In each of these two cases, a state court held that it had jurisdiction over Ford Motor Company in a products-liability suit stemming from a car accident. The accident happened in the State where suit was brought. The victim was one ney General Mooppan, Vivek Suri, Michael S. Raab, and Joseph F. Busa; for the Alliance for Automotive Innovation et al. by Jaime A. Santos and Darryl M. Woo; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by Andrew J. Pincus, Archis A. Parasharami, Daniel E. Jones, and Patrick Hedren; for the Institute of International Bankers by Elbert Lin; for the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America by Virginia A. Seitz, Jonathan F. Cohn, Allan Rothman, James C. Stansel, and Melissa B. Kimmel; for the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., by David R. Geiger; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Amanda K. Rice, Cory L. Andrews, Corbin K. Barthold, and Beth Heifetz.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance in both cases were fled for the State of Minnesota et al. by Keith Ellison, Attorney General of Minnesota, Liz Kramer, Solicitor General, Jason Marisam, Assistant Attorney General, Pete Surdo, Special Assistant Attorney General, Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, Jeffrey C. Mateer, First Assistant Attorney General, Kyle D. Hawkins, Solicitor General, Bill Davis, Deputy Solicitor General, Lisa A. Bennett, Assistant Solicitor General, and Abigail M. Frisch, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Kevin G. Clark- son of Alaska, Leslie Rutledge of Arkansas, Xavier Becerra of California, Phil Weiser of Colorado, William Tong of Connecticut, Kathleen Jennings of Delaware, Karl A. Racin, Attorney General of the District of Columbia, Ashley Moody of Florida, Clare E. Connors of Hawaii, Lawrence G. Was- den of Idaho, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Tom Miller of Iowa, Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Brian E. Frosh of Maryland, Maura Healey of Massachusetts, Dana Nessel of Michigan, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, Timothy C. Fox of Montana, Douglas J. Peterson of Nebraska, Aaron D. Ford of Nevada, Gurbir S. Grewal of New Jersey, Hector Bald- eras of New Mexico, Joshua H. Stein of North Carolina, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, Mike Hunter of Oklahoma, Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania, Peter F. Neronha of Rhode Island, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Jason Ravnsborg of South Dakota, Her bert H. Slatery III of Tennessee, Sean D. Reyes of Utah, Thomas J. Dono van, Jr., of Vermont, Mark R. Herring of Virginia, Robert W. Ferguson of Washington, and Patrick Morrisey of West Virginia; for the American of the State's residents. And Ford did substantial business in the State—among other things, advertising, selling, and servicing the model of vehicle the suit claims is defective. Still, Ford contends that jurisdiction is improper because the particular car involved in the crash was not frst sold in the forum State, nor was it designed or manufactured there.
We reject that argument.
When a company like Ford serves a market for a product in a State and that product causes injury in the State to one of its residents, the State's courts may entertain the resulting suit.
I
Ford is a global auto company. It is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in Michigan. But its business is everywhere. Ford markets, sells, and services its products across the United States and overseas. In this country alone, the company annually distributes over 2.5 million new cars, trucks, and SUVs to over 3,200 licensed dealerships. See App. 70, 100. Ford also encourages a resale market for its products: Almost all its dealerships buy and sell used Fords, as well as selling new ones. To enhance its brand and increase its sales, Ford engages in wide-ranging promotional activities, including television, print, online, and direct-mail advertisements. No matter where you live, you've seen them: “Have you driven a Ford lately?” or “Built Ford Tough.” Ford also ensures that consumers can keep their Association for Justice et al. by Robert S. Peck and Jeffrey R. White; for Civil Procedure Professors by Alan B. Morrison; for Civil Procedure Professors by Pamela K. Bookman and D. Theodore Rave, both pro se; for the Foundation for Moral Law by Martin Wishnatsky; for Main Street Alliance by Hassan A. Zavareei; for the National Association of Home Builders by Eric F. Citron, Daniel Woofter, and Erica Oleszczuk Evans; for Professors of Civil Procedure and Federal Courts by Linda Sandstrom Simard; for Professors of Jurisdiction by Vincent Levy and Gregory Dubi nsky; and for Jonathan R. Nash by Jonathan R. Nash, pro se. Briefs of amici curiae were fled in both cases for the Center for Auto Safety by Larry E. Coben and Jason Levine; and for DRI-The Voice of the Defense Bar by Lisa M. Baird, James C. Martin, and James M. Beck. Page Proof Pending Publication JUDICIAL DIST. COURT vehicles running long past the date of sale. The company provides original parts to auto supply stores and repair shops across the country. (Goes another slogan: “Keep your Ford a Ford.”) And Ford's own network of dealers offers an array of maintenance and repair services, thus fostering an ongoing relationship between Ford and its customers.
Accidents involving two of Ford's vehicles—a 1996 Explorer and a 1994 Crown Victoria—are at the heart of the suits before us. One case comes from Montana. Markkaya Gullett was driving her Explorer near her home in the State when the tread separated from a rear tire. The vehicle spun out, rolled into a ditch, and came to rest upside down. Gullett died at the scene of the crash. The representative of her estate sued Ford in Montana state court, bringing claims for a design defect, failure to warn, and negligence. The second case comes from Minnesota. Adam Bandemer was a passenger in his friend's Crown Victoria, traveling on a rural road in the State to a favorite ice-fshing spot. When his friend rear-ended a snowplow, this car too landed in a ditch. Bandemer's air bag failed to deploy, and he suffered serious brain damage. He sued Ford in Minnesota state court, asserting products-liability, negligence, and breach-ofwarranty claims.
Ford moved to dismiss the two suits for lack of personal jurisdiction, on basically identical grounds. According to Ford, the state court (whether in Montana or Minnesota) had jurisdiction only if the company's conduct in the State had given rise to the plaintiff's claims. And that causal link existed, Ford continued, only if the company had designed, manufactured, or—most likely—sold in the State the particular vehicle involved in the accident.1 In neither suit could the plaintiff make that showing. Ford had designed the Ex1Ford's Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss in Lucero v. Ford Motor Co., No. DV–18–247 (8th Jud. Dist., Cascade Cty., Mont.), pp. 14−15; Ford Motor Co.'s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss in No. 77–cv– 16–1025 (7th Jud. Dist., Todd Cty., Minn.), pp. 11−12, and n. 3. Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication plorer and Crown Victoria in Michigan, and it had manufactured the cars in (respectively) Kentucky and Canada. Still more, the company had originally sold the cars at issue outside the forum States—the Explorer in Washington, the Crown Victoria in North Dakota. Only later resales and relocations by consumers had brought the vehicles to Montana and Minnesota. That meant, in Ford's view, that the courts of those States could not decide the suits.
Both the Montana and the Minnesota Supreme Courts (affrming lower court decisions) rejected Ford's argument.
The Montana court began by detailing the varied ways Ford “purposefully” seeks to “serve the market in Montana.” 395 Mont. 478, 488, 443 P. 3d 407, 414 (2019). The company advertises in the State; “has thirty-six dealerships” there; “sells automobiles, specifcally Ford Explorers[,] and parts” to Montana residents; and provides them with “certifed repair, replacement, and recall services.” Ibid. Next, the court assessed the relationship between those activities and the Gullett suit. Ford's conduct, said the court, encourages “Montana residents to drive Ford vehicles.” Id., at 491, 443 P. 3d, at 416. When that driving causes in-state injury, the ensuing claims have enough of a tie to Ford's Montana activities to support jurisdiction. Whether Ford “designed, manufactured, or sold [the] vehicle” in the State, the court concluded, is “immaterial.” Ibid. Minnesota's Supreme Court agreed. It highlighted how Ford's “marketing and advertisements” infuenced state residents to “purchase and drive more Ford vehicles.” 931 N. W. 2d 744, 754 (2019). Indeed, Ford had sold in Minnesota “more than 2,000 1994 Crown Victoria[s]”—the “very type of car” involved in Bandemer's suit. Id., at 751, 754. That the “particular vehicle” injuring him was “designed, manufactured, [and frst] sold” elsewhere made no difference. Id., at 753 (emphasis in original). In the court's view, Ford's Minnesota activities still had the needed connection to Bandemer's allegations that a defective Crown Victoria caused in-state injury. See id., at 754.
JUDICIAL DIST. COURT We granted certiorari to consider if Ford is subject to jurisdiction in these cases. 589 U. S. ––– (2020). We hold that it is.
II
A
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause limits a state court's power to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant. The canonical decision in this area remains International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945). There, the Court held that a tribunal's authority depends on the defendant's having such “contacts” with the forum State that “the maintenance of the suit” is “reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government,” and “does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id., at 316–317 (internal quotation marks omitted). In giving content to that formulation, the Court has long focused on the nature and extent of “the defendant's relationship to the forum State.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty., 582 U. S. 255, 262 (2017) (citing cases). That focus led to our recognizing two kinds of personal jurisdiction: general (sometimes called all-purpose) jurisdiction and specifc (sometimes called case-linked) jurisdiction. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U. S. 915, 919 (2011).
A state court may exercise general jurisdiction only when a defendant is “essentially at home” in the State. Ibid. General jurisdiction, as its name implies, extends to “any andall claims” brought against a defendant. Ibid. Those claims need not relate to the forum State or the defendant's activity there; they may concern events and conduct anywhere in the world. But that breadth imposes a correlative limit: Only a select “set of affliations with a forum” will expose a defendant to such sweeping jurisdiction. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. 117, 137 (2014). In what we have called the “paradigm” case, an individual is subject to genPage Proof Pending Publication eral jurisdiction in her place of domicile. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). And the “equivalent” forums for a corporation are its place of incorporation and principal place of business. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted); see id., at 139, n. 19 (leaving open “the possibility that in an exceptional case” a corporation might also be “at home” elsewhere). So general jurisdiction over Ford (as all parties agree) attaches in Delaware and Michigan—not in Montana and Minnesota. See supra, at 355.
Specifc jurisdiction is different: It covers defendants less intimately connected with a State, but only as to a narrower class of claims. The contacts needed for this kind of jurisdiction often go by the name “purposeful availment.”
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462, 475 (1985). The defendant, we have said, must take “some act by which [it] purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235, 253 (1958). The contacts must be the defendant's own choice and not “random, isolated, or fortuitous.” Kee ton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U. S. 770, 774 (1984). They must show that the defendant deliberately “reached out beyond” its home—by, for example, “exploi[ting] a market” in the forum State or entering a contractual relationship centered there. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U. S. 277, 285 (2014) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Yet even then—because the defendant is not “at home”—the forum State may exercise jurisdiction in only certain cases. The plaintiff 's claims, we have often stated, “must arise out of or relate to the defendant's contacts” with the forum. Bristol-Myers, 582 U. S., at 262 (quoting Daimler, 571 U. S., at 127; alterations omitted); see, e. g., Burger King, 471 U. S., at 472; Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U. S. 408, 414 (1984); International Shoe, 326 U. S., at 319. Or put just a bit differently, “there must be `an affliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place Page Proof Pending Publication JUDICIAL DIST. COURT in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State's regulation.' ” Bristol-Myers, 582 U. S., at 262, 264 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U. S., at 919).
These rules derive from and refect two sets of values— treating defendants fairly and protecting “interstate federalism.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286, 293 (1980); see id., at 297–298. Our decision in Interna tional Shoe founded specifc jurisdiction on an idea of reciprocity between a defendant and a State: When (but only when) a company “exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state”—thus “enjoy[ing] the benefts and protection of [its] laws”—the State may hold the company to account for related misconduct. 326 U. S., at 319; see Burger King, 471 U. S., at 475−476. Later decisions have added that our doctrine similarly provides defendants with “fair warning”—knowledge that “a particular activity may subject [it] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.” Id., at 472 (internal quotation marks omitted); World-Wide Volks wagen, 444 U. S., at 297 (likewise referring to “clear notice”). A defendant can thus “structure [its] primary conduct” to lessen or avoid exposure to a given State's courts. Id., at 297. And this Court has considered alongside defendants' interests those of the States in relation to each other. One State's “sovereign power to try” a suit, we have recognized, may prevent “sister States” from exercising their like authority. Id., at 293. The law of specifc jurisdiction thus seeks to ensure that States with “little legitimate interest” in a suit do not encroach on States more affected by the controversy. Bristol-Myers, 582 U. S., at 263.2 2One of the concurrences here expresses a worry that our International Shoe-based body of law is not “well suited for the way in which business is now conducted,” and tentatively suggests a 21st-century rethinking. Post, at 372 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). Fair enough perhaps, see infra, at 366, n. 4, but the concurrence then acknowledges that these cases have no distinctively modern features, and it decides them on grounds that (as it agrees) are much the same as ours. See post, at 3−4; compare ibid. with infra, at 364–368. The other concurrence proposes instead a return to the mid-19th century—a replacement of our current Page Proof Pending Publication
B
Ford contends that our jurisdictional rules prevent Montana's and Minnesota's courts from deciding these two suits. In making that argument, Ford does not contest that it does substantial business in Montana and Minnesota—that it actively seeks to serve the market for automobiles and related products in those States. See Brief for Petitioner 6, 9, 13. Or to put that concession in more doctrinal terms, Ford agrees that it has “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities” in both places. Hanson, 357 U. S., at 253; see supra, at 359−360. Ford's claim is instead that those activities do not suffciently connect to the suits, even though the resident-plaintiffs allege that Ford cars malfunctioned in the forum States. In Ford's view, the needed link must be causal in nature: Jurisdiction attaches “only if the defendant's forum conduct gave rise to the plaintiff's claims.” Brief for Petitioner 13 (emphasis in original). And that rule reduces, Ford thinks, to locating specifc jurisdiction in the State where Ford sold the car in question, or else the States where Ford designed and manufactured the vehicle. See id., at 2; Reply Brief 2, 19; supra, at 356 (identifying those States). On that view, the place of accident and injury is immaterial. So (Ford says) Montana's and Minnesota's courts have no power over these cases.
But Ford's causation-only approach fnds no support in this Court's requirement of a “connection” between a plaintiff 's suit and a defendant's activities. Bristol-Myers, 582 U. S., at 265. That rule indeed serves to narrow the class of claims doctrine with the Fourteenth Amendment's original meaning respecting personal jurisdiction. Post, at 383−384 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment). But that opinion never reveals just what the Due Process Clause as understood at its ratifcation required, and its ground for deciding these cases is correspondingly spare. Post, at 384. This opinion, by contrast, resolves these cases by proceeding as the Court has done for the last 75 years—applying the standards set out in International Shoe and its progeny, with attention to their underlying values of ensuring fairness and protecting interstate federalism.
Page Proof Pending Publication JUDICIAL DIST. COURT over which a state court may exercise specifc jurisdiction. But not quite so far as Ford wants. None of our precedents has suggested that only a strict causal relationship between the defendant's in-state activity and the litigation will do. As just noted, our most common formulation of the rule demands that the suit “arise out of or relate to the defendant's contacts with the forum.” Id., at 262 (quoting Daimler, 571 U. S., at 127; emphasis added; alterations omitted); see supra, at 359. The frst half of that standard asks about causation; but the back half, after the “or,” contemplates that some relationships will support jurisdiction without a causal showing. That does not mean anything goes. In the sphere of specifc jurisdiction, the phrase “relate to” incorporates real limits, as it must to adequately protect defendants foreign to a forum. But again, we have never framed the specifc jurisdiction inquiry as always requiring proof of causation— i. e., proof that the plaintiff's claim came about because of the defendant's in-state conduct. See also Bristol-Myers, 582 U. S., at 262, 264 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U. S., at 919) (asking whether there is “an affliation between the forum and the underlying controversy,” without demanding that the inquiry focus on cause). So the case is not over even if, as Ford argues, a causal test would put jurisdiction in only the States of frst sale, manufacture, and design. A different State's courts may yet have jurisdiction, because of another “activity [or] occurrence” involving the defendant that takes place in the State. Bristol-Myers, 582 U. S., at 262, 264 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U. S., at 919).3 3 In thus reiterating this Court's longstanding approach, we reject Justice Gorsuch's apparent (if oblique) view that a state court should have jurisdiction over a nationwide corporation like Ford on any claim, no matter how unrelated to the State or Ford's activities there. See post, at 384. On that view, for example, a California court could hear a claim against Ford brought by an Ohio plaintiff based on an accident occurring in Ohio involving a car purchased in Ohio. Removing the need for any connection between the case and forum State would transfgure our specifc jurisdicPage Proof Pending Publication And indeed, this Court has stated that specifc jurisdiction attaches in cases identical to the ones here—when a company like Ford serves a market for a product in the forum State and the product malfunctions there. In World-Wide Volks wagen, the Court held that an Oklahoma court could not assert jurisdiction over a New York car dealer just because a car it sold later caught fre in Oklahoma. 444 U. S., at 295. But in so doing, we contrasted the dealer's position to that of two other defendants—Audi, the car's manufacturer, and Volkswagen, the car's nationwide importer (neither of which contested jurisdiction): “[I]f the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor such as Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product in [several or all] other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner or to others.”
Id., at 297.
Or said another way, if Audi and Volkswagen's business deliberately extended into Oklahoma (among other States), then Oklahoma's courts could hold the companies accountable for a car's catching fre there—even though the vehicle had been designed and made overseas and sold in New York.
For, the Court explained, a company thus “purposefully avail[ing] itself ” of the Oklahoma auto market “has clear notice” of its exposure in that State to suits arising from local accidents involving its cars. Ibid. And the company could do something about that exposure: It could “act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks tion standard as applied to corporations. “Case-linked” jurisdiction, see supra, at 359–360, would then become not case-linked at all. Page Proof Pending Publication JUDICIAL DIST. COURT are [still] too great, severing its connection with the State.” Ibid. Our conclusion in World-Wide Volkswagen—though, as Ford notes, technically “dicta,” Brief for Petitioner 34—has appeared and reappeared in many cases since. So, for example, the Court in Keeton invoked that part of World-Wide Volkswagen to show that when a corporation has “continuously and deliberately exploited [a State's] market, it must reasonably anticipate being haled into [that State's] court[s]” to defend actions “based on” products causing injury there. 465 U. S., at 781 (citing 444 U. S., at 297–298); see Burger King, 471 U. S., at 472–473 (similarly citing World-Wide Volkswagen). On two other occasions, we reaffrmed that rule by reciting the above block-quoted language verbatim. See Goodyear, 564 U. S., at 927; Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U. S. 102, 110 (1987) (opinion of O'Connor, J.). And in Daimler, we used the Audi/Volkswagen scenario as a paradigm case of specifc jurisdiction (though now naming Daimler, the maker of Mercedes Benzes). Said the Court, to “illustrate[ ]” specifc jurisdiction's “province[ ]”: A California court would exercise specifc jurisdiction “if a California plaintiff, injured in a California accident involving a Daimler-manufactured vehicle, sued Daimler [in that court] alleging that the vehicle was defectively designed.” 571 U. S., at 127, n. 5. As in World- Wide Volkswagen, the Court did not limit jurisdiction to where the car was designed, manufactured, or frst sold.
Substitute Ford for Daimler, Montana and Minnesota for California, and the Court's “illustrat[ive]” case becomes . . . the two cases before us.
To see why Ford is subject to jurisdiction in these cases (as Audi, Volkswagen, and Daimler were in their analogues), consider frst the business that the company regularly conducts in Montana and Minnesota. See generally 395 Mont., at 488, 443 P. 3d, at 414; 931 N. W. 2d, at 748; supra, at 357. Page Proof Pending Publication Small wonder that Ford has here conceded “purposeful availment” of the two States' markets. See supra, at 361. By every means imaginable—among them, billboards, TV and radio spots, print ads, and direct mail—Ford urges Montanans and Minnesotans to buy its vehicles, including (at all relevant times) Explorers and Crown Victorias. Ford cars— again including those two models—are available for sale, whether new or used, throughout the States, at 36 dealerships in Montana and 84 in Minnesota. And apart from sales, Ford works hard to foster ongoing connections to its cars' owners. The company's dealers in Montana and Minnesota (as elsewhere) regularly maintain and repair Ford cars, including those whose warranties have long since expired. And the company distributes replacement parts both to its own dealers and to independent auto shops in the two States. Those activities, too, make Ford money. And by making it easier to own a Ford, they encourage Montanans and Minnesotans to become lifelong Ford drivers.
Now turn to how all this Montana-and Minnesota-based conduct relates to the claims in these cases, brought by state residents in Montana's and Minnesota's courts. Each plaintiff's suit, of course, arises from a car accident in one of those States. In each complaint, the resident-plaintiff alleges that a defective Ford vehicle—an Explorer in one, a Crown Victoria in the other—caused the crash and resulting harm. And as just described, Ford had advertised, sold, and serviced those two car models in both States for many years. (Contrast a case, which we do not address, in which Ford marketed the models in only a different State or region.) In other words, Ford had systematically served a market in Montana and Minnesota for the very vehicles that the plaintiffs allege malfunctioned and injured them in those States. So there is a strong “relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation”—the “essential foundation” of specifc jurisdiction. Helicopteros, 466 U. S., at 414 (internal Page Proof Pending Publication JUDICIAL DIST. COURT quotation marks omitted). That is why this Court has used this exact fact pattern (a resident-plaintiff sues a global car company, extensively serving the state market in a vehicle, for an in-state accident) as an illustration—even a paradigm example—of how specifc jurisdiction works. See Daimler, 571 U. S., at 127, n. 5; supra, at 364.4 The only complication here, pressed by Ford, is that the company sold the specifc cars involved in these crashes outside the forum States, with consumers later selling them to the States' residents. Because that is so, Ford argues, the plaintiffs' claims “would be precisely the same if Ford had never done anything in Montana and Minnesota.” Brief for Petitioner 46. Of course, that argument merely restates Ford's demand for an exclusively causal test of connection— which we have already shown is inconsistent with our caselaw. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4; supra, at 361−362. And indeed, a similar assertion could have been made in World- Wide Volkswagen—yet the Court made clear that systematic contacts in Oklahoma rendered Audi accountable there for an in-state accident, even though it involved a car sold in New York. See supra, at 363−364. So too here, and for the 4None of this is to say that any person using any means to sell any good in a State is subject to jurisdiction there if the product malfunctions after arrival. We have long treated isolated or sporadic transactions differently from continuous ones. See, e. g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286, 297 (1980); supra, at 359. And we do not here consider internet transactions, which may raise doctrinal questions of their own. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U. S. 277, 290, n. 9 (2014) (“[T]his case does not present the very different questions whether and how a defendant's virtual `presence' and conduct translate into `contacts' with a particular State”). So consider, for example, a hypothetical offered at oral argument. “[A] retired guy in a small town” in Maine “carves decoys” and uses “a site on the Internet” to sell them. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39. “Can he be sued in any state if some harm arises from the decoy?” Ibid. The differences between that case and the ones before us virtually list themselves. (Just consider all our descriptions of Ford's activities outside its home bases.) So we agree with the plaintiffs' counsel that resolving these cases does not also resolve the hypothetical. See id., at 39−40. Page Proof Pending Publication same reasons, see supra, at 364−366—even supposing (as Ford does) that without the company's Montana or Minnesota contacts the plaintiffs' claims would be just the same. But in any event, that assumption is far from clear. For the owners of these cars might never have bought them, and so these suits might never have arisen, except for Ford's contacts with their home States. Those contacts might turn any resident of Montana or Minnesota into a Ford owner— even when he buys his car from out of state. He may make that purchase because he saw ads for the car in local media. And he may take into account a raft of Ford's in-state activities designed to make driving a Ford convenient there: that Ford dealers stand ready to service the car; that other auto shops have ample supplies of Ford parts; and that Ford fosters an active resale market for its old models. The plaintiffs here did not in fact establish, or even allege, such causal links. But cf. post, at 373–374 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (nonetheless fnding some kind of causation). Nor should jurisdiction in cases like these ride on the exact reasons for an individual plaintiff 's purchase, or on his ability to present persuasive evidence about them.5 But the possibilities listed above—created by the reach of Ford's Montana and Minnesota contacts—underscore the aptness of fnding jurisdiction here, even though the cars at issue were frst sold out of state.
For related reasons, allowing jurisdiction in these cases treats Ford fairly, as this Court's precedents explain. In conducting so much business in Montana and Minnesota, Ford “enjoys the benefts and protection of [their] laws”— the enforcement of contracts, the defense of property, the resulting formation of effective markets. International Shoe, 326 U. S., at 319. All that assistance to Ford's in-state 5It should, for example, make no difference if a plaintiff had recently moved to the forum State with his car, and had not made his purchasing decision with that move in mind—so had not considered any of Ford's activities in his new home State.
Page Proof Pending Publication JUDICIAL DIST. COURT business creates reciprocal obligations—most relevant here, that the car models Ford so extensively markets in Montana and Minnesota be safe for their citizens to use there. Thus our repeated conclusion: A state court's enforcement of that commitment, enmeshed as it is with Ford's government- protected in-state business, can “hardly be said to be undue.” Ibid.; see supra, at 363−364. And as World-Wide Volkswa gen described, it cannot be thought surprising either. An automaker regularly marketing a vehicle in a State, the Court said, has “clear notice” that it will be subject to jurisdiction in the State's courts when the product malfunctions there (regardless where it was frst sold). 444 U. S., at 297; see supra, at 363. Precisely because that exercise of jurisdiction is so reasonable, it is also predictable—and thus allows Ford to “structure [its] primary conduct” to lessen or even avoid the costs of state-court litigation. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U. S., at 297.
Finally, principles of “interstate federalism” support jurisdiction over these suits in Montana and Minnesota. Id., at 293. Those States have signifcant interests at stake— “providing [their] residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inficted by out-of-state actors,” as well as enforcing their own safety regulations. Burger King, 471 U. S., at 473; see Keeton, 465 U. S., at 776. Consider, next to those, the interests of the States of frst sale (Washington and North Dakota)—which Ford's proposed rule would make the most likely forums. For each of those States, the suit involves all out-of-state parties, an out-of-state accident, and out-of-state injuries; the suit's only connection with the State is that a former owner once (many years earlier) bought the car there. In other words, there is a less signifcant “relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Walden, 571 U. S., at 284 (internal quotation marks omitted). So by channeling these suits to Washington and North Dakota, Ford's regime would undermine, rather than promote, what the company calls the Due Process Clause's “jurisdiction-allocating function.” Brief for Petitioner 24. Page Proof Pending Publication
C
Ford mainly relies for its rule on two of our recent decisions—Bristol-Myers and Walden. But those precedents stand for nothing like the principle Ford derives from them. If anything, they reinforce all we have said about why Montana's and Minnesota's courts can decide these cases.
Ford says of Bristol-Myers that it “squarely foreclose[s]” jurisdiction. Reply Brief 2. In that case, non-resident plaintiffs brought claims in California state court against Bristol-Myers Squibb, the manufacturer of a nationally marketed prescription drug called Plavix. The plaintiffs had not bought Plavix in California; neither had they used or suffered any harm from the drug there. Still, the California Supreme Court thought it could exercise jurisdiction because Bristol-Myers Squibb sold Plavix in California and was defending there against identical claims brought by the State's residents. This Court disagreed, holding that the exercise of jurisdiction violated the Fourteenth Amendment. In Ford's view, the same must be true here. Each of these plaintiffs, like the plaintiffs in Bristol-Myers, alleged injury from a particular item (a car, a pill) that the defendant had sold outside the forum State. Ford reads Bristol-Myers to preclude jurisdiction when that is true, even if the defendant regularly sold “the same kind of product” in the State.
Reply Brief 2 (emphasis in original).
But that reading misses the point of our decision. We found jurisdiction improper in Bristol-Myers because the forum State, and the defendant's activities there, lacked any connection to the plaintiffs' claims. See 582 U. S., at 265 (“What is needed—and what is missing here—is a connection between the forum and the specifc claims at issue”). The plaintiffs, the Court explained, were not residents of California. They had not been prescribed Plavix in California.
They had not ingested Plavix in California. And they had not sustained their injuries in California. See id., at 265−266 (emphasizing these points). In short, the plaintiffs Page Proof Pending Publication JUDICIAL DIST. COURT were engaged in forum-shopping—suing in California because it was thought plaintiff-friendly, even though their cases had no tie to the State. See id., at 266 (distinguishing the Plavix claims from the litigation in Keeton, see supra, at 364, because they “involv[e] no in-state injury and no injury to residents of the forum State”). That is not at all true of the cases before us. Yes, Ford sold the specifc products in other States, as Bristol-Myers Squibb had. But here, the plaintiffs are residents of the forum States. They used the allegedly defective products in the forum States. And they suffered injuries when those products malfunctioned in the forum States. In sum, each of the plaintiffs brought suit in the most natural State—based on an “affliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that t[ook] place” there. Bristol-Myers, 582 U. S., at 262, 264 (internal quotation marks omitted). So Bristol-Myers does not bar jurisdiction.
Ford falls back on Walden as its last resort. In that case, a Georgia police offcer working at an Atlanta airport searched, and seized money from, two Nevada residents before they embarked on a fight to Las Vegas. The victims of the search sued the offcer in Nevada, arguing that their alleged injury (their inability to use the seized money) occurred in the State in which they lived. This Court held the exercise of jurisdiction in Nevada improper even though “the plaintiff[s] experienced [the] effect[s]” of the offcer's conduct there. 571 U. S., at 290. According to Ford, our ruling shows that a plaintiff 's residence and place of injury can never support jurisdiction. See Brief for Petitioner 32. And without those facts, Ford concludes, the basis for jurisdiction crumbles here as well.
But Walden has precious little to do with the cases before us. In Walden, only the plaintiffs had any contacts with the State of Nevada; the defendant-offcer had never taken any act to “form[ ] a contact” of his own. 571 U. S., at 290. The offcer had “never traveled to, conducted activities within, contacted anyone in, or sent anything or anyone to Nevada.” Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication Id., at 289. So to use the language of our doctrinal test: He had not “purposefully avail[ed himself] of the privilege of conducting activities” in the forum State. Hanson, 357 U. S., at 253. Because that was true, the Court had no occasion to address the necessary connection between a defendant's in-state activity and the plaintiff's claims. But here, Ford has a veritable truckload of contacts with Montana and Minnesota, as it admits. See supra, at 364−365. The only issue is whether those contacts are related enough to the plaintiffs' suits. As to that issue, so what if (as Walden held) the place of a plaintiff's injury and residence cannot create a defendant's contact with the forum State? Those places still may be relevant in assessing the link between the defendant's forum contacts and the plaintiff's suit—including its assertions of who was injured where. And indeed, that relevance is a key part of Bristol-Myers' reasoning. See 582 U. S., at 265−266 (fnding a lack of “connection” in part because the “plaintiffs are not California residents and do not claim to have suffered harm in that State”). One of Ford's own favorite cases thus refutes its appeal to the other. * * * Here, resident-plaintiffs allege that they suffered in-state injury because of defective products that Ford extensively promoted, sold, and serviced in Montana and Minnesota.
For all the reasons we have given, the connection between the plaintiffs' claims and Ford's activities in those States— or otherwise said, the “relationship among the defendant, the forum[s], and the litigation”—is close enough to support specifc jurisdiction. Walden, 571 U. S., at 284 (internal quotation marks omitted). The judgments of the Montana and Minnesota Supreme Courts are therefore affrmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
JUDICIAL DIST. COURT