Syllabus
AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUNDATION v. BONTA, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 19–251. Argued April 26, 2021—Decided July 1, 2021* Charitable organizations soliciting funds in California must disclose the identities of their major donors to the state Attorney General's Offce. Charities generally must register with the Attorney General and renew their registrations annually. The Attorney General requires charities renewing their registrations to fle copies of their Internal Revenue Service Form 990, a form on which tax-exempt organizations provide information about their mission, leadership, and fnances. Schedule B to Form 990—the document that gives rise to the present dispute— requires organizations to disclose the names and addresses of their major donors. The State contends that having this information readily available furthers its interest in policing misconduct by charities. The petitioners are two tax-exempt charities that solicit contributions in California. Since 2001, each petitioner has renewed its registration and has fled a copy of its Form 990 with the Attorney General, as required by Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 301. To preserve their donors' anonymity, however, the petitioners have declined to fle unredacted Schedule Bs, and they had until recently faced no consequences for noncompliance. In 2010, the State increased its enforcement of charities' Schedule B disclosure obligations, and the Attorney General ultimately threatened the petitioners with suspension of their registrations and fnes for noncompliance. The petitioners each responded by fling suit in District Court, alleging that the compelled disclosure requirement violated their First Amendment rights and the rights of their donors. Disclosure of their Schedule Bs, the petitioners alleged, would make their donors less likely to contribute and would subject them to the risk of reprisals. Both organizations challenged the constitutionality of the disclosure requirement on its face and as applied to them. In each case, the District Court granted preliminary injunctive relief prohibiting the Attorney General from collecting the petitioners' Schedule B information. The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded, reasoning that Circuit precedent required rejection of the petitioners' facial chal*Together with No. 19–255, Thomas More Law Center v. Bonta, also on certiorari to the same court.
Page Proof Pending Publication lenge. Reviewing the petitioners' as-applied claims under an “exacting scrutiny” standard, the panel narrowed the District Court's injunction, and it allowed the Attorney General to collect the petitioners' Schedule Bs so long as they were not publicly disclosed. On remand, the District Court held bench trials in both cases, after which it entered judgment for the petitioners and permanently enjoined the Attorney General from collecting their Schedule Bs. Applying exacting scrutiny, the District Court held that disclosure of Schedule Bs was not narrowly tailored to the State's interest in investigating charitable misconduct. The court found little evidence that the Attorney General's investigators relied on Schedule Bs to detect charitable fraud, and it determined that the disclosure regime burdened the associational rights of donors. The District Court also found that California was unable to ensure the confdentiality of donors' information. The Ninth Circuit again vacated the District Court's injunctions, and this time reversed the judgments and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the Attorney General. The Ninth Circuit held that the District Court had erred by imposing a narrow tailoring requirement. And it reasoned that the disclosure regime satisfed exacting scrutiny because the up-front collection of charities' Schedule Bs promoted investigative effciency and effectiveness. The panel also found that the disclosure of Schedule Bs would not meaningfully burden donors' associational rights. The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc, over a dissent.
Held: The judgment is reversed, and the cases are remanded. 903 F. 3d 1000, reversed and remanded.
The Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to all but Part II–B–1, concluding that California's disclosure requirement is facially invalid because it burdens donors' First Amendment rights and is not narrowly tailored to an important government interest. Pp. 605–607, 608–619.
(a) The Court reviews the petitioners' First Amendment challenge to California's compelled disclosure requirement with the understanding that “compelled disclosure of affliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association as [other] forms of governmental action.” NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 462. NAACP v. Alabama did not phrase in precise terms the standard of review that applies to First Amendment challenges to compelled disclosure. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 64 (per curiam), the Court articulated an “exacting scrutiny” standard, which requires “a substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and a suffciently important governmental interest,” Doe v. Reed, 561 U. S. 186, 196. The parties dispute whether exacting scrutiny applies in these cases, and if so, whether that test imposes a least restrictive means requirement similar to the one imposed by strict scrutiny. The Court concludes that exacting scrutiny requires that a government-mandated disclosure regime be narrowly tailored to the government's asserted interest, even if it is not the least restrictive means of achieving that end. The need for narrow tailoring was set forth early in the Court's compelled disclosure cases. In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, the Court considered an Arkansas statute that required teachers to disclose every organization to which they belonged or contributed. The Court acknowledged the importance of “the right of a State to investigate the competence and ftness of those whom it hires to teach in its schools,” and it distinguished prior decisions that had found “no substantially relevant correlation between the governmental interest asserted and the State's effort to compel disclosure.” Id., at 485. But the Court invalidated the Arkansas statute because even a “legitimate and substantial” governmental interest “cannot be pursued by means that broadly stife fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.” Id., at 488. Shelton stands for the proposition that a substantial relation to an important interest is not enough to save a disclosure regime that is insuffciently tailored. Where exacting scrutiny applies, the challenged requirement must be narrowly tailored to the interest it promotes. Pp. 605–607, 608–611. (b) California's blanket demand that all charities disclose Schedule Bs to the Attorney General is facially unconstitutional. Pp. 611–619. (1) The Ninth Circuit did not impose a narrow tailoring requirement to the relationship between the Attorney General's demand for Schedule Bs and the identifed governmental interest. That was error under the Court's precedents. And properly applied, the narrow tailoring requirement is not satisfed by California's disclosure regime. In fact, a dramatic mismatch exists between the interest the Attorney General seeks to promote and the disclosure regime that he has implemented. The Court does not doubt the importance of California's interest in preventing charitable fraud and self-dealing. But the enormous amount of sensitive information collected through Schedule Bs does not form an integral part of California's fraud detection efforts. California does not rely on Schedule Bs to initiate investigations, and evidence at trial did not support the State's concern that alternative means of obtaining Schedule B information—such as a subpoena or audit letter— are ineffcient and ineffective compared to up-front collection. In reality, California's interest is less in investigating fraud and more in ease of administration. But “the prime objective of the First Amendment is not effciency.” McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U. S. 464, 495. Mere administrative convenience does not remotely “refect the seriousness of Page Proof Pending Publication the actual burden” that the demand for Schedule Bs imposes on donors' association rights. Reed, 561 U. S., at 196 (internal quotation marks omitted). Pp. 611–615.
