Congress requires most domestic refneries to blend a certain amount of ethanol and other renewable fuels into the transportation fuels they produce. But when it frst adopted these mandates, Congress temporarily exempted small refneries across the board. Looking beyond that initial period, Congress authorized individual small refneries to apply for additional hardship “extensions” from the federal government “at any time.” The question before us is whether a small refnery that manages to comply with renewable fuel mandates in one year is forever forbidden from applying for an “extension” in any future year.
I
In 2005 and 2007, Congress created the renewable fuel program (RFP). §§ 201, 202(a)(1), 121 Stat. 1519, 42 U. S. C. § 7545(o)(1)(J), (o)(1)(L), (o)(2)(A)(i). For 2006, Congress ordained the inclusion of 4 billion gallons of renewable fuel in the Nation's fuel supply. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i)(I). By 2022, the Patrick Morrisey of West Virginia; for American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers by Andrew M. Grossman, Christopher H. Marraro, and Richard Moskowitz; for Countrymark Refning and Logistics, LLC, by Derek R. Molter and Jenny R. Buchheit; and for the Small Refneries Coalition by Jonathan G. Hardin.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of Iowa et al. by Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, Jeffrey Thompson, Solicitor General, and Samuel P. Langholz, Assistant Solicitor General, Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General of Nebraska, James A. Campbell, Solicitor General, and Justin D. Lavene and Joshua E. Dethlefsen, Assistant Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Dana Nessel of Michigan, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Jason R. Ravnsborg of South Dakota, and Mark R. Herring of Virginia; for the Advanced Biofuels Association by Rafe Petersen; for the Coalition for Renewable Natural Gas et al. by Sandra Franco and Jerome C. Muys, Jr.; for Growth Energy et al. by Seth P. Waxman, David M. Lehn, Ellen Steen, and Travis Cushman; and for the National Biodiesel Board by Ethan G. Shenkman, Jonathan S. Martel, William Perdue, and Sally L. Pei. Page Proof Pending Publication HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE REFINING, LLC v. RENEWABLE FUELS ASSN.
number will climb to 36 billion gallons. Ibid. For years after that, Congress has largely left it to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to set the applicable volumes.
§ 7545(o)(2)(B)(ii).
From the start, EPA has apportioned the nationwide volume mandates into individualized ones for each refnery. § 7545(o)(3)(B); 40 CFR § 80.1407(a) (2020). The Agency polices these mandates with a system of credits. Each credit represents the blending of a certain quantity of renewable fuel.
42 U. S. C. § 7545(o)(5)(A)(i); 40 CFR §§ 80.1415, 80.1429. A refnery that blends renewables may either “retire” the credits it has earned (i. e., use them) to satisfy its own RFP volume obligation—or sell those credits to a different producer that needs them. 42 U. S. C. § 7545(o)(5)(B); 40 CFR §§ 80.1425–80.1427. Any given refnery may therefore comply with the law thanks to its own blending efforts, the purchase of credits from someone else, or a combination of both.
Congress tempered its mandates in other ways too. For example, if a refnery is unable to generate or purchase suffcient credits in a given year, it may “carry forward” any defcit to the following year. 42 U. S. C. § 7545(o)(5)(D). But this reprieve has a snowball effect. The next year, the refnery must offset the defcit it carried forward.
§ 7545(o)(5)(D)(ii). Elsewhere, Congress authorized more sweeping relief: EPA may waive RFP obligations in a particular State or region if it determines they “would severely harm the economy or environment” or if “there is an inadequate domestic supply.” § 7545(o)(7)(A). That waiver lasts for only one year, “but [it] may be renewed.” § 7545(o)(7)(C).
