Syllabus
CEDARPOINTNURSERYetal.v.HASSIDetal.
certiorarito theunitedstatescourt ofappealsfor theninthcircuit No.20–107.
ArguedMarch22,2021—DecidedJune23,2021 A Californiaregulation grantslabor organizations a“right totake access” toanagriculturalemployer’spropertyinordertosolicitsupportfor unionization.
Cal.CodeRegs.,tit.8,§20900(e)(1)(C).
Theregulation mandatesthatagriculturalemployersallowunionorganizersontotheir propertyforuptothreehoursperday,120daysperyear.
Organizers from the United Farm Workers sought to take access to property owned bytwoCaliforniagrowers—CedarPointNurseryandFowlerPacking Company.
ThegrowersfiledsuitinFederalDistrictCourtseekingto enjoin enforcement of the access regulation on the grounds that it appro- priated without compensation an easement for union organizers to enter their property and therefore constituted an unconstitutional per se phys- ical taking under theFifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The District Courtdeniedthegrowers’motionforapreliminaryinjunctionanddis- missedthecomplaint,holdingthattheaccessregulationdidnotconsti- tute a per se physical taking because it did not allow the public to access thegrowers’propertyinapermanentandcontinuousmanner.
Adi- videdpaneloftheCourtofAppealsfortheNinthCircuitaffirmed,and rehearingenbancwasdeniedoverdissent.
Held:California’saccessregulationconstitutesapersephysicaltaking. Pp.147–162.
(a)Thegrowers’complaintstatesaclaimforanuncompensated takinginviolationoftheFifthandFourteenthAmendments.
Pp.147–159.
(1)TheTakingsClauseoftheFifthAmendment,applicabletothe StatesthroughtheFourteenthAmendment,provides:“[N]orshallpri- vatepropertybetakenforpublicuse,withoutjustcompensation.” Whenthegovernmentphysicallyacquiresprivatepropertyforapublic use,theTakingsClauseobligatesthegovernmenttoprovidetheowner withjustcompensation.
Tahoe-SierraPreservationCouncil,Inc.v. TahoeRegionalPlanningAgency,535U. S.302,321.
TheCourtas- sessessuchphysicaltakingsusingaperserule:Thegovernmentmust payforwhatittakes.
Id.,at322.
A different standard applies when the government, rather than appro- priatingprivatepropertyforitselforathirdparty,insteadimposes regulationsrestrictinganowner’sabilitytousehisownproperty. Id., Page Proof Pending Publication CEDARPOINTNURSERYv.HASSID at321–322.
Todeterminewhethersuchauserestrictionamountstoa taking,theCourthasgenerallyappliedtheflexibleapproachsetforth inPennCentralTransportationCo.v.NewYorkCity,438U. S.104, consideringfactorssuchastheeconomicimpactoftheregulation,its interferencewithreasonableinvestment-backedexpectations,andthe character of the government action.
Id., at 124.
But when the govern- mentphysicallyappropriatesproperty,PennCentralhasnoplace— regardlesswhetherthegovernmentactiontakestheformofaregula- tion,statute,ordinance,ordecree.
Pp.147–149.
(2)California’saccessregulationappropriates arighttoinvadethe growers’propertyandthereforeconstitutesapersephysicaltaking. Ratherthanrestrainingthegrowers’useoftheirownproperty,the regulationappropriatesfortheenjoymentofthirdparties(hereunion organizers)theowners’righttoexclude.
Therighttoexcludeis“a fundamentalelementofthepropertyright.”
KaiserAetnav.United States,444U. S.164,179–180.
TheCourt’sprecedentshavethus treatedgovernment-authorizedphysicalinvasionsastakingsrequiring justcompensation.
Asinpreviouscases,thegovernmentherehasap- propriatedarightofaccesstoprivateproperty.
Becausetheregula- tionappropriatesarighttophysicallyinvadethegrowers’property— toliterally“takeaccess”—itconstitutesapersephysicaltakingunder theCourt’sprecedents.
Pp.149–152.
(3)Theviewthattheaccessregulationcannotqualifyasaperse takingbecauseitdoesnotallowforpermanentandcontinuousaccess 24hoursaday,365daysayearisinsupportable.
TheCourthasheld thataphysicalappropriationisatakingwhetheritispermanentor temporary;thedurationoftheappropriationbearsonlyontheamount ofcompensationdue.
SeeUnitedStatesv.Dow,357U. S.17,26.
To besure,theCourtinLorettov.TeleprompterManhattanCATVCorp., 458U. S.419,discussedtheheightenedconcernsassociatedwith“[t]he permanenceandabsoluteexclusivityofaphysicaloccupation”incon- trast to “temporary limitations on the right to exclude,” and stated that “[n]oteveryphysicalinvasionisataking.”
Id.,at435,n.12.
Butthe regulationhereisnottransformedfromaphysicaltakingintoause restrictionjustbecausetheaccessgrantedisrestrictedtounionorga- nizers,foranarrowpurpose,andforalimitedtime.
Andalthoughthe Board disputes whether the access regulation appropriates an easement asdefinedbyCalifornialaw,itcannotabsolveitselfoftakingsliability byappropriatingthegrowers’righttoexcludeinaformthatisaslight mismatchfromstatepropertylaw.
PruneYardShoppingCenterv.Robins,447U. S.74,doesnotcut againsttheCourt’sconclusionthattheaccessregulationconstitutesa Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:594U. S.139(2021) per se taking.
In PruneYard the California Supreme Court recognized a right to engage in leafleting at the PruneYard, a privately owned shop- ping center, and the Court applied the Penn Central factors to hold that nocompensabletakinghadoccurred.
447U. S.,at78,83.
PruneYard doesnotestablishthatlimitedrightsofaccesstoprivateproperty shouldbeevaluatedasregulatoryratherthanpersetakings.
Restric- tionsonhowabusinessgenerallyopentothepublicsuchasthePrune- Yardmaytreatindividualsonthepremisesarereadilydistinguishable fromregulationsgrantingarighttoinvadepropertyclosedtothepub- lic.
Pp.152–157.
(4)TheCourtdeclinestoadoptthetheorythattheaccessregula- tionmerelyregulates,anddoesnotappropriate,thegrowers’rightto exclude.
Therighttoexcludeisnotanemptyformalitythatcanbe modifiedatthegovernment’spleasure.
Pp.157–159.
(b)TheBoard’sfearthattreatingtheaccessregulationasaperse physicaltakingwillendangerahostofstateandfederalgovernment activitiesinvolvingentryontoprivatepropertyisunfounded. First, theCourt’sholdingdoesnothingtoeffacethedistinctionbetweentres- passandtakings.
TheCourt’sprecedentsmakeclearthatisolated physical invasions, not undertaken pursuant to a granted right of access, areproperlyassessedasindividualtortsratherthanappropriationsof apropertyright.
Second,manygovernment-authorizedphysicalinva- sionswillnotamounttotakingsbecausetheyareconsistentwithlong- standingbackgroundrestrictionsonpropertyrights,includingtradi- tionalcommonlawprivilegestoaccessprivateproperty.
SeeLucasv.
SouthCarolina CoastalCouncil,505 U. S.1003, 1028–1029. Third,the governmentmayrequirepropertyownerstocedearightofaccessas aconditionofreceivingcertainbenefits,withoutcausingataking. Underthisframework,governmenthealthandsafetyinspectionre- gimes will generally not constitute takings.
In this case, however, none oftheseconsiderationsunderminetheCourt’sdeterminationthatthe accessregulationgivesrisetoapersephysicaltaking.
Pp.159–162.
923F.3d524,reversedandremanded.
Roberts,C.J.,deliveredtheopinionoftheCourt,inwhichThomas, Alito,Gorsuch,Kavanaugh,andBarrett,JJ.,joined.
Kavanaugh, J.,filedaconcurringopinion,post,p.162.
Breyer,J.,filedadissenting opinion,inwhichSotomayorandKagan,JJ.,joined,post,p.164. JoshuaP.Thompsonarguedthecauseforpetitioners.
With him on the briefs were Damien M. Schiff, Wencong Fa, Page Proof Pending Publication CEDARPOINTNURSERYv.HASSID Counsel ChristopherM.Kieser,HowardA.Sagaser,andIanB.
Wieland.
Michael J. Mongan, Solicitor General of California, argued thecauseforrespondents.
WithhimonthebriefwereXa- vier Becerra, Attorney General of California, Janill L. Rich- ards,PrincipalDeputySolicitorGeneral,JoshuaPatashnik, DeputySolicitorGeneral,R.MatthewWise,DeputyAttor- neyGeneral,andAmariL.Hammonds,AssociateDeputy SolicitorGeneral.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States byActingSolicitorGeneralWall,DeputyAssistantAttorneysGeneral BrightbillandGrant,HashimM.Mooppan,JonathanY.Ellis,andAu- stin L. Raynor; for the State of Oklahoma et al. by Mike Hunter, Attorney General of Oklahoma,Mithun Mansinghani, Solicitor General,and Bryan Cleveland,AssistantSolicitorGeneral,andbytheAttorneysGeneralfor theirrespectiveStatesasfollows:SteveMarshallofAlabama,Mark BrnovichofArizona,LeslieRutledgeofArkansas,DanielCameronof Kentucky,JeffLandryofLouisiana,LynnFitchofMississippi,Eric SchmittofMissouri,DouglasJ.PetersonofNebraska,AlanWilsonof SouthCarolina,andKenPaxtonofTexas;forAmericansforProsperity FoundationbyCynthiaFlemingCrawfordandMichaelPepson;forthe BuckeyeInstitutebyThomasR.McCarthyandRobertAlt;fortheCato Instituteetal. byIlyaShapiroand KarenR.Harned;forthe Chamberof CommerceoftheUnitedStatesofAmericabySteffenN.Johnson,Mi- chaelW.McConnell,andDarylJoseffer;fortheInstituteforJusticeby Jeffrey H. Redfern, Dana Berliner, and Robert McNamara; for the Liberty JusticeCenterbyJeffreyM.SchwabandDanielSuhr;fortheMountain States Legal Foundation by Cristen Wohlgemuth and David C. McDonald; andbytheWesternGrowersAssociationetal.byMichaelM.Berger.
A
brief of amicus curiae urging vacatur was filed for the American Farm Bu- reauFederationbyPaulJ.BeardII,EllenSteen,andTravisCushman. BriefsofamicicuriaeurgingaffirmancewerefiledfortheCommon- wealthofVirginiaetal.byMarkR.Herring,AttorneyGeneralofVir- ginia,TobyJ.Heytens,SolicitorGeneral,ErinB.Ashwell,ChiefDeputy AttorneyGeneral,DonaldD.AndersonandSamuelT.Towell,Deputy AttorneysGeneral,andMichelleS.KallenandJessicaMerrySamuels, DeputySolicitorsGeneral,andbytheAttorneysGeneralfortheirrespec- tivejurisdictionsasfollows:PhilipJ.WeiserofColorado,WilliamTong ofConnecticut,KathleenJenningsofDelaware,KarlA.Racineofthe Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:594U. S.139(2021) OpinionoftheCourt ChiefJusticeRobertsdeliveredtheopinionofthe Court.
A California regulation grants labor organizations a “right totakeaccess”toanagriculturalemployer’spropertyin ordertosolicitsupportforunionization.
Cal.CodeRegs., tit.8,§20900(e)(1)(C)(2020).
Agriculturalemployersmust allowunionorganizersontotheirpropertyforuptothree hoursperday,120daysperyear.
Thequestionpresented DistrictofColumbia,ClareE.ConnorsofHawaii,KwameRaoulofIlli- nois,MauraHealeyofMassachusetts,DanaNesselofMichigan,Keith EllisonofMinnesota,GurbirS.GrewalofNewJersey,HectorBalderas ofNewMexico,LetitiaJamesofNewYork,EllenF.RosenblumofOre- gon,JoshShapiroofPennsylvania,PeterF.NeronhaofRhodeIsland, Thomas J. Donovan, Jr., of Vermont, and Robert W. Ferguson of Washing- ton;fortheAmericanFederationofLaborandCongressofIndustrial OrganizationsbyHaroldC.BeckerandMatthewJ.Ginsburg;forCalifor- nia Rural Legal Assistance, Inc., et al. by Verónica Meléndez and Cynthia L.Rice;fortheConstitutionalAccountabilityCenterbyElizabethB. WydraandBrianneJ.Gorod;forLegalHistoriansbyKatharineM. Mapes; for Local Governments by Jonathan B. Miller, Jessica M. Scheller, PeterS.Holmes,EricaR.Franklin,JamesR.Williams,MichaelL. Rossi,JeremyA.Avila,ChristopherJ.Caso,KristinM.Bronson,Mi- chaelN.Feuer,DianaP.Cortes,andLyndseyM.Olson;fortheNational EmploymentLawProjectetal.byCatherineK.RuckelshausandBrian Chen;forthePelicanInstituteforPublicPolicybySarahHarbison;for PropertyLawProfessorsbyJohnD.Echeverria,prose;fortheService EmployeesInternationalUnionbyLeonDayan,NicoleG.Berner,and ClairePrestel;forUnitedFarmWorkersofAmericabyMarioMartinez; for the United Food and Commercial Workers Western States Council et al. byHenryM.Willis,MichaelE.Plank,DavidA.Rosenfeld,andRobert P. Bonsall; and for Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse et al. by Glenn Rothner. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the California Farm Bureau Federa- tion by Carl G. Borden; for the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence by John C. Eastman and Anthony T. Caso; for International Lawyers Assisting Workers Network et al. by Jeanne Mirer and Jonathan Hiatt; for the Na- tionalAssociation ofCountieset al.byMatthew Littleton,David T.Gold- berg, Lisa Soronen, Charles W. Thompson, Jr., and Amanda Kellar Karras; and forthe New England LegalFoundation by John Pagliaroand Martin J. Newhouse.
Page Proof Pending Publication CEDARPOINTNURSERYv.HASSID OpinionoftheCourt is whether the access regulation constitutes a per se physical takingundertheFifthandFourteenthAmendments.
I
TheCaliforniaAgriculturalLaborRelationsActof1975 givesagriculturalemployeesarighttoself-organizationand makesitanunfairlaborpracticeforemployerstointerfere withthatright.
Cal.Lab.CodeAnn.§§1152,1153(a)(West 2020).
ThestateAgriculturalLaborRelationsBoardhas promulgated a regulation providing, in its current form, that theself-organizationrightsofemployeesinclude“theright ofaccessbyunionorganizerstothepremisesofanagricul- turalemployerforthepurposeofmeetingandtalkingwith employeesandsolicitingtheirsupport.”
Cal.CodeRegs., tit.8,§20900(e).
Undertheregulation,alabororganization may“takeaccess”toanagriculturalemployer’sproperty foruptofour30-dayperiodsinonecalendaryear.
§§20900(e)(1)(A),(B).
Inordertotakeaccess,alabororga- nizationmustfileawrittennoticewiththeBoardandserve acopyontheemployer.
§20900(e)(1)(B).
Twoorganizers perworkcrew(plusoneadditionalorganizerforevery15 workersover30workersinacrew)mayentertheemploy- er’s property for up to one hour before work, one hour during the lunch break, and one hour after work.
§§20900(e)(3)(A)– (B),(4)(A).
Organizersmaynotengageindisruptivecon- duct, but are otherwise free to meet and talk with employees astheywish.
§§20900(e)(3)(A),(4)(C).
Interferencewith organizers’rightofaccessmayconstituteanunfairlabor practice,§ 20900(e)(5)(C),whichcanresultinsanctions againsttheemployer,see,e. g.,HarryCarianSalesv.Ag- riculturalLaborRelationsBd.,39Cal.3d209,231–232,703 P.2d27,42(1985).
CedarPointNurseryisastrawberrygrowerinnorthern California.
Itemploysover400seasonalworkersand around 100 full-time workers, none of whom live on the prop- erty.
Accordingtothecomplaint,inOctober2015,atfive Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:594U. S.139(2021) OpinionoftheCourt o’clockonemorning,membersoftheUnitedFarmWorkers enteredCedarPoint’spropertywithoutpriornotice.
The organizersmovedtothenursery’strimshed,wherehun- dredsofworkerswerepreparingstrawberryplants.
Call- ingthroughbullhorns,theorganizersdisturbedoperations, causingsomeworkerstojointheorganizersinaprotestand otherstoleavetheworksitealtogether.
CedarPointfileda chargeagainsttheunionfortakingaccesswithoutgiving notice.
The union responded with a charge of its own, alleg- ingthatCedar Pointhadcommittedan unfairlaborpractice.
FowlerPackingCompanyisaFresno-basedgrowerand shipper of table grapes and citrus.
It has 1,800 to 2,500 em- ployeesinitsfieldoperationsandaround500initspacking facility.
As with Cedar Point, none of Fowler’s workers live onthepremises.
InJuly2015,organizersfromtheUnited FarmWorkersattemptedtotakeaccesstoFowler’sprop- erty,butthecompanyblockedthemfromentering.
The unionfiledanunfairlaborpracticechargeagainstFowler, whichitlaterwithdrew.
Believingthattheunionwouldlikelyattempttoenter their property again in the near future, the growers filed suit inFederalDistrictCourtagainstseveralBoardmembersin theirofficialcapacity.
Thegrowersarguedthattheaccess regulation effected an unconstitutional per se physical taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by appropriat- ingwithoutcompensationaneasementforunionorganizers toentertheirproperty.
Theyrequesteddeclaratoryand injunctivereliefprohibitingtheBoardfromenforcingthe regulationagainstthem.
TheDistrictCourtdeniedthegrowers’motionforapre- liminaryinjunctionandgrantedtheBoard’smotiontodis- miss.
Thecourtrejectedthegrowers’argumentthatthe accessregulationconstitutedapersephysicaltaking,rea- soningthatitdidnot“allowthepublictoaccesstheirprop- ertyinapermanentandcontinuousmannerforwhatever reason.”
CedarPointNurseryv.Gould,2016WL1559271, Page Proof Pending Publication CEDARPOINTNURSERYv.HASSID OpinionoftheCourt *5(EDCal.,Apr.18,2016)(emphasisdeleted).
Inthe court’s view, the regulation was instead subject to evaluation underthemultifactorbalancingtestofPennCentralTrans- portationCo.v.NewYorkCity,438U. S.104(1978),which thegrowershadmadenoattempttosatisfy.
CedarPoint Nurseryv.Gould,2016WL3549408,*4(EDCal.,June29, 2016).
AdividedpaneloftheCourtofAppealsfortheNinth Circuitaffirmed.
Thecourtidentifiedthreecategoriesof regulatory actions in takings jurisprudence: regulations that imposepermanentphysicalinvasions,regulationsthatde- priveanownerofalleconomicallybeneficialuseofhisprop- erty,andtheremainderofregulatoryactions.
CedarPoint Nurseryv.Shiroma,923F.3d524,530–531(2019).
Onthe court’s understanding, while regulations in the first two cate- goriesconstitutepersetakings,thoseinthethirdmustbe evaluatedunderPennCentral.
923F.3d,at531.
The courtagreedwiththeDistrictCourtthattheaccessregula- tiondidnotfallintothefirstcategorybecauseitdidnot “allowrandommembersofthepublictounpredictablytra- verse[thegrowers’]property24hoursaday,365daysa year.”
Id., at 532.
And given that the growers did not con- tendthattheregulationdeprivedthemofalleconomically beneficialuseoftheirproperty,persetreatmentwasinap- propriate.
Id.,at531,534.
JudgeLeavydissented.
HeobservedthatthisCourthad neverallowedlabororganizerstoenteranemployer’sprop- erty for substantial periods of time when its employees lived offpremises.
Id.,at536;seeLechmere,Inc.v.NLRB,502 U. S.527,540–541(1992);NLRBv.Babcock&WilcoxCo., 351U. S.105,113(1956).
Ashesawit,theregulationcon- stituted a physical occupation and therefore effected a per se taking.
923F.3d,at538.
The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc.
Judge Ikuta dissented,joinedbysevenotherjudges.
Shereasonedthat the access regulation appropriated from the growers a tradi- Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:594U. S.139(2021) OpinionoftheCourt tionalformofprivateproperty—aneasementingross—and transferredthatpropertytounionorganizers.
CedarPoint Nurseryv.Shiroma,956F.3d1162,1168,1171(2020).
The appropriationofsuchaneasement,sheconcluded,consti- tutedapersephysicaltakingundertheprecedentsofthis Court.
Id.,at1168.
Wegrantedcertiorari.
592U. S.–––(2020).
II
A
TheTakingsClauseoftheFifthAmendment,applicable totheStatesthroughtheFourteenthAmendment,provides: “[N]orshallprivatepropertybetakenforpublicuse,with- outjustcompensation.”
TheFoundersrecognizedthatthe protection of private property is indispensable to the promo- tionofindividualfreedom.
AsJohnAdamsterselyputit, “[p]ropertymustbesecured,orlibertycannotexist.”
Dis- coursesonDavila,in6WorksofJohnAdams280(C.Adams ed.1851).
ThisCourtagrees,havingnotedthatprotection ofpropertyrightsis“necessarytopreservefreedom”and “empowerspersonstoshapeandtoplantheirowndestiny inaworldwheregovernmentsarealwayseagertodosofor them.”
Murrv.Wisconsin,582U. S.383,394(2017).
Whenthegovernmentphysicallyacquiresprivateprop- erty for a public use, the Takings Clause imposes a clear and categoricalobligationtoprovidetheownerwithjustcom- pensation.
Tahoe-SierraPreservationCouncil,Inc.v. TahoeRegionalPlanningAgency,535U. S.302,321(2002).
TheCourt’sphysicaltakingsjurisprudenceis“asoldasthe Republic.”
Id.,at322.
Thegovernmentcommitsaphysi- caltakingwhenitusesitspowerofeminentdomainto formallycondemnproperty.
SeeUnitedStatesv.General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373, 374–375 (1945); United States ex rel.TVAv.Powelson,319U. S.266,270–271(1943).
The sameistruewhenthegovernmentphysicallytakesposses- sionofpropertywithoutacquiringtitletoit.
SeeUnited Page Proof Pending Publication CEDARPOINTNURSERYv.HASSID OpinionoftheCourt Statesv.PeweeCoalCo.,341U. S.114,115–117(1951)(plu- ralityopinion).
Andthegovernmentlikewiseeffectsa physical taking when it occupies property—say, by recurring floodingasaresultofbuildingadam.
SeeUnitedStatesv.
Cress, 243 U. S. 316, 327–328 (1917).
These sorts of physical appropriationsconstitutethe“clearestsortoftaking,”Pa- lazzolov.RhodeIsland,533U. S.606,617(2001),andwe assessthemusingasimple,perserule:Thegovernment mustpayforwhatittakes.
SeeTahoe-Sierra,535U. S., at322.
Whenthegovernment,ratherthanappropriatingprivate propertyforitselforathirdparty,insteadimposesregula- tions that restrict an owner’s ability to use his own property, a different standard applies.
Id., at 321–322.
Our jurispru- dencegoverningsuchuserestrictionshasdevelopedmore recently.
Beforethe20thcentury,theTakingsClausewas understoodtobelimitedtophysicalappropriationsofprop- erty.
SeeHornev.DepartmentofAgriculture,576U. S. 351,360(2015);LegalTenderCases,12Wall.457,551(1871).
InPennsylvaniaCoalCo.v.Mahon,260U. S.393(1922), however,theCourtestablishedthepropositionthat“while propertymayberegulatedtoacertainextent,ifregulation goestoofaritwillberecognizedasataking.”
Id.,at415.
Thisframeworknowappliestouserestrictionsasvariedas zoningordinances,VillageofEuclidv.AmblerRealtyCo., 272U. S.365,387–388(1926),ordersbarringtheminingof gold,UnitedStatesv.CentralEurekaMiningCo.,357U. S. 155,168(1958),andregulationsprohibitingthesaleofeagle feathers,Andrusv.Allard,444U. S.51,65–66(1979).
To determinewhetherauserestrictioneffectsataking,this Courthasgenerallyappliedtheflexibletestdeveloped inPennCentral,balancingfactorssuchastheeconomicim- pactoftheregulation,itsinterferencewithreasonable investment-backedexpectations,andthecharacterofthe governmentaction.
438U. S.,at124.
Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:594U. S.139(2021) OpinionoftheCourt Ourcaseshaveoftendescribeduserestrictionsthatgo “toofar”as“regulatorytakings.”
See,e. g.,Horne,576 U. S., at 360; Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 527 (1992). But thatlabelcanmislead.
Governmentactionthatphysically appropriatespropertyisnolessaphysicaltakingbecauseit arisesfromaregulation.
Thatexplainswhyweheldthat anadministrativereserverequirementcompellingraisin growers to physically set aside a percentage of their crop for thegovernmentconstitutedaphysicalratherthanaregula- torytaking.
Horne,576U. S.,at361.
Theessentialques- tionisnot,astheNinthCircuitseemedtothink,whether the government action at issue comes garbed as a regulation (orstatute,orordinance,ormiscellaneousdecree).
Itis whetherthegovernmenthasphysicallytakenpropertyfor itselforsomeoneelse—bywhatevermeans—orhasinstead restricted a property owner’s ability to use his own property. SeeTahoe-Sierra,535U. S.,at321–323.
Wheneveraregu- lation results in a physical appropriation of property, a per se takinghasoccurred,andPennCentralhasnoplace.
B
Theaccessregulationappropriatesarighttoinvadethe growers’ property and therefore constitutes a per se physical taking.
Theregulationgrantsunionorganizersarightto physically enter and occupy the growers’ land for three hours perday,120daysperyear.
Ratherthanrestrainingthe growers’useoftheirownproperty,theregulationappro- priatesfortheenjoymentofthirdpartiestheowners’right toexclude.
Therighttoexcludeis“oneofthemosttreasured”rights of property ownership.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATVCorp.,458U. S.419,435(1982).
AccordingtoBlack- stone,theveryideaofpropertyentails“thatsoleanddes- poticdominionwhichonemanclaimsandexercisesoverthe externalthingsoftheworld,intotalexclusionoftheright Page Proof Pending Publication CEDARPOINTNURSERYv.HASSID OpinionoftheCourt ofanyotherindividualintheuniverse.”
2W.Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 2 (1766).
In less ex- uberantterms,wehavestatedthattherighttoexcludeis “universallyheldtobeafundamentalelementoftheprop- ertyright,”andis“oneofthemostessentialsticksinthe bundleofrightsthatarecommonlycharacterizedasprop- erty.”
KaiserAetnav.UnitedStates,444U. S.164,176, 179–180(1979);seeDolanv.CityofTigard,512U. S.374, 384,393(1994);Nollanv.CaliforniaCoastalComm’n,483 U. S. 825, 831 (1987); see also Merrill, Property and the Right toExclude,77Neb.L.Rev.730(1998)(callingtherightto excludethe“sinequanon”ofproperty).
Given the central importance to property ownership of the righttoexclude,itcomesaslittlesurprisethattheCourt haslongtreatedgovernment-authorizedphysicalinvasions astakingsrequiringjustcompensation.
TheCourthas oftendescribedthepropertyinteresttakenasaservitude oraneasement.
Forexample,inUnitedStatesv.Causby,weheldthatthe invasion of private propertyby overflights effected a taking. 328U. S.256(1946).
Thegovernmentfrequentlyflewmili- taryaircraft lowover theCausby farm,grazingthe treetops andterrorizingthepoultry.
Id.,at259.
TheCourtob- servedthatownershipofthelandextendedtoairspacethat low,andthat“invasionsofitareinthesamecategoryas invasionsofthesurface.”
Id.,at265.
Becausethedam- agessufferedbytheCausbys“weretheproductofadirect invasionof[their]domain,”weheldthat“aservitudehas beenimposedupontheland.”
Id.,at265–266,267;seealso PortsmouthHarborLand&HotelCo.v.UnitedStates,260 U. S.327,330(1922)(governmentassertionofarighttofire coastaldefensegunsacrossprivatepropertywouldconsti- tuteataking).
Wesimilarlyheldthattheappropriationofaneasement effectedatakinginKaiserAetnav.UnitedStates.
Areal- estatedeveloperdredgedapond,converteditintoamarina, Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:594U. S.139(2021) OpinionoftheCourt andconnectedittoanearbybayandtheocean.
444U. S., at167.
Thegovernmentassertedthatthedevelopercould not exclude the public from the marina because the pond had becomeanavigablewater.
Id.,at168.
Weheldthatthe righttoexclude“fallswithin[the]categoryofintereststhat the Government cannot take without compensation.”
Id., at 180.
Afternotingthat“theimpositionofthenavigational servitude” would “result in an actual physical invasion of the privatelyownedmarina”bymembersofthepublic,wecited Causby and Portsmouth for the proposition that “even if the Governmentphysicallyinvadesonlyaneasementinprop- erty, it must nonetheless pay just compensation.”
444 U. S., at180.
InLorettov.TeleprompterManhattanCATVCorp.,we madeclearthatapermanentphysicaloccupationconstitutes a perse taking regardlesswhether it resultsin onlya trivial economic loss.
New York adopted a law requiring landlords toallowcablecompaniestoinstallequipmentontheirprop- erties.
458U. S.,at423.
Lorettoallegedthattheinstalla- tionofa½-inchdiametercableandtwo1½-cubic-footboxes on her roof caused a taking.
Id., at 424.
We agreed, stating that where government action results in a “permanent physi- caloccupationofproperty,ourcasesuniformlyhavefounda takingtotheextentoftheoccupation,withoutregardto whethertheactionachievesanimportantpublicbenefitor hasonlyminimaleconomicimpactontheowner.”
Id.,at 434–435.
Wereiteratedthattheappropriationofaneasementcon- stitutesaphysicaltakinginNollanv.CaliforniaCoastal Commission.
The Nollans sought a permit to build a larger homeontheirbeachfrontlot.
483U. S.,at828.
TheCali- forniaCoastalCommissionissuedthepermitsubjecttothe conditionthattheNollansgrantthepublicaneasementto passthroughtheirpropertyalongthebeach.
Ibid. Asa startingpointtoouranalysis,weexplainedthat,hadthe CommissionsimplyrequiredtheNollanstograntthepublic Page Proof Pending Publication CEDARPOINTNURSERYv.HASSID OpinionoftheCourt aneasementacrosstheirproperty,“wehavenodoubtthere wouldhavebeenataking.”
Id.,at831;seealsoDolan,512 U. S.,at384(holdingthatcompelleddedicationofanease- mentforpublicusewouldconstituteataking).
More recently, in Hornev. Department of Agriculture, we observedthat“peoplestilldonotexpecttheirproperty,real orpersonal,tobeactuallyoccupiedortakenaway.”
U. S., at 361.
The physical appropriation by the government of the raisins in that case was a per se taking, even if a regu- latorylimitwiththesameeconomicimpactwouldnothave been.
Id.,at362;seesupra,at149.
“TheConstitution,” weexplained,“isconcernedwithmeansaswellasends.”
576U. S.,at362.
Theupshotofthislineofprecedentisthatgovernment- authorizedinvasionsofproperty—whetherbyplane,boat, cable,orbeachcomber—arephysicaltakingsrequiringjust compensation.
Asinthosecases,thegovernmentherehas appropriatedarightofaccesstothegrowers’property, allowingunionorganizerstotraverseitatwillforthree hours a day, 120 days a year.
The regulation appropriates a right to physically invade the growers’ property—to literally “takeaccess,”astheregulationprovides.
Cal.CodeRegs., tit.8,§20900(e)(1)(C).
Itisthereforeapersephysical takingunderourprecedents.
Accordingly,thegrowers’ complaintstatesaclaimforanuncompensatedtakingin violationoftheFifthandFourteenthAmendments.
C
The Ninth Circuit saw matters differently, as do the Board andthedissent.
Inthedecisionbelow,theNinthCircuit tooktheviewthattheaccessregulationdidnotqualifyasa per se taking because, although it grants a right to physically invadethegrowers’property,itdoesnotallowforperma- nent and continuous access “24 hours a day, 365 days a year.” 923F.3d,at532(citingNollan,483U. S.,at832).
Thedis- sent likewise concludes that the regulation cannot amount to Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:594U. S.139(2021) OpinionoftheCourt apersetakingbecauseitallows“accessshortof365daysa year.”
Post,at174(opinionofBreyer,J.).
Thatposition is insupportable as a matter of precedent and common sense. Thereisnoreasonthelawshouldanalyzeanabrogationof the right toexclude in one manner if itextends for 365 days, butinanentirelydifferentmannerifitlastsfor364.
Tobeginwith,wehaveheldthataphysicalappropriation is a taking whether it is permanent or temporary.
Our cases establishthat“compensationismandatedwhenaleasehold istakenandthegovernmentoccupiespropertyforits ownpurposes,eventhoughthatuseistemporary.”
Tahoe- Sierra,535U. S.,at322(citingGeneralMotorsCorp.,323 U. S.373;UnitedStatesv.PettyMotorCo.,327U. S.372 (1946)).
The duration of an appropriation—just like the size of an appropriation, see Loretto, 458 U. S., at 436–437—bears onlyontheamountofcompensation.
SeeUnitedStatesv.
Dow,357U. S.17,26(1958).
Forexample,afterfindinga takingbyphysicalinvasion,theCourtinCausbyremanded thecasetothelowercourttodetermine“whethertheease- ment taken was temporary or permanent,” in order to fix the compensationdue.
328U. S.,at267–268.
Tobesure,Lorettoemphasizedtheheightenedconcerns associatedwith“[t]hepermanenceandabsoluteexclusivity ofaphysicaloccupation”incontrastto“temporarylimita- tionsontherighttoexclude,”andstatedthat“[n]otevery physicalinvasionisataking.”
458U. S.,at435,n.12;see alsoid.,at432–435.
Thelatterpointiswelltaken,aswe willexplain.
ButNollanclarifiedthatappropriationofa righttophysicallyinvadepropertymayconstituteataking “eventhoughnoparticularindividualispermittedtostation himselfpermanentlyuponthepremises.”
483U. S.,at832.
Next,wehaverecognizedthatphysicalinvasionsconsti- tutetakingseveniftheyareintermittentasopposedtocon- tinuous.
Causbyheldthatoverflightsofprivateproperty effectedataking,eventhoughtheyoccurredononly4%of takeoffs and 7% of landings at the nearby airport.
328 U. S., Page Proof Pending Publication CEDARPOINTNURSERYv.HASSID OpinionoftheCourt at 259.
And while Nollan happened to involve a legally con- tinuousrightofaccess,wehavenodoubtthattheCourt wouldhavereachedthesameconclusioniftheeasementde- mandedbytheCommissionhadlastedforonly364daysper year.
Afterall,theeasementwashardlycontinuousasa practicalmatter.
AsJusticeBrennanobservedindissent, giventheshiftingtides,“publicpassageforaportionofthe yearwouldeitherbeimpossibleorwouldnotoccuron[the Nollans’] property.”
483 U. S., at 854.
What matters is not thattheeasementnotionallyranroundtheclock,butthat thegovernmenthadtakenarighttophysicallyinvadethe Nollans’land.
Andwhenthegovernmentphysicallytakes aninterestinproperty,itmustpayfortherighttodoso.
SeeHorne,576U. S.,at357–358;Tahoe-Sierra,535U. S.,at 322.
Thefactthatarighttotakeaccessisexercisedonly from time to time does not make it any less a physical taking. EventheBoarddeclinestodefendtheNinthCircuit’sab- solutiststance.
Itprudentlyconcedesthat“arequirement thatlandownersgrantaneasementotherwiseidenticalto theoneinNollanbutlimitedtodaylighthours,mightvery wellqualifyas ‘atakingwithoutregard tootherfactorsthat acourtmightordinarilyexamine.’ ” BriefforRespondents 25–26(quotingLoretto,458U. S.,at432;citationandsome internalquotationmarksomitted).
Buttheaccessregula- tion,itcontends,neverthelessfailstoqualifyasaperse takingbecauseit“authorizesonlylimitedandintermittent accessforanarrowpurpose.”
BriefforRespondents26.
ThatpositionislittlemoredefensiblethantheNinthCir- cuit’s.
Thefactthattheregulationgrantsaccessonlyto unionorganizersandonlyforalimitedtimedoesnottrans- form it from a physical taking into a use restriction. Saying thatappropriationofathreehourperday,120dayperyear righttoinvadethegrowers’premises“doesnotconstitutea takingofapropertyinterestbutrather...amererestric- tiononitsuse,istousewordsinamannerthatdeprives themofalltheirordinarymeaning.”
Nollan,483U. S.,at 831(citationandinternalquotationmarksomitted).
Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:594U. S.139(2021) OpinionoftheCourt The Board also takes issue with the growers’ premise that theaccessregulationappropriatesaneasement.
Inthe Board’s estimation, the regulation does not exact a true ease- mentingrossunderCalifornialawbecausetheaccessright maynotbetransferred,doesnotburdenanyparticularpar- celofproperty,andmaynotberecorded.
This,theBoard says,reinforcesitsconclusionthattheregulationdoesnot takeaconstitutionallyprotectedpropertyinterestfromthe growers.
Thedissentagrees,suggestingthattheaccess right cannot effect a per se taking because it does not require thegrowerstogranttheunionorganizersaneasementas definedbystatepropertylaw.
Seepost,at167,174.
Theseargumentsmisconstrueourphysicaltakingsdoc- trine.
Asageneralmatter,itistruethattheproperty rights protected by the Takings Clause are creatures of state law.
SeePhillipsv.WashingtonLegalFoundation,524 U. S. 156, 164 (1998); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun- cil,505U. S.1003,1030(1992).
Butnoonedisputesthat, withouttheaccessregulation,thegrowerswouldhavehad therightunderCalifornialawtoexcludeunionorganizers fromtheirproperty.
SeeAllredv.Harris,14Cal.App.4th 1386,1390,18Cal.Rptr.2d530,533(1993).
Andnoone disputesthattheaccessregulationtookthatrightfrom them.
TheBoardcannotabsolveitselfoftakingsliability by appropriating the growers’ right to exclude in a form that isaslightmismatchfromstateeasementlaw.
Underthe Constitution,propertyrights“cannotbesoeasilymanipu- lated.”
Horne,576U. S.,at365(internalquotationmarks omitted);seealsoWebb’sFabulousPharmacies,Inc.v. Beckwith,449U. S.155,164(1980)(“aState,byipsedixit, maynottransformprivatepropertyintopublicproperty withoutcompensation”).
Ourdecisionsconsistentlyreflectthisintuitiveapproach.
We have recognized that the government can commit a phys- icaltakingeitherbyappropriatingpropertythroughacon- demnationproceedingorbysimply“enter[ing]intophysical possessionofpropertywithoutauthorityofacourtorder.”
Page Proof Pending Publication CEDARPOINTNURSERYv.HASSID OpinionoftheCourt Dow,357U. S.,at21;seealsoUnitedStatesv.Clarke,445 U. S.253,256–257,andn.3(1980).
Inthelattersituation, thegovernment’sintrusiondoesnotvestitwithaproperty interestrecognizedbystatelaw,suchasafeesimpleora leasehold.
SeeDow,357U. S.,at21.
Yetwerecognizea physicaltakingallthesame.
Seeid.,at22.
Anyotherre- sultwouldallowthegovernmenttoappropriateprivate propertywithoutjustcompensationsolongasitavoidsfor- malcondemnation.
Wehavenevertoleratedthatoutcome.
SeePeweeCoalCo.,341U. S.,at116–117.
Formuchthe samereason,inPortsmouth,Causby,andLorettowenever pausedtoconsiderwhetherthephysicalinvasionsatissue vested the intruders with formal easements according to the nuances ofstate propertylaw (nordo wesee howthey could have).
Instead,wefollowedourtraditionalrule:Because thegovernmentappropriatedarighttoinvade,compensa- tionwasdue.
Thatsametestgovernshere.
TheBoardandthedissentfurthercontendthatourdeci- sioninPruneYardShoppingCenterv.Robins,447U. S.74 (1980),establishesthattheaccessregulationcannotqualify asapersetaking.
TheretheCaliforniaSupremeCourt heldthattheStateConstitutionprotectedtherighttoen- gageinleafletingatthePruneYard,aprivatelyownedshop- pingcenter.
Id.,at78.
Theshoppingcenterarguedthat thedecisionhadtakenwithoutjustcompensationitsright toexclude.
Id.,at82.
ApplyingthePennCentralfactors, we held that no compensable taking had occurred.
447 U. S., at83;cf.HeartofAtlantaMotel,Inc.v.UnitedStates,379 U. S.241,261(1964)(rejectingclaimthatprovisionsofthe CivilRightsActof1964prohibitingracialdiscriminationin publicaccommodationseffectedataking).
TheBoardandthedissentarguethatPruneYardshows thatlimitedrightsofaccesstoprivatepropertyshouldbe evaluatedasregulatoryratherthanpersetakings.
See post,at171.
Wedisagree.
Unlikethegrowers’properties, thePruneYardwasopentothepublic,welcomingsome Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:594U. S.139(2021) OpinionoftheCourt 25,000patronsaday.
447U. S.,at77–78.
Limitationson howabusinessgenerallyopentothepublicmaytreatindi- viduals on the premises are readily distinguishable from reg- ulationsgrantingarighttoinvadepropertyclosedtothe public.
SeeHorne,576U. S.,at364(distinguishingPrune- Yardasinvolving“analreadypubliclyaccessible”business); Nollan,483U. S.,at832,n.1(same).
TheBoardalsoreliesonourdecisioninNLRBv.Bab- cock&WilcoxCo.
Butthatrelianceismisplaced.
InBab- cock,theNationalLaborRelationsBoardfoundthatseveral employershadcommittedunfairlaborpracticesunderthe NationalLaborRelationsActbypreventingunionorganiz- ersfromdistributingliteratureoncompanyproperty.
U. S.,at109.
Weheldthatthestatutedidnotrequireem- ployerstoalloworganizersontotheirproperty,atleastout- sidetheunusualcircumstancewheretheiremployeeswere otherwise“beyondthereachofreasonableunioneffortsto communicatewiththem.”
Id.,at113;seealsoLechmere, 502U. S.,at540(employeesresidingoffcompanyproperty arepresumptivelynotbeyondthereachoftheunion’smes- sage).
TheBoardcontendsthatBabcock’sapproachofbal- ancingpropertyandorganizationalrightsshouldguideour analysishere.
SeeLoretto,458U. S.,at434,n.11(discuss- ingBabcockprinciple).
ButBabcockdidnotinvolvea takings claim.
Whatever specific takings issues may be pre- sentedbythehighlycontingentaccessrightwerecognized undertheNLRA,California’saccessregulationeffectsa persephysicaltakingunderourprecedents.
SeeTahoe- Sierra,535U. S.,at322.
D
In its thoughtful opinion, the dissent advances a distinctive viewofpropertyrights.
Thedissentencouragesreadersto considertheissue“throughthelensofordinaryEnglish,” and contends that, so viewed, the “regulation does not appro- priate anything.”
Post, at 166, 167.
Rather, the access reg- ulation merely “regulates . . . the owners’ right to exclude,” so Page Proof Pending Publication CEDARPOINTNURSERYv.HASSID OpinionoftheCourt it must be assessed “under Penn Central’s fact-intensive test.” Post, at 165, 168.
“A right to enter my woods only on certain occasions,” the dissent elaborates, “is a taking only if the regu- lationallowingitgoes ‘toofar.’ ” Post,at174.
Thedissent contends that our decisions in Causby, Portsmouth, and Kai- serAetnaappliedjustsuchaflexibleapproach,underwhich the Court “balanced several factors” to determine whether the physicalinvasionsatissueeffectedataking.
Post,at172– 173.
Accordingtothedissent,thiskindoflatitudetoward temporaryinvasionsisapracticalnecessityforgoverningin our complex modern world.
See post, at 174–175.
Withrespect,ourownunderstandingoftheroleofprop- ertyrightsinourconstitutionalorderismarkedlydifferent. In“ordinaryEnglish”“appropriation”means“takingas one’sown,”1OxfordEnglishDictionary587(2ded.1989) (emphasisadded),andtheregulationexpresslygrantsto labororganizersthe“righttotakeaccess,”Cal.CodeRegs., tit.8,§20900(e)(1)(C)(emphasisadded).
Wecannotagree thattherighttoexcludeisanemptyformality,subjectto modification at the government’s pleasure.
On the contrary, itisa“fundamentalelementofthepropertyright,”Kaiser Aetna,444U. S.,at179–180,thatcannotbebalancedaway.
Ourcasesestablishthatappropriationsofarighttoinvade arepersephysicaltakings,notuserestrictionssubjectto PennCentral:“[W]hen[government]planesuseprivateair- spaceto approachagovernment airport,[the government]is required to pay for that share no matter how small.”
Tahoe- Sierra,535U. S.,at322(citingCausby).
AndwhileKaiser AetnamayhavereferredtothetestfromPennCentral,see 444U. S.,at174–175,theCourtconcludedcategoricallythat thegovernmentmustpayjustcompensationforphysicalin- vasions,seeid.,at180(citingCausbyandPortsmouth).
Withregardtothecomplexitiesofmodernsociety,wethink theyonlyreinforcetheimportanceofsafeguardingthebasic propertyrightsthathelppreserveindividualliberty,asthe Foundersexplained.
Seesupra,at147.
Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:594U. S.139(2021) OpinionoftheCourt Intheend,thedissent’spermissiveapproachtoproperty rights hearkens back to views expressed (in dissent) for dec- ades.
See,e. g.,Nollan,483U. S.,at864(Brennan,J.,dis- senting)(“[TheCourt’s]reasoningishardlysuitedtothe complexrealityofnaturalresourceprotectioninthe20th century.”);Loretto,458U. S.,at455(Blackmun,J.,dissent- ing)(“[T]oday’sdecision...representsanarchaicjudicial responsetoamodernsocialproblem.”);Causby,328U. S.,at 275(Black,J.,dissenting)(“Today’sopinionis,Ifear,an opening wedge for an unwarranted judicial interference with the power of Congress to develop solutions for new and vital nationalproblems.”).
Asfortoday’sconsidereddissent,it concludeswith“Betterthedevilweknow...,”post,at179, butitsobjections,toborrowfromthen-JusticeRehnquist’s invocationofWordsworth,“bear[]thesoundof‘Old,un- happy,far-offthings,andbattleslongago,’ ”KaiserAetna, 444U. S.,at177.
III
TheBoard,secondedbythedissent,warnsthattreating theaccessregulationasapersephysicaltakingwillendan- gerahostofstateandfederalgovernmentactivitiesinvolv- ingentryontoprivateproperty.
Seepost,at174–176.
Thatfearisunfounded.
First,ourholdingdoesnothingtoeffacethedistinction betweentrespassandtakings.
Isolatedphysicalinvasions, notundertakenpursuanttoagrantedrightofaccess,are properlyassessedasindividualtortsratherthanappropria- tionsofapropertyright.
Thisbasicdistinctionisfirmly groundedinourprecedent.
SeePortsmouth,260U. S.,at 329–330 (“[W]hilea singleact maynot beenough, acontinu- anceoftheminsufficientnumberandforasufficienttime mayprove[theintenttotakeproperty].
Everysuccessive trespassaddstotheforceoftheevidence.”);1P.Nichols, TheLawofEminentDomain§112,p.311(1917)(“[A]mere occasionaltrespasswouldnotconstituteataking.”).
And lowercourtshavehadlittletroubleapplyingit.
See,e. g., Page Proof Pending Publication CEDARPOINTNURSERYv.HASSID OpinionoftheCourt Hendler v. United States, 952 F. 2d 1364, 1377 (CA Fed. 1991) (identifying a “truckdriver parking on someone’s vacant land toeatlunch”asanexampleofameretrespass).
Thedistinctionbetweentrespassandtakingsaccountsfor ourtreatmentoftemporarygovernment-inducedfloodingin ArkansasGame andFishCommissionv. UnitedStates,568 U. S.23 (2012).
Thereweheld, “simplyandonly,” thatsuch flooding “gainsno automaticexemption fromTakings Clause inspection.”
Id.,at38.
Becausethistypeoffloodingcan presentcomplexquestionsofcausation,weinstructedlower courts evaluating takings claims based on temporary flooding toconsiderarangeoffactorsincludingthedurationofthe invasion,thedegreetowhich itwasintendedorforeseeable, andthecharacterofthelandatissue.
Id.,at38–39.
Applyingthosefactorsonremand,theFederalCircuitcon- cluded that the government had effected a taking in the form ofatemporaryflowageeasement.
ArkansasGameand FishComm’nv.UnitedStates,736F.3d1364,1372(2013).
OurapproachinArkansasGameandFishCommissionre- flectsnothingmorethananapplicationofthetraditional trespass-versus-takingsdistinctiontotheuniqueconsidera- tionsthataccompanytemporaryflooding.
Second,manygovernment-authorizedphysicalinvasions willnotamounttotakingsbecausetheyareconsistentwith longstandingbackgroundrestrictionsonpropertyrights.
AsweexplainedinLucasv.SouthCarolinaCoastalCoun- cil,thegovernmentdoesnottakeapropertyinterestwhen itmerelyassertsa“pre-existinglimitationupontheland owner’stitle.”
505U. S.,at1028–1029.
Forexample,the government owes a landowner no compensation for requiring himtoabateanuisanceonhisproperty,becausehenever hadarighttoengageinthenuisanceinthefirstplace.
See id.,at1029–1030.
Thesebackgroundlimitationsalsoencompasstraditional common law privileges to access private property.
One such privilegeallowedindividualstoenterpropertyintheevent Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:594U. S.139(2021) OpinionoftheCourt ofpublicorprivatenecessity.
SeeRestatement(Second)of Torts§196(1964)(entrytoavertanimminentpublicdisas- ter);§197(entrytoavertseriousharmtoaperson,land,or chattels);cf.Lucas,505U. S.,at1029,n.16.
Thecommon law also recognized a privilege to enter property to effect an arrestorenforcethecriminallawundercertaincircum- stances.
Restatement(Second)ofTorts§§204–205.
Be- causeapropertyownertraditionallyhadnorighttoexclude an official engaged in a reasonable search, see, e. g., Sandford v.Nichols,13Mass.286,288(1816),governmentsearches thatareconsistentwiththeFourthAmendmentandstate lawcannotbesaidto takeanypropertyrightfromlandown- ers.
See generally Camara v. Municipal Court of City and CountyofSanFrancisco,387U. S.523,538(1967).
Third,thegovernmentmayrequirepropertyownersto cede a right of access as a condition of receiving certain ben- efits,withoutcausingataking.
InNollan,weheldthat“a permitconditionthatservesthesamelegitimatepolice- powerpurposeasarefusal toissuethepermitshouldnotbe foundtobeatakingiftherefusaltoissuethepermitwould not constitute a taking.”
483 U. S., at 836.
The inquiry, we later explained, is whether the permit condition bears an “es- sentialnexus”and“roughproportionality”totheimpactof theproposeduseoftheproperty.
Dolan,512U. S.,at386, 391;seealsoKoontzv.St.JohnsRiverWaterManagement Dist.,570U. S.595,599(2013).
Underthisframework,governmenthealthandsafetyin- spection regimes will generally not constitute takings. See, e. g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 1007 (1984). Whenthegovernmentconditionsthegrantofabenefitsuch asapermit,license,orregistrationonallowingaccessfor reasonable health andsafety inspections, both thenexus and rough proportionality requirements of the constitutional con- ditionsframeworkshouldnotbedifficulttosatisfy.
See, e. g.,7U. S. C.§136g(a)(1)(A)(pesticideinspections);16 U. S. C.§823b(a)(hydroelectricprojectinvestigations);21 Page Proof Pending Publication CEDARPOINTNURSERYv.HASSID Kavanaugh,J.,concurring U. S. C.§374(a)(1)(pharmaceuticalinspections);42U. S. C. §2201(o)(nuclearmaterialinspections).
None of these considerations undermine our determination that the access regulation here gives rise to a per se physical taking.
Unlikeameretrespass,theregulationgrantsa formalentitlementtophysicallyinvadethegrowers’land.
Unlikealawenforcementsearch,notraditionalbackground principleofpropertylawrequiresthegrowerstoadmit unionorganizersontotheirpremises.
Andunlikestandard healthandsafetyinspections,theaccessregulationisnot germanetoanybenefitprovidedtoagriculturalemployers oranyriskposedtothepublic.
SeeHorne,576U. S.,at 366(“basicandfamiliarusesofproperty”arenotaspecial benefitthat“theGovernmentmayholdhostage,toberan- somedbythewaiverofconstitutionalprotection”).
Theac- cessregulationamountstosimpleappropriationofprivate property.
* * * The access regulation grants labor organizations a right to invadethegrowers’property.
Itthereforeconstitutesa persephysicaltaking.
ThejudgmentoftheUnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfor theNinthCircuitisreversed,andthecaseisremandedfor furtherproceedingsconsistentwiththisopinion.
Itissoordered.
JusticeKavanaugh,concurring.
IjointheCourt’sopinion,whichcarefullyadherestocon- stitutionaltext,history,andprecedent.
Iwriteseparately toexplainthat,inmyview,theCourt’sprecedentinNLRB v.Babcock&WilcoxCo.,351U. S.105(1956),alsostrongly supportstoday’sdecision.
InBabcock,theNationalLaborRelationsBoardargued thattheNationalLaborRelationsActaffordedunionorga- nizersarighttoentercompanypropertytocommunicate Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:594U. S.139(2021) Kavanaugh,J.,dissenting withemployees.
Severalemployersrespondedthatthe Board’s reading of the Act would infringe their Fifth Amend- mentpropertyrights.
TheemployerscontendedthatCon- gress,“evenifitcouldconstitutionallydoso,hasatnotime shownanyintentionofdestroyingpropertyrightssecured bytheFifthAmendment,inprotectingemployees’rightsof collectivebargainingundertheAct.
UntilCongressshould evidencesuchintentionbyspecificlegislativelanguage,our courts should not construe the Act on such dangerous consti- tutionalgrounds.”
BriefforRespondentinNLRBv.Bab- cock&WilcoxCo.,O.T.1955,No.250,pp.18–19.
ThisCourtagreedwiththeemployers’argumentthatthe Actshouldbeinterpretedtoavoidunconstitutionality.
The Courtreasonedthat“theNationalGovernment”viathe Constitution“preservespropertyrights,”including“the righttoexcludefromproperty.”
Babcock,351U. S.,at112.
AgainstthebackdropoftheConstitution’sstrongprotection ofpropertyrights,theCourtinterpretedtheActtoafford accesstounionorganizersonlywhen“needed,”ibid.—that is,whentheemployeesliveoncompanypropertyandunion organizers have no other reasonable means of communicating withtheemployees,id.,at113.
SeealsoLechmere,Inc.v. NLRB,502U. S.527,540–541(1992).
AsIreadit,Babcock recognizedthatemployershaveabasicFifthAmendment righttoexcludefromtheirprivateproperty,subjecttoa “necessity”exceptionsimilartothatnotedbytheCourt today.
Ante,at161.
Babcock strongly supports the growers’ position in today’s casebecausetheCaliforniaunionaccessregulationintrudes onthegrowers’propertyrightsfarmorethanBabcock allows.
WhenthissameCaliforniaunionaccessregulation waschallengedonconstitutionalgroundsbeforetheCalifor- niaSupremeCourtin1976,thatcourtupheldtheregulation bya4-to-3vote.
AgriculturalLaborRel.Bd.v.Superior Ct.ofTulareCty.,16Cal.3d392,546P.2d687.
Justice WilliamClarkwrotethedissent.
JusticeClarkstressed Page Proof Pending Publication CEDARPOINTNURSERYv.HASSID Breyer,J.,dissenting that“propertyrightsarefundamental.”
Id.,at429,n.4, 546P. 2d,at712, n.4.
And heconcludedthat theCalifornia unionaccessregulation“violatestherule”ofBabcockand thus“violatestheconstitutionalprovisionsprotectingpri- vate property.”
16Cal. 3d,at 431,546 P.2d, at713.
In my view,JusticeClarkhaditexactlyright.
Withthosecomments,IjointheCourt’sopinioninfull.
JusticeBreyer,withwhomJusticeSotomayorand JusticeKaganjoin,dissenting.
ACaliforniaregulationprovidesthatrepresentativesof alabororganizationmayenteranagriculturalemployer’s propertyforpurposesofunionorganizing.
Theymaydoso duringfourmonthsoftheyear,onehourbeforethestartof work,onehourduringanemployeelunchbreak,andone hourafterwork.
Thequestionbeforeusishowtocharac- terizethisregulationforpurposesoftheConstitution’sTak- ingsClause.
Doestheregulationphysicallyappropriatetheemploy- ers’property?
Ifso,thereisnoneedtolookfurther;the Governmentmustpaytheemployers“justcompensation.”
U. S. Const., Amdt. 5; see Arkansas Game and Fish Comm’n v.UnitedStates,568U. S.23,31(2012)(“ ‘[W]henthegov- ernmentphysicallytakespossessionofaninterestinprop- ertyforsomepublicpurpose,ithasacategoricaldutyto compensatetheformerowner’ ”).
Ordoestheregulation simplyregulatetheemployers’propertyrights?
Ifso,then thereiseveryneedtolookfurther;thegovernmentneed pay the employers “just compensation” only if the regulation “goestoofar.”
PennsylvaniaCoalCo.v.Mahon,260U. S. 393, 415 (1922) (Holmes, J., for the Court); see also Penn Cen- tralTransp.Co.v.NewYorkCity,438U. S.104,124(1978) (determiningwhetheraregulationisatakingbyexamining theregulation’s“economicimpact,”theextentofinterfer- encewith“investment-backedexpectations,”andthe“char- acterofthegovernmentalaction”);ArkansasGameand Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:594U. S.139(2021) Breyer,J.,dissenting FishComm’n,568U. S.,at38–39(listingfactorsrelevantto thecharacteroftheregulation).
The Court holds that the provision’s “access to organizers” requirement amounts to a physical appropriation of property. Initsview,virtuallyeverygovernment-authorizedinvasion isan“appropriation.”
Butthisregulationdoesnot“appro- priate” anything; it regulates the employers’ right to exclude others.
Atthesametime,ourpriorcasesmakeclearthat theregulationbeforeusallowsonlyatemporaryinvasionof alandowner’spropertyandthatthiskindoftemporary invasionamountstoatakingonlyifitgoes“toofar.”
See, e. g.,Lorettov.TeleprompterManhattanCATVCorp.,458 U. S.419,434(1982).Inmyview,themajority’sconclusion threatenstomakemanyordinaryformsofregulationun- usuallycomplexorimpractical.
Andthoughthemajority attempts to createexceptions to narrow its rule,see ante, at 159–162, the law’s need for feasibility suggests that the majori- ty’sframeworkiswrong.
Withrespect,Idissentfromthe majority’sconclusionthattheregulationisapersetaking.
I
“Inviewofthenearlyinfinitevarietyofwaysinwhich governmentactionsorregulations canaffectpropertyinter- ests,theCourthasrecognizedfewinvariablerulesinthis area.”
ArkansasGameandFishComm’n,568U. S.,at31; seealsoKaiserAetnav.UnitedStates,444U. S.164,175 (1979)(“[T]hisCourthasgenerally‘beenunabletodevelop any“setformula”fordeterminingwhen“justiceandfair- ness”requirethateconomicinjuriescausedbypublicaction becompensatedbythegovernment’ ”).
Instead,mostgov- ernmentactionaffectingpropertyrightsisanalyzedcaseby caseunderPennCentral’sfact-intensivetest.
Petitioners donotarguethattheprovisionatissueisa“regulatorytak- ing”underthattest.
Instead,thequestionbeforeusiswhethertheaccess regulationfallswithinoneoftwonarrowcategoriesofgov- Page Proof Pending Publication CEDARPOINTNURSERYv.HASSID Breyer,J.,dissenting ernmentconductthatarepersetakings.
Thefirstiswhen “ ‘thegovernment directlyappropriatesprivate propertyfor itsownuse.’ ” Hornev.DepartmentofAgriculture,576 U. S.351,357(2015).
Thesecondiswhenthegovernment causesapermanentphysicaloccupationofprivateproperty.
See Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc., 544 U. S. 528, 538 (2005). Itdoesnot.
A
Initiallyitmayhelptolookatthelegalproblem—aprob- lemofcharacterization—throughthelensofordinaryEng- lish.
The word “regulation” rather than “appropriation” fits thisprovisioninbothlabelandsubstance.
Cf.ante,at149.
ItiscontainedinTitle8oftheCaliforniaCodeofRegula- tions.
Itwasadoptedbyastateregulatoryboard,namely, theCaliforniaAgriculturalLaborRelationsBoard,in1975.
Itisembeddedinasetofrelateddetailedregulationsthat describeandlimittheaccessatissue.
Inadditiontothe hoursofaccessjustmentioned,itprovidesthatunionrepre- sentativescanenterthepropertyonly“forthepurposeof meeting and talkingwith employees and solicitingtheir sup- port”;theyhaveaccessonlyto“areasinwhichemployees congregate beforeand after working”or “at suchlocation or locationsastheemployeeseattheirlunch”;andtheycannot engagein“conductdisruptiveoftheemployer’spropertyor agriculturaloperations,includinginjurytocropsormachin- eryorinterferencewiththeprocessofboardingbuses.”
§§20900(e), (e)(3), (e)(4)(C) (2021).
From the employers’ per- spective, it restricts when and where they can exclude others fromtheirproperty.
Atthesametime,theprovisiononlyawkwardlyfitsthe terms“physicaltaking”and“physicalappropriation.”
The “access”thatitgrantsunionorganizersdoesnotamountto anytraditionalpropertyinterestinland.
Itdoesnot,for example, take from the employers, or provide to the organiz- ers,anyfreeholdestate(e. g.,afeesimple,feetail,orlife estate);anyconcurrentestate(e. g.,ajointtenancy,tenancy Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:594U. S.139(2021) Breyer,J.,dissenting incommon,ortenancybytheentirety);oranyleaseholdes- tate(e. g.,atermofyears,periodictenancy,ortenancyat will).
See J. Dukeminier, J. Krier, G. Alexander, M. Schill, & L.Strahilevitz,Property215–216,222–224,226,343–345, 443–445(8thed.2014).
Nor(asallnowagree)doesitpro- videtheorganizers withaformaleasement oraccessresem- blinganeasement,astheemployersonceargued,sinceit does not burden any particular parcel of property.
See, e. g., Balestrav.Button,54Cal.App.2d192,197(1942)(thebur- denofaneasementingrossisappurtenantto“thereal property of another”); Restatement (Third) of Property: Ser- vitudes§1.2(3)(1998)(“Theburdenofaneasementorprofit is always appurtenant”); see also ante, at 155 (acknowledging a“slightmismatchfromstateeasementlaw”).
Compare Pet.forCert.i(askingtheCourttoaddress“whetherthe uncompensatedappropriationofaneasementthatislimited intimeeffectsapersephysicaltakingundertheFifth Amendment”),withReplyBrief8(“[T]heaccessrequired heredoesnotbearallthehallmarksofaneasement”).
Themajorityconcludesthattheregulationnonetheless amounts to a physical taking of property because, the major- itysays,it“appropriates”a“righttoinvade”ora“rightto exclude” others.
See ante, at 149, 152, 154, 156, 157, 158, 162 (righttoinvade);ante,at149,150,153,155,158(righttoex- clude).
It thereby likens this case to cases in which we have held that appropriation of property rights amounts to a physi- cal per se taking.
See ante, at 147–148 (citing United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U. S. 114, 115 (1951) (plurality opinion) (seizureandoperationofacoalminebytheUnitedStates); UnitedStatesv.GeneralMotorsCorp.,323U. S.373,375 (1945)(condemnationofawarehousebuildingbytheUnited States); Horne, 576 U. S., at 361 (transfer of “[a]ctual raisins,” andtitletotheraisins,fromgrowerstotheGovernment)).
Itisimportanttounderstand,however,that,technically speaking,themajorityiswrong.
Theregulationdoesnot appropriateanything.
Itdoesnottakefromtheownersa Page Proof Pending Publication CEDARPOINTNURSERYv.HASSID Breyer,J.,dissenting righttoinvade(whateverthatmightmean).
Itdoesnot give the union organizations the right to exclude anyone. It doesnotgivethegovernmenttherighttoexcludeanyone.
What does it do?
It gives union organizers the right tempo- rarilytoinvadeaportionofthepropertyowners’land.
It therebylimitsthelandowners’righttoexcludecertain others.
The regulation regulates (but does not appropriate) theowners’righttoexclude.
Whyisitimportanttounderstandthistechnicalpoint?
Becauseonlythencanweunderstandtheissuebeforeus.
That issue is whether a regulation that temporarily limits an owner’s right to exclude others from property automatically amountstoaFifthAmendmenttaking.
Underourcases,it doesnot.
B
Our cases draw a distinction between regulations that pro- vide permanent rights of access and regulations that provide nonpermanentrightsofaccess.
Theyeitherstateorhold thatthefirsttypeofregulationisatakingperse,butthe secondkindisatakingonlyifitgoes“toofar.”
Andthey makethisdistinctionforgoodreason.
ConsidertheCourt’sreasoninginanimportantcasein whichtheCourtfoundapersetaking.
InLoretto,the Court considered the status of a New York law that required landlords to permit cable television companies to install cable facilitiesontheirproperty.
458U. S.,at421.
Weheldthat theinstallationamountedtoapermanentphysicaloccupa- tionofthepropertyandhencetoapersetaking.
Seeid., at441(“affirm[ing]thetraditionalrulethatapermanent physicaloccupationofpropertyisataking”);seealsoid.,at 427 (tracing that rule back to 1872).In reaching this holding wespecificallysaidthat“[n]oteveryphysicalinvasionisa taking.”
Id.,at435,n.12(emphasisdeleted);seealsoante, at153(acknowledgingthatthis“pointiswelltaken”).
We explainedthatthe“permanenceandabsoluteexclusivityof aphysicaloccupationdistinguishitfromtemporarylimita- Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:594U. S.139(2021) Breyer,J.,dissenting tionsontherighttoexclude.”
Loretto,458U. S.,at435, n. 12.
And we provided an example of a federal statute that didnoteffectapersetaking—anexamplealmostidentical totheregulationbeforeus.
Thatstatuteprovided“ ‘access ...limitedto(i)unionorganizers;(ii)prescribednon- workingareasoftheemployer’s premises;and(iii)thedura- tion of the organization activity.’ ” Id., at 434, n. 11 (quoting CentralHardwareCo.v.NLRB,407U. S.539,545(1972)).
Wealsoexplainedwhypermanentphysicaloccupations aredistinctfromtemporarylimitationsontherighttoex- clude.
Wesaidthat,whenthegovernmentpermanentlyoc- cupiesproperty,it“doesnotsimplytakeasingle‘strand’ fromthe‘bundle’ofpropertyrights:itchopsthrough thebundle,takingasliceofeverystrand,”“effectivelyde- stroy[ing]”“therights‘topossess,useanddisposeofit.’ ” Loretto,458U. S.,at435.
Weaddedthattheproperty owner“ha[d]norighttopossesstheoccupiedspacehimself, and alsoha[d] nopower toexclude theoccupier fromposses- sion and use of the space.”
Ibid. The requirement “forever denie[d]theowneranypowertocontroltheuseoftheprop- erty”ormakeany“nonpossessoryuse”ofit.
Id.,at436.
Itwould“ordinarilyemptytheright”tosellortransferthe occupiedspace“ofanyvalue,sincethepurchaserw[ould] also be unable to make any use of the property.”
Ibid. The ownercouldnot“exercisecontrol”overtheequipment’sin- stallation,andsocouldnot“minimize[its]physical,esthetic, andothereffects.”
Id.,at441,n.19.
Thus,weconcluded, apermanentphysicaloccupation“isperhapsthemost seriousformofinvasionofanowner’spropertyinterests.”
Id.,at435.
NowconsiderPruneYardShoppingCenterv.Robins,447 U. S.74(1980).
Wethereconsideredthestatusofastate constitutionalrequirementthataprivatelyownedshopping center permit other individuals to enter upon, and to use, the propertytoexercisetheirrightstofreespeechandpetition.
Seeid.,at78.
Weheldthatthisrequirementwasnotaper Page Proof Pending Publication CEDARPOINTNURSERYv.HASSID Breyer,J.,dissenting setakinginpartbecause(eventhoughtheindividualsmay have“ ‘physicallyinvaded’ ”theowner’sproperty)“[t]here [wa]snothingtosuggestthatpreventing[theowner]from prohibitingthissortofactivityw[ould]unreasonablyimpair thevalueoruseofth[e]propertyasashoppingcenter,”and the owner could “adop[t] time, place, and manner regulations thatw[ould]minimizeanyinterferencewithitscommercial functions.”
Id.,at83–84;seealsoLoretto,458U. S.,at434 (describingthe“invasion”inPruneYardas“temporaryand limitedinnature”).
InNollanv.CaliforniaCoastalComm’n,483U. S.825 (1987),weheldthattheState’stakingofaneasementacross alandowner’spropertydidconstituteapersetaking.
But considertheCourt’sreason:“[I]ndividualsaregivenaper- manentandcontinuousrighttopasstoandfro.”
Id.,at 832 (emphasis added).
We clarified that by “permanent” and “continuous”wemeantthatthe“realpropertymaycontinu- ouslybetraversed,eventhoughnoparticularindividualis permittedtostationhimselfpermanentlyupontheprem- ises.”
Ibid. InArkansasGameandFishComm’n,568U. S.23,we againsaidthatpermanentphysicaloccupationsareperse takings,buttemporaryinvasionsarenot.
Rather,they “ ‘aresubjecttoamorecomplexbalancingprocesstodeter- minewhethertheyareataking.’ ” Id.,at36;seealsoid., at38–39(courtsshouldconsiderthelengthoftheinvasion, the“degreetowhichtheinvasionisintendedoristhe foreseeableresultofauthorizedgovernmentaction,”“the characterofthelandatissue,”“theowner’s‘reasonable investment-backedexpectations’regardingtheland’suse,” andthe“[s]everityoftheinterference”(citing,interalia, PennCentral,438U. S.,at130–131)).
As these cases have used the terms, the regulation here at issueprovidesaccessthatis“temporary,”not“permanent.”
UnliketheregulationinLoretto,itdoesnotplacea“fixed structureonlandorrealproperty.”
458U. S.,at437.
The Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:594U. S.139(2021) Breyer,J.,dissenting employersarenot“foreverdenie[d]”“anypowertocontrol theuse”ofanyparticularportionoftheirproperty.
Id.,at 436.
Anditdoesnottotallyreducethevalueofanysection oftheproperty.
Ibid. UnlikeinNollan,thepubliccannot walkoverthelandwheneveritwishes;ratherasubsetof thepublicmayenteraportionofthelandthreehoursper dayforfourmonthsperyear(about4%ofthetime).
At bottom, the regulation here, unlike the regulations in Loretto and Nollan, is not “functionally equivalent to the classic tak- inginwhichgovernment directlyappropriatesprivateprop- erty or ousts the owner from his domain.”
Lingle, 544 U. S., at539.
Atthesametime,PruneYard’sholdingthatthetaking was “temporary” (and hence not a per se taking) fits this case almost perfectly.
There the regulation gave non-owners the righttoenterprivatelyownedpropertyforthepurposeof speakinggenerallytoothers,aboutmattersoftheirchoice, subjecttoreasonabletime,place,andmannerrestrictions.
447U. S.,at83.
Theregulationbeforeusgrantsafar smallergroupofpeopletherighttoenterlandowners’prop- ertyforfarmorelimitedtimesinordertospeakabouta specificsubject.
Employershavemorepowertocontrol entry by setting work hours, lunch hours, and places of gath- ering.
Ontheotherhand,asthemajoritynotes,theshop- pingcenterinPruneYardwasopentothepublicgenerally.
Seeante,at156–157.
Allthesefactors,however,arethe stuff of which regulatory-balancing, not absolute per se, rules aremade.
Ourcaseshaverecognized,asthemajoritysays,thatthe righttoexcludeisa“ ‘fundamentalelementoftheproperty right.’ ” Ante,at158.
Forthatreason,“[a]‘taking’may morereadilybefoundwhentheinterferencewithproperty canbecharacterizedasaphysicalinvasionbygovernment.”
PennCentral,438U. S.,at124(emphasisadded);seealso Loretto, 458 U. S., at 426 (“[W]e have long considered a phys- icalintrusionbygovernmenttobeapropertyrestrictionof Page Proof Pending Publication CEDARPOINTNURSERYv.HASSID Breyer,J.,dissenting anunusuallyseriouscharacterforpurposesoftheTakings Clause”).
Butatakingisnotinevitablyfoundjustbecause theinterferencewithpropertycanbecharacterizedasa physicalinvasionbythegovernment,or,inotherwords, whenitaffectstherighttoexclude.
Themajorityreferstoothercases.
Butthosecasesdo nothelpitscause.
ThatisbecausetheCourtinthosecases (someofwhichprecededPennCentralandothersofwhich Ihavediscussedabove)didnotapplya“persetakings”ap- proach.
Butseeante,at156(claimingthatour“traditional rule”isthatwhen“thegovernmentappropriate[s]arightto invade, compensation [i]s due”).
In United States v. Causby, 328U. S.256,259(1946),forexample,thequestionwas whethergovernmentflightsoverapieceoflandconstituted ataking.
Theflightsamountedto4%ofthetakeoffs,and 7%ofthelandings,atanearbyairport.
Seeibid.
Butthe planesflew“inconsiderablenumbersandrathercloseto- gether.”
Ibid. Andtheflightswere“solowandsofre- quentastobeadirectandimmediateinterferencewiththe enjoymentanduseoftheland.”
Id.,at266.
Takento- gether,thoseflights“destr[oyed]theuseofthepropertyas acommercialchickenfarm.”
Id.,at259.
Basedinparton thateconomicdamage,theCourtfoundthattheruleallow- ingtheseoverflightswent“toofar.”
Seeid.,at266(“ ‘[I]t isthecharacteroftheinvasion,nottheamountofdamage resultingfromit,solongasthedamageissubstantial,that determinesthequestionwhetheritisataking’ ”(emphasis added)).
In PortsmouthHarbor Land &Hotel Co. v.United States, 260U. S.327,329(1922),theCourtheldthattheGovern- ment’s firing of guns across private property would be a tak- ingonlyiftheshotsweresufficientlyfrequenttoestablish an“intenttofireacrosstheclaimants’landatwill.”
The frequency of the projectiles itself mattered less than whether theGovernmentacted“ ‘withthepurposeandeffectofsub- ordinatingthestripofland...totherightandprivilegeof Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:594U. S.139(2021) Breyer,J.,dissenting theGovernmenttofireprojectilesdirectlyacrossitforthe purpose of practice or otherwise, whenever it saw fit, in time ofpeace,withtheresultofdeprivingtheownerofitsprofit- ableuse.’ ” Ibid.(emphasisadded).
Again,theCourtbal- ancedseveralfactors—permanence,severity,andeconomic impact—ratherthantreatingthemerefactofentryas dispositive.
InKaiserAetnav.UnitedStates,444U. S.164,theCourt consideredwhethertheGovernmenthadtakenpropertyby convertingaformerly“privatepond”(withaprivateaccess fee) into a “public aquatic park” (with free navigation-related accessforthepublic).
Id.,at176,180.
TheCourtheld therewasataking.
Butindoingso,itappliedaPennCen- tral,notaperse,analysis.
TheCourtwrotethat“[m]ore than one factor contribute[d] to” the conclusion that the Gov- ernmenthadgone“farbeyondordinaryregulationorim- provement.”
444U. S.,at178.
Anditfoundtherewasa taking.
Ifthereisambiguityinthesecases,itconcernswhether the Court considered the occupation at issue to be temporary (requiringPennCentral’s“toofar”analysis)orpermanent (automaticallyrequiringcompensation).
Nothinginthem suggeststhemajority’sview,namely,thatcompensationis automatically required for a temporary right of access. Nor doesanythinginthemsupportthedistinctionthatthema- joritygleansbetween“trespass”and“takings.”
Seeante, at159–160;seealsoinfra,at176.
The majorityalso refersto Nollan assupport for itsclaim thatthe“factthatarighttotakeaccessisexercisedonly fromtimetotimedoesnotmakeitanylessaphysicaltak- ing.”
Ante,at154.
True.
Here,however,unlikeinNol- lan, the right taken is not a right to have access to the prop- ertyatanytime(whichaccessdifferentpersons“exercis[e] ...fromtimetotime”).
Ratherherewehavearightthat doesnotallowaccessatanytime.
Itallowsaccessonly from“time totime.”
Andthat makesall thedifference.
A
Page Proof Pending Publication CEDARPOINTNURSERYv.HASSID Breyer,J.,dissenting right toenter mywoods wheneveryou wishis aright touse thatpropertypermanently,evenifyouexercisethatright only on occasion.
A right to enter my woods only on certain occasionsisnotarighttousethewoodspermanently.
In thefirstcaseonemightreasonablyusethetermpersetak- ing.
Itisasifmywoodsareyours.
Inthesecondcaseit isatakingonlyiftheregulationallowingitgoes“toofar,” consideringthefactorswehavelaidoutinPennCentral.
Thatiswhatourcasessay.
Finally,themajoritysaysthatNollanwouldhavecome outthesamewayhaditinvolved,similartotheregulation here,accessshortof365daysayear.
Seeante,at154.
Perhapsso.
But,ifso,thatlikelywouldbebecausethe Courtwouldhaveviewedtheaccessasan“easement,”and thereforeanappropriation.
SeeNollan,483U. S.,at828.
Or,perhaps,theCourtwouldhaveviewedtheregulationas going“toofar.”
Icanassume,purelyforargument’ssake, thatthatisso.
Butthelawisclear:Aregulationthatpro- videstemporary,notpermanent,accesstoalandowner’s property,andthatdoesnotamounttoatakingofatradi- tionalpropertyinterest,isnotapersetaking.
Thatis,it doesnotautomaticallyrequirecompensation.
Rather,a courtmustconsiderwhetheritgoes“toofar.”
C
Thepersistenceofthepermanent/temporarydistinction thatIhavedescribedisnotsurprising.
Thatdistinc- tion serves animportant purpose.
We live togetherin com- munities.
(Approximately80%ofAmericansliveinurban areas.
U.S.CensusBureau,UrbanAreaFacts(Mar.30, 2021),https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/geography/ guidance/geo-areas/urban-rural/ua-facts.html.)
Modernlife inthesecommunitiesrequiresdifferentkindsofregulation.
Some,perhapsmany,formsofregulationrequireaccessto privateproperty(forgovernmentofficialsorothers)fordif- ferentreasonsandforvaryingperiodsoftime.
Mostsuch Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:594U. S.139(2021) Breyer,J.,dissenting temporary-entryregulationsdonotgo“toofar.”
Anditis impracticaltocompensateeverypropertyownerforany briefuseoftheirland.
Aswehavefrequentlysaid,“[g]ov- ernment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every suchchangeinthegenerallaw.”
PennsylvaniaCoalCo., 260U. S.,at413;seealso,e. g.,Murrv.Wisconsin,582U. S. 383, 394 (2017) (same); Lingle, 544 U. S., at 538 (same); Tahoe- SierraPreservationCouncil,Inc.v.TahoeRegionalPlan- ningAgency,535U. S.302,335(2002)(same);Dolanv.City ofTigard,512U. S.374,384–385(1994)(same);Lucasv.
SouthCarolinaCoastalCouncil,505U. S.1003,1018(1992) (same); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51, 65 (1979) (same); Penn Central,438U. S,at124(same).
Thus,thelawhasnot,and shouldnot,convertalltemporary-access-permittingregula- tionsintopersetakingsautomaticallyrequiringcompensa- tion.
See,e. g.,Hodelv.Irving,481U. S.704,713(1987) (“ThisCourthasheldthattheGovernmenthasconsiderable latitudeinregulatingpropertyrightsinwaysthatmayad- verselyaffecttheowners”).
Considerthelargenumbersofordinaryregulationsina hostofdifferent fieldsthat,fora varietyofpurposes,permit temporaryentryonto(oran“invasionof”)apropertyown- er’sland.
Theyincludeactivitiesrangingfromexamination of food products to inspections for compliance with preschool licensingrequirements.
See,e. g.,29U. S. C.§657(a)(au- thorizinginspectionsandinvestigationsof“any...work- place or environment where work is performed” during “reg- ularworkinghoursandatotherreasonabletimes”);21 U. S. C.§606(a)(authorizing“examinationandinspectionof allmeatfoodproducts...atalltimes,bydayornight”);42 U. S. C.§5413(b)(authorizinginspectionsanywhere“manu- facturedhomesaremanufactured,stored,orheldforsale” at“reasonabletimesandwithoutadvancenotice”);Miss.
CodeAnn.§49–27–63(2012)(authorizinginspectionsof “coastalwetlands”“fromtimetotime”);Mich.Comp.Laws Page Proof Pending Publication CEDARPOINTNURSERYv.HASSID Breyer,J.,dissenting §208.1435(5)(2010)(authorizinginspectionsofany“historic resource”“atanytimeduringtherehabilitationprocess”); Mont.CodeAnn.§81–22–304(2019)(grantinga“rightof entry...[into]anypremiseswheredairyproducts...are produced,manufactured,[or]sold”“duringnormalbusiness hours”);Neb.Rev.Stat.§43–1303(5)(2016)(authorizingvisi- tationof“fostercarefacilitiesinordertoascertainwhether theindividualphysical,psychological,andsociologicalneeds ofeachfosterchildarebeingmet”);Va.CodeAnn.§22.1– 289.032(C)(8)(Cum.Supp.2020)(authorizing“annualinspec- tion”of“preschoolprogramsofaccreditedprivateschools”); Cincinnati,Ohio,MunicipalCode§603–1(2021)(authorizing entry“atanytime”foranyplaceinwhich“animalsare slaughtered”);Dallas,Tex.,CodeofOrdinance§ 33–5(a) (2021)(authorizinginspectionof“assistedlivingfacilit[ies]” “atreasonabletimes”);6N.Y.Rules&Regs.§360.7(Supp.
2020)(authorizinginspectionofsolidwastemanagement facilities“atallreasonabletimes,locations,whetheran- nouncedorunannounced”);seealsoBoiseCascadeCorp.v. United States, 296 F. 3d 1339, 1352 (CA Fed. 2002) (affirming an injunction requiring property owner to allow Government agentstoenteritspropertytoconductowlsurveys);Brief forRespondents43–44,46(collectingsimilarregulations); App.toBriefforLocalGovernmentsasAmiciCuriae1–13 (same);BriefforVirginiaetal.asAmiciCuriae3–6(same).
Themajoritytriestodealwiththeadverseimpactof treatingthese,andother,temporaryinvasionsasifthey werepersephysicaltakingsbycreatingaseriesofexcep- tionsfromitsperserule.
Itsays:(1)“Isolatedphysicalin- vasions,notundertakenpursuanttoagrantedrightofac- cess,areproperlyassessedasindividualtortsratherthan appropriationsofapropertyright.”
Ante,at159.
Italso would exceptfrom its perse rule (2)government access that is“consistentwithlongstandingbackgroundrestrictionson propertyrights,”including“traditionalcommonlawprivi- Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:594U. S.139(2021) Breyer,J.,dissenting legestoaccessprivateproperty.”
Ante,at160.
Andit addsthat(3)“thegovernmentmayrequirepropertyowners tocedearightofaccessasaconditionofreceivingcertain benefits,withoutcausingataking.”
Ante,at161.
How well will this new system work?
I suspect that the majority hassubstitutedanew,complexlegalschemeforacompara- tivelysimpleroldone.
Astothefirstexception,whatwillcountas“isolated”?
How is an “isolated physical invasion” different from a “tem- porary” invasion, sufficient under present law to invoke Penn Central?
Andwhereshouldonedrawthelinebetween trespassandtakings?
Imagineaschoolbusthatstopsto allowpublicschoolchildrentopicniconprivateland.
Do threestopsayearplacethestopsoutsidetheexception?
One stop every week?
Buses from one school?
From every school?
Undercurrentlawacourtwouldknowwhatques- tion to ask.
The stops are temporary; no one assumes a per- manentrighttostop;thusthecourtwillaskwhetherthe schooldistricthasgone“toofar.”
Underthemajority’sap- proach,thecourtmustansweranewquestion(apparently aboutwhatcountsas“isolated”).
Astothesecondexception,acourtmustfocuson“tradi- tionalcommonlawprivilegestoaccessprivateproperty.”
Justwhatarethey?
Wehavesaidbeforethatthegovern- mentcan,withoutpayingcompensation,imposealimitation onlandthat“inhere[s]inthetitleitself,intherestrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisancealreadyplaceuponlandownership.”
Lucas,505 U. S.,at1029.
Butwedefinedaverynarrowsetofsuch backgroundprinciples.
Seeibid.,andn.16(abatementof nuisancesandcasesof“ ‘actualnecessity’ ”or“toforestall othergravethreatstothelivesandpropertyofothers”).
Tothesethemajorityadds“publicorprivatenecessity,”the enforcementofcriminallaw“undercertaincircumstances,” and reasonable searches.
Ante, at 161.
Do only those excep- Page Proof Pending Publication CEDARPOINTNURSERYv.HASSID Breyer,J.,dissenting tionsthatexistedin,say,1789count?
Shouldcourtsapply thoseprivilegesastheyexistedatthattime,whenthere were nounion organizers?
Ordo we bringsome exceptions (butnotothers)uptodate,e. g.,anecessityexceptionfor preservinganimalhabitats?
Astothethird,whatisthescopeofthephrase“certain benefits”?
Doesitincludethebenefitofbeingabletosell meatlabeled“inspected”ininterstatecommerce?
Butsee Horne, 576 U. S., at 366 (concludingthat “[s]elling produce in interstatecommerce”is“notaspecialgovernmentalbene- fit”).
What about the benefit of having electricity?
Of sew- agecollection?
Ofinternetaccessibility?
Myriadregula- toryschemesbasedonjustthesesortsofbenefitsdepend uponintermittent,temporarygovernmententryontopri- vateproperty.
Laborpeace(broughtaboutthroughunionorganizing)is onesuchbenefit,atleastintheviewofelectedrepresenta- tives.
Theywrotelawsthatledtorulesgoverningtheor- ganizingofagriculturalworkers.
Manyofthemmaywell have believed that union organizing brings with it “benefits,” includingcommunityhealthandeducationalbenefits,higher standardsofliving,and(asIjustsaid)laborpeace.
See, e. g.,1975Cal.Stats.ch.1,§1(statingthatthepurposeof theAgriculturalLaborRelationsActwasto“ensurepeace intheagriculturalfieldsbyguaranteeingjusticeforallag- ricultural workers and stability in labor relations”). A land- owner,ofcourse,maydenytheexistenceofthesebenefits, butalandownermightdothesamewerearegulatorystat- utetopermitbriefaccesstoverifyproperpreservationof wetlandsorthehabitatenjoyedbyanendangeredspecies or,forthatmatter,thesafetyofinspectedmeat.
So,ifa regulationauthorizingtemporaryaccessforpurposesofor- ganizingagriculturalworkersfallsoutsideoftheCourt’sex- ceptionsandisapersetaking,thentowhatotherformsof regulationdoestheCourt’sperseconclusionalsoapply?
Page Proof Pending Publication Citeas:594U. S.139(2021) Breyer,J.,dissenting
II
Finally,Itouchbrieflyonremedies,whichthemajority doesnotaddress.
TheTakingsClauseprohibitstheGov- ernment from taking private property for public use without “justcompensation.”
U. S.Const.,Amdt.5.
Buttheem- ployersdonotseekcompensation.
Theyseekonlyinjunc- tiveanddeclaratoryrelief.
Indeed,theydidnotallegeany damages.
SeeApp.toPet.forCert.G–16toG–17.
Onre- mand, California should have the choice of foreclosing injunc- tivereliefbyprovidingcompensation.
See,e. g.,Knickv.
TownshipofScott,588U. S.–––,–––(2019)(“Aslongasjust compensationremediesareavailable—astheyhavebeenfor nearly150years—injunctivereliefwillbeforeclosed”).
* * * IrecognizethattheCourt’spriorcasesinthisareaare noteasytoapply.
Moreover,wordssuchas“temporary,” “permanent,”or“toofar”donotdefinethemselves.
ButI donotbelievethattheCourthasmadematterscleareror better.
Ratherthanadoptanewbroadruleandindetermi- nateexceptions,IwouldstickwiththeapproachthatIbe- lievetheCourt’scaselawsetsforth.
“Betterthedevilwe know....”
Arightofaccesssuchastherightatissue here,anonpermanentright,isnotautomaticallya“taking.”
It is a regulation that falls within the scope of Penn Central. BecausetheCourttakesadifferentview,Irespectfully dissent.