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But in this case Mr. Kennedy's private religious exercise did not come close to crossing any line one might imagine separating protected private expression from impermissible government coercion.
Begin with the District's own contemporaneous description of the facts. In its correspondence with Mr. Kennedy, the District never raised coercion concerns. To the contrary, the District conceded in a public 2015 document that there was “no evidence that students [were] directly coerced to pray with Kennedy.” App. 105. This is consistent with Mr. Kennedy's account too. He has repeatedly stated that he “never coerced, required, or asked any student to pray,” and that he never “told any student that it was important that they participate in any religious activity.”
Id., at 170.
5See, e. g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577, 640–642 (1992) (Scalia, J. dissenting); Shurtleff, 596 U. S., at 285–286 (opinion of Gorsuch, J.) (discussing coercion and certain other historical hallmarks of an established religion); 1 Annals of Cong. 730–731 (1789) (Madison explaining that the First Amendment aimed to prevent one or multiple sects from “establish[ing] a religion to which they would compel others to conform”); M. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2105, 2144–2146 (2003). Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication Consider, too, the actual requests Mr. Kennedy made.
The District did not discipline Mr. Kennedy for engaging in prayer while presenting locker-room speeches to students.
That tradition predated Mr. Kennedy at the school. Ibid. And he willingly ended it, as the District has acknowledged. Id., at 77, 170. He also willingly ended his practice of post- game religious talks with his team. Id., at 70, 77, 170–172. The only prayer Mr. Kennedy sought to continue was the kind he had “started out doing” at the beginning of his ten- ure—the prayer he gave alone. Id., at 293–294. He made clear that he could pray “while the kids were doing the fght song” and “take a knee by [him]self and give thanks and continue on.” Id., at 294. Mr. Kennedy even considered it “acceptable” to say his “prayer while the players were walking to the locker room” or “bus,” and then catch up with his team. Id., at 280, 282; see also id., at 59 (proposing the team leave the feld for the prayer). In short, Mr. Kennedy did not seek to direct any prayers to students or require anyone else to participate. His plan was to wait to pray until athletes were occupied, and he “told everybody” that's what he wished “to do.” Id., at 292. It was for three prayers of this sort alone in October 2015 that the District suspended him. See Parts I–B and I–C, supra.
Naturally, Mr. Kennedy's proposal to pray quietly by himself on the feld would have meant some people would have seen his religious exercise. Those close at hand might have heard him too. But learning how to tolerate speech or prayer of all kinds is “part of learning how to live in a pluralistic society,” a trait of character essential to “a tolerant citizenry.” Lee, 505 U. S., at 590. This Court has long recognized as well that “secondary school students are mature enough . . . to understand that a school does not endorse,” let alone coerce them to participate in, “speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis.” Mergens, 496 U. S., at 250 (plurality opinion). Of course, some will take offense to certain forms of speech or prayer they are sure to encounter in a society where those activities enjoy such robust constitutional protection. But “[o]ffense . . . does not equate to coercion.” Town of Greece, 572 U. S., at 589 (plurality opinion).
The District responds that, as a coach, Mr. Kennedy “wielded enormous authority and infuence over the students,” and students might have felt compelled to pray alongside him. Brief for Respondent 37. To support this argument, the District submits that, after Mr. Kennedy's suspension, a few parents told District employees that their sons had “participated in the team prayers only because they did not wish to separate themselves from the team.” App.
356.
This reply fails too. Not only does the District rely on hearsay to advance it. For all we can tell, the concerns the District says it heard from parents were occasioned by the locker-room prayers that predated Mr. Kennedy's tenure or his postgame religious talks, all of which he discontinued at the District's request. There is no indication in the record that anyone expressed any coercion concerns to the District about the quiet, postgame prayers that Mr. Kennedy asked to continue and that led to his suspension. Nor is there any record evidence that students felt pressured to participate in these prayers. To the contrary, and as we have seen, not a single Bremerton student joined Mr. Kennedy's quiet prayers following the three October 2015 games for which he was disciplined. On October 16, those students who joined Mr. Kennedy were “ `from the opposing team,' ” 991 F. 3d, at 1012–1013, and thus could not have “reasonably fear[ed]” that he would decrease their “playing time” or destroy their “opportunities” if they did not “participate,” Brief for Respondent 43. As for the other two relevant games, “no one joined” Mr. Kennedy on October 23. 991 F. 3d, at 1019. And only a few members of the public participated Page Proof Pending Publication on October 26.
App. 97, 314–315; see also Part I–B, supra.6 The absence of evidence of coercion in this record leaves the District to its fnal redoubt. Here, the District suggests that any visible religious conduct by a teacher or coach should be deemed—without more and as a matter of law— impermissibly coercive on students. In essence, the District asks us to adopt the view that the only acceptable government role models for students are those who eschew any visible religious expression. See also post, at 560–561 (Sotoshould. Really, it is just another way of repackaging the District's earlier submission that government may script everything a teacher or coach says in the workplace. See Part III–B, supra. The only added twist here is the District's suggestion not only that it may prohibit teachers from engaging in any demonstrative religious activity, but that it must do so in order to conform to the Constitution.
