The Court holds that lower federal courts are powerless to issue classwide injunctive relief against the Executive Branch's violation of noncitizens' rights under several provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). It reaches this conclusion in a purportedly textualist opinion that, in truth, elevates piecemeal dictionary defnitions and policy concerns over plain meaning and context. I respectfully dissent from the Court's blinkered analysis, which will leave many vulnerable noncitizens unable to protect their rights.1
I
Respondents in these two cases are named plaintiffs in two class actions: Esteban Aleman Gonzalez and Jose Eduardo Gutierrez Sanchez in the Aleman Gonzalez litigation, and Edwin Omar Flores Tejada in the Flores Tejada litigation. Respondents sought withholding of removal under the INA based on their fear that, if returned to their countries of origin, they would face persecution or torture. See ante, at 547; Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2021) (explaining “withholding-only proceedings”). The Government detained them pending their proceedings, a de1I concur in the judgment because the Government prevails on the merits. See Pet. for Cert. I; Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U. S. 573 (2022).
tention this Court has held authorized by 8 U. S. C. § 1231. See Guzman Chavez, 594 U. S., at –––.
In both cases, respondents raised statutory and constitutional challenges to their prolonged detention without bond hearings. In both cases, respondents moved to certify classes of similarly situated individuals. In Aleman Gonza lez, the District Court certifed a class of “ `all individuals who are detained pursuant to 8 U. S. C. § 1231(a)(6) in the Ninth Circuit . . . and who have reached or will reach six months in detention, and have been or will be denied a prolonged detention bond hearing before an Immigration Judge.' ” Gonzalez v. Sessions, 325 F. R. D. 616, 621, 626 (ND Cal. 2018). In Flores Tejada, the District Court certifed a class of “ `[a]ll individuals who (1) were placed in withholding only proceedings . . . in the Western District of Washington . . . , and (2) have been detained for 180 days (a) without a custody hearing or (b) since receiving a custody hearing.' ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 149a. By these defnitions, the specifed classes include only individuals against whom the Government has initiated removal proceedings.
Both District Courts held that § 1231(a)(6) did not authorize prolonged detention exceeding six months without bond hearings.2 Both District Courts issued classwide injunctive relief (preliminary in Aleman Gonzalez and permanent in Flores Tejada) requiring individualized bond hearings. The Ninth Circuit affrmed in relevant part.
When the Government petitioned for certiorari, it challenged only the lower courts' interpretations of § 1231(a)(6) as requiring bond hearings after six months of detention. See Pet. for Cert. I. The Court granted certiorari on the question presented by the Government in these cases and a companion case from the Third Circuit. 594 U. S. ––– (2021); see Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U. S. 573 (2022). The Court additionally directed the parties in these cases “to 2The District Courts did not reach respondents' constitutional claims. Page Proof Pending Publication brief and argue the following question: Whether, under 8 U. S. C. §1252(f)(1), the courts below had jurisdiction to grant classwide injunctive relief.” 594 U. S. –––. As to that question, the Court now holds that §1252(f)(1) barred the lower courts from granting such relief.
II
Section 1252(f)(1) sets forth a precise limitation on the lower federal courts' jurisdiction to enter injunctive relief in cases involving specifed sections of the INA. The provision states: “(f) Limit on injunctive relief “(1) In general “Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or of the identity of the party or parties bringing the action, no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of [§§ 1221–1232], as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, other than with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.”
Section 1252(f)(1) includes two operative clauses: a primary clause that strips courts of authority “to enjoin or restrain the operation of” the specifed provisions of the INA, and a saving clause that reserves that authority as applied to a noncitizen “against whom proceedings . . . have been initiated.” Properly read, both clauses independently preserve the lower courts' authority to order classwide injunctive relief compelling the Executive Branch to comply with the INA in these cases. The Court holds otherwise only by disregarding the language Congress used in §1252(f)(1) itself, elsewhere in § 1252, and in the INA as a whole.
Page Proof Pending Publication
A
Section 1252(f)(1)'s primary clause provides that the lower federal courts may not “enjoin or restrain the operation of” the specified provisions of the INA. An injunction that compels the Executive Branch to comply with the specifed provisions (or, phrased differently, prohibits the unlawful implementation of the specifed provisions) does not “enjoin or restrain” the “operation” of those provisions.
This is clear as a matter of plain meaning. Starting with the word “operation,” all agree that the ordinary meaning of “operation” is “functioning” or “working.” Ante, at 549.
An injunction requiring the Executive Branch to conform its conduct with a statute or to cease statutorily unauthorized conduct does not enjoin or restrain the “functioning or working” of the statute. That is because unlawful agency action is not a part of the functioning or working of the authorizing statute.
The Government responds that “operation,” as used in §1252(f)(1), is synonymous with “implementation,” which may include either lawful or unlawful implementation. Reply Brief 3. This contention, however, disregards Congress' careful choice of language. Section 1252(f)(1) says nothing about enjoining or restraining the Executive Branch's “implementation” of the law. By contrast, in other subsections of § 1252 enacted simultaneously with this one, Congress twice expressly limited jurisdiction over challenges to “implementation” of a statute or order or specifed a particular forum for judicial review of such challenges. See § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i) (restricting jurisdiction to review claims “arising from or relating to the implementation or operation of an order of removal”); § 1252(e)(3)(A) (channeling review of the “implementation” of specifed provisions into the U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia); see also §1252(a)(2)(A)(iv) (limiting jurisPage Proof Pending Publication diction to review “procedures and policies adopted by the Attorney General to implement” a certain provision). As this Court previously explained when interpreting this very statute: “ `[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section . . . it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.' ” Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 430 (2009). “This is particularly true here, where [the relevant subsections of § 1252] were enacted as part of a unifed overhaul of judicial review procedures.” Id., at 430–431.
In addition to Congress' deliberate use of “operation,” its use of “enjoin or restrain” in this context is most naturally read to bar only lower court injunctions that stop the operation of a statute, not those that command the Executive Branch to conform its conduct to the statute. It is true that, depending on the context, the word “enjoin” may describe a prohibition (“abstain or desist from . . . some act”) or an affrmative command (“perform . . . some act”). Black's Law Dictionary 529 (6th ed. 1990); see ante, at 548–549. In §1252(f)(1), however, clear textual signals point to the conclusion that “enjoin” refers to a prohibition on the operation of a statute. First, Congress consistently has used the term “enjoin” in Title 8 to refer to prohibitions, including in the immediately neighboring and simultaneously enacted subsection, §1252(f)(2).3 “A standard principle of statutory construction provides that identical words and phrases within the same statute should normally be given the same meaning,” Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U. S. 224, 232 (2007), particularly where, as here, “the same term was used in related provisions enacted at the same time,” Return 3 Section 1252(f)(2) provides: “[N]o court shall enjoin the removal of any alien pursuant to a fnal order under this section unless the alien shows by clear and convincing evidence that the entry or execution of such order is prohibited as a matter of law.” This use of “enjoin” can only mean “prohibit.”
Page Proof Pending Publication Mail, Inc. v. Postal Service, 587 U. S. –––, ––– (2019). Even beyond § 1252 itself, every use of “enjoin” in Title 8 refers to prohibitory injunctions.4 Moreover, in §1252(f)(1) specifcally, “enjoin” is paired with the term “restrain,” which means to “check, hold back, or prevent (a person or thing) from some course of action.” 13 Oxford English Dictionary 756 (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis deleted). “[T]he company [the word] keeps,” Direct Marketing Assn. v. Brohl, 575 U. S. 1, 13 (2015), thus cements a prohibitory reading of “enjoin.” Under this reading, lower courts may not prohibit the operation of the specifed statutes, but nothing in §1252(f)(1) prevents them from commanding compliance with the statutes or enjoining unauthorized agency action.
Finally, if any ambiguity remains as to the meaning of the primary “enjoin or restrain the operation of” clause, a longstanding clear-statement principle counsels in favor of preserving the lower courts' remaining equitable jurisdiction. This Court “ `will not construe a statute to displace courts' traditional equitable authority absent the clearest command.' ” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U. S. 383, 397 (2013) (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. 631, 646 (2010)); accord, e. g., Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U. S. 395, 398 (1946); Brown v. Swann, 10 Pet. 497, 503 (1836). There can be no doubt that §1252(f)(1) operates to displace equitable authority to an extent. As explained, however, the most natural and contextual reading of the provision's primary clause does not limit federal courts' authority to enjoin or 4See § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) (enacted simultaneously with § 1252 and referring to a noncitizen “who at any time after admission is enjoined under a protection order issued by a court,” with “protection order” defned as “any injunction issued for the purpose of preventing violent or threatening acts of domestic violence”); §1324a(f)(2) (authorizing the Attorney General to sue over pattern or practice of unlawful employment, recruitment, or referral of noncitizens under header titled “[e]njoining of pattern or practice violations”). After oral argument in these cases, Congress used the term “enjoined” in an amendment to an additional provision of Title 8, again in a prohibitory sense. See § 1153(b)(5)(I)(iv)(I). Page Proof Pending Publication restrain agency action unauthorized by statute, or to compel agency action commanded by a statute. The clause contains nothing approaching the clear command necessary, under centuries of this Court's precedents, to displace that authority.
Independently of §1252(f)(1)'s primary clause, the provision's saving clause also operates to preserve the lower federal courts' equitable authority here. That clause provides that lower courts may enjoin or restrain the operation of the covered statutory provisions “with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.” §1252(f)(1). Each benefciary of the injunctions in these cases is “an individual alien against whom [removal] proceedings . . .
have been initiated.” Ibid. Under these circumstances, §1252(f)(1) poses no barrier to classwide injunctive relief. The Government contends that the phrase “an individual alien” is inconsistent with injunctive relief on a classwide basis. A class action, however, is a collection of individual claims. See, e. g., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 701 (1979) (“Where the district court has jurisdiction over the claim of each individual member of the class, Rule 23 provides a procedure by which the court may exercise that jurisdiction over the various individual claims in a single proceeding”); Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P. A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U. S. 393, 408 (2010) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) (“A class action, no less than traditional joinder (of which it is a species), merely enables a federal court to adjudicate claims of multiple parties at once, instead of in separate suits”). Moreover, contextual and historical evidence demonstrates that the enacting Congress would not have prohibited classwide relief simply by using the word “individual.” It was well understood when Congress enacted §1252(f)(1) in 1996 that mere use of the word “individual” would not preclude classwide adjudication or relief. In Califano,a Page Proof Pending Publication unanimous Court interpreted § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, codifed at 42 U. S. C. § 405(g), to permit class actions and classwide relief, even though the statute provided only that “ `[a]ny individual' ” could obtain judicial review. See 442 U. S., at 698–701. The Court rejected the Government's argument that the word “individual” required “a case-bycase adjudication of claims under § 205(g) that is incompatible with class relief.” Id., at 698–699. “[C]lass relief is consistent with the need for case-by-case adjudication,” the Court noted, “at least so long as the membership of the class is limited to those who meet the requirements of” the provision. Id., at 701.
“We normally assume that, when Congress enacts statutes, it is aware of relevant judicial precedent.” Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U. S. 633, 648 (2010). When §1252(f)(1) was enacted in 1996, that precedent included both Califano and the settled rule, discussed above, that a statute should not be construed to displace a court's equitable authority absent a clear command. Yet Congress provided no such command against all classwide injunctive relief in §1252(f)(1). Indeed, in other subsections of § 1252, Congress provided precisely such a clear command. Section 1252(e)(1)(B), enacted simultaneously with §1252(f)(1), explicitly divests federal courts of authority to “certify a class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” in certain cases. The enacting Congress thus knew how to preclude classwide relief and did so in unmistakable terms when that was its intent. In §1252(f)(1), however, it made no mention of class actions or Rule 23. Again, “ `it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion' ” of language, particularly where, as here, it enacted the language as part of a unifed whole. Nken, 556 U. S., at 430.
The Government responds that this reading of §1252(f)(1)'s saving clause renders the word “individual” superfuous. “ `[S]ometimes the better overall reading of the Page Proof Pending Publication statute contains some redundancy,' ” however, as Congress may “emplo[y] a belt and suspenders approach” to ensure its aims are met. Atlantic Richfeld Co. v. Christian, 590 U. S. –––, –––, n. 5 (2020). Relevant here, parties other than individuals in removal proceedings may bring immigration- related lawsuits. For example, prior to 1996, several organizations brought preenforcement challenges to immigration statutes. See Brief for Respondents 55 (collecting examples). In recent years, States, too, increasingly have sued on behalf of their own interests. See, e. g., Biden v. Texas, No. 21–954, now pending before the Court; Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 591 U. S. ––– (2020); United States v. Texas, 579 U. S. 547 (2016) (per cu riam). In drafting §1252(f)(1), Congress had every reason “to be doubly sure,” Barton v. Barr, 590 U. S. –––, ––– (2020), that only individuals in removal proceedings and not other entities would receive injunctive relief restraining the operation of the specifed provisions of the INA. Additionally, the Government's redundancy concern is particularly unpersuasive because Congress used the adjective “individual” redundantly in other immigration-related provisions within Title 8. See § 1446(a) (authorizing the Attorney General to waive investigation of applicant for naturalization “in an individual case or in such cases or classes of cases as may be designated by him”); § 1601(4) (expressing concern that “individual aliens,” prior to 1996, were “burden[ing] the public benefts system”).
In sum, the courts below retained their equitable authority to issue classwide injunctive relief for two independent reasons. First, the relief the District Courts issued did not purport “to enjoin or restrain the operation of” any statute; rather, the District Courts sought to enforce a statute and enjoin what they deemed to be unlawful agency action. Second, and in any event, the injunctive relief issued below fell within §1252(f)(1)'s saving clause because it concerned only Page Proof Pending Publication the application of provisions of the INA to individual noncitizens in removal proceedings.
This interpretation is a reasonable one. Congress' express and particular use of words in §1252(f)(1) protected the specifed statutory provisions against restraint by lower court injunctions, but evinced no quarrel with lower courts ensuring that the Executive Branch complied with the commands in those provisions. In addition, Congress ensured that this goal did not come at the expense of violating the rights of noncitizens in removal proceedings.
B
The Court reaches a contrary result only by prioritizing unavailing and largely atextual concerns.
Starting with the primary “enjoin or restrain the operation of” clause, the Court accepts the Government's argument that “the `operation of' the relevant statutes is best understood to refer to the Government's efforts to enforce or implement them.” Ante, at 550. Aside from ignoring Congress' choice to restrict judicial review of “implementation” in some subsections of § 1252 but not others, the Court misapprehends how statutes operate. No doubt, “laws ordinarily `work' or `function' . . . through the actions of offcials or other persons who implement them.” Ante, at 549.
That proposition, however, only holds if those individuals properly implement the relevant statute. An unlawful implementation of a statute is not the “work[ing]” or “function[ing]” of the statute at all; it is simply unauthorized. Restraining such action does not interfere with the operation of the statute for purposes of §1252(f)(1).
Resisting this result, the Court offers a string cite of several inapt uses of “operation,” none of which concern the operation of legal authority. See ante, at 552. The Court wonders why, “[i]f cars, trucks, railroads, water utilities, Page Proof Pending Publication drainage ditches, auto dealerships, planes, radios, video poker machines, cable TV systems, and many other things can be unlawfully or improperly operated, . . . the same cannot be said of a statute.” Ante, at 552–553. The answer is obvious: Unlike all of those examples, a statute is the law. Offcials may implement a statute unlawfully, but a statute does not operate in confict with itself.5 The Court also agrees with the Government that “enjoin,” as used in §1252(f)(1), necessarily takes on both affrmative and negative connotations, but only by rigidly segmenting each word in the clause, defning each in isolation, and adding those definitions together. See ante, at 548–549. Elsewhere, however, this Court has cautioned against such a piecemeal approach to statutory interpretation. Cf., e. g., FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U. S. 397, 406 (2011) (cautioning that “two words together may assume a more particular meaning than those words in isolation”). Moreover, the Court pays no mind to Congress' other uses of “enjoin” in § 1252 and elsewhere in Title 8 as meaning banning or stopping.
The Court offers one fnal purportedly textual basis for its strained reading of the primary clause: that it is the only option consistent with §1252(f)(1)'s prefatory clause. See ante, at 553; §1252(f)(1) (“Regardless of the nature of the action or claim . . . ”). The prefatory clause, however, does not purport to expand the scope of §1252(f)(1)'s restriction; it simply makes clear that the restriction must apply to all claims that would otherwise fall within it, without exception. See Atlantic Richfeld Co., 590 U. S., at –––, n. 5 (reasoning similarly as to phrase “ `without regard to the citizenship of the parties or the amount in controversy' ”).
5The Court's sole response is to suggest that if an offcial can “ `carry out' ” a statute contrary to its terms, the statute should be able to “ `operat[e]' ” contrary to itself, too. Ante, at 553, n. 3. This once again elides the distinction Congress drew in § 1252 between “implementation” and “operation,” a difference that must be given meaning. See supra, at 559–560. Page Proof Pending Publication The Court closes with two policy arguments. It deems it “most unlikely” that Congress would enact a statute that disproportionately limits lower courts' authority to issue injunctive relief to remedy constitutional claims, a result it contends would fow from respondents' reading. Ante, at 553.
This is in large part a problem of the Court's own making. As explained, a proper interpretation of §1252(f)(1)'s saving clause preserves lower courts' authority to issue injunctive relief on constitutional claims, including on a classwide basis, so long as all plaintiffs are individuals against whom removal proceedings have been initiated. Moreover, even in preenforcement challenges brought by entities or by individuals not in removal proceedings, respondents' reading of §1252(f)(1) does not prohibit injunctive relief exclusively as to constitutional claims, but also as to claims that arise from any statutes external to the covered INA provisions (for example, a claim that a covered provision violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)). See ante, at 553, n. 4.
The correct reading of §1252(f)(1) evenhandedly protects the specifed INA provisions from all such external, preenforcement, lower court injunctions, whether on statutory or constitutional grounds, without shielding unlawful agency action inconsistent with the specifed provisions. Whatever the Court may think of the wisdom of that policy, it is a perfectly plausible one.
The Court also worries that under this reading of §1252(f)(1), the inquiry as to whether injunctive relief is available may overlap with the merits of a claim that a covered provision has been violated. Ante, at 554. The Court is wrong to fnd “anything unusual about that consequence.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U. S. 338, 351 (2011). Even as to the question of subject-matter jurisdiction (as opposed to the remedial authority at issue here), “[t]he necessity of touching aspects of the merits . . . is a familiar feature of litigation.” Id., at 351–352; accord, e. g., Page Proof Pending Publication Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 582 U. S. 420, 434– 435 (2017) (“[T]he distinction between jurisdictional and merits issues is not inevitably sharp, for the two inquiries may overlap”). Any overlap may be substantial: Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, for instance, “all elements of a meritorious claim are also jurisdictional.” Brownback v. King, 592 U. S. –––, ––– (2021).6 This concern, too, offers no justifcation for the Court's departure from ordinary meaning or its disregard of clear contextual evidence contrary to its view. The Court's arguments in support of its reading of the saving clause fare little better. The Court opens with language from past cases suggesting support for its interpretation. See ante, at 550. None of the cases the Court quotes, however, presented or decided the scope of §1252(f)(1)'s bar on injunctive relief.
The Court next affords dispositive weight to its class-exclusive view of the word “individual” in §1252(f)(1). See ante, at 550–551. The Court distinguishes Califano in a footnote, asserting that §1252(f)(1)'s saving clause should be construed narrowly because it is an exception to the primary clause. See ante, at 555, n. 6. The point, however, is not that the statute interpreted in Califano was identical to §1252(f)(1), but that Califano established that a statute's mere use of the word “individual” does not suffce to preclude classwide relief. Moreover, the Court overlooks that it is §1252(f)(1)'s primary clause (which divests lower courts of their “ `tradi6 The Court states that respondents' reading of §1252(f)(1) will, in some cases, cause a “complete overlap between a jurisdictional inquiry and the merits of a claim.” Ante, at 554, n. 5. Once again, such an overlap is far from unprecedented. Moreover, as the Court implicitly concedes, it will not always be present. As explained, respondents' interpretation divests the lower courts of authority to issue injunctive relief on external challenges to the specifed provisions (e. g., a challenge to a specifed provision based on RFRA or the Due Process Clause), regardless of the merits of those challenges, unless the saving clause applies.
Page Proof Pending Publication tional equitable authority' ”) that constitutes an exception to the norm. McQuiggin, 569 U. S., at 397. The Court ignores the clear-statement rule for such displacements of courts' equitable jurisdiction. Califano and the clear- statement rule both instruct that Congress would not have done so much so obliquely, particularly when it clearly prohibited class relief in another subsection of the same statute.
On the question of Congress' disparate inclusion and exclusion of language in § 1252 referring to class actions, the Court declines to decide what it thinks. Taking one path, it suggests that one should not “give much weight to this negative inference.” Ante, at 555. But see Nken, 556 U. S., at 430–431 (giving weight to equivalent inference when interpreting same statute). Taking another, the Court admits that adhering to its holding might well “rule out efforts to obtain any injunctive relief that applies to multiple named plaintiffs (or perhaps even rule out injunctive relief in a lawsuit brought by multiple named plaintiffs).” Ante, at 555. That result, which would require separate remedial orders or even separate lawsuits for family members asserting legally and factually identical claims based on joint immigration applications or proceedings, is absurd. There is no conceivable beneft in requiring identical claims to be raised in separate, duplicative actions. This bizarre outcome offers further proof that the Court has erred.
III
The ramifcations of the Court's errors should not be ignored. Today's holding risks depriving many vulnerable noncitizens of any meaningful opportunity to protect their rights.
To understand why, consider the practical realities of the removal and detention system. Noncitizens subjected to removal proceedings are disproportionately unlikely to be familiar with the U. S. legal system or fuent in the English Page Proof Pending Publication language. Even so, these individuals must navigate the Nation's labyrinthine immigration laws without entitlement to appointed counsel or legal support. If they are detained, like respondents here, they face particularly daunting hurdles. On average, immigration detention facilities are located signifcantly farther away from detained individuals' communities and court proceedings than criminal jails, making it extraordinarily diffcult to secure legal representation. Even for those individuals who can locate and afford counsel under these circumstances, such remote confnement impedes evidence gathering and communication with counsel.
After traveling (perhaps for hours) to meet with detained clients, attorneys may be barred from doing so due to logistical or administrative errors; legal phone calls, too, frequently are nonconfdential, prohibitively costly, or otherwise unavailable. Exacerbating these challenges, the Government regularly transfers detained noncitizens between facilities, often multiple times.7 It is one matter to expect noncitizens facing these obstacles to defend against their removal in immigration court. It is another entirely to place upon each of them the added burden of contesting systemic violations of their rights through discrete, collateral, federal-court proceedings. In a 7See, e. g., Brief for Former Immigration Judges et al. as Amici Curiae 8–14; Z. Manfredi & J. Meyers, Isolated and Unreachable: Contesting Unconstitutional Restrictions on Communication in Immigration Detention, 95 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 130, 139–145 (2020); E. Ryo & I. Peacock, A National Study of Immigration Detention in the United States, 92 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 29, 37–41 (2018); I. Eagly & S. Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 30–36 (2015); P. Markowitz et al., Accessing Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 357, 367–373 (2011); M. Taylor, Promoting Legal Representation for Detained Aliens: Litigation and Administrative Reform, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 1647, 1670–1673 (1997); cf. De- more v. Kim, 538 U. S. 510, 554 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that immigration offcials “can detain, transfer, and isolate aliens away from their lawyers, witnesses, and evidence”). Page Proof Pending Publication great many cases, the inevitable consequence of barring classwide injunctive relief will be that those violations will go unremedied, except as to the few fortunate enough to afford competent collateral counsel or to secure vigorous pro bono representation. The burdens will fall on those least able to vindicate their rights, as well as the law frms and nonproft organizations that will endeavor to assist as many of these noncitizens as their capacity permits.8 If, somehow, a substantial number of noncitizens are able to overcome these obstacles and fle separate federal lawsuits against unlawful removal or detention policies, a different problem will arise. Class litigation not only enables individual class members to enforce their rights against powerful actors, but also advances judicial economy by eliminating the need for duplicative proceedings pertaining to each class member. In contrast, the Court's overbroad reading of §1252(f)(1) forces noncitizens facing unlawful detention, if they are able, “to food district court dockets with individual habeas actions raising materially indistinguishable claims and requesting materially indistinguishable injunctive relief.” Brief for Retired Federal Judges as Amici Curiae 15. There is no reason to think Congress intended either of these untenable results.
In fairness, the Court's decision is not without limits. For instance, the Court does not purport to hold that §1252(f)(1) affects courts' ability to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, fndings, and conclusions” under the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U. S. C. § 706(2). No such claim is raised here. In addition, the Court rightly does not embrace the Government's eleventh-hour suggestion at oral argument to 8It is no answer to say that other individuals similarly situated may generate controlling precedent by pursuing their own claims. In the months or years it may take to secure a published appellate ruling resolving a pertinent legal issue, a great many noncitizens without meaningful access to justice will suffer irreparable injury.
Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication hold that §1252(f)(1) bars even classwide declaratory relief,9 a suggestion that would (if accepted) leave many noncitizens with no practical remedy whatsoever against clear violations by the Executive Branch.
Even with these limits, however, the repercussions of today's decision will be grave. In view of the text and context of §1252(f)(1), these repercussions offer yet more evidence that the Court's interpretive effort has gone badly astray. * * * The essence of statutory interpretation is to review the plain meaning of a provision in its context. The Court's analysis, by violating several interpretive principles, ultimately fails in that endeavor. I respectfully dissent.
9Although I reach no defnitive conclusion on this unpresented issue, it is diffcult to square the Government's claim with the statute Congress enacted. Section 1252(f)(1) limits lower courts' authority to “enjoin or restrain,” whereas a declaratory judgment (unlike an injunction) “ `is not ultimately coercive.' ” Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 471 (1974). In addition, §1252(f)(1) is titled “[l]imit on injunctive relief,” in contrast to nearby §1252(e)(1)'s broader “[l]imitations on relief.” True to its title, § 1252(e)(1) expressly prohibits courts from “enter[ing] declaratory, injunctive, or other equitable relief” under certain circumstances, whereas §1252(f)(1) makes no mention of declaratory relief.
Moreover, if (as the Court holds today) §1252(f)(1) bars classwide relief, and (as the Government suggests) the provision affects both injunctive and declaratory relief, it is hard to see how any class action could proceed, as no relief would be available in the lower courts. That, in turn, would prevent any such case from reaching this Court, rendering Congress' reservation of this Court's authority a nullity. See §1252(f)(1) (stripping authority from all courts “other than the Supreme Court”).
For these reasons and others, several Courts of Appeals have held that §1252(f)(1) poses no bar to the issuance of declaratory relief. See Brito v. Garland, 22 F. 4th 240, 250–252 (CA1 2021); Make The Road New York v. Wolf, 962 F. 3d 612, 635 (CADC 2020); Alli v. Decker, 650 F. 3d 1007, 1010–1013 (CA3 2011); Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F. 3d 1105, 1119–1120 (CA9 2010). But see Hamama v. Adducci, 912 F. 3d 869, 880, n. 8 (CA6 2018) (suggesting, but not holding, otherwise).
Page Proof Pending Publication Reporter’s Note The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional edits were made: p. 570, n. 7, line 8 from bottom: “Markovitz” is replaced with “Markowitz”