Most important for our case, however, is a different, if related, set of tempering features. Evidently, Congress was concerned that escalating RFP obligations could work special burdens on small refneries that lack the “inherent scale advantages of large refneries,” Sinclair Wyoming Refning Page Proof Pending Publication Co. v. EPA, 887 F. 3d 986, 989 (CA10 2017), and sometimes supply a major source of jobs in rural communities, Brief for State of Wyoming et al. as Amici Curiae 19–25. To protect small refneries that produce (on average) fewer than 75,000 barrels a day “for a calendar year,” § 7545(o)(1)(K), Congress created a blanket exemption from RFP obligations “until calendar year 2011,” § 7545(o)(9)(A)(i). Congress also directed EPA to “extend the exemption under clause (i)” for at least two years if the Secretary of Energy determined RFP obligations would impose “a disproportionate economic hardship” on a given small refnery. § 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii). Accordingly, subparagraph (A) anticipated temporary relief until 2011 or at least 2013. In the next subparagraph, the one most squarely at issue before us, Congress offered the possibility of still further relief in future years: “A small refnery may at any time petition the Administrator for an extension of the exemption under subparagraph (A) for the reason of disproportionate economic hardship.” § 7545(o)(9)(B)(i). Here's how things played out for small refneries once the law went into effect. Under subparagraph (A)(i), all small refneries were exempt through 2010. See Dept. of Energy, Offce of Policy and International Affairs, D. Vashishat et al., Small Refnery Exemption Study 25 (Mar. 2011). In 2011, EPA extended that exemption for 13 small refneries under subparagraph (A)(ii)—and it extended the exemption for an additional 11 small refneries under subparagraph (B)(i). Id., at 37. As time went on, and as economic conditions fuctuated, EPA extended more exemptions under subparagraph (B)(i) in some years than in others. For example, EPA granted 8 extensions in 2013, but expanded that number to 31 in 2018. EPA, RFS Small Refnery Exemptions (May 20, 2021), https://www.epa.gov/fuels-registration-reporting-andcompliance-help/rfs-small-refnery-exemptions.
This case concerns three small refneries that initially received an exemption, saw it lapse for a period, and then petitioned for an exemption again under subparagraph (B)(i). Page Proof Pending Publication HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE REFINING, LLC v. RENEWABLE FUELS ASSN.
HollyFrontier Woods Cross Refning LLC received only the blanket exemption under subparagraph (A)(i) through 2010. See Renewable Fuels Assn. v. EPA, 948 F. 3d 1206, 1228 (CA10 2020). Wynnewood Refning Company received the blanket exemption under subparagraph (A)(i) and a 2-year extension under subparagraph (A)(ii) through 2012. Id., at 1229. HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refning LLC received subparagraph (A)(i)'s blanket exemption, subparagraph (A)(ii)'s 2-year extension, and then subparagraph (B)(i)'s hardship exemption in 2015. Id., at 1227. After a lull, all three refneries petitioned for a hardship exemption under subparagraph (B)(i) in 2017 or 2018. EPA granted all three.
A group of renewable fuel producers objected. They petitioned for review of EPA's decisions in the Tenth Circuit, arguing the Agency acted “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations” by granting the petitions. 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(C). The court vacated EPA's decisions. It concluded the refneries were ineligible for an “extension” of their exemptions because all three had allowed their exemptions to lapse at some point in the past. 948 F. 3d, at 1249. We granted review to consider the question for ourselves. 592 U. S. ––– (2021).
II
A
Where Congress does not furnish a defnition of its own, we generally seek to afford a statutory term “its ordinary or natural meaning.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U. S. 471, 476 (1994). Before us, the parties agree on one thing: The key word here—“extension”—is nowhere defned in the statute and it can mean different things depending on context.
Sometimes, as the renewable fuel producers observe and the court of appeals held, an “extension” can refer to an increase in time. See, e. g., 5 Oxford English Dictionary 597 (2d ed. 1989) (OED) (“Enlargement in duration”); 7 U. S. C. § 940f(a) (“extension of the fnal maturity” of a federal loan). Page Proof Pending Publication In other settings, as the small refneries emphasize, an “extension” can mean the offering or making something available to someone, such as the granting of a beneft. See, e. g., 5 OED 595 (“[t]o hold out, accord, grant”); 15 U. S. C. § 1141e(a) (“extension of [intellectual property] protection”). These defnitional differences matter too. If Congress used the term in the second sense, everyone before us seems to accept the court of appeals erred: Just because a small refnery's frst exemption lapsed, nothing would foreclose the government from extending—in the sense of granting or conferring—a second exemption later.
Ultimately, however, we agree with the renewable fuel producers and the court of appeals that subparagraph (B)(i) uses “extension” in its temporal sense—referring to the lengthening of a period of time. We fnd three textual clues telling. First, the initial exemption described in subparagraph (A)(i) is described temporally (as lasting “until calendar year 2011”). 42 U. S. C. § 7545(o)(9)(A)(i). Second, the next exemption described in subparagraph (A)(ii) speaks temporally too, and it does so using a variation of the very term in dispute—authorizing EPA to “extend the exemption under clause (i) for the small refnery for a period of not less than 2 additional years.” § 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II) (emphasis added). Finally, subparagraph (A)(ii) and subparagraph (B)(i) share an identical title—“Extension of exemption”— underscoring the likelihood that the two neighboring provisions use the term “extension” in one consistent sense. Nor do we see any persuasive countervailing evidence that Congress meant to adopt one meaning of the term in subparagraph (A)(ii) and a different one next door in subparagraph (B)(i). See Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U. S. 79, 85 (2017) (absent contrary evidence, this Court normally presumes consistent usage).
B
Resolving that much, however, does not resolve this case. Really, it only takes us to the heart of the dispute. The Page Proof Pending Publication HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE REFINING, LLC v. RENEWABLE FUELS ASSN.
Tenth Circuit didn't just hold that an extension means an increase in time—it imposed a continuity requirement. On that court's view, a small refnery becomes permanently ineligible for a further extension of time once its exemption lapses. Even accepting that subparagraph (B)(i) uses the term “extension” in its temporal sense, the small refneries submit this was error. On their view, small refneries whose exemptions have lapsed in one year may still seek an “extension” in a following year. Indeed, the small refneries candidly characterize this as their stronger argument for reversal.
We agree. It is entirely natural—and consistent with ordinary usage—to seek an “extension” of time even after some lapse. Think of the forgetful student who asks for an “extension” for a term paper after the deadline has passed, the tenant who does the same after overstaying his lease, or parties who negotiate an “extension” of a contract after its expiration. Perhaps for reasons like these, the respondents and court of appeals are unable to point to a single dictionary defnition of the term “extension” requiring unbroken continuity. To be sure, some defnitions speak of an extension as a “continuation.” See, e. g., Black's Law Dictionary 703 (10th ed. 2014) (defning “extension” as “[t]he continuation of the same contract for a specifed period” (emphasis added)). And the dissent urges us to read “extension” to mean “continuation.” Post, at 401 (opinion of Barrett, J.). But even that term can denote a resumption after some interrupting lapse. See, e. g., 3 OED 828 (defning “continuation” as “the resumption of any interrupted action or course”); Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 220 (1936) (defning “continuation” as the “[a]ct of continuing; esp. a resumption”); B. Garner, Modern English Usage 214 (4th ed. 2016).
Much federal law proceeds on this same understanding.
Under certain circumstances, a court “may . . . extend” a party's “time for appeal” even “after the expiration of Page Proof Pending Publication the time otherwise set for bringing appeal.” 28 U. S. C. § 2107(c). In other words, the timer can start, run, fnish, and then restart—because a court has the power to “extend” the time allotted even after a lapse. Likewise, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribe all sorts of rules about “[w]hen an act may or must be done within a specifed time” in trial court proceedings. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 6(b)(1). And for almost all rules prescribing a deadline, a district court may “extend the time” even “after the time has expired.” Ibid.; cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 6(b)(2). More than a few lawyers and clients have taken advantage of “extensions” of just these sorts.
Still other examples exist. Maybe most notably, just last year Congress twice passed laws providing for the “extension” of public benefts that had lapsed or been interrupted. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021, Pub. L. 116– 260, § 203, 134 Stat. 1182 (providing an “extension” of unemployment compensation starting on December 26, 2020, after lapsing on July 31, 2020); Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. 116–136, § 2114, 134 Stat. 334 (providing an “extension” of unemployment benefts starting in 2020, after lapsing in 2013). The dissent gives these particular examples short shrift because they appear in statutes “passed in an emergency context” a decade after the statute at issue here. Post, at 406. We do not doubt that meaning may change with time, but unless the dissent thinks the ordinary meaning of “extension” changed in just 10 years, it's hard to understand why these enactments don't shed at least some light on today's question. If anything, the emergency context in which these laws were passed—forcing legislators to use a term on short notice—would seem to provide useful evidence of ordinary meaning.
Beyond that, the dissent counters by attempting to recast all these varied examples of temporal extensions after interruption. It imagines, for example, that when a teacher extends a paper deadline after a lapse, that act of grace always Page Proof Pending Publication HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE REFINING, LLC v. RENEWABLE FUELS ASSN.
operates like a nunc pro tunc judicial decree—retroactively deeming the time originally allotted as now extending continuously to some new and future due date. But no one thinks extensions always work this way. As the COVID–19 statutes illustrate, a previously lapsed beneft can and sometimes is “extended” for a new period without any retroactive effect. Likewise, if a student misses the 4 p.m. deadline on Friday, his teacher may extend the deadline by authorizing him to hand in his paper the following Monday between 8 a.m. and 9 a.m. Besides, even looking to the nunc pro tunc analogy, what does it prove? It cannot change the fact that, absent time travel, a lapse or interruption has occurred. The student cannot go back in time and turn in his paper when it was originally due on Friday afternoon. His lapse may be forgiven or overlooked, maybe even with a Latin term invoked in the process, but none of that means a break in continuity, a lapse, or an interruption never happened. See infra, at 394, n. 2 (discussing treatment of a lapse under subparagraph (A)).
We do not mean to suggest that every use of the word “extension” must be read the same way. On occasion, for example, Congress requires “extensions” to be “consecutive” or “successive.” E. g., 8 U. S. C. § 1184(g)(8)(D); 10 U. S. C. §2304a(f); 19 U. S. C. §2432(d)(1); 28 U. S. C. §594(b)(3)(A). Modifers like those may well suggest a continuity requirement. See, e. g., Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, at 994 (defning “successive” as “following each other without interruption”). Other contextual clues in a given statute may yield a similar conclusion. But none of that means the bare term “extension” obviously and always includes a strict continuity requirement. If anything, the absence of any parallel modifying language in the statute before us supplies one clue that continuity is not required here.
Further statutory clues confrm this understanding. Recall that subparagraph (B)(i) authorizes small refneries to seek hardship exemptions “at any time.” 42 U. S. C. Page Proof Pending Publication § 7545(o)(9)(B)(i). Far from indicating that a refnery may apply for an exemption in a future year only if it has always received one in the past, this language suggests a much more “expansive meaning.” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997). “At any time” does not connote a demand for some rigid continuity so much as its opposite—including the possibility that small refneries might apply for exemptions in different years in light of market fuctuations and changing hardship conditions, whether consecutively or otherwise.1 We fnd another feature telling too. Next door, subparagraph (A) uses the term “extension” without a continuity requirement. To see how subparagraph (A) was designed, imagine a small refnery avails itself of the blanket exemption in 2008 and 2009 under subparagraph (A)(i). Then in 2010, because of an increase in production capacity, the refnery loses “small refnery” status under § 7545(o)(1)(K) and with it the blanket exemption that “appl[ies] to small refneries.” § 7545(o)(9)(A)(i). One year later, production capacity falls and the refnery moves back into small refnery status for 2011. If that refnery applies for an “extension” under subparagraph (A)(ii), the statute provides that EPA “shall extend the exemption under clause (i),” so long as the Secretary of Energy found the refnery would suffer a disproportionate hardship. The result? A refnery may receive an “extension” despite its exemption having lapsed. And if that's how the term is used in subparagraph (A), we 1On the dissent's account, this language merely permits a small refnery to seek an extension for the following year after EPA's November 30 deadline for publishing the coming year's RFP mandates. Post, at 409–410. But to pursue this interpretation we would effectively have to read words into the statute. A provision promising small refneries that they may seek an extension “at any time” would become a provision promising them only the chance to seek an extension “for the following year at any time before or after EPA's November 30 deadline for publishing next year's RFP mandates.”
Page Proof Pending Publication HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE REFINING, LLC v. RENEWABLE FUELS ASSN.
would once again expect subparagraph (B) to follow a consistent pattern of usage. See Henson, 582 U. S., at 85.2 The refneries suggest we need to place still another point in their column. They direct our attention to a regulation EPA adopted in 2014 to clarify the bounds of “small refnery” status. When EPA frst sought public comment, some suggested a refnery should be eligible for exemption only if it constantly remained “small” from 2006 onward—and EPA expressly rejected that view in favor of revisiting annually whether a refnery falls above or below the “small refnery” threshold. 40 CFR § 80.1441(e)(2)(iii). Before the Tenth Circuit, the Agency insisted this regulation sheds light on the meaning of “extension” and underscores that it does not include a continuity requirement. Indeed, EPA asked the court of appeals to defer to its understanding under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). Although the refneries repeat that ask here, the government does not. With the recent change in administrations, “the government is not invoking Chevron.” Brief for Federal Respondent 46–47. We therefore decline to consider whether any deference might be due its regulation.
2Replying to our example, the dissent posits that subparagraph (A)(i)'s exemption “existed in the year 2010 by virtue of statute, even if a particular refnery was not in a position to take advantage of it.” Post, at 410– 411. But it's hard to see how a refnery might have an “exemptio[n] currently in place” when it does not qualify for or receive its benefts. Post, at 400. Even putting that problem aside, following the dissent's logic does not aid its cause. What is true for subparagraph (A)(i) should likewise be true for subparagraph (B)(i), which refers to “the exemption under subparagraph (A).” So, following the dissent's reasoning, one might just as easily conceive of a subparagraph (B)(i) exemption as “existing” even in a year when a small refnery “was not in a position to take advantage of it.” Accordingly, on the dissent's logic, if a small refnery lacked the exemption in one year (say, 2016) and then applied for it in a later year (say, 2017), it would seem the exemption always “presently exist[ed]” and can be “extended.” Post, at 403, 407.
Page Proof Pending Publication Against the petitioners' evidence of statutory meaning, the respondents ask us to consider their own. They point to the fact that subparagraph (A) is titled “temporary exemption,” that it was permitted to expire in 2013, and that subparagraph (B)(i) speaks of extending “the exemption under subparagraph (A).” Together, respondents say, these statutory features suggest that the whole scheme of exemptions was meant to end rapidly, that subparagraph (B)(i) was designed as a narrow exception to a 2013 sunset rule, and that any further exemptions it allows should therefore be construed narrowly to end as quickly as possible.