Such a rule would be a sure sign that our Establishment Clause jurisprudence had gone off the rails. In the name of protecting religious liberty, the District would have us suppress it. Rather than respect the First Amendment's double protection for religious expression, it would have us preference secular activity. Not only could schools fre teachers for praying quietly over their lunch, for wearing a yarmulke to school, or for offering a midday prayer during a break before practice. Under the District's rule, a school would be required to do so. It is a rule that would defy this 6The dissent expresses concern that looking to “histor[y] an[d] tradition” to guide Establishment Clause inquiries will not afford “school administrators” suffcient guidance. Post, at 573–574. But that concern supplies no excuse to adorn the Constitution with rules not supported by its terms and the traditions undergirding them. Nor, in any event, is there any question that the District understands that coercion can be a hallmark of an Establishment Clause violation. See App. 105. The District's problem isn't a failure to identify coercion as a crucial legal consideration; it is a lack of evidence that coercion actually occurred. Page Proof Pending Publication Court's traditional understanding that permitting private speech is not the same thing as coercing others to participate in it. See Town of Greece, 572 U. S., at 589 (plurality opinion). It is a rule, too, that would undermine a long constitutional tradition under which learning how to tolerate diverse expressive activities has always been “part of learning how to live in a pluralistic society.” Lee, 505 U. S., at 590. We are aware of no historically sound understanding of the Establishment Clause that begins to “mak[e] it necessary for government to be hostile to religion” in this way. Zorach, 343 U. S., at 314.
Our judgments on all these scores fnd support in this Court's prior cases too. In Zorach, for example, challengers argued that a public school program permitting students to spend time in private religious instruction off campus was impermissibly coercive. Id., at 308, 311–312. The Court rejected that challenge because students were not required to attend religious instruction and there was no evidence that any employee had “us[ed] their offce to persuade or force students” to participate in religious activity. Id., at 311, and n. 6. What was clear there is even more obvious here—where there is no evidence anyone sought to persuade or force students to participate, and there is no formal school program accommodating the religious activity at issue.
Meanwhile, this case looks very different from those in which this Court has found prayer involving public school students to be problematically coercive. In Lee, this Court held that school offcials violated the Establishment Clause by “including [a] clerical membe[r]” who publicly recited prayers “as part of [an] offcial school graduation ceremony” because the school had “in every practical sense compelled attendance and participation in” a “religious exercise.” 505 U. S., at 580, 598. In Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, the Court held that a school district violated the Establishment Clause by broadcasting a prayer “over the public address system” before each football game. 530 U. S. 290, Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication 294 (2000). The Court observed that, while students generally were not required to attend games, attendance was required for “cheerleaders, members of the band, and, of course, the team members themselves.” Id., at 311. None of that is true here. The prayers for which Mr. Kennedy was disciplined were not publicly broadcast or recited to a captive audience. Students were not required or expected to participate. And, in fact, none of Mr. Kennedy's students did participate in any of the three October 2015 prayers that resulted in Mr. Kennedy's discipline. See App. 90, 97, 173, 236–239; Parts I–B and I–C, supra.7
C
In the end, the District's case hinges on the need to generate confict between an individual's rights under the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses and its own Establishment Clause duties—and then develop some explanation why one of these Clauses in the First Amendment should “ `trum[p]' ” the other two. 991 F. 3d, at 1017; App. 43. But the project falters badly. Not only does the District fail to offer a sound reason to prefer one constitutional guarantee 7Even if the personal prayers Mr. Kennedy sought to offer after games are not themselves coercive, the dissent suggests that they bear an indelible taint of coercion by association with the school's past prayer practices—some of which predated Mr. Kennedy, and all of which the District concedes he ended on request. But none of those abandoned practices formed the basis for Mr. Kennedy's suspension, and he has not sought to claim First Amendment protection for them. See Town of Greece, 572 U. S., at 585 (other past practices do not permanently “despoil a practice” later challenged under the Establishment Clause). Nor, contrary to the dissent, does the possibility that students might choose, unprompted, to participate in Mr. Kennedy's prayers necessarily prove them coercive. See post, at 562–564, 567–577. For one thing, the District has conceded that no coach may “discourag[e]” voluntary student prayer under its policies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 91. For another, Mr. Kennedy has repeatedly explained that he is willing to conduct his prayer without students—as he did after each of the games that formed the basis of his suspension—and after students head to the locker room or bus. See App. 280, 282, 292–294. over another. It cannot even show that they are at odds.
In truth, there is no confict between the constitutional commands before us. There is only the “mere shadow” of a confict, a false choice premised on a misconstruction of the Establishment Clause. Schempp, 374 U. S., at 308 (Goldberg, J., concurring). And in no world may a government entity's concerns about phantom constitutional violations justify actual violations of an individual's First Amendment rights.
See, e. g., Rosenberger, 515 U. S., at 845–846; Good News Club, 533 U. S., at 112–119; Lamb's Chapel v. Center Mo- riches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384, 394–395 (1993); Widmar, 454 U. S., at 270–275.8
V
Respect for religious expressions is indispensable to life in a free and diverse Republic—whether those expressions take place in a sanctuary or on a feld, and whether they manifest through the spoken word or a bowed head. Here, a government entity sought to punish an individual for engaging in a brief, quiet, personal religious observance doubly protected by the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment. And the only meaningful justifcation the government offered for its reprisal rested on a mistaken view that it had a duty to ferret out and suppress religious obser8Failing under its coercion theory, the District offers still another backup argument. It contends that it had to suppress Mr. Kennedy's protected First Amendment activity to ensure order at Bremerton football games. See also post, at 546, 552–554, 555–556, 578–579 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). But the District never raised concerns along these lines in its contemporaneous correspondence with Mr. Kennedy. And unsurprisingly, neither the District Court nor the Ninth Circuit invoked this rationale to justify the District's actions. Government “justifcation[s]” for interfering with First Amendment rights “must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation.” United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 533 (1996). Nor under our Constitution does protected speech or religious exercise readily give way to a “heckler's veto.” Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U. S. 98, 119 (2001); supra, at 534–535. Page Proof Pending Publication vances even as it allows comparable secular speech. The Constitution neither mandates nor tolerates that kind of discrimination. Mr. Kennedy is entitled to summary judgment on his First Amendment claims. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed.