Eminent domain is the power of the government to take property for public use without the consent of the owner. It can be exercised either by public offcials or by private parties to whom the power has been delegated. And it can be exercised either through the initiation of legal proceedings *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by Deanne E. Maynard, James R. Sigel, and Daryl Joseffer; for Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC, by Catherine E. Stetson and Sean Marotta; for the Energy Equipment and Infrastructure Alliance by Michael H. McGinley and Steven B. Feir son; for the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America et al. by Lela M. Hollabaugh, Nicholas A. Danella, Sandra Y. Snyder, Paul G. Afonso, and Michael L. Murray; for the Marcellus Shale Coalition et al. by Terry R. Bossert and Kevin Jon Moody; for the Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association et al. by Charles O. Beckley II; and for the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, et al. by Ellen O. Boardman. Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of Oregon et al. by Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General of Oregon, Benja min Gutman, Solicitor General, Paul L. Smith, Deputy Solicitor General, and Jona J. Maukonen, Philip M. Thoennes, and Inge D. Wells, Assistant Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General and other offcials for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Matthew Rodriquez, Acting Attorney General of California, William Tong of Connecticut, Kathleen Jen nings of Delaware, Clare E. Connors of Hawaii, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Brian E. Frosh of Maryland, Maura Healey of Massachusetts, Dana Nessel of Michigan, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Aaron D. Ford of Nevada, Hector Balderas of New Mexico, Letitia James of New York, Joshua H. Stein of North Carolina, Peter F. Neronha of Rhode Island, Thomas J. Donovan, Jr., of Vermont, Mark R. Herring of Virginia, and Robert W. Ferguson of Washington; and for the Council of State Governments et al. by Vivek V. Tata and Lisa E. Soronen. Robert J. McNamara fled a brief for the Institute for Justice as ami cus curiae.
Page Proof Pending Publication or simply by taking possession up front, with compensation to follow. Since the founding, the United States has used its eminent domain authority to build a variety of infrastructure projects. It has done so on its own and through private delegatees, and it has relied on legal proceedings and upfront takings. It has also used its power against both private property and property owned by the States.
This case involves one of the ways the federal eminent domain power can be exercised: through legal proceedings initiated by private delegatees against state-owned property. Specifcally, we are asked to decide whether the Federal Government can constitutionally confer on pipeline companies the authority to condemn necessary rights-of-way in which a State has an interest. We hold that it can. Although non- consenting States are generally immune from suit, they surrendered their immunity from the exercise of the federal eminent domain power when they ratifed the Constitution. That power carries with it the ability to condemn property in court. Because the Natural Gas Act delegates the federal eminent domain power to private parties, those parties can initiate condemnation proceedings, including against state-owned property.
I
A
Natural gas has been a part of the Nation's energy supply since at least the 1820s, when an “enterprising gunsmith” named William Aaron Hart developed a natural gas well near Fredonia, New York. D. Waples, The Natural Gas Industry in Appalachia 12 (2d ed. 2012). Initially, diffculties in transporting natural gas limited its distribution, as the available pipeline technology did not allow producers to reach the sprawling American markets. See Tarr, Transforming an Energy System, in The Governance of Large Technical Systems 26 (O. Coutard ed. 1999). Over the following century, however, that technology slowly improved. In 1891, one Page Proof Pending Publication of the frst interstate pipelines—albeit a rudimentary and ineffcient one—was built to carry natural gas from central Indiana to Chicago. And in the 1920s, development began in earnest on the country's pipeline infrastructure. See id., at 27–28; J. Speight, Natural Gas 20–21, 26 (2007).
In 1938 Congress passed the Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821, to regulate the transportation and sale of natural gas in interstate commerce. Congress vested the Federal Power Commission (now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) with the authority to administer the NGA, including by approving the construction and extension of interstate pipelines. The NGA provides that in order to build an interstate pipeline, a natural gas company must obtain from FERC a certifcate refecting that such construction “is or will be required by the present or future public convenience and necessity.” 15 U. S. C. § 717f(e). The NGA also provides that, before issuing a certifcate of public convenience and necessity, FERC “shall set the matter for hearing and shall give such reasonable notice of the hearing thereon to all interested persons.” § 717f(c)(1)(B).
As originally enacted, the NGA did not identify a mechanism for certifcate holders to secure property rights necessary to build pipelines. Natural gas companies were instead left to rely on state eminent domain procedures, which were frequently made unavailable to them. In some States, the eminent domain power could be exercised only if the operation of a pipeline would beneft residents. See S. Rep. No. 429, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1947) (collecting cases). In others, statutory and constitutional provisions denied state eminent domain power to corporations from other States. See id., at 2–3. The result was that certifcate holders often had only an illusory right to build. Congress acted to remedy this defect.
In 1947, it amended the NGA to authorize certifcate holders to exercise the federal eminent domain power. See ch. 333, 61 Stat. 459. Under 15 U. S. C. § 717f(h): “When any holder of a certifcate of public convenience and necessity cannot acquire by contract, or is unable to agree with the owner of property to the compensation to be paid for, the necessary right-of-way to construct, operate, and maintain a pipe line or pipe lines for the transportation of natural gas . . . , it may acquire the same by the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the district court of the United States for the district in which such property may be located, or in the State courts.”
By enabling FERC to vest natural gas companies with the federal eminent domain power, the 1947 amendment ensured that certifcates of public convenience and necessity could be given effect.
B
Petitioner PennEast Pipeline Co. is a joint venture owned by several energy companies. In 2015, PennEast applied to FERC for a certifcate of public convenience and necessity authorizing the construction of a 116-mile pipeline from Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, to Mercer County, New Jersey. FERC published notice of PennEast's application in the Federal Register, and subsequently received thousands of comments in writing and at public hearings. FERC then issued a draft environmental impact statement for the project, which yielded thousands of additional comments.
PennEast made a number of route modifcations in response to the concerns commenters had raised.
In January 2018, FERC granted PennEast a certifcate of public convenience and necessity. FERC later denied rehearing of this decision, and several parties, including respondent New Jersey, petitioned for review in the D. C. Circuit. The D. C. Circuit has held those proceedings in abeyance pending resolution of this case.
Weeks after FERC granted its application, PennEast fled various complaints in Federal District Court in New Jersey. Page Proof Pending Publication PennEast sought to exercise the federal eminent domain power under § 717f(h) to obtain rights-of-way along the pipeline route approved by FERC, and to establish just compensation for affected owners. PennEast also sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief allowing it to take immediate possession of each property in advance of any award of just compensation. As relevant here, PennEast sought to condemn two parcels in which New Jersey asserts a possessory interest, and 40 parcels in which the State claims nonpossessory interests, such as conservation easements. PennEast also sought to condemn parcels in which respondent New Jersey Conservation Foundation holds an interest.
New Jersey moved to dismiss PennEast's complaints on sovereign immunity grounds. The District Court denied the motion, holding that New Jersey was not immune from PennEast's exercise of the Federal Government's eminent domain power. In re PennEast Pipeline Co., 2018 WL 6584893, *12 (D NJ, Dec. 14, 2018). Having denied New Jersey's motion to dismiss on immunity grounds, the District Court granted PennEast's requests for a condemnation order and preliminary injunctive relief. Id., at *21, *26.
The Third Circuit vacated the District Court's order insofar as it awarded PennEast relief with respect to New Jersey's property interests, and it remanded for dismissal of any claims against the State. In re PennEast Pipeline Co., 938 F. 3d 96, 113 (2019). Although the court acknowledged that the Federal Government can condemn state-owned property, it reasoned that this power is in fact the product of two separate powers: the Federal Government's eminent domain power, on the one hand, and its ability to sue nonconsenting States, on the other. Id., at 104. While the Federal Government can delegate its eminent domain power to private parties, the court found “reason to doubt” that it can do the same with respect to its exemption from state sovereign immunity. Id., at 100. After expressing skepticism as to Page Proof Pending Publication whether the Federal Government could ever delegate this exemption, see id., at 105–111, the court determined that it did not need to “defnitively resolve that question,” because “nothing in the NGA indicates that Congress intended to do so,” id., at 111. In reaching this determination, the Third Circuit relied on this Court's precedents holding that Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity in the absence of an “ `unmistakably clear' ” statement. Ibid. (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U. S. 775, 786 (1991)). Concluding that § 717f(h) did not clearly delegate to certifcate holders the Federal Government's ability to sue nonconsenting States, the court held that PennEast was not authorized to condemn New Jersey's property. 938 F. 3d, at 111–113.
We granted certiorari to determine whether the NGA authorizes certifcate holders to condemn land in which a State claims an interest. 592 U. S. ––– (2021).
II
We begin by addressing a jurisdictional issue raised by the United States. As just noted, the Third Circuit ruled in New Jersey's favor based on the State's statutory argument that the NGA did not delegate to certifcate holders the right to fle condemnation actions against nonconsenting States. The United States now argues that the Third Circuit lacked jurisdiction to decide that question under 15 U. S. C. § 717r(b), which gives the court of appeals reviewing FERC's certifcate order (here, the D. C. Circuit) “exclusive” jurisdiction to “affrm, modify, or set aside such order.” According to the United States, New Jersey's statutory argument, if accepted, would modify FERC's order because FERC “expressly stated” in the order that PennEast “would have authority to acquire the necessary land or property to construct the approved facilities by exercising the right of eminent domain.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 15 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Page Proof Pending Publication PennEast and the respondents both argue that the United States is wrong. We agree. New Jersey does not seek to modify FERC's order; it asserts a defense against the condemnation proceedings initiated by PennEast. To determine whether the District Court correctly rejected New Jersey's defense, the Third Circuit needed to decide whether § 717f(h) grants natural gas companies the right to bring condemnation suits against States. Its conclusion that § 717f(h) does not authorize such suits did not “modify” or “set aside” FERC's order, which neither purports to grant PennEast the right to fle a condemnation suit against States nor addresses whether § 717f(h) grants that right. This case is thus unlike Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U. S. 320 (1958), in which we held that the Federal Power Act's similarly worded exclusive-review provision barred a State from arguing that a licensee could not exercise the rights granted to it by the license itself. Contrary to the United States' argument, New Jersey's appeal is not a collateral attack on the FERC order.
III
Turning to New Jersey's sovereign immunity defense, we begin by discussing the federal eminent domain power.
Since the founding, the Federal Government has exercised its eminent domain authority through both its own offcers and private delegatees. And it has used that power to take property interests held by both individuals and States. Section 717f(h) is an unexceptional instance of this established practice.
A
Governments have long taken property for public use without the owner's consent. Although the term “eminent domain” appears to have been coined by Grotius, see 2 De Jure Belli ac Pacis 807 (1646 ed., F. Kelsey transl. 1925), the history of the power may stretch back to biblical times, see Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 517, 524–525 (2009). In England and the early Colonies, a host of statutes authorPage Proof Pending Publication ized the use of eminent domain for the construction of roads, bridges, and river improvements, among other projects. See Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 Wash. L. Rev. 553, 561–562 (1972). Those vested with the power could either initiate legal proceedings to secure the right to build, or they could take property up front and force the owner to seek recovery for any loss of value. See 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 1.22[11–12] (3d ed. 2021); see also Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U. S. 180, 186 (2019) (contrasting “direct condemnation” with “inverse condemnation”).
When the Constitution and Bill of Rights were ratifed, they did not include the words “eminent domain.” The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation”) nevertheless recognized the existence of such a power. Shortly after the founding, the Federal Government began exercising its eminent domain authority in areas subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1809, 2 Stat. 539 (authorizing construction of turnpike road in the District of Columbia); see also Custiss v. Georgetown & Alexandria Turnpike Co., 6 Cranch 233 (1810) (suit by one of Martha Washington's grandsons to quash inquisition into value of land pursuant to Act).
By the second half of the 19th century, however, this Court confrmed that federal eminent domain extended to property within state boundaries as well. In Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367 (1876), we held that the United States could condemn land in Ohio to construct a federal building. We reasoned that “[t]he powers vested by the Constitution in the general government demand for their exercise the acquisition of lands in all the States.” Id., at 371. And we noted that “[t]he right of eminent domain was one of those means well known when the Constitution was adopted, and employed to obtain lands for public uses.” Id., at 372. The federal eminent domain power, we said, “can neither be enPage Proof Pending Publication larged nor diminished by a State. Nor can any State prescribe the manner in which it must be exercised.” Id., at 374. And to avoid any doubt, we added that “[t]he consent of a State can never be a condition precedent to [the] enjoyment” of federal eminent domain. Ibid. While Kohl involved the condemnation of private land, we have since explained that federal eminent domain applies to state property interests as well. In Oklahoma ex rel. Phil lips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U. S. 508 (1941), we upheld an Act of Congress authorizing construction of a dam and a reservoir that would inundate thousands of acres of state- owned land. There, we made explicit a point that was implicit in Kohl's reasoning: “The fact that land is owned by a state is no barrier to its condemnation by the United States.” 313 U. S., at 534.
B
For as long as the eminent domain power has been exercised by the United States, it has also been delegated to private parties. It was commonplace before and after the founding for the Colonies and then the States to authorize the private condemnation of land for a variety of public works. See Bell, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev., at 545; see generally, e. g., Hart, The Maryland Mill Act, 1669–1766, 39 Am. J. Legal Hist. 1 (1995). The Federal Government was no different. As early as 1809, Congress authorized private parties to exercise the eminent domain power—including through the initiation of direct condemnation proceedings— within areas subject to federal jurisdiction. See supra, at 494; see also Act of Mar. 2, 1831, 4 Stat. 477.
In the years following Kohl, the Court confrmed that private delegatees can exercise the federal eminent domain power within the States as well. Our decision in Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525 (1894), is clear on this point. Congress authorized a corporation to build a bridge between New York and New Jersey, and to condemn property as necessary along the way. Id., at 525–528 (statement Page Proof Pending Publication of the case); see Act of July 11, 1890, ch. 669, 26 Stat. 268. Luxton—who owned land in Hoboken against which the corporation had brought condemnation proceedings—objected on the ground that Congress had unconstitutionally delegated its eminent domain power to the corporation. 153 U. S., at 527–528 (statement of the case). We rejected Luxton's challenge, explaining that Congress “may, at its discretion, use its sovereign powers, directly or through a corporation created for that object, to construct bridges for the accommodation of interstate commerce.” Id., at 530. These powers, we noted, could be exercised “with or without a concurrent act of the State in which the lands lie.” Ibid. State property was not immune from the exercise of delegated eminent domain power. In fact, this is not the frst time New Jersey has tried to thwart such a delegation. In Stockton v. Baltimore & N. Y. R. Co., 32 F. 9 (CC NJ 1887), Justice Bradley, riding circuit, considered a challenge by New Jersey to an Act of Congress authorizing a New York corporation to build a bridge on state-owned land. Id., at 9–11; see Act of June 16, 1886, ch. 417, 24 Stat. 78. The Secretary of War had approved the plans for the bridge, as required by the Act, and the corporation had begun preparing for construction. 32 F., at 11. New Jersey sought an injunction, arguing among other things that an out-of-state corporation could not operate within its borders, and that the corporation could not take its land without its consent. Id., at 13, 17. Justice Bradley dismissed these arguments, reasoning that “if congress, in the execution of its powers, chooses to employ the intervention of a proper corporation, whether of the state, or out of the state, we see no reason why it should not do so.” Id., at 14. Justice Bradley also presciently noted that New Jersey's position, if accepted, would give rise to the “dilemma of requiring the consent of the state in almost every case of an interstate line of communication by railroad, for hardly a case can arise in Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication which some property belonging to a state will not be crossed.” Id., at 17.
Just a few years after Stockton, Justice Bradley's views were adopted by the full Court. In Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 135 U. S. 641 (1890), the Cherokees argued that a private railroad company could not exercise the federal eminent domain power pursuant to an Act of Congress. Id., at 655–656. The Act authorized the company to condemn land, including land owned by the Cherokees, through a set of procedures for determining just compensation. See Act of July 4, 1884, ch. 179, 23 Stat. 73. This Court concluded that the Cherokees' challenge was merit- less. We quoted at length from Stockton's discussion of the Federal Government's superior eminent domain power within the States. See 135 U. S., at 656 (quoting 32 F., at 19). And although Stockton involved state-owned land, whereas Cherokee Nation involved property owned by an Indian Tribe, the Court said that “[i]t would be very strange if the national government, in the execution of its rightful authority, could exercise the power of eminent domain in the several States, and could not exercise the same power in a Territory occupied by an Indian nation or tribe.” 135 U. S., at 656–657. It made no difference, moreover, that the Cherokees' property was condemned by a private delegatee, as the delegatee was “none the less a ft instrumentality to accomplish the public objects contemplated by the act.” Id., at 657.
C
The cases above paint a clear picture: Since its inception, the Federal Government has wielded the power of eminent domain, and it has delegated that power to private parties. We have observed and approved of that practice. The eminent domain power may be exercised—whether by the Government or its delegatees—within state boundaries, including against state property. We have also stated, as a general matter, that “the United States may take property pursuant to its power of eminent domain in one of two ways: it can enter into physical possession of property without authority of a court order; or it can institute condemnation proceedings under various Acts of Congress providing authority for such takings.” United States v. Dow, 357 U. S. 17, 21 (1958). The same is true for private delegatees. Luxton, for example, arose out of a condemnation proceeding initiated by a corporation, 153 U. S., at 525–528 (statement of the case), whereas Stockton was a suit brought by the State after preparations for construction had already begun, 32 F., at 11.
Section 717f(h) follows this path. As described above, a natural gas company must obtain a certifcate of public convenience and necessity from FERC in order to build a pipeline. Once the certifcate is obtained, if the company “cannot acquire by contract, or is unable to agree with the owner of property to the compensation to be paid for, the necessary right-of-way” to build the pipeline, then the company “may acquire the same by the exercise of the right of eminent domain.” § 717f(h). This delegation is categorical. No one disputes that § 717f(h) was passed specifcally to solve the problem of States impeding interstate pipeline development by withholding access to their own eminent domain procedures. See S. Rep. No. 429, at 2–4. And it was understood both at the time the provision was enacted and over the following decades that States' property interests would be subject to condemnation. See, e. g., Hearings on S. 734 et al. before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 105 (1947) (opponents of the bill that would become § 717f(h) objecting on the ground that it would “permit[ ] the taking of State-owned lands used for State purposes by a private company”); Tenneco Atlantic Pipeline Co., 1 FERC ¶63,025, p. 65,203 (1977) (“the eminent domain grant to persons holding [certifcates of public convenience and necessity] applies Page Proof Pending Publication equally to private and state lands”). By its terms, § 717f(h) delegates to certifcate holders the power to condemn any necessary rights-of-way, including land in which a State holds an interest.
IV
The respondents and the principal dissent do not dispute that the NGA empowers certifcate holders to condemn private property. They argue instead that sovereign immunity bars condemnation actions against nonconsenting States. And even if such actions are constitutionally permissible, the respondents (but not the dissent) contend that § 717f(h) does not speak with suffcient clarity to authorize them. We address each of these arguments in turn.
A
“States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratifcation of the Constitution.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 713 (1999). When “the States entered the federal system,” they did so “with their sovereignty intact.” Blatchford, 501 U. S., at 779. Although the Court initially held that States could be subject to suit by citizens of other States, see Chis holm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793), the ratifcation of the Eleventh Amendment soon corrected this error. That Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” Our decision in Hans v. Louisi ana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), clarifed that States retain their immunity from suit regardless of the citizenship of the plaintiff. Since Hans, “we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confrms.” Blatchford, 501 U. S., at 779.
Page Proof Pending Publication Under our precedents, a State may be subject to suit only in limited circumstances. A State may of course consent to suit, although such consent must be “unequivocally expressed.” Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U. S. 277, 284 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Congress may also abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 456 (1976), again assuming it does so with the requisite clarity, Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 721, 726 (2003). And a State may be sued if it has agreed to suit in the “plan of the Convention,” which is shorthand for “the structure of the original Constitution itself.” Alden, 527 U. S., at 728; see The Federalist No. 81, pp. 548–549 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). The “plan of the Convention” includes certain waivers of sovereign immunity to which all States implicitly consented at the founding. See Alden, 527 U. S., at 755–756. We have recognized such waivers in the context of bankruptcy proceedings, Central Va. Community College v. Katz, 546 U. S. 356, 379 (2006); see Allen v. Cooper, 589 U. S. 248, 258–259 (2020), suits by other States, South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286, 318 (1904), and suits by the Federal Government, United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621, 646 (1892).
B
The respondents and the dissent argue that private parties cannot condemn state-owned property under § 717f(h) because there is no applicable exception to sovereign immunity. In the dissent's view, PennEast's suit is barred because § 717f(h) is just another “exercise of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce,” and “Congress cannot authorize private suits against a nonconsenting State pursuant to its Commerce Clause power.” Post, at 515 (opinion of Barrett, J.); see also Brief for Respondent NJCF 22–24. The dissent also contends that States did not implicitly consent to private condemnation suits when they ratifed the ConstituPage Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication tion. See post, at 515–518; see also Brief for Respondent NJCF 38–44; Brief for Respondent New Jersey et al. 13–22. Beginning with the argument that Congress cannot subject States to suit pursuant to its commerce power, it is undoubtedly true under our precedents that—with the exception of the Bankruptcy Clause, see Katz, 546 U. S., at 379—“Article I cannot justify haling a State into federal court,” Allen, 589 U. S., at 257. In Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44 (1996), we held that state sovereign immunity “restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.” Id., at 72–73. Seminole Tribe concluded that States' inherent immunity from suit would be “eviscerated” if Congress were allowed to abrogate States' immunity pursuant to its Article I powers. Id., at 64.
But congressional abrogation is not the only means of subjecting States to suit. As noted above, States can also be sued if they have consented to suit in the plan of the Convention. And where the States “agreed in the plan of the Convention not to assert any sovereign immunity defense,” “no congressional abrogation [is] needed.” Allen, 589 U. S., at 258–259.
As the cases discussed in Part III show, the States consented in the plan of the Convention to the exercise of federal eminent domain power, including in condemnation proceedings brought by private delegatees. The plan of the Convention refects the “fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional design.” Alden, 527 U. S., at 729. And we have said regarding the exercise of federal eminent domain within the States that one “postulate of the Constitution [is] that the government of the United States is invested with full and complete power to execute and carry out its purposes.” Cherokee Nation, 135 U. S., at 656 (quoting Stockton, 32 F., at 19).
Put another way, when the States entered the federal system, they renounced their right to the “highest dominion in the lands comprised within their limits.” 135 U. S., at 656 (quoting 32 F., at 19). The plan of the Convention contemplated that States' eminent domain power would yield to that of the Federal Government “so far as is necessary to the enjoyment of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution.” Kohl, 91 U. S., at 372. As we explained in Cherokee Nation (again quoting Justice Bradley in Stockton), “[i]f it is necessary that the United States government should have an eminent domain still higher than that of the State, in order that it may fully carry out the objects and purposes of the Constitution, then it has it.” 135 U. S., at 656 (quoting 32 F., at 19). The Court left no doubt about the importance of the proposition: “This is not a matter of words, but of things.” 135 U. S., at 656 (quoting 32 F., at 19). And as we have emphasized in cases involving delegations of the federal eminent domain power, Congress “may, at its discretion, use its sovereign powers, directly or through a corporation created for that object.” Luxton, 153 U. S., at 530. PennEast's condemnation action to give effect to the federal eminent domain power falls comfortably within the class of suits to which States consented under the plan of the Convention. The respondents and the dissent do not dispute that the Federal Government enjoys a power of eminent domain superior to that of the States. Nor do they dispute that the Federal Government can delegate that power to private parties. They instead assert that the only “question is whether Congress can authorize a private party to bring a condemnation suit against a State.” Post, at 516–517; see Brief for Respondent NCJF 40; Brief for Respondent New Jersey et al. 15. And they argue that because there is no founding- era evidence of such suits, States did not consent to them when they entered the federal system. See post, at 516– 518; Brief for Respondent NCJF 39–42; Brief for Respondent New Jersey et al. 13–16.
Page Proof Pending Publication The faw in this reasoning is that it attempts to divorce the eminent domain power from the power to bring condemnation actions—and then argue that the latter, so carved out, cannot be delegated to private parties with respect to state- owned lands. But the eminent domain power is inextricably intertwined with the ability to condemn. We have even at times equated the eminent domain power with the power to bring condemnation proceedings. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 258, n. 2 (1980), abrogated on other grounds by Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc., 544 U. S. 528, 532 (2005). Separating the eminent domain power from the power to condemn—when exercised by a delegatee of the Federal Government—would violate the basic principle that a State may not diminish the eminent domain authority of the federal sovereign. See Kohl, 91 U. S., at 374 (“If the United States have the power, it must be complete in itself. It can neither be enlarged nor diminished by a State.”). If private parties authorized by the Federal Government were unable to condemn States' property interests, then that would leave delegatees with only one constitutionally permissible way of exercising the federal eminent domain power: Take property now and require States to sue for compensation later.* It is diffcult to see how such an arrangement would vindicate the principles underlying state sovereign immunity. Whether the purpose of that doctrine is to “shield[ ] state treasuries” or “accord the States the respect owed them as joint sovereigns,” Federal Maritime Comm'n v. South Carolina Ports Authority, 535 U. S. 743, *In addition, all agree that Congress could authorize FERC itself to condemn the exact same property interests, pursuant to the exact same certifcate of public convenience and necessity, and then transfer those interests to PennEast following a legal proceeding in which the Government would presumably act in concert with PennEast. See post, at 518 (opinion of Barrett, J.); Brief for Petitioner 40; Brief for Respondent New Jersey et al. 43–46. This further highlights the counterintuitive nature of the constitutional scheme envisioned by the respondents and the dissent. Page Proof Pending Publication 765 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted), it would hardly be served by favoring private or Government supported invasions of state-owned lands over judicial proceedings.
Perhaps sensing the incongruity of such a result, New Jersey has taken the extreme stance that there is no constitutional mechanism for Federal Government delegatees to exercise the eminent domain power against the States. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 86. This position is untenable. “[J]ust as permission to harvest the wheat on one's land implies permission to enter on the land for that purpose,” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law 192 (2012), so too does authorization to take property interests imply a means through which those interests can be peaceably transferred. An eminent domain power that is incapable of being exercised amounts to no eminent domain power at all. And that is contrary to the plan of the Convention for the reasons discussed in Kohl, Stockton, Cherokee Nation, and Luxton.
The dissent, for its part, declines to say whether Congress could authorize a certifcate holder to take possession of state property through upfront entry. See post, at 519, and n. 3. The dissent gestures at other judicial and administrative procedures that delegatees might be able to use to take state property. See post, at 519, n. 3. But such procedures would almost certainly meet the same fate as traditional condemnation actions under the dissent's analysis. See Federal Maritime Comm'n v. South Carolina Ports Authority, 535 U. S. 743, 760–761 (2002).
Furthermore, the respondents and the dissent prove too much by emphasizing the historical absence of private condemnation suits against state-owned lands. As a preliminary matter, they appear to cast doubt on the provenance of the Federal Government's ability to exercise its eminent domain power within the States. See post, at 517; Brief for Respondent NCJF 40–42; Brief for Respondent New Jersey Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication et al. 16–18. But we resolved in Kohl and its progeny that the Federal Government has such an ability—including against state-owned property—and that the exercise of the federal eminent domain power was a means that was “known and appropriate” at the time of the founding. 91 U. S., at 372. We made very clear that this conclusion was unaffected by the fact that the federal eminent domain power had “not heretofore been exercised adversely” within the States, because “the non-user of a power does not disprove its existence.” Id., at 373.
The respondents and the dissent recognize, moreover, that States consented in the plan of the Convention to suits by the Federal Government, even though that proposition was not established until 1892 in United States v. Texas. See post, at 517–518; Brief for Respondent NCJF 37; Brief for Respondent New Jersey et al. 20–21; see also Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 329 (1934); Blatch ford, 501 U. S., at 781–782. The Court in Texas—which was decided even more recently than Kohl, Stockton, and Chero kee Nation—did not insist upon examples from the founding era of federal suits against States. The Court instead reasoned as a structural matter that such suits were authorized because it “does no violence to the inherent nature of sovereignty” for a State to be sued by “the government established for the common and equal beneft of the people of all the States.” 143 U. S., at 646. The structural considerations discussed above likewise show that States consented to the federal eminent domain power, whether that power is exercised by the Government or its delegatees. And that is true even in the absence of a perfect historical analogue to the proceedings PennEast initiated below.
The dissent argues that the Court in Texas relied not only on “constitutional structure,” but also on “textual cues.” Post, at 518. But the only relevant constitutional text in Texas was a grant of federal jurisdiction, and that cannot explain States' implicit consent in the plan of the Convention to suits by the Federal Government. If it could, then the extension of the judicial power to controversies “between a State and Citizens of another State,” Art. III, § 2, cl. 1, would suggest that Chisholm v. Georgia correctly held that nonconsenting States could be subject to private suit. And the existence of federal jurisdiction over controversies “between a State . . . and foreign States,” Art. III, § 2, cl. 1, would suggest that States consented in the plan of the Convention to suit by other nations, notwithstanding our holding to the contrary in Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi. A grant of judicial power does not imply an abrogation of sovereign immunity. Texas rested on “the consent of the State” in the constitutional plan, as does our decision today. 143 U. S., at 646. As a fnal point, the other dissent offers a different the- ory—that even if the States consented in the plan of the Convention to the proceedings below, the Eleventh Amendment nonetheless divests federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over a suit fled against a State by a diverse plaintiff. See post, at 510–512 (opinion of Gorsuch, J.). But under our precedents that no party asks us to reconsider here, we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to confer “a personal privilege which [a State] may waive at pleasure.” Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436, 447 (1883); see, e. g., Lapides v. Board of Regents of Univ. System of Ga., 535 U. S. 613, 618–619 (2002); Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 200 U. S. 273, 284 (1906). When “a State waives its immunity and consents to suit in federal court, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the action.” Atascadero State Hospital v. Scan lon, 473 U. S. 234, 238 (1985). Such consent may, as here, be “ `inherent in the constitutional plan.' ” McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Fla. Dept. of Business Regulation, 496 U. S. 18, 30 (1990) (quoting Princi pality of Monaco, 292 U. S., at 329); see, e. g., Katz, 546 U. S., at 377–378.
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C
We conclude by addressing the respondents' argument (which the dissent does not join) that even if States agreed in the plan of the Convention to condemnation suits by Federal Government delegatees, the NGA does not authorize such suits with the requisite clarity. The Third Circuit adopted this position below, concluding that § 717f(h) did not use the “unmistakably clear” language necessary to delegate the Federal Government's ability to sue nonconsenting States. 938 F. 3d, at 111 (quoting Blatchford, 501 U. S., at 786); 938 F. 3d, at 111 (“If Congress had intended to delegate the federal government's exemption from sovereign immunity, it would certainly have spoken much more clearly.”). The respondents renew their contention before this Court. See Brief for Respondent NCJF 24–31; Brief for Respondent New Jersey et al. 31–39. They note that we have required “unequivocal textual evidence” when determining whether a State has expressly consented to suit, or when evaluating whether Congress has validly abrogated state sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 32 (citing Sossamon, 563 U. S., at 291; Hibbs, 538 U. S., at 726). And they argue that this requirement should apply with equal force in the context of private condemnation actions against nonconsenting States.
The respondents are certainly correct that a clear statement is required to subject States to suit in the waiver and abrogation contexts. But they have again misconstrued the issue in this case as whether the United States can delegate its ability to sue States. The issue is instead whether the United States can delegate its eminent domain power to private parties. Regardless whether the Federal Government must speak with unmistakable clarity when delegating its freestanding exemption from state sovereign immunity (assuming such a delegation is even permissible, see Blatchford, 501 U. S., at 785), there is no similar requirement when the Page Proof Pending Publication Federal Government authorizes a private party to exercise its eminent domain power. The respondents do not dispute that the federal eminent domain power can be delegated, or that § 717f(h) speaks with suffcient clarity to delegate the power to condemn privately owned land. They argue only that § 717f(h) fails to delegate the power to condemn States' property interests. But the federal eminent domain power is “complete in itself,” Kohl, 91 U. S., at 374, and the States consented to the exercise of that power—in its entirety—in the plan of the Convention. The States thus have no immunity left to waive or abrogate when it comes to condemnation suits by the Federal Government and its delegatees.
V
When the Framers met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787, they sought to create a cohesive national sovereign in response to the failings of the Articles of Confederation. Over the course of the Nation's history, the Federal Government and its delegatees have exercised the eminent domain power to give effect to that vision, connecting our country through turnpikes, bridges, and railroads—and more recently pipelines, telecommunications infrastructure, and electric transmission facilities. And we have repeatedly upheld these exercises of the federal eminent domain power— whether by the Government or a private corporation, whether through an upfront taking or a direct condemnation proceeding, and whether against private property or state- owned land.
The NGA fts well within this tradition. From humble beginnings in central Indiana, the Nation's interstate pipeline system has grown to span hundreds of thousands of miles. This development was made possible by the enactment of § 717f(h) in 1947. By its terms, § 717f(h) authorizes FERC certifcate holders to condemn all necessary rights-ofway, whether owned by private parties or States. Such condemnation actions do not offend state sovereignty, bePage Proof Pending Publication cause the States consented at the founding to the exercise of the federal eminent domain power, whether by public offcials or private delegatees. Because the Third Circuit reached a contrary conclusion, we reverse the judgment below and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.