(2) In the First Amendment context, the Court has recognized a “type of facial challenge, whereby a law may be invalidated as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 473 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Attorney General's disclosure requirement is plainly overbroad under that standard. The regulation lacks any tailoring to the State's investigative goals, and the State's interest in administrative convenience is weak. As a result, every demand that might deter association “creates an unnecessary risk of chilling” in violation of the First Amendment. Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U. S. 947, 968. It does not make a difference in these cases if there is no disclosure to the public, see Shelton, 364 U. S., at 486, if some donors do not mind having their identities revealed, or if the relevant donor information is already disclosed to the IRS as a condition of federal tax-exempt status. California's disclosure requirement imposes a widespread burden on donors' associational rights, and this burden cannot be justifed on the ground that the regime is narrowly tailored to investigating charitable wrongdoing, or that the State's interest in administrative convenience is suffciently important. Pp. 615–619.
B–1. Kavanaugh and Barrett, JJ., joined that opinion in full, Alito and Gorsuch, JJ., joined except as to Part II–B–1, and Thomas, J., joined except as to Parts II–B–1 and III–B. Thomas, J., fled an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 619. Alito, J., fled an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Gorsuch, J., joined, post, p. 622. Sotomayor, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer and Kagan, JJ., joined, post, p. 623. Derek L. Shaffer argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With him on the briefs for petitioner in No. 19–251 were William A. Burck, John F. Bash, Jonathan G. Cooper, and Kathleen M. Sullivan. Kristen K. Waggoner, John J.
Bursch, David A. Cortman, Rory T. Gray, Christopher P. Schandevel, and Louis H. Castoria fled briefs for petitioner in No. 19–255.
Acting Solicitor General Prelogar argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging vacatur in both Page Proof Pending Publication Counsel cases. With her on the brief were Deputy Assistant Attor ney General Harrington, Frederick Liu, Sopan Joshi, Mi chael S. Raab, and Daniel Winik.
Aimee A. Feinberg, Deputy Solicitor General of California, argued the cause for respondent in both cases. With her on the brief were Matthew Rodriguez, Acting Attorney General of California, Michael J. Mongan, Solicitor General, Tamar Pachter, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jose A.
Zelidon-Zepeda, Deputy Attorney General, and Kimberly M. Castle, Associate Deputy Solicitor General.† †Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were fled for the State of Arizona et al. by Mark Brnovich, Attorney General of Arizona, Drew C. Ensign, Deputy Solicitor General, Joseph A. Kanefeld, and Brunn W. Roysden III, Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Treg R. Taylor of Alaska, Leslie Rutledge of Arkansas, Ashley Moody of Florida, Christo pher M. Carr of Georgia, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Theodore E. Rok ita of Indiana, Derek Schmidt of Kansas, Daniel Cameron of Kentucky, Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, Eric S. Schmitt of Missouri, Austin Knudsen of Montana, Douglas J. Peterson of Nebraska, Mike Hunter of Oklahoma, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Jason Ravnsb org of South Dakota, Herbert H. Slatery III of Tennessee, Ken Paxton of Texas, Sean D. Reyes of Utah, and Patrick Morrisey of West Virginia; for the American Center for Law and Justice by Jay Alan Sekulow, Stuart J. Roth, Jordan Sekulow, Colby M. May, and Laura B. Hernandez; for the American Civil Liberties Union, Inc., et al. by Brian M. Hauss, Jennesa Calvo-Friedman, Ben Wizner, David D. Cole, Sherrilyn A. Ifll, Janai S. Nelson, Samuel Spital, Mahogane D. Reed, and Alex Abdo; for the American Legislative Exchange Council by Lee E. Goodman, Bruce L. McDon ald, Andrew G. Woodson, and Jonathon P. Hauenschild; for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty by Eric S. Baxter, Adèle A. Keim, and Wil liam J. Haun; for the Buckeye Institute et al. by Jay R. Carson and Rob ert Alt; for the Center for Equal Opportunity by Thomas G. Hungar, Douglas R. Cox, and Jason J. Mendro; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by Caleb P. Burns and Stephen J. Obermeier; for the China Aid Association by Andrew C. Nichols and Sean P. Gates; for Citizen Power Initiatives for China by Kelly J. Shackelford, Jeffrey C. Mateer, Hiram S. Sasser III, and Jordan E. Pratt; for Citizens United et al. by Jeremiah L. Morgan, William J. Olson, Robert J. Olson, and Michael Boos; for the Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. by Brian Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part II–B–1.
To solicit contributions in California, charitable organizations must disclose to the state Attorney General's Offce the T. Burgess; for the Free Speech Coalition et al. by William J. Olson, Jere miah L. Morgan, Robert J. Olson, David A. Warrington, Gary G. Kreep, and Steven C. Bailey; for the Goldwater Institute et al. by Timothy Sande- fur; for the Hispanic Leadership Fund et al. by Jeffrey M. Harris and William S. Consovoy; for the Independent Women's Law Center by Kas din M. Mitchell; for the Institute for Free Speech by Lisa S. Blatt, Amy Mason Saharia, Katherine Moran Meeks, Alan Gura, and Owen Yeates; for the Institute for Justice by Paul M. Sherman; for the National Association of Manufacturers et al. by Sean Marotta, Benjamin A. Field, and Lawrence S. Ebner; for the National Taxpayers Union Foundation et al. by Barnaby W. Zall and Joseph D. Henchman; for the New Civil Liberties Alliance by Aditya Dynar and Margaret A. Little; for the Nonproft Alliance Foundation et al. by Karen Donnelly and Errol Copilevitz; for the Pacifc Legal Foundation et al. by Jeremy Talcott, James M. Manley, Kimberly S. Hermann, and Anthony T. Caso; for the Philanthropy Round- table by Alexander L. Reid; for the Proposition 8 Legal Defense Fund by Andrew P. Pugno; for the Thomas More Society by Thomas Brejcha; and for Sen. Mitch McConnell by Donald F. McGahn II and Robert Luther III. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in No. 19–251 were fled for the Council on American-Islamic Relations by Lena F. Masri and Justin Sa dowsky; and for the Freedom Foundation by James G. Abernathy and Timothy R. Snowball.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance in both cases were fled for the State of New York et al. by Letitia James, Attorney General of New York, Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Steven C. Wu, Deputy Solicitor General, and Matthew W. Grieco, Assistant Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Phil Weiser of Colorado, William Tong of Connecticut, Karl A. Racine of the District of Columbia, Clare E. Connors of Hawaii, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Brian E. Frosh of Maryland, Maura Healey of Massachusetts, Dana Nessel of Michigan, Aaron Ford of Nevada, Gurbir S. Grewal of New Jersey, Hector Balderas of New Mexico, Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania, Peter F. Neronha of Rhode Island, and Mark R. Herring of Virginia; for the California Association of Nonprofts by Anna-Rose Mathieson; for the Campaign Legal Center et al. by Paul M. Smith, Tara Malloy, Megan P. McAllen, Stuart C. McPhail, and Adam J. Rappaport; for CharityWatch by Kathleen R. Hartnett and Adam S. Gershenson; for Legal Historians by Darin Page Proof Pending Publication identities of their major donors. The State contends that having this information on hand makes it easier to police misconduct by charities. We must decide whether California's disclosure requirement violates the First Amendment right to free association.
I
The California Attorney General's Offce is responsible for statewide law enforcement, including the supervision and regulation of charitable fundraising. Under state law, the Attorney General is authorized to “establish and maintain a register” of charitable organizations and to obtain “whatever information, copies of instruments, reports, and records are needed for the establishment and maintenance of the register.” Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 12584 (West 2018). In order to operate and raise funds in California, charities generally must register with the Attorney General and renew their Sands and David Freeman Engstrom; for the National Council of Nonprofts by Tim Delaney and Tiffany Gourley Carter; for Public Citizen et al. by Scott L. Nelson and Allison M. Zieve; and for Scholars of the Law of Non-Proft Organizations by Bradley S. Phillips.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled in both cases by the Association of National Advertisers et al. by James C. Martin; for the Cato Institute et al. by Ilya Shapiro, Cristen Wohlgemuth, David C. McDonald, Manuel S. Klausner, Joseph G. S. Greenlee, Theodore H. Frank, Anna St. John, D. Gill Sperlein, and Darpana Sheth; for Concerned Women for America et al. by Frederick W. Claybrook, Jr., Steven W. Fitschen, James A. Da vids, and David A. Bruce; for the Floyd Abrams Institute for Freedom of Expression at Yale Law School by Floyd Abrams; for the James Madison Center for Free Speech by James Bopp, Jr., and Richard E. Coleson; for Judicial Watch, Inc., et al. by Robert D. Popper and T. Russell Nobile; for the Legacy Foundation by Jason Torchinsky; for the Liberty Justice Center by Daniel R. Suhr, Jeffrey M. Schwab, and Brian K. Kelsey; for Protect the 1st et al. by Gene C. Schaerr, Erik S. Jaffe, Hannah C. Smith, and Kathryn E. Tarbert; for the Public Interest Legal Foundation et al. by J. Christian Adams, Kaylan Phillips, and Eric E. Doster; for Randy Elf by Mr. Elf, pro se; and for Congressman John Sarbanes et al. by Seth P. Waxman, Catherine M. A. Carroll, Fred Wertheimer, and Donald J. Simon.
Daniel P. Chiplock fled a brief in No. 19–251 for U. S. Senators as amici curiae.
registrations annually. §§ 12585(a), 12586(a). Over 100,000 charities are currently registered in the State, and roughly 60,000 renew their registrations each year.
California law empowers the Attorney General to make rules and regulations regarding the registration and renewal process. §§ 12585(b), 12586(b). Pursuant to this regulatory authority, the Attorney General requires charities renewing their registrations to fle copies of their Internal Revenue Service Form 990, along with any attachments and schedules. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 301 (2020). Form 990 contains information regarding tax-exempt organizations' mission, leadership, and fnances. Schedule B to Form 990—the document that gives rise to the present dispute— requires organizations to disclose the names and addresses of donors who have contributed more than $5,000 in a particular tax year (or, in some cases, who have given more than 2 percent of an organization's total contributions). See 26 CFR §§1.6033–2(a)(2)(ii)(f), (iii) (2020).
The petitioners are tax-exempt charities that solicit contributions in California and are subject to the Attorney General's registration and renewal requirements. Americans for Prosperity Foundation is a public charity that is “devoted to education and training about the principles of a free and open society, including free markets, civil liberties, immigration reform, and constitutionally limited government.”
Brief for Petitioner Foundation 10. Thomas More Law Center is a public interest law frm whose “mission is to protect religious freedom, free speech, family values, and the sanctity of human life.” Brief for Petitioner Law Center 4. Since 2001, each petitioner has renewed its registration and has fled a copy of its Form 990 with the Attorney General, as required by Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 301. Out of concern for their donors' anonymity, however, the petitioners have declined to fle their Schedule Bs (or have fled only redacted versions) with the State.
For many years, the petitioners' reluctance to turn over donor information presented no problem because the AttorPage Proof Pending Publication ney General was not particularly zealous about collecting Schedule Bs. That changed in 2010, when the California Department of Justice “ramped up its efforts to enforce charities' Schedule B obligations, sending thousands of defciency letters to charities that had not complied with the Schedule B requirement.” Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Becerra, 903 F. 3d 1000, 1006 (CA9 2018). The Law Center and the Foundation received defciency letters in 2012 and 2013, respectively. When they continued to resist disclosing their contributors' identities, the Attorney General threatened to suspend their registrations and fne their directors and offcers.
The petitioners each responded by fling suit in the Central District of California. In their complaints, they alleged that the Attorney General had violated their First Amendment rights and the rights of their donors. The petitioners alleged that disclosure of their Schedule Bs would make their donors less likely to contribute and would subject them to the risk of reprisals. Both organizations challenged the disclosure requirement on its face and as applied to them.
In each case, the District Court granted preliminary injunctive relief prohibiting the Attorney General from collecting their Schedule B information. Americans for Pros perity Foundation v. Harris, 2015 WL 769778 (CD Cal., Feb. 23, 2015); App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 19–255, pp. 90a– 96a. The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded. Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Harris, 809 F. 3d 536 (2015) (per curiam). The court held that it was bound by Circuit precedent to reject the petitioners' facial challenge. Id., at 538 (citing Center for Competitive Politics v. Harris, 784 F. 3d 1307, 1317 (2015)). And reviewing the petitioners' as- applied claims under an “exacting scrutiny” standard, the panel narrowed the injunction, allowing the Attorney General to collect the petitioners' Schedule Bs so long as he did not publicly disclose them. 809 F. 3d, at 538, 543.
On remand, the District Court held bench trials in both cases, after which it entered judgment for the petitioners Page Proof Pending Publication and permanently enjoined the Attorney General from collecting their Schedule Bs. Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Harris, 182 F. Supp. 3d 1049 (CD Cal. 2016); Thomas More Law Center v. Harris, 2016 WL 6781090 (CD Cal., Nov. 16, 2016). Applying exacting scrutiny, the District Court held that disclosure of Schedule Bs was not narrowly tailored to the State's interest in investigating charitable misconduct. The court credited testimony from California offcials that Schedule Bs were rarely used to audit or investigate charities. And it found that even where Schedule B information was used, that information could be obtained from other sources.
The court also determined that the disclosure regime burdened the associational rights of donors. In both cases, the court found that the petitioners had suffered from threats and harassment in the past, and that donors were likely to face similar retaliation in the future if their affliations became publicly known. For example, the CEO of the Foundation testifed that a technology contractor working at the Foundation's headquarters had posted online that he was “inside the belly of the beast” and “could easily walk into [the CEO's] offce and slit his throat.” 182 F. Supp. 3d, at 1056. And the Law Center introduced evidence that it had received “threats, harassing calls, intimidating and obscene emails, and even pornographic letters.” 2016 WL 6781090, *4.
The District Court also found that California was unable to ensure the confdentiality of donors' information. During the course of litigation, the Foundation identifed nearly 2,000 confdential Schedule Bs that had been inadvertently posted to the Attorney General's website, including dozens that were found the day before trial. One of the Foundation's expert witnesses also discovered that he was able to access hundreds of thousands of confdential documents on the website simply by changing a digit in the URL. The court found after trial that “the amount of careless mistakes Page Proof Pending Publication made by the Attorney General's Registry is shocking.” 182 F. Supp. 3d, at 1057. And although California subsequently codifed a policy prohibiting disclosure, Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 310(b)—an effort the District Court described as “commendable”—the court determined that “[d]onors and potential donors would be reasonably justifed in a fear of disclosure given such a context” of past breaches. 2016 WL 6781090, *5.
The Ninth Circuit again vacated the District Court's injunctions, and this time reversed the judgments and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the Attorney General. 903 F. 3d 1000. The court held that the District Court had erred by imposing a narrow tailoring requirement. Id., at 1008–1009. And it reasoned that the disclosure regime satisfed exacting scrutiny because the up-front collection of charities' Schedule Bs promoted investigative effciency and effectiveness. Id., at 1009–1012. The panel also found that the disclosure of Schedule Bs would not meaningfully burden donors' associational rights, in part because the Attorney General had taken remedial security measures to fx the confdentiality breaches identifed at trial. Id., at 1013–1019.
The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc. Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Becerra, 919 F. 3d 1177 (2019). Judge Ikuta dissented, joined by four other judges. In her view, the panel had impermissibly overridden the District Court's factual fndings and evaluated the disclosure requirement under too lenient a degree of scrutiny. Id., at 1184– 1187.
We granted certiorari. 592 U. S. ––– (2021).
II
A
The First Amendment prohibits government from “abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Page Proof Pending Publication Government for a redress of grievances.” This Court has “long understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others.” Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 622 (1984). Protected association furthers “a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends,” and “is especially important in preserving political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression from suppression by the majority.” Ibid. Government infringement of this freedom “can take a number of forms.” Ibid. We have held, for example, that the freedom of association may be violated where a group is required to take in members it does not want, see id., at 623, where individuals are punished for their political affliation, see Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347, 355 (1976) (plurality opinion), or where members of an organization are denied benefts based on the organization's message, see Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 181–182 (1972).
We have also noted that “[i]t is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association as [other] forms of governmental action.” NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 462 (1958). NAACP v. Alabama involved this chilling effect in its starkest form. The NAACP opened an Alabama offce that supported racial integration in higher education and public transportation. Id., at 452. In response, NAACP members were threatened with economic reprisals and violence. Id., at 462. As part of an effort to oust the organization from the State, the Alabama Attorney General sought the group's membership lists. Id., at 452–453. We held that the First Amendment prohibited such compelled disclosure. Id., at 466. We explained that “[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association,” id., at 460, and we noted “the vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one's associaPage Proof Pending Publication tions,” id., at 462. Because NAACP members faced a risk of reprisals if their affliation with the organization became known—and because Alabama had demonstrated no offsetting interest “suffcient to justify the deterrent effect” of disclosure, id., at 463—we concluded that the State's demand violated the First Amendment.
B
NAACP v. Alabama did not phrase in precise terms the standard of review that applies to First Amendment challenges to compelled disclosure. We have since settled on a standard referred to as “exacting scrutiny.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam). Under that standard, there must be “a substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and a suffciently important governmental interest.” Doe v. Reed, 561 U. S. 186, 196 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To withstand this scrutiny, the strength of the governmental interest must refect the seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment rights.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Such scrutiny, we have held, is appropriate given the “deterrent effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights” that arises as an “inevitable result of the government's conduct in requiring disclosure.” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 65.
The Law Center (but not the Foundation) argues that we should apply strict scrutiny, not exacting scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, the government must adopt “the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest,” McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U. S. 464, 478 (2014), rather than a means substantially related to a suffciently important interest. The Law Center contends that only strict scrutiny adequately protects the associational rights of charities. And although the Law Center acknowledges that we have applied exacting scrutiny in prior disclosure cases, it argues that those cases arose in the electoral context, where the government's important interests justify less searching review. Page Proof Pending Publication It is true that we frst enunciated the exacting scrutiny standard in a campaign fnance case. See Buckley, 424 U. S., at 64–68. And we have since invoked it in other election- related settings. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Federal Elec tion Comm'n, 558 U. S. 310, 366–367 (2010); Davis v. Federal Election Comm'n, 554 U. S. 724, 744 (2008). But exacting scrutiny is not unique to electoral disclosure regimes. To the contrary, Buckley derived the test from NAACP v. Ala bama itself, as well as other nonelection cases. See 424 U. S., at 64 (citing Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investiga tion Comm., 372 U. S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516 (1960)). As we explained in NAACP v. Alabama, “it is immaterial” to the level of scrutiny “whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters.” 357 U. S., at 460–461. Regardless of the type of association, compelled disclosure requirements are reviewed under exacting scrutiny.
The Law Center (now joined by the Foundation) argues in the alternative that even if exacting scrutiny applies, such review incorporates a least restrictive means test similar to the one imposed by strict scrutiny. The United States and the Attorney General respond that exacting scrutiny demands no additional tailoring beyond the “substantial relation” requirement noted above. We think that the answer lies between those two positions. While exacting scrutiny does not require that disclosure regimes be the least restrictive means of achieving their ends, it does require that they be narrowly tailored to the government's asserted interest. The need for narrow tailoring was set forth early in our compelled disclosure cases. In Shelton v. Tucker, we considered an Arkansas statute that required teachers to disclose every organization to which they belonged or contributed. 364 U. S., at 480. We acknowledged the importance of “the right of a State to investigate the competence and Page Proof Pending Publication ftness of those whom it hires to teach in its schools.” Id., at 485. On that basis, we distinguished prior decisions in which we had found “no substantially relevant correlation between the governmental interest asserted and the State's effort to compel disclosure.” Ibid. But we nevertheless held that the Arkansas statute was invalid because even a “legitimate and substantial” governmental interest “cannot be pursued by means that broadly stife fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.” Id., at 488; see also Louisiana ex rel. Gremil lion v. NAACP, 366 U. S. 293, 296 (1961) (quoting same). Shelton stands for the proposition that a substantial relation to an important interest is not enough to save a disclosure regime that is insuffciently tailored. This requirement makes sense. Narrow tailoring is crucial where First Amendment activity is chilled—even if indirectly—“[b]ecause First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive.” Button, 371 U. S., at 433.
Our more recent decisions confrm the need for tailoring. In McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 572 U. S. 185 (2014), for example, a plurality of the Court explained: “In the First Amendment context, ft matters. Even when the Court is not applying strict scrutiny, we still require a ft that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served, that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.” Id., at 218 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
McCutcheon is instructive here. A substantial relation is necessary but not suffcient to ensure that the government adequately considers the potential for First Amendment harms before requiring that organizations reveal sensitive information about their members and supporters.
Where exacting scrutiny applies, the challenged requirement Page Proof Pending Publication must be narrowly tailored to the interest it promotes, even if it is not the least restrictive means of achieving that end.
The dissent reads our cases differently. It focuses on the words “broadly stife” in the quotation from Shelton above, and it interprets those words to mean that narrow tailoring is required only for disclosure regimes that “impose a severe burden on associational rights.” Post, at 634 (opinion of Sotomayor, J.). Because, in the dissent's view, the petitioners have not shown such a burden here, narrow tailoring is not required.
We respectfully disagree. The “government may regulate in the [First Amendment] area only with narrow specifcity,” Button, 371 U. S., at 433, and compelled disclosure regimes are no exception. When it comes to “a person's beliefs or associations,” “[b]road and sweeping state inquiries into these protected areas . . . discourage citizens from exercising rights protected by the Constitution.” Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U. S. 1, 6 (1971) (plurality opinion). Contrary to the dissent, we understand this Court's discussion of rules that are “broad” and “broadly stife” First Amendment freedoms to refer to the scope of challenged restrictions— their breadth—rather than the severity of any demonstrated burden. That much seems clear to us from Shelton's statement (in the sentence following the one quoted by the dissent) that “[t]he breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.” 364 U. S., at 488; see id., at 488,n. 9 (citing sources that support this reading). It also seems clear from the immediately preceding paragraph, which stressed that “[t]he scope of the inquiry required by [the law] is completely unlimited. . . . It requires [the teacher] to list, without number, every conceivable kind of associational tie—social, professional, political, avocational, or religious. Many such relationships could have no possible bearing upon Page Proof Pending Publication the teacher's occupational competence or ftness.” Id., at 488. In other words, the law was not narrowly tailored to the State's objective.
Nor does our decision in Reed suggest that narrow tailoring is required only for laws that impose severe burdens. The dissent casts Reed as a case involving only “ `modest burdens,' ” and therefore “a correspondingly modest level of tailoring.” Post, at 634 (quoting 561 U. S., at 201). But it was only after we concluded that various narrower alternatives proposed by the plaintiffs were inadequate, see 561 U. S., at 198–199, that we held that the strength of the government's interest in disclosure refected the burden imposed, see id., at 201. The point is that a reasonable assessment of the burdens imposed by disclosure should begin with an understanding of the extent to which the burdens are unnecessary, and that requires narrow tailoring.
III
The Foundation and the Law Center both argued below that the obligation to disclose Schedule Bs to the Attorney General was unconstitutional on its face and as applied to them. See 903 F. 3d, at 1007. The petitioners renew their facial challenge in this Court, and they argue in the alternative that they are entitled to as-applied relief. For the reasons below, we conclude that California's blanket demand for Schedule Bs is facially unconstitutional.
A
As explained, exacting scrutiny requires that there be “a substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and a suffciently important governmental interest,” Reed, 561 U. S., at 196 (internal quotation marks omitted), and that the disclosure requirement be narrowly tailored to the interest it promotes, see Shelton, 364 U. S., at 488. The Ninth Circuit found that there was a substantial relation between the Page Proof Pending Publication Attorney General's demand for Schedule Bs and a suffciently strong governmental interest. 903 F. 3d, at 1008–1020. Of particular relevance, the court found that California had such an interest in preventing charitable fraud and self-dealing, and that “the up-front collection of Schedule B information improves the effciency and effcacy of the Attorney General's important regulatory efforts.” Id., at 1011–1012. The court did not apply a narrow tailoring requirement, however, because it did not read our cases to mandate any such inquiry. Id., at 1008–1009. That was error. And properly applied, the narrow tailoring requirement is not satisfed by the disclosure regime.
We do not doubt that California has an important interest in preventing wrongdoing by charitable organizations. It goes without saying that there is a “substantial governmental interest[ ] in protecting the public from fraud.” Schaum burg v. Citizens for Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 636 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Attorney General receives complaints each month that identify a range of misconduct, from “misuse, misappropriation, and diversion of charitable assets,” to “false and misleading charitable solicitations,” to other “improper activities by charities soliciting charitable donations.” App. in No. 19–255, p. 270 (alteration omitted). Such offenses cause serious social harms. And the Attorney General is the primary law enforcement offcer charged with combating them under California law. See Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 12598.
There is a dramatic mismatch, however, between the interest that the Attorney General seeks to promote and the disclosure regime that he has implemented in service of that end. Recall that 60,000 charities renew their registrations each year, and nearly all are required to fle a Schedule B. Each Schedule B, in turn, contains information about a charity's top donors—a small handful of individuals in some cases, but hundreds in others. See App. in No. 19–251, p. 319.
Page Proof Pending Publication This information includes donors' names and the total contributions they have made to the charity, as well as their addresses.
Given the amount and sensitivity of this information harvested by the State, one would expect Schedule B collection to form an integral part of California's fraud detection efforts. It does not. To the contrary, the record amply supports the District Court's fnding that there was not “a single, concrete instance in which pre-investigation collection of a Schedule B did anything to advance the Attorney General's investigative, regulatory or enforcement efforts.” 182 F. Supp. 3d, at 1055.
The dissent devotes much of its analysis to relitigating factual disputes that the District Court resolved against the Attorney General, see post, at 637–642, notwithstanding the applicable clear error standard of review, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a). For example, the dissent echoes the State's argument that, in some cases, it relies on up-front Schedule B collection to prevent and police fraud. See post, at 639–640. But the record before the District Court tells a different story. See, e.g., App. in No. 19–251, at 397, 403, 417. And even if the State relied on up-front collection in some cases, its showing falls far short of satisfying the means-end ft that exacting scrutiny requires. California is not free to enforce any disclosure regime that furthers its interests. It must instead demonstrate its need for universal production in light of any less intrusive alternatives. Cf. Shelton, 364 U. S., at 488.
The Attorney General and the dissent contend that alternative means of obtaining Schedule B information—such as a subpoena or audit letter—are ineffcient and ineffective compared to up-front collection. See post, at 640–641. It became clear at trial, however, that the Offce had not even considered alternatives to the current disclosure requirement. See App. in No. 19–251, at 421 (“I see no reason to change Page Proof Pending Publication what we've been doing.”). The Attorney General and the dissent also argue that a targeted request for Schedule B information could tip a charity off, causing it to “hide or tamper with evidence.” Brief for Respondent 43; see post, at 641–642. But again, the States' witnesses failed to substantiate that concern. See, e.g., App. in No. 19–251, at 405–406; see also Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469, 480 (1989) (“the State . . . must affrmatively establish the reasonable ft we require”). Nor do the actions of investigators suggest a risk of tipping off charities under suspicion, as the standard practice is to send audit letters asking for a wide range of information early in the investigative process. See App. in No. 19–251, at 406, 411, 418. Furthermore, even if tipoff were a concern in some cases, the State's indiscriminate collection of Schedule Bs in all cases would not be justifed.
The upshot is that California casts a dragnet for sensitive donor information from tens of thousands of charities each year, even though that information will become relevant in only a small number of cases involving fled complaints. See id., at 307–308. California does not rely on Schedule Bs to initiate investigations, and in all events, there are multiple alternative mechanisms through which the Attorney General can obtain Schedule B information after initiating an investigation. The need for up-front collection is particularly dubious given that California—one of only three States to impose such a requirement, see id., at 420—did not rigorously enforce the disclosure obligation until 2010. Certainly, this is not a regime “whose scope is in proportion to the interest served.” McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 218 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In reality, then, California's interest is less in investigating fraud and more in ease of administration. This interest, however, cannot justify the disclosure requirement. The Attorney General may well prefer to have every charity's information close at hand, just in case. But “the prime Page Proof Pending Publication objective of the First Amendment is not effciency.” Mc- Cullen, 573 U. S., at 495. Mere administrative convenience does not remotely “refect the seriousness of the actual burden” that the demand for Schedule Bs imposes on donors' association rights. Reed, 561 U. S., at 196 (internal quotation marks omitted).
B
The foregoing discussion also makes clear why a facial challenge is appropriate in these cases. Normally, a plaintiff bringing a facial challenge must “establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid,” United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987), or show that the law lacks “a plainly legitimate sweep,” Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U. S. 442, 449 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the First Amendment context, however, we have recognized “a second type of facial challenge, whereby a law may be invalidated as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 473 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have no trouble concluding here that the Attorney General's disclosure requirement is overbroad.
The lack of tailoring to the State's investigative goals is categorical—present in every case—as is the weakness of the State's interest in administrative convenience. Every demand that might chill association therefore fails exacting scrutiny.
The Attorney General tries to downplay the burden on donors, arguing that “there is no basis on which to conclude that California's requirement results in any broad-based chill.” Brief for Respondent 36. He emphasizes that “California's Schedule B requirement is confdential,” and he suggests that certain donors—like those who give to noncontroversial charities—are unlikely to be deterred from contributing. Id., at 36–37. He also contends that disclosure Page Proof Pending Publication to his offce imposes no added burdens on donors because tax-exempt charities already provide their Schedule Bs to the IRS. Id., at 37.
We are unpersuaded. Our cases have said that disclosure requirements can chill association “[e]ven if there [is] no disclosure to the general public.” Shelton, 364 U. S., at 486. In Shelton, for example, we noted the “constant and heavy” pressure teachers would experience simply by disclosing their associational ties to their schools. Ibid. Exacting scrutiny is triggered by “state action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate,” and by the “possible deterrent effect” of disclosure. NAACP v. Ala bama, 357 U. S., at 460–461 (emphasis added); see Talley v. California, 362 U. S. 60, 65 (1960) (“identifcation and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of importance” (emphasis added)). While assurances of confdentiality may reduce the burden of disclosure to the State, they do not eliminate it.* It is irrelevant, moreover, that some donors might not mind—or might even prefer—the disclosure of their identities to the State. The disclosure requirement “creates an unnecessary risk of chilling” in violation of the First Amendment, Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U. S. 947, 968 (1984), indiscriminately sweeping up the *Here the State's assurances of confdentiality are not worth much. The dissent acknowledges that the Foundation and Law Center “have unquestionably provided evidence that their donors face a reasonable probability of threats, harassment, and reprisals if their affliations are made public,” but it concludes that the petitioners have no cause for concern because the Attorney General “has implemented security measures to ensure that Schedule B information remains confdential.” Post, at 636–637 (opinion of Sotomayor, J.). The District Court—whose fndings, again, we review only for clear error—disagreed. After two full bench trials, the court found that the Attorney General's promise of confdentiality “rings hollow,” and that “[d]onors and potential donors would be reasonably justifed in a fear of disclosure.” Thomas More Law Center v. Har ris, 2016 WL 6781090, *5 (CD Cal., Nov. 16, 2016).
Page Proof Pending Publication information of every major donor with reason to remain anonymous. The petitioners here, for example, introduced evidence that they and their supporters have been subjected to bomb threats, protests, stalking, and physical violence. App. in No. 19–251, at 256, 291–292. Such risks are heightened in the 21st century and seem to grow with each passing year, as “anyone with access to a computer [can] compile a wealth of information about” anyone else, including such sensitive details as a person's home address or the school attended by his children. Reed, 561 U. S., at 208 (Alito, J., concurring).
The gravity of the privacy concerns in this context is further underscored by the flings of hundreds of organizations as amici curiae in support of the petitioners. Far from representing uniquely sensitive causes, these organizations span the ideological spectrum, and indeed the full range of human endeavors: from the American Civil Liberties Union to the Proposition 8 Legal Defense Fund; from the Council on American-Islamic Relations to the Zionist Organization of America; from Feeding America—Eastern Wisconsin to PBS Reno. The deterrent effect feared by these organizations is real and pervasive, even if their concerns are not shared by every single charity operating or raising funds in California. The dissent argues that—regardless of the defects in California's disclosure regime—a facial challenge cannot succeed unless a plaintiff shows that donors to a substantial number of organizations will be subjected to harassment and reprisals. See post, at 642, n. 11. As we have explained, plaintiffs may be required to bear this evidentiary burden where the challenged regime is narrowly tailored to an important government interest. See supra, at 610–611. Such a demanding showing is not required, however, where—as here—the disclosure law fails to satisfy these criteria.
Finally, California's demand for Schedule Bs cannot be saved by the fact that donor information is already disclosed Page Proof Pending Publication to the IRS as a condition of federal tax-exempt status. For one thing, each governmental demand for disclosure brings with it an additional risk of chill. For another, revenue collection efforts and conferral of tax-exempt status may raise issues not presented by California's disclosure requirement, which can prevent charities from operating in the State altogether. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U. S. 540, 545 (1983); see also Schaumburg, 444 U. S., at 633 (First Amendment protects right to solicit charitable contributions).
We are left to conclude that the Attorney General's disclosure requirement imposes a widespread burden on donors' associational rights. And this burden cannot be justifed on the ground that the regime is narrowly tailored to investigating charitable wrongdoing, or that the State's interest in administrative convenience is suffciently important. We therefore hold that the up-front collection of Schedule Bs is facially unconstitutional, because it fails exacting scrutiny in “a substantial number of its applications . . . judged in relation to [its] plainly legitimate sweep.” Stevens, 559 U. S., at 473 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The dissent concludes by saying that it would be “sympathetic” if we “had simply granted as-applied relief to petitioners based on [our] reading of the facts.” Post, at 646. But the pertinent facts in these cases are the same across the board: Schedule Bs are not used to initiate investigations. That is true in every case. California has not considered alternatives to indiscriminate up-front disclosure. That is true in every case. And the State's interest in amassing sensitive information for its own convenience is weak. That is true in every case. When it comes to the freedom of association, the protections of the First Amendment are triggered not only by actual restrictions on an individual's ability to join with others to further shared goals. The risk of a chilling effect on association is enough, “[b]ecause First Page Proof Pending Publication Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive.”
Button, 371 U. S., at 433.
* * * The District Court correctly entered judgment in favor of the petitioners and permanently enjoined the Attorney General from collecting their Schedule Bs. The Ninth Circuit erred by vacating those injunctions and directing entry of judgment for the Attorney General. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.