But this much we do not see. In the frst place, we do not construe subparagraph (B) as part of some sunset scheme. To be sure, subparagraph (A)'s exemptions were permitted to expire in 2013, but did not have to do so. In theory, EPA could have granted a small refnery exemption under subparagraph (A)(ii) that lasted many years or indefnitely. See 42 U. S. C. 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II). In any case, subparagraph (B)(i) expressly contemplates exemptions beyond 2013—“at any time” hardship conditions are satisfed. If Congress really had wanted all exemptions to cease after a temporary period, that was surely an odd way to achieve it. Odder still in light of the fact that Congress had before it (but eschewed) many readymade models for a sunset statute if that's what it wished here. See, e. g., § 247d–7f(b) (providing that statutory provisions authorizing a “limited antitrust exemption” “shall expire at the end of [a] 17-year period” after the Act was passed). And maybe odder yet given that subparagraph (B)(i) exemptions are hardly destined to sunset quickly even on the respondents' account, for they do not dispute that small refneries with an unbroken record of failing to comply with the RFP may continue to seek and obtain extensions forever. See Brief for Federal Respondent 43, n. 7; Brief for Industry Respondents 39.
Additionally, even assuming (without granting) that subparagraph (B) really did represent only some sort of excepPage Proof Pending Publication HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE REFINING, LLC v. RENEWABLE FUELS ASSN.
tion to a general 2013 deadline, we still don't see how that would help. The respondents urge us to construe statutory exceptions narrowly. But this Court has made clear that statutory exceptions are to be read fairly, not narrowly, for they “are no less part of Congress's work than its rules and standards—and all are worthy of a court's respect.” BP p.l.c. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 593 U. S. 230, 239 (2021). And fairly read, the key phrase at issue before us—“A small refnery may at any time petition the Administrator for an extension of the exemption under subparagraph (A) for the reason of disproportionate economic hardship”— simply does not contain the continuity requirement the court of appeals supposed. Instead, more naturally, it means exactly what it says: A small refnery can apply for (if not always receive) a hardship extension “at any time.” 3
III
Everything else the respondents offer in defense of the court of appeals' judgment involves surmise about legislative purpose and arguments from public policy. Like the Tenth Circuit, they emphasize that, by the time the petitioners sought new exemptions in 2017 and 2018, small refneries already “had many years to ponder . . . whether it made 3Rather than argue subparagraph (B)(i) is an exception that should be construed narrowly, the dissent imagines some weakness in our position when we observe above that the word extension “can” or “may” be used to refer to an increase in time after a lapse. Supra, at 390. From this, the dissent supposes that we mean to say “HollyFrontier wins because its reading is [merely] possible.” Post, at 402. That is mistaken. As we have sought to explain, we simply recognize that the term “extension” may or may not convey a continuity requirement depending on context— much as the dissent acknowledges the term can sometimes tolerate a lapse of some sort. See supra, at 394, n. 2 (discussing subparagraph (A)(1)). Our holding today, too, should be clear. Rather than rule for HollyFrontier because it has advanced a permissible reading, and rather than offer assertions about “common sense” or what seems “more natural” to us, post, at 402–404, we have sought to explain why this particular statute's usage, context, and structure persuade us that continuity is not required here. Page Proof Pending Publication sense to enter into or remain in the market.” 948 F. 3d, at 1247. The respondents argue that subparagraph (B) was adopted for the purpose of “funnel[ing] small refneries toward compliance over time.” Id., at 1246. And they submit that enforcing a continuity requirement helps advance congressional goals such as increasing “biofuel production, energy independence, and environmental protection.” Ibid. The dissent seemingly agrees. It acknowledges that Congress provided other ameliorating provisions to address various challenges to the fuel market. Post, at 407–409. For example and as we have already seen, § 7545(o)(7)(A) grants EPA authority to waive RFP obligations at any time across an entire State or region to address severe hardships or shortages. Section 7545(o)(7)(E)(ii) provides a more limited waiver with respect to biomass-based diesel fuels. And § 7545(o)(8)(D)(i) provided a waiver authority to address hardships for consumers “in calendar year 2006.” But on the dissent's view, everything else in the statute aims to “[f]unne[l] refneries toward compliance.” Post, at 408. Indeed, the dissent fnds it “odd” that our reading would permit hardship relief only to small refneries in existence in 2008 and not to new ones, post, at 411—and that our reading “will require EPA to examine the 2008 study” when reviewing extension applications “decades from now,” post, at 408.
But, as usual, the other side presents a plausible competing narrative. On the petitioners' account, the statute seeks to increase production of renewable fuel while also offering a “safety valve” each year for small refneries that might otherwise face extinction. According to the small refneries, the respondents' competing “funnel” metaphor makes little sense because a small refnery's compliance in one year is in no way dispositive of its ability to comply in a future year. Instead, compliance depends on numerous factors unique to each year and circumstances over which small refneries Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE REFINING, LLC v. RENEWABLE FUELS ASSN.
often have no control. Brief for Petitioners 42–44. In particular, most small refneries cannot comply with RFP mandates but must purchase credits from those that can. Each year more credits are required. And the price for those credits refect the famously volatile nature of the fuel market—in one recent year, prices shot up by as much as 100%. See id., at 45. Aware of these market realities, the small refneries say, a rational Congress could have created (and did create) a means for small refneries to seek a hardship exemption “at any time” rather than be forced to exit the market.
The petitioners say their “safety valve” analogy fts better for other reasons too. As the dissent acknowledges, Congress included many other “safety valve” provisions to address various challenges to the market that may arise at any time, including regional shortages and economic hardships. Post, at 407–409. Surely, Congress could have chosen to provide similar relief targeted to small refneries. Nor is there anything odd about the fact that Congress chose only to protect existing small refneries rather than new entrants. Often Congress chooses to protect existing market participants from shifts in the law while applying new restrictions fully to future entrants. Maybe, too, the petitioners suggest, Congress wasn't particularly concerned with new entrants in 2008 because, until last year, there had not been a new refnery of any size in this country for almost 50 years. See Blackmon, First Major U. S. Oil Refnery Since 1977 Targets Bakken Shale Crude, Forbes (July 25, 2020), https:// www.forbes.com /sites/davidblackmon / 2020 / 07/ 25/frst-newus-oil-refnery-since-1977-targets-bakken-shale-crude/.
The petitioners stress as well that, even on the respondents' account, Congress did create a “safety valve” rather than a “funnel” for some small refneries: Those with an unbroken record of failing to comply with the RFP may continue to seek and obtain extensions forever without being “funneled” toward compliance. Supra, at 395. Yet the respondents never explain why the least compliant refneries should be the most favored in this way. Nor do they confront the fact that their rule would have the strange effect of disincentivizing small refneries from ever trying to comply. Brief for Petitioners 22; Brief for State of Wyoming et al. as Amici Curiae 13–14. And even on the respondents' account, EPA will have to consult its 2008 study in future years for these permanently noncompliant refneries.
Beyond that, the petitioners note, if subparagraph (B)(i) really did create a “miss one and done” rule for small refneries able to comply with RFP mandates in a single year the statute could wind up reducing overall domestic fuel supply—all without adding a single additional gallon of renewable fuel to the mix. See 42 U. S. C. § 7545(o)(5)(B); 40 CFR § 80.1427. Permanently shuttering existing small refneries in the process could, as well, increase the Nation's future reliance on imported fuels. Brief for Petitioners 41. All of which sits uneasily with even the respondents' account of the statute's purposes.
We mention all this not because we pick sides. Neither the statute's text, structure, nor history afford us suffcient guidance to be able to choose with confdence between the parties' competing narratives and metaphors. We mention this only to observe that both sides can offer plausible accounts of legislative purpose and sound public policy—and that it would therefore be a mistake to rely on appeals to some abstract intuition that the number of small refneries receiving exemptions “should have tapered down” over time. 948 F. 3d, at 1246 (emphasis added). Instead, our analysis can be guided only by the statute's text—and that nowhere commands a continuity requirement.
* The respondents have not shown that EPA's approval of the petitioners' extension requests was in excess of the Agency's statutory authority. 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(C). To the Page Proof Pending Publication HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE REFINING, LLC v. RENEWABLE FUELS ASSN.
extent the court of appeals vacated EPA's orders on this ground, the judgment is Reversed.