Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 231. Qualifed immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U. S. 48, 63 (internal quotation marks omitted). A clearly established rule is not one merely suggested by then- existing precedent; the rule's contours must be so well defned that a reasonable offcer would know that his conduct was unlawful in the situation confronted. Ibid. The Tenth Circuit contravened those settled principles here. None of the decisions on which the Court of Appeals relied comes close to establishing that the offcers' conduct was unlawful. Neither the panel majority nor the respondent has identifed a single precedent fnding a Fourth Amendment violation under similar circumstances. The offcers were thus entitled to qualifed immunity. Given that conclusion, the Court need not, and does not, decide whether the offcers violated the Fourth Amendment, or whether recklessly creating a situation that requires deadly force can itself violate the Fourth Amendment.
Certiorari granted; 981 F. 3d 808, reversed.
Per Curiam.
On August 12, 2016, Dominic Rollice's ex-wife, Joy, called 911. Rollice was in her garage, she explained, and he was intoxicated and would not leave. Joy requested police assistance; otherwise, “it's going to get ugly real quick.” 981 F. 3d 808, 812 (CA10 2020). The dispatcher asked whether Rollice lived at the residence. Joy said he did not but explained that he kept tools in her garage.
Offcers Josh Girdner, Chase Reed, and Brandon Vick responded to the call. All three knew that Rollice was Joy's ex-husband, was intoxicated, and would not leave her home. Joy met the offcers out front and led them to the side entrance of the garage. There the offcers encountered Rollice and began speaking with him in the doorway. Rollice expressed concern that the offcers intended to take him to jail; Offcer Girdner told him that they were simply trying to get him a ride. Rollice began fdgeting with something in his hands and the offcers noticed that he appeared nervous. Offcer Girdner asked if he could pat Rollice down for weapons. Rollice refused.
Police body-camera video captured what happened next.
As the conversation continued, Offcer Girdner gestured with his hands and took one step toward the doorway, causing Rollice to take one step back. Rollice, still conversing with the offcers, turned around and walked toward the back of the garage where his tools were hanging over a workbench. Offcer Girdner followed, the others close behind. No offcer was within six feet of Rollice. The video is silent, but the offcers stated that they ordered Rollice to stop. Rollice kept walking. He then grabbed a hammer from the back wall over the workbench and turned around to face the offcers. Rollice grasped the handle of the hammer with both hands, as if preparing to swing a baseball bat, and pulled it up to shoulder level. The offcers backed up, drawing their guns. At this point the video is no longer silent, and the offcers can be heard yelling at Rollice to drop the hammer. He did not. Instead, Rollice took a few steps to his right, coming out from behind a piece of furniture so that he had an unobstructed path to Offcer Girdner. He then raised the hammer higher back behind his head and took a stance as if he was about to throw the hammer or charge at the offcers. In response, Offcers Girdner and Vick fred their weapons, killing Rollice.
Rollice's estate fled suit against, among others, Offcers Girdner and Vick, alleging that the offcers were liable under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, for violating Rollice's Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. The offcers moved for summary judgment, both on the merits and on qualifed immunity grounds. The District Court granted their motion. Burke v. Tahlequah, 2019 WL 4674316, *6 (ED Okla., Sept. 25, 2019). The offcers' use of force was reasonable, it concluded, and even if not, qualifed immunity prevented the case from going further. Ibid. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed. 981 F. 3d, at 826. The Court began by explaining that Tenth Circuit precedent allows an offcer to be held liaPage Proof Pending Publication ble for a shooting that is itself objectively reasonable if the offcer's reckless or deliberate conduct created a situation requiring deadly force. Id., at 816. Applying that rule, the Court concluded that a jury could fnd that Offcer Girdner's initial step toward Rollice and the offcers' subsequent “cornering” of him in the back of the garage recklessly created the situation that led to the fatal shooting, such that their ultimate use of deadly force was unconstitutional. Id., at 823. As to qualifed immunity, the Court concluded that several cases, most notably Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F. 3d 837 (CA10 1997), clearly established that the offcers' conduct was unlawful. 981 F. 3d, at 826. This petition followed. We need not, and do not, decide whether the offcers violated the Fourth Amendment in the frst place, or whether recklessly creating a situation that requires deadly force can itself violate the Fourth Amendment. On this record, the offcers plainly did not violate any clearly established law. The doctrine of qualifed immunity shields offcers from civil liability so long as their conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 231 (2009). As we have explained, qualifed immunity protects “ `all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.' ” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U. S. 48, 63 (2018) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 341 (1986)).
We have repeatedly told courts not to defne clearly established law at too high a level of generality. See, e.g., Ash croft v. al-Kidd, 563 U. S. 731, 742 (2011). It is not enough that a rule be suggested by then-existing precedent; the “rule's contours must be so well defned that it is `clear to a reasonable offcer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.' ” Wesby, 583 U. S., at 63 (quoting Sau cier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 202 (2001)). Such specifcity is “especially important in the Fourth Amendment context,” where it is “sometimes diffcult for an offcer to determine Page Proof Pending Publication how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the offcer confronts.” Mul lenix v. Luna, 577 U. S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Tenth Circuit contravened those settled principles here. Not one of the decisions relied upon by the Court of Appeals—Estate of Ceballos v. Husk, 919 F. 3d 1204 (CA10 2019), Hastings v. Barnes, 252 Fed. Appx. 197 (CA10 2007), Allen, 119 F. 3d 837, and Sevier v. Lawrence, 60 F. 3d 695 (CA10 1995)—comes close to establishing that the offcers' conduct was unlawful. The Court relied most heavily on Allen. But the facts of Allen are dramatically different from the facts here. The offcers in Allen responded to a potential suicide call by sprinting toward a parked car, screaming at the suspect, and attempting to physically wrest a gun from his hands. 119 F. 3d, at 841. Offcers Girdner and Vick, by contrast, engaged in a conversation with Rollice, followed him into a garage at a distance of 6 to 10 feet, and did not yell until after he picked up a hammer. We cannot conclude that Allen “clearly established” that their conduct was reckless or that their ultimate use of force was unlawful.
The other decisions relied upon by the Court of Appeals are even less relevant. As for Sevier, that decision merely noted in dicta that deliberate or reckless preseizure conduct can render a later use of force excessive before dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See 60 F. 3d, at 700–701. To state the obvious, a decision where the court did not even have jurisdiction cannot clearly establish substantive constitutional law. Regardless, that formulation of the rule is much too general to bear on whether the offcers' particular conduct here violated the Fourth Amendment. See al-Kidd, 563 U. S., at 742. Estate of Ceballos, decided after the shooting at issue, is of no use in the clearly established inquiry. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 200, n. 4 (2004) (per curiam). And Hastings, an unpublished deciPage Proof Pending Publication sion, involved offcers initiating an encounter with a potentially suicidal individual by chasing him into his bedroom, screaming at him, and pepper-spraying him. 252 Fed.
Appx., at 206. Suffce it to say, a reasonable offcer could miss the connection between that case and this one.
Neither the panel majority nor the respondent has identifed a single precedent fnding a Fourth Amendment violation under similar circumstances. The offcers were thus entitled to qualifed immunity.
The petition for certiorari and the motions for leave to fle briefs amici curiae are granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication Reporter’s Note The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional edits were made: p. 14, line 6, “have” is replaced with